$8.75

CIIA
APR 10 1985

WINTER 1985

A Journal of World Affairs

ORBIS

Foreign Policy Research Institute

in Association with the Graduate Program in International Relations
University of Pennsylvania

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS: A Journal of World Affairs **(ISSN 0030-4387)**

Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Association with the Graduate Program in International Relations, University of Pennsylvania

EDITORIAL BOARD

RICHARD K. BETTS
The Brookings Institution

HENRY S. BIENEN
Princeton University

ADDA B. BOZEMAN
Sarah Lawrence College, Emeritus

PAUL BRACKEN
Yale University

INIS L. CLAUDE
University of Virginia

RICHARD V. L. COOPER
Coopers & Lybrand

DAVID DEESE
Boston College

CHARLES F. DORAN
The Johns Hopkins University

MARK FALCOFF
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

ALTON FRYE
Council on Foreign Relations

ALEXANDER GEORGE
Stanford University

COLIN S. GRAY
National Institute for Public Policy

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

J. C. HUREWITZ
Columbia University

MORTON A. KAPLAN
University of Chicago

ROBERT KENNEDY
U.S. Army War College

LAWRENCE B. KRAUSE
The Brookings Institution

BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH
The Rand Corporation

CHONG-SIK LEE
University of Pennsylvania

DEREK LEEBAERT
Eisenhower Institute

KENNETH MAXWELL
The Tinker Foundation

STEPHANIE G. NEUMAN
Columbia University

NORMAN D. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania, Emeritus

RICHARD PIPES
Harvard University

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO
*University of California–*Berkeley

PAUL SEABURY
*University of California–*Berkeley

DONALD E. SMITH
University of Pennsylvania

RICHARD F. STAAR
The Hoover Institution

WILLIAM R. VAN CLEAVE
University of Southern California

IVAN VOLGYES
*University of Nebraska–*Lincoln

SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR.
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

ALLEN S. WHITING
University of Arizona

DAVID S. YOST
Naval Postgraduate School

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS

Editor
NILS H. WESSELL

Managing Editor
GORDON H. McCORMICK

Manuscript Editor
JoANN TOMAZINIS

Circulation Manager
KAREN M. KAMENS

Editorial Assistant
CHRISTINE GOLIA

Editorial Research and Review
ADAM M. GARFINKLE
JOHN H. MAURER
MICHAEL S. RADU

Editors Emeriti: WILLIAM R. KINTNER, ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ

The Foreign Policy Research Institute is a nonprofit organization devoted to scholarly research and analysis of international developments affecting the national security interests of the United States. The Institute's major activities include a broad-based research program; an internationally recognized publications program; seminars, workshops, and conferences for business, government, and academic leaders; and a fellowship program that provides training in policy analysis for promising scholars.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the University of Pennsylvania, or the Editors of ORBIS.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Copyright © 1985 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a Delaware nonprofit corporation. Reproduction of contents without permission is forbidden. The Foreign Policy Research Institute is a publicly supported, nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation as described in Section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) of the Internal Revenue Code. All contributions to the Institute are tax-deductible.

ORBIS (ISSN 0030-4387) is published quarterly by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. **Editorial and business offices:** 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104. **Subscription rates,** per year: $20.00 for individuals, $50.00 for institutions. Special student rate, $16.00. (Outside U.S.A., add $4.00 per year.) Single copy, $8.75, add $1.00 postage outside U.S.A. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, PA, and at additional mailing offices. **Postmaster:** Send address changes to ORBIS, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

Books and other publications for review should be sent to the Book Review Editor. Address correspondence relating to **subscriptions and bulk orders** to the Circulation Manager (please include ZIP).

Direct all **advertising correspondence** to Marcia A. Maziarz, ORBIS Advertising, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS

A Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME 28

NUMBER 4

WINTER 1985

Forum: The Crisis in Central America

Central America: A View from Washington — Mark Falcoff — 665

The Structure of the Salvadoran Left — Michael Radu — 673

Rethinking the Monroe Doctrine — David F. Ronfeldt — 684

Compound Deterrence vs. No-First-Use: What's Wrong is What's Right — Richard K. Betts — 697

Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany — Peter Schmidt — 719

The Dialectics of Détente and Discord: The Moscow-East Berlin-Bonn Triangle — Ronald D. Asmus — 743

The Attempted Assassination of the Pope — Thomas P. Melady and John F. Kikoski — 775

Europe's Role in the Middle East: Illusions and Realities — Harvey Sicherman — 803

NATO's Out-Of-Region Challenges and Extended Containment — William T. Tow — 829

Correspondence — 857

Selected Publications Received — 861

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES
A FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE BOOK SERIES

THE NEUTRON BOMB CONTROVERSY
A Study in Alliance Politics
Sherri L. Wasserman

An intriguing presentation of the decisions and developments that have led to the potential deployment by the United States of enhanced radiation weapons (ERWs) in Europe. Shows why President Carter in 1978 reversed his administration's course of action and chose to defer production of ERWs. Then explores the Reagan administration's subsequent decisions to proceed with development, production, and deployment of the missiles without prior official arrangements between the United States and its NATO allies. Examines what the neutron bomb controversy reveals about U.S. approaches to the modernization of theater nuclear weapons and to nuclear decisionmaking within NATO.
151 pp. October 1983 $21.95

ISBN 0-03-064154-3

COHESION AND DISSENSION IN EASTERN EUROPE
Six Crises
Jeffrey Simon

Examines the increasing level of dissension in Eastern Europe between 1967 and 1977. Based on observation of the media, governmental statements and actions, and public diplomatic activities of party and government leaders, the study compares the responses of the USSR and its allies to six international crises that threatened East European unity—The Middle East War, June 1967; The Invasion of Czechoslovakia; The Ussuri Incident; Nixon's Visit to Peking; The Middle East War, October 1973; and Sadat's Visit to Jerusalem.
235 pp. 1983 $25.95

ISBN 0-03-063751-1

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
New Weapons, Old Conflicts
edited by **Shirin Tahir-Kheli** and **Shaheen Ayubi**

Examines the implications of the Iran-Iraq War for the Gulf region and for the rest of the world. While the immediate cause of the war is the long-standing territorial dispute over the Shatt al-Arab Waterway, its roots lie in the ancient rivalry between the secular Sunni and the fundamental Shiite factions of Islam. The contributors discuss both immediate and long-term causes and effects of the war.
210 pp. 1983 $25.95

ISBN 0-03-062906-3

THE GREAT GAME
Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia
edited by **Alvin Z. Rubinstein**

Expert analysis of the changing nature of the Persian Gulf and South Asian areas in the wake of Khomeini's revolution in Iran, the Soviet military takeover of Afganistan, and the disarray of OPEC. Examines these and other crucial developments since the late 1970s in terms of their implications for the area as a whole and their impact on the future of superpower rivalry. Evaluates the continuities and changes in the policies and perceptions of the various principal figures in the area, and speculates on the prospects for security and stability in the region.
278 pp. October 1983 $27.95

ISBN 0-03-064016-4

from PRAEGER Publishers
521 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10175

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forum

THE CRISIS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The Reagan administration's policies toward Central America have been and are likely to remain a source of political tension at home and abroad. Debate over these policies has focused on the conduct of the war in El Salvador, Washington's immediate and long-term relations with the Sandinista regime, growing Cuban and Soviet-bloc involvement in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin, and the nature of U.S. interests and commitments in the area. The current "ORBIS Forum" addresses a number of these and other related issues. The contributors are **Mark Falcoff,** *a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, and previously a senior consultant to the Kissinger Commission on Central America;* **Michael Radu,** *a Research Associate at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a National Peace Fellow at the Hoover Institution; and* **David F. Ronfeldt,** *a staff member in the Political Science Department of the Rand Corporation.*

CENTRAL AMERICA: A VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

by MARK FALCOFF

Although public opinion surveys repeatedly demonstrate that most Americans neither know nor care very much about Central America, over the past four years probably no foreign policy issue has come near to generating so much passion and controversy at home. Various views account for this paradox: the division between elite ("attentive") and non-elite ("non-attentive") foreign policy publics; the activism of fringe groups on both ends of the spectrum; the enhanced role of Congress in the making of foreign policy; and finally, garden-variety partisan politics.[1] All of these explanations have one thing in common: they establish that the debate

[1] For a fuller discussion see Mark Falcoff, "The Apple of Discord: Central America in U.S. Domestic Politics" in Howard J. Wiarda, ed., *Rift and Revolution: The Central American Imbroglio* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984), pp. 360-81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over Central America is about that region only by accident. Rather, the debate turns upon larger questions of U.S. policy in the Third World in the light of our Vietnam experience. Hence, "El Salvador" or "Nicaragua" are but metaphors for a larger discussion of the root causes of political insurgency; of the nature of "revolutionary" regimes; of their linkages (potential and actual) to the Soviet Union and its clients; of the proper role of diplomatic and military instruments; and of the place of morality (means versus ends) in U.S. foreign policy.

It would be comforting to report that after four years — during which Central American issues have dominated the front pages of newspapers, prime time on the nightly television news, and the legislative agendas of both houses of Congress — that we have somehow emerged knowing more about the countries concerned, while also elucidating the broader issues they pose. Actually, nothing of the sort has occurred. Instead, the Reagan administration and its (largely Democratic) critics, each having failed to exhaust or defeat the other, have arrived at a peculiarly Solomonic compromise. In exchange for the ritual admission that the preternatural causes of Central American instability are poverty and backwardness (rather than communism), Congress has authorized the sale of arms to El Salvador. The purpose of these is, of course, to kill communists. At the same time, Congress appears quite prepared to "trade" Nicaragua in exchange for El Salvador, inasmuch as it has suspended aid to those who would thwart the consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in Managua. Moreover, the Reagan administration has bought a measure of peace from its congressional opponents by pursuing a more vigorous human rights policy in El Salvador than it apparently at first envisaged; its critics, while equally deploring the abuses of human rights in Nicaragua, are convinced that to do something about *them* would be imprudent if not immoral. They console themselves that, after all, it is the soul of the Sandinistas, not our own, on trial there. No doubt an American could find a way to make sense of all these contradictions; it is really too much to ask of helpless foreigners.

Precisely why people point with such assurance to poverty as the sole and unique cause of Central American insurgency is something of a mystery. The statistics of human need, eloquent in and of themselves, may be used to justify a revolt post hoc; they do little or nothing to explain it. In the particular case of Central America, surveys repeatedly demonstrate that between 1950 and 1977 the entire region registered one of the highest economic growth rates in the developing world — and not merely in aggregated sums, but as evident in such individual rubrics as increased life expectancy, literacy, and public services. The collapse of right-wing military governments in Nicaragua and El Salvador in 1979

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was produced not by poverty, but by widespread political disaffection led, in fact, by the children of a successful middle class, much as in Cuba twenty years before.

To be sure, even in the best days of Central American development — from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s — the region was beset by serious social and economic problems. Since 1977, however, these have become enormously aggravated by a fourfold increase in the world price of oil; a decline in the markets (and prices) for tropical exports; an increase in the cost of credit; and the flight of local capital in the wake of the Nicaraguan revolution. These things make the tiny republics vastly more difficult to govern, and offer important opportunities to those subversive elements — both domestic and foreign — who would undermine their precarious stability. That is why a twelve-member bipartisan commission, appointed by President Reagan and directed by former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, recommended to the Congress a five-year, $8 billion program of economic aid to the region. That is why, too, at present three dollars of humanitarian, nutritional, and development assistance is being poured into El Salvador for every dollar spent on military aid.

That conservatives like Senator Jesse Helms (Republican-North Carolina) would find the economic recommendations of the Kissinger Commission somewhat distant from their tastes is not surprising. It is more difficult to comprehend why some of the very people who insist that poverty is the root of the region's problems are reluctant to take steps to alleviate it, as if they believed (as some of them apparently do) that "revolutionary" regimes are far better equipped to deal with hunger and other basic human needs in the Third World than, say, the Agency for International Development. There is really no basis for this assumption other than cultural self-hatred or an extremely short-sighted political opportunism. The record on this subject is quite clear, and the tragic situation in Ethiopia only its latest installment.

Armies, it is said, are always prepared to fight the last war. Evidently the same is true for journalists, politicians, and social and religious activists. The seminal experience for those Americans who reached adulthood in the late 1960s was Vietnam, an event to which many owe their political and personal identities. As Catholic theologian Michael Novak has said, too many have invested too much in the notion of the wickedness of America to abandon it now. It is also established wisdom that all nasty wars in little countries pose the selfsame issues as Vietnam, and are bound to end in the same way. More than that: the very existence of a guerrilla movement in a country is prima facie evidence that it has lost the support of its own people, is therefore unworthy of U.S. assistance,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and deserves for that very reason to fall. These were the notions that informed most of the congressional hearings on El Salvador in 1981 and 1982, echoed in newspaper editorials, protest marches, and thousands of memorials sent to Congress by churches, town councils, even state legislatures. In case some persisted in missing the point, one could rent at nominal cost a film (made in Sweden) with the alliterative title, *El Salvador: Another Vietnam.*

There were, it must be conceded, certain elements on the ground in El Salvador which allowed one to draw such distant analogies. The country in 1979-1980 was torn by a civil war in which a small guerrilla force, supplied and advised from a neighboring country, could operate against a poorly trained, poorly officered army whose real skills historically lay in corruption, bribery, and patronage — not the business of war. The political arm of the guerrillas claimed to represent a broad front of forces, most ostensibly noncommunist, for whom the *desiderata* of settlement was "negotiations" (in this case, leading to "power-sharing"). And finally, a U.S. embassy was struggling to play a proconsular role for which it was apparently unprepared both intellectually and morally.

But there were also some significant differences. In the political vacuum left by the collapse of the military dictatorship of General Carlos Romero in 1979, vigilante elements of the far right ("death squads") scrambled to eliminate all persons whom they imagined to be subversive (i.e., in some way to favor a more open and democratic political and social order). The long, bloody arm of these thugs reached into almost every political home in El Salvador throughout 1980, the bloodiest year in that tiny country's sanguinary history. It reached, even, to the high altar of the Cathedral, where in an act of almost unimaginable barbarism, it murdered the Archbishop while he was celebrating a mass to the memory of his mother. Several months later, elements of the armed forces, presumably in collusion with right-wing politicians, raped and murdered four American religious women, three of them Maryknoll nuns. That infamous act made the further provisioning of the Salvadoran army by the United States a domestic political issue of extraordinary emotional force; and probably explains the success of religious lobbies in obtaining a congressional requirement in 1981 for semi-annual "certification" of the human rights progress in El Salvador. Perhaps more important, the U.S. military presence in El Salvador was limited to fifty-five trainers, and thanks to the War Powers Act, the cap on that number could not easily be lifted —as it had been fifteen years before — by mere executive discretion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On a Saturday in March 1982, more than 10,000 people filled the streets of Washington to protest U.S. military presence — such as it was — in El Salvador. Today it is apparent that rather than opening a new cycle of anti-war mobilization, that event was really the closing episode of the Vietnam era. The next day Salvadorans by the multitudes went to the polls to vote for a new constituent assembly. Those elections were extraordinarily important because they demonstrated that a political Center existed in the country, at least in potential. Up to that time, it was common to hear it said that in El Salvador there really was no third option between death squads and guerrillas — some out of genuine exasperation, others because they saw this as the best way to immobilize Washington and ensure the victory of the Marxist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)-Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). It would have been far closer to the truth to say that historically the forces of the Center had been the weakest of all *organized* political forces, and that all things being equal, the destiny of the country was bound to be consigned to whoever managed to prevail in a bloodbath.

As it happened, all things were not equal. However clumsily, the United States took a hand in the matter, and the unfamiliar machinery of constitutional democracy was established. The army was reorganized, and exceedingly strong representations from Washington were made to its leaders, to the police, and to right-wing political elements generally on the certain consequences of a military coup or the wholesale resurgence of human rights abuses. The following May, a presidential election produced a victory for Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte — a man of the Left by European standards but the firmest of moderates by local measure — who almost immediately offered to open discussions with the political arm of the guerrilla movement. To the surprise of many, the latter accepted his offer; indicative that among those best in a position to know, perhaps El Salvador was not destined to be "another Vietnam."

In Washington, all of this was a bit disorienting. Since failure had been the hard currency of U.S. foreign policy for so many years — indeed, entire careers, institutions, and journals had been established to feed upon it — there was an understandable reluctance to recognize success. Nonetheless, almost overnight there was a perceptible shift in the domestic political terrain, and Duarte's post-election visit to Congress was a triumphal procession in which Democrats and Republicans alike scrambled to be photographed with him. His country's problems were far from being resolved — but at least they were moved to a less prominent place in the *Washington Post,* and some days they did not appear at all.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Meanwhile, quite another drama was unfolding just across the border in Nicaragua. There the issue was not whether disaster could be staved off, but what to do about it once an accomplished fact. In 1978 and 1979, the Carter administration had labored to bring down the dictator Anastasio Somoza not because it wished to ensure the victory of the Marxist FSLN (Sandinistas), but quite the contrary, because they wished to pre-empt it. The effort failed for many reasons, but largely because the far more numerous moderate and conservative opposition was disorganized and divided, each component waiting for the other (and for Washington) to take the decisive steps which would bring matters to a proper head. Once the Sandinistas had established themselves in the Government Palace in Managua, the Carter people set out to work with them as best they could, hoping against hope that they could moderate and even win over a political movement whose anthem declared the United States to be "the great enemy of humanity."

This was not as outlandish an idea as it seems today. Some Nicaraguans who were themselves very far from being Marxists assured Washington that there was a real chance this strategy would work, and proved it by joining the new government themselves. Moreover, there was little else the Carter administration could do short of sending in the Marines, something for which it was temperamentally unequipped. Moreover, even if the strategy of conciliation and cooptation failed, at least the blame would be clearly fixed on the other side, and the United States more advantageously positioned to make its case against Managua should the need arise. There was, in other words, to be no repetition of the Cuban experience of 1959-1961, in which a small Caribbean country was supposedly pushed into the arms of the Soviet Union as the result of U.S. pressures or even of U.S. neglect.[2]

By 1980 it was painfully obvious that sweet reason and more than $100 million in U.S. aid were not having the desired effect. At home, the elections promised the Nicaraguans in 1979 were abruptly postponed for the indefinite future. Moderates were expelled from the government — or resigned under pressure or protest. The courageous daily newspaper *La Prensa* was censored.

More to the point, the Sandinistas were receiving massive quantities of Soviet arms to equip an army several times the size of

[2] Those who carefully examine the Cuban case will, I believe, agree that no such thing occurred; Castro from the very beginning planned to pursue a hostile relationship with the United States. However, he was fortunate in that the Eisenhower administration took a number of maladroit steps to which he was later able to point as a pretext for doing what he had planned to do from the very start. His comments, however cynical, have become the ideological bread and wine of an entire generation of left-wing Europeans and Americans; indeed, his version of how Cuba "went communist" is something approaching the Revised Standard Version of the subject.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Somoza's National Guard, and the country was overrun by Cuban and Eastern bloc police and intelligence operatives. Although originally committed to a nonaligned foreign policy, the new government gratuitously supported the Soviet Union at the United Nations and other international forums on issues where the USSR normally could count only upon its most devoted followers. And finally, U.S. intelligence data revealed beyond any doubt that the Sandinistas were shipping arms in massive quantities to El Salvador. Thus, in its final weeks the Carter administration suspended further disbursements of economic aid to Nicaragua.

At this point the Reagan administration took office, loudly proclaiming its intention of reversing the foreign policy defeats of the Carter years, beginning with Central America. The Democrats responded by very nearly discarding the hard-won knowledge of the past eighteen months; suddenly all untoward events in Managua were but a reaction to the Reagan administration's bellicosity and lack of subtlety. The game became more exquisite after it was revealed in 1982 that the CIA was covertly training and equipping anti-Sandinista guerrillas in Honduras; in 1983 that the U.S. Navy had mined the Nicaraguan Atlantic ports (where Soviet arms were being regularly off-loaded); and in 1984 that the contras were being provided with a manual that sanctioned some extremely distasteful methods, most (it turned out) borrowed from the communists themselves. In the ensuing national debate, administration critics concentrated wholly upon means rather than ends: much was said about the evils of covert action, of the unsavory political antecedents of the contra leaders,[3] of the imperatives of international law, of the need for diplomatic and not military instruments, as if the two were wholly unrelated. Precisely what was to be done if good will, good sense, and good behavior on the U.S. side failed to prevent the consolidation of a heavily armed, highly militarized Soviet client state in Central America was never mentioned. When pressed, the best Democratic presidential nominee Walter F. Mondale could manage were vague references to an undefined "quarantine." The method he suggested to implement it (the Rio Treaty machinery) had not been successfully invoked for twenty years; and no one who knew the political realities of inter-American relations could imagine a situation, no matter how drastic, in which it might be.

No less than in El Salvador, in Nicaragua the U.S. search for policy has been a race between contending metaphors. Though all the signs point to the emergence of another Cuba, earnest attempts have

[3] The fact that some had been officers in Somoza's National Guard was used to discredit an entire movement, as if 12-15,000 men were fighting and dying to establish a new dictatorship. It was also used to divert attention from the character of the Sandinista regime itself. For example, Congressman (now Senator) Tom Harkin (D.-Iowa) is famous for the comment that "while the Sandinistas are not Boy Scouts, compared to the contras they are Eagle Scouts."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been made to espy in Nicaragua fragments of another Mexico, another Yugoslavia, another almost anything else that would not challenge the national security of the United States. Though such a perception (or rather, misperception) in the United States would clearly favor its own interests, the Sandinista regime has not been forthcoming with the kind of concrete acts that would strengthen the hands of its American friends, even in the very short term. Indeed, some of the latter have been forced to retreat to a fall-back position, contending that the entire mess in Central America — insofar as it has a limited political explanation — is due to U.S. failure to deal realistically with Cuba, to accept Castro's revolution, to lift the trade embargo, to free itself, as it were, of "an inordinate fear of communism." Of course, if Cuba is no threat, or at any rate, a threat we could very easily exorcise, then Nicaragua is nothing to worry about at all. Such arguments have strengthened the case of the Reagan administration in unexpected ways. But the ineptness of its critics has not turned matters wholly around for the administration.

The government's sense of what is happening — and the need to head it off before matters become more serious — must somehow be matched to a domestic political consensus that does not exist, or at any rate is running far behind events, and in all likelihood will not be congruent with them until nearly too late. This is the difference which it must split during the next four years — an uncomfortable task in which, paradoxically, the Nicaraguan government itself may prove the most useful ally. For as serious Central American revolutionaries, the Sandinistas must seek a confrontation with the United States. They really have no other choice. Anything else would devalue their ideological credentials and discount the historic significance of their victory over Somoza. Anything else, too, would cause the considerable support they enjoy in Western Europe, Latin America, even in the United States, to be diverted to other channels. Anything else would raise too many disturbing questions about the authoritarian nature of their rule, the military burden they are imposing upon their young people and upon increasingly scarce resources, and, above all, about the wretched economic performance that — in spite of $3.3 billion in foreign assistance — has become the most distinctive hallmark of five years of revolutionary government. These are the imperatives — not the desire, or need of someone else for Nicaragua to be another Yugoslavia — which will determine the future course of events there. How the United States will respond to this challenge remains to be seen.

Many people naturally hope that matters will never reach the point of confrontation. Some put their trust in a multilateral diplomatic solution, such as that supposedly evolving within the so-called Contadora process. Now, no one can doubt that the chanceries of Mexico, Vene-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

zuela, Colombia, and Panama can draft a treaty; they may even be able to embarrass the United States and Nicaragua into signing it. What they cannot do is to guarantee the consequences. Of course, it is not their particular task to do so: no matter what happens, they can always blame the United States — either for being too tough, or for not being tough enough. This is not a luxury that Washington enjoys, which explains why Central America has been (and is likely to remain) so unpalatable an entree on its foreign policy menu.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SALVADORAN LEFT

by MICHAEL RADU

The conflict in El Salvador has been news almost constantly since 1979. Despite the abundance of information on both sides, however, the nature of the anti-government forces is still not clearly understood in the United States. Nor has their structure been examined in any critical manner. Not only are these two problems intimately linked, but it is essential that policy makers — and all those involved in the public debate over El Salvador — understand the nature and the structure of the Salvadoran Left. The purpose of this essay is to provide some analytical background related to the organization, operational patterns, and leadership structure of the Left in El Salvador. Since one of the Left's most interesting and important aspects over the past decade has been its dynamic character — including dramatic shifts in tactics, coalitions, and a baroque flourishing of secondary and front groups — a brief history is necessary.

The peculiar nature of the civil war in El Salvador blurs the structure of the Salvadoran Left. In almost all known cases of civil war environments, the polarization of the society immediately resulted in legal and institutional cleavages. Each party to the conflict purged all traces of the opposition from its own territory. However, that is not the case in El Salvador. For all the pervasiveness of the myth of a ruthless Salvadoran military regime before October 1979, and of the military institution since then, the fact remains that at least some Marxists-Leninists were, and to some extent still are, tolerated and allowed to maintain legal activities in the midst of a civil war they have led from its very beginning. Thus, in some cases, it is practically impossible to make any meaningful distinction between the legal and illegal as well as between the military and political bodies constituting the Left.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The most spectacular instance of such overlapping of legal and violent revolutionary activities — the former allowed by the existing government, the latter directed toward its obliteration — is the oldest Marxist-Leninist group in El Salvador, the Communist party of El Salvador (PCES). The PCES, founded in March 1930 by Comintern agents led by Agustin Farabundo Marti, is directly or indirectly the source of all other major revolutionary groups established between 1970 and 1975. The party's methods of preserving its legal presence, while actively seeking the destruction of the established governments, are significant for an understanding of the methods used by other groups. Between its founding in 1930 and its prohibition in January 1932 — a result of its organizing a violent insurrection in the western departments — the PCES was legal; and only a few days before the insurrection it participated without noticeable success in general elections. Clearly, even as the party campaigned, it was preparing the violent overthrow of the same government that allowed it to campaign. Far from being a historical peculiarity, such an attitude was part of PCES Leninist ideology, and foreshadowed events of 1979 almost to the last detail.

On October 15, 1979, the military overthrew the Romero government, imposing a civilian-military junta with an agenda for reform. Certainly some members of the junta were sincerely committed to evolutionary change in El Salvador. However, a significant number preferred revolutionary change of a Marxist-Leninist style — but did not proclaim their beliefs at the time. Among the groups and parties receiving important positions in the new junta was the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN) — the PCES legal front since 1969, i.e., a political party led by communist cadres and representing party interests within the boundaries of existing law. The new education minister Salvador Samayoa was a secret member[1] of the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR), the major front of the then largest guerrilla group, the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL). The FPL supreme leader was Salvador Cayetano Carpio, a 1950s' graduate of the Soviet Communist Party School in Moscow, who had been general secretary of the PCES between 1964-1970 — a neat demonstration of the permanence of party tactics. Finally, a significant number of the younger officers involved in the October coup were connected with, some probably active members of, the National Resistance Armed Forces (FARN) — then as now the third largest guerrilla group. FARN, established in 1975 under the influence of Roque Dalton, a former Central Committee member of the PCES, was a splinter of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). ERP, in turn, was formed by ultra-radical elements

[1] Tommie Sue Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evaluation,* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), p. 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the communist youth organization, joined by equally radical members of the Christian Democratic party.

The thoroughly infiltrated junta of October 1979 was unable to survive the tensions between guerrilla sympathizers, fellow travelers, communist agents, and true reformers and conservative officers. It collapsed on January 3, 1980. In a replay of January 1932, one week before the collapse of the junta, the PCES formed a coordinating body[2] with its historic rivals, FPL and FARN, to be joined in 1980 by ERP and a fifth guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC). Moreover, on January 11, 1980, eight days after the resignation of the junta, the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN) joined the BPR and the FARN front, the United Popular Action Front (FAPU), in an umbrella organization named the Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses (CRM). An old and deep animus existed between the PCES and the FPL and the FARN. This hostility dated from Carpio's 1970 split with the party — the result of pressure from now PCES secretary general Jorge Shafick Handal who succeeded Carpio as party leader. In light of this history, let alone the discord between the FPL and the FARN, it is probable the party negotiated with the guerrillas for months before reaching an agreement. All the while, PCES was a part of the existing government under attack from these very guerrilla forces.

Handal highlighted the revolutionary process by revealing that the PCES decided to begin armed action against the government at its VII Congress, in April 1979. In a similar vein, the FPL intensified guerrilla action against the post-October 1979 junta while Samayoa was still a member of the government. FARN maintained its agents or friends within the military until the failed insurrection of January 1981, when the most prominent of those, Captain Francisco Mena Sandoval, murdered his superior officer and joined the guerrillas.

As the nature of Leninist theory and practice stresses the interests of the revolution ahead of any ethical considerations, the major point here is that deception, infiltration, the use of legal opportunities, and revolutionary violence are essential tactics of the Salvadoran Left. What distinguishes the Salvadoran revolutionaries from most similar groups today and in the past is the sophisticated implementation of their tactics. In addition, the Salvadoran Left benefits from indirect access in a maze of groups, parties, and fronts. Many elements of the Left are but shadows, with no life of their own.

The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) has been led since 1978 by Joaquin Villalobos (alias René Cruz), a former economics student

[2] Ibid, p. 127.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at the University of El Salvador (UES). It is the direct descendant of "El Grupo" (The Group), a loosely organized terrorist cell active since 1970. The members of the Group were middle- and upper-middle-class youths, mostly university dropouts, formerly active in the PCES and Christian Democratic Party's youth organizations. In May 1975, due to tactical disagreements and the murder of Roque Dalton by Villalobos and his faction, Dalton's followers, led by Ernesto Jovel, bolted to establish the National Resistance (RN). Villalobos and his supporters retained the ERP label. Jovel described the RN as a party, with FARN as its armed branch. The ERP, on the other hand, was initially a military organization that only established the Party of the Salvadoran Revolution (PRS) in 1977. In fact, neither RN nor the PRS is a political party in any meaningful sense: their leaders are always those of FARN and ERP respectively, they seldom have a plenum or congress, and they do not have permanent cadres of their own but assemble them from among selected guerrilla militants and front organization leaders. The Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) claimed to be both a party and its armed branch. The FALN sometimes defined the Armed Forces of Popular Liberation (FALP) as its guerrilla organization, but, in fact, FALP is seldom mentioned and is indistinguishable from the FPL itself. In all three cases, establishment of a party appears to be both a concession to Leninist dogma regarding the role of the vanguard party, and an attempt to fend off criticism from the PCES and communist countries critical of the Salvadoran Left's "militarism."

The PRTC, established in 1976 in Costa Rica as a Trotskyist regional party with branches in all Central American states, has never taken root anywhere outside El Salvador and Honduras. Attracting mostly former communist cadres, particularly the young, and a few fellow travelers or secret PCES members like Fabio Castillo Figueroa, the PRTC formally renounced its regionalist claims on October 29, 1980, and its Salvadoran organization joined the FMLN. The PRTC, like the FPL, does not distinguish between its political and military structure. The PCES, however, in a move similar to that of FARN, established an armed branch, the Liberation Armed Forces (FAL) in 1979, following the April Congress, but kept it secret and inactive for at least a year. Unlike the FARN-RN, or ERP-PRS relationship, however, the PCES is in total control of FAL, although the latter includes some non-party members.

The origins of the FMLN lie in the protracted negotiations of 1979 between the FPL, PCES, and FARN that culminated in an agreement between their respective leaders, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, Jorge Shafick Handal, and Ernesto Jovel in December. All three were leaders of their military organizations as well as of the political parties. The agreement, first publicly announced on January 10, 1980, was followed a day later

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the announcement of CRM's formation. The Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses (CRM) was composed of the fronts of the three groups as well as the February 28 Popular Leagues (LP-28), the front group of the ERP. The ERP held back from joint efforts until May 27, 1980, when FPL, PCES, FARN, and ERP announced the National Unified Directorate (DRU) — in effect, an incipient guerrilla general staff. The PRTC and its front, the Popular Liberation Movement (MLP), were part of neither the CRM nor of the DRU until October 10, 1980, when the FMLN was established to encompass the military structures, the political centers, and the fronts of the guerrillas. At the time of the FMLN's establishment, however, FARN departed from the DRU in circumstances that shed light on the decision-making process within the FMLN.

During the summer of 1980, the leaders of ERP, PCES, and FPL decided that the Leninist principle of party decision making known as "democratic centralism," which prevailed within their individual organizations, should also be adopted by the projected umbrella groups. FARN objected and left the DRU. Only the death of Jovel in mysterious circumstances led his successor, Ferman Cienfuegos, to decide to accept democratic centralism and to join the newly established FMLN on November 8, 1980. Democratic centralism would appear to be only one means of problem solving within the FMLN considering the circumstances of Roque Dalton's murder in 1975, the ERP's repeated attempts to kill Jovel and other FARN leaders at that time, Jovel's own convenient death in 1980,[3] and the hecatomb consuming the top FPL leadership in 1983.

The Left's practiced use of deception makes it worthwhile to examine both its formal structural characteristics and the real control mechanisms behind them. Thus, the PCES and PRTC are parties and the centers of power in the respective front-military-party structures; RN and PRS are in fact subordinate to their military branches, FARN and ERP; FPL is, in practice at least, both a party and an armed organization.

Since the end of 1980 all public statements from the Salvadoran Left have been issued in the name of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)-Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). Except for the two rounds of negotiation between the FMLN-FDR and the Duarte government in November–December 1984, all diplomatic or public political activities of the Left occurred under the FDR label. Both the FMLN and the FDR are groupings of organizations, and some of their component

[3] Jovel's death was variously described as having occurred "in the struggle" (presumably in battle) (Ferman Cienfuegos, *Commander Ferman Cienfuegos Speaks,* [Los Angeles: Casa El Salvador, 1982], p. 4.); in a car accident; and in a plane crash over the ocean (Gabriel Zaid, "Enemy Colleagues," *Dissent,* [Winter 1982], pp. 18-19).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organizations are umbrella structures rather than unified and homogeneous parties or groups.

The Formal Structure of the FMLN

The FMLN is largely a shifting coalition of the five Marxist-Leninist guerrilla groups or, as they are generally called, the five politico-military organizations, together with their complex front organizations. Differing in structure, as well as in strength, the five will be examined separately.

The *Communist Party of El Salvador* (PCES) is structured in the orthodox manner of all pro-Soviet communist parties. Theoretically the supreme organ is the congress, irregularly convened at the whim of the central committee, to elect the CC members from a list of candidates prepared by the outgoing central committee. In fact, the CC is by far the most powerful element in the party; not only does it have the authority to convene the congress, and to decide on the candidates, but in practice it also selects the delegates to the congress. The central committee is thus a self-contained and self-perpetuating group of cadres loyal to Shafick Handal.

Following the April 1979 Congress, the PCES decided to establish its own armed branch — the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL), since led by CC member Rigoberto Lopez under the overall command of Handal. FAL also controls the largely urban terrorist cells of the party (little more than armed party cells), known as Revolutionary Action Groups (GAR).

Meanwhile, the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN), the PCES legal front, has been regarded as a popular organization, since the formation of the CRM, i.e., on the same level as FAPU, LP-28, BPR, or MLP. Its top leaders are PCES central committee members.

The *Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces* (FPL), at least during the period Carpio led it, was controlled by its Central Command, with Salvador Cayetano Carpio both the supreme political leader and the overall military chief. Second in command, Melida Anaya Montes, the founder of the teachers' union (ANDES), a former prominent PCES member and one of the founders and early leaders of the BPR, conducted most of the regular political activities; Rogelio Bazaglia, third ranking official, was most often the actual field commander. The Central Command of the FPL, to a large extent *was* the FPL as a "party"; the military face of the FPL was a more complex structure. The three main elements of the military structure were the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) — basically the strategic force; the Popular Liberation Militias (MPL), generally

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

poorly trained and armed local defense units, divided into groups and columns; and the Zonal Guerrillas, mobile shock units.[4]

The Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR), FPL's front or popular organization, was established in 1975, largely by Melida Anaya Montes (alias Ana Maria), by forcing a split within the United Popular Action Front (FAPU). The latter had been established the previous year by FARN with a power base of radical peasant unions and some urban unions initially created by Jesuit priests. Part of FAPU, retaining the name and its connection to FARN continued to exist; part formed the BPR. Top BPR leaders were members of the FPL Central Command, while some also retained control over individual unions under the BPR umbrella. The constituent elements of the BPR included farmworkers and predominantly peasant unions, ANDES, high school, UES, and University of Central America "José Simeon Canas" (UCA) student associations, shantytown dwellers' groups, and a few urban workers' organizations.[5]

The *National Resistance Armed Forces* (FARN) is perhaps the least accessible group in terms of structure, because of overlapping political, military, and general leadership layers. Thus, according to Jovel, the party (RN) and the military branch (FARN itself) follow decisions taken by the "Council of Delegates-similar to a Congress"[6] including "the most advanced militants." Thus, ideology and rank, rather than popularity among rank and file would appear to decide the council's membership. This council is chaired by the secretary general of the party and his second in command — the former in charge of political matters; the latter, the military. In addition, the leaders of FAPU and some of its components, as well as ideologues, field commanders, etc. form the National Executive Directorate — in effect a Politburo. When immediate decisions are required, a loosely defined body, an "amplified directorate," including the Nation Executive and selected cadres, is consulted by the directorate. FARN's regional branches are similarly structured under the overall leadership of the National Executive Directorate.[7] Following Ernesto Jovel's death, it appears that his second in command and successor, Ferman Cienfuegos, has ended the division between the political and military leadership, concentrating both in his own hands.

FARN's military structure is parallel, often overlapping that of RN. The General Military Command includes the top RN leaders (Jovel and Cienfuegos until September 1980) and directs the General Staff, which

[4] Tomas Guerra, *El Salvador en la Hora de la Liberacion,* (San Jose, Costa Rica, 1980), p. 286.
[5] *Revolution in El Salvador: From Coordination to Unity.* Documents from the Salvadorean Revolution, Popular Press, no date, p. 1.
[6] Mario Menedez Rodriguez, *El Salvador: Una autentica guerra civil,* Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, San Jose, Costa Rica, 1981, pp. 189-90.
[7] Ibid, p. 190.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in turn controls the regional general staffs. All are divided into several commissions: operational, military, guerrilla, and militia. The guerrilla force is divided into sections of twenty-five fighters. The militias are divided into columns, each containing five squadrons of ten militiamen, and the "armed self-defense" brigades are intended primarily to serve as paramilitary elements for demonstrations, strikes, etc.[8]

FAPU, FARN-RN's mass organization, like the BPR, includes a number of associations and unions, mostly centered among peasants, UES, high schools, teachers, and a few urban workers.

The *People's Revolutionary Army — Party of the Salvadoran Revolution* (ERP-PRS) structure is under the control of the General Staff and the Political Commission respectively — the members of both are the same seven persons. Established in 1977, the PRS was little more than an attempt to put some political flesh on ERP and deflect accusations of "militarism." Once "elected" general secretary in 1977, and after purging his chief rivals, Villalobos lost interest in the PRS; its leaders met once in 1981, and that meeting was only announced three months after it ended.

Like other guerrilla groups, ERP's forces are divided into mobile guerrilla units, local defense forces (militias), and urban terrorist cells. Unlike the others, it has established a well-armed, regular elite unit —the Rafael Arce Zablah Brigade (BRAZ).

The ERP popular organization, like PRS itself, was a reaction to the successful use of political deception and mobilization by other groups, mostly the PCES and FPL. Established only in 1978, the LP-28 includes a few student (UES and high school) groups, and a limited number of peasants and urban workers. Unlike the relatively important role and rank of other popular organization leaders in their parent-group hierarchy, LP-28 leaders are unimportant within ERP. This does not mean that ERP is not interested in propaganda and public relations. On the contrary, it appears to be more active than any other group in El Salvador in both fields, as demonstrated by the two of its top seven leaders who are involved strictly in propaganda work.

The smallest of the five guerrilla groups, the *Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers* (PRTC) is also the least known. Its origins as a largely urban terrorist organization, heavily influenced and probably taught by South American urban terrorist groups like the Uruguayan Tupamaros and Argentine Montoneros, explain its basic structure — small cells whose rank and file do not generally know members of other cells. The PRTC popular organization, the MLP, was hurriedly

[8] Ibid, p. 191.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

established at the end of 1979, to enable the party to claim a share in the CRM — then in negotiation. So small was the MLP that FAPU has repeatedly blocked its inclusion in the CRM, pointing to its minuscule size and minor impact. The components of the MLP are UES and high school student groups.

At the local (village, hamlet) level, in those rural areas where they have succeeded in establishing some control, all five guerrilla groups have set up "popular committees," mostly involved in propaganda, quasi-police activities, and elementary military training for militiamen.[9]

The FMLN umbrella itself is formally under the control of a five-member General Command: Joaquin Villalobos of ERP, Jorge Schafick Handal of the PCES, Roberto Roca of the PRTC, Ferman Cienfuegos of FARN, and Salvador Guerra of the FPL. In theory at least, joint unified commands have been established at most levels, particularly the front. The combat area is divided by the FMLN into four fronts: Western ("Feliciano Ama"), including the departments of Santa Ana, Ahuachapan, and Sonsonate, and the least active; Para-Central ("Anastacio Aquino"), in the departments of La Paz, San Vicente, and Cabanas; Central ("Modesto Ramirez") in La Libertad, San Salvador, Cuscatlan and Chalatenango; and Eastern ("Francisco Sanchez") in the departments of Usulutan, San Miguel, Morazan, and La Union.[10]

Despite such apparent equality and fair division of authority, the FMLN groups are not equal, nor are their mutual relations stable. In fact, after Carpio appeared to be the *primus inter pares* within the DRU in 1980, pressure from Villalobos, Cienfuegos, and Handal brought him to an equal footing, and Roberto Roca was always a minor figure due to PRTC's small size and lack of resources. Following Carpio's death in 1983, a group of loyal followers left the FPL, accusing ERP of imposing two puppet leaders as Carpio's successors — both have since disappeared. Moreover, in December 1983, FPL internecine fighting apparently resulted in ERP's moving some of its units into Chalatenango — traditionally FPL's fiefdom — to stop such self-destructive behavior. Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports indicate that the process of PCES penetration of PRTC is very advanced, with the latter group steadily losing its identity. Should such developments continue, which is very likely, the five-group umbrella that is the FMLN will soon be reduced to an ERP-PCES partnership with FARN playing a limited complementary role.

[9] Antonio Alvarez-Solis, Maria Lopez Vigil, José Luis Morales, Marianella Garcia Villas, *El Salvador, La larga marcha de un pueblo (1932-1982)*, Editorial Revolucion, Madrid, 1982, p. 278.

[10] *Cienfuegos Speaks*, pp. 6, 29, 44, 50, for description of fronts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Structure of the FDR

The *Democratic Revolutionary Front* (FDR) was established on April 11, 1980, one day after a Democratic Front was set up by a motley group of disenchanted politicians of the Left. The RD included a professional association (MIPTES), set up by a former Agriculture minister, Enrique Alvarez, the minuscule Social Democratic Party (National Revolutionary Movement-MNR), and a small splinter of the Christian Democratic Party, the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC), led by Ruben Zamora. MIPTES had no political structure and no political experience or tradition. The MPSC was both small and only a few months old; the MNR, though older, had never succeeded in expanding its small base of support beyond intellectuals and a few professionals. In the 1972 elections, running together with the PDC and UDN, with Guillermo Ungo — MNR Chairman — as Duarte's running mate, the MNR polled the fewest votes of all three parties.

The FDR is officially the umbrella organization of all left of center anti-government forces in El Salvador. At its inception, it included the FD, the CRM, and a number of other organizations. That the FD elements were then, and are now, politically inconsequential is clear. Without a military arm, their practical role in the war is nil. The CRM is itself the umbrella of the Marxist-Leninist-led and -controlled popular organizations described above. Other elements in the FDR are various union groups (involving more than one union), each of which includes individuals or organizations belonging to one of the CRM popular organizations or political-military groups. More important, none of these groups (FENASTRAS, FUSS, founded by Carpio in 1965, FESTIAVSCES, STISS, FSR,[11] and other examples of the Salvadoran fixation with acronyms) is represented in the leadership bodies of the FDR.

In addition to the political groups and unions, "academic institutions" were also members of the FDR from the start. These include the University Student Council (AGEUS), in turn controlled by the student associations belonging to the popular organizations, which represent a majority of its membership. AGEUS's nature is further revealed by the fact that one of its founders and early vice presidents was Roberto Roca, now PRTC supreme-leader. As for the UES, another FDR member, all its rectors since mid-1965 were revolutionaries associated with the FMLN, among them: Fabio Castillo Figueroa, the MLP leader and prominent former PCES front man, and José Rodriguez Ruiz, the present FAPU leader.

[11] National Federation of Salvadoran Workers; United Federation of Salvadoran Unions; Union Federation of Workers in Food, Clothing, Textiles and Similar and Related Industries; Workers' Union of the Salvadoran Institute of Social Security; Revolutionary Union Federation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Both Ruiz and Castillo are in the supreme FDR decision-making body, the Politico-Diplomatic Commission, representing the FAPU and the MLP. As for the UCA, its faculty included such revolutionary cadres as Salvador Samayoa, and played a decisive role in the planning of the 1979 coup bringing the far Left temporarily into power.

The Politico-Diplomatic Commission, is sometimes described by enthusiastic supporters of the FMLN-FDR, as a "government in exile." The commission includes seven members: Guillermo Ungo, chairman of the MNR; Ruben Zamora of the MPSC; Fabio Castillo of MLP and thus PRTC; Mario Aguinada Carranza of the UDN, hence of the PCES; Salvador Samayoa of the BPR, and therefore a FPL cadre; FAPU leader and FARN cadre José Rodriguez Ruiz; and ERP second in command and propaganda expert Ana Guadalupe Martinez.

In light of the immediate and direct control of the guerrilla groups over their fronts, i.e., popular organizations, their clear majority in the commission (five to two), and democratic centralism as the decision-making method within their respective organizations as well as within the FMLN as a whole, the five clearly and openly serve as watchdogs over the activities of the FDR. They also act as "transmission belts" for decisions made (usually in Managua) by the five DRU commanders. Despite the evidence, a number of authors, as well as many in the media, insist on a dichotomy between the FDR and the FMLN, not only institutionally but ideologically as well (FDR being the "moderate"). Thus, John Beverly, describes the FDR commission members as representing two groups: the "primarily urban and middle class" forces (in which he includes Ruiz), and the representatives of the popular organizations — and only Martinez, Samayoa, and Aguinada.[12] The impression given is thus of both a numerical and an ideological balance within the FDR commission. In fact, that author does not mention Fabio Castillo as the seventh member, and "misses" the fact that Ruiz is the FARN-RN-FAPU representative and therefore on the same side as Aguinada, Martinez, etc.

But the FMLN control over the FDR is not only limited to the top levels of decision making and to the decision-making process; it is also manifest in the joint FMLN-FDR control over the International Relations Commission of the FDR, which formally comes under FMLN control as well. The FMLN controls the Social and Relief Work of the FMLN-FDR "coalition," thus in effect controlling the purse, and shares control over the "Foreign Solidarity" activities of the Salvadoran Left as a whole. This system of double or triple control mechanisms, all coming from the FMLN to the FDR, and none going the other way, clearly

[12] Rick Kunnes, ed., *El Salvador: No Middle Ground,* (Chicago: New American Movement, 1981), p. 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

demonstrates that individuals like Guillermo Ungo or Ruben Zamora, in the unlikely case that they do not share the ideology of the FMLN five commanders, are at least a public relations team. In this regard they are useful for their previously democratic credentials and, perhaps most importantly, for their access to the Socialist International in Ungo's case, and to a number of Christian Democratic parties in Zamora's. In any case, they have no say in decisions, and their influence on the public presentation of the FMLN decisions may well be limited by the effective and knowledgeable influence of some of their Leninist colleagues, most particularly Ana Guadalupe Martinez. Furthermore, the evolution of the Salvadoran civil war since 1979, from urban violence, massive demonstrations staged by the popular organizations, and political intrigue to the more clear cut and mostly military methods employed by both sides today has certainly made the minimal political case of the MNR and MPSC shrink even further — and with it the influence of Ungo and Zamora. In such circumstances, it becomes clear that not only are meaningful negotiations with Ungo and Zamora meaningless, but their very presence should demonstrate that the FMLN does not take such negotiations seriously. It is thus indicative that, after years of claiming interest in talks with the government of El Salvador, and the use of Ungo, Zamora, etc. as intermediaries, the first time the FMLN may have expected some concrete results — the meeting with President Duarte in November 1983 in La Palma — it sent Ferman Cienfuegos as a representative, a person with real authority and a real mandate. The fact was largely neglected in the Western press, but it demonstrated clearly where the power is on the revolutionary side in El Salvador — with the guerrilla leaders, and with some of them more than with others.

RETHINKING THE MONROE DOCTRINE *

by DAVID F. RONFELDT

How important is the security of the Caribbean Basin to U.S. interests? The preferred answer has changed radically these last ten years. During

* This paper was prepared originally for the conference on "Central America and the Caribbean in the 1980s: Security Perspectives and Prospects," at the Keck Center for International Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, California, December 10-11, 1984. A revised version of this paper will be published in 1985 by the Keck Center in a volume titled after the conference. The views in this paper are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily express those of the Rand Corporation or its sponsors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Carter administration and earlier in the 1970s, global economic and strategic interdependence made the Basin, then at peace, seem so marginal to U.S. security concerns that the Monroe Doctrine was considered obsolete if not dead. In an abrupt return to tradition, the Reagan administration has promoted global geopolitical views that make the Basin, now riddled with conflict, seem as vital to U.S. security as when the Monroe Doctrine was in vogue.

Public opinion has not responded easily to these shifts. After decades of believing in the sanctity of U.S. power in its "backyard," public opinion resisted the Carter administration's campaign to accept the Panama Canal treaties — and, in accepting them, lost touch with its traditional views of the region. Then, during the first years of the Reagan administration, its critics severely challenged its arguments that the conflicts unfolding in Central America affected vital U.S. interests. Instead, counter-arguments were widely accepted that the sources of the conflicts were mainly internal to the region, and that neither Sandinista Nicaragua nor Castro's Cuba could really threaten U.S. security. Most Americans simply did not want to get involved in Central America.

By now, the eve of the second term of the Reagan administration, public awareness of the region has increased substantially and perceptions are shifting. Agreement is spreading that Central America's conflicts have external as well as internal causes; that the United States should prevent the consolidation of another Cuba in Nicaragua; and that the Soviet Union may benefit politically and militarily if it acquires military facilities there. Public concerns still run deep that the administration may resort to military force against Nicaragua or Cuba. However, beliefs are less widespread now than four years ago that the United States should acquiesce to revolutionary change and disengage from Central America. The public increasingly agrees that the United States should play a leading role in the region, though opinions remain divided over what that role should be.

Public acceptance of the Basin's importance is not the only recent change; the administration's language about why the Basin is important is also evolving. During the first term, it relied on reciting a standard list of U.S. security interests: the security of vital sea-lanes and resources, and the need to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining additional military bases and allies near our borders. The language emphasized anti-communism, U.S. credibility, and the defense of democracy — all familiar to the public.

Now a dramatic new element has been mentioned: the Monroe Doctrine. Official reference to this traditional underpinning of U.S. policy surfaced informally in November when the media disclosed that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a Soviet ship en route to Nicaragua might be carrying the MiG fighters the Sandinistas have long wanted to acquire. In the context of renewed warnings to the Soviet Union and Nicaragua to halt a possible build-up of advanced weapons in Nicaragua, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger noted, as a personal observation, "We shouldn't forget that the United States' policy for many decades has been governed by the Monroe Doctrine." [1]

Few words in U.S.-Latin American relations are so loaded with historical and political symbolism. There are, in fact, many Monroe Doctrines. In its original form, conveying the aspirations of John Quincy Adams, James Monroe, Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington, the Doctrine told the European colonial powers to keep their hands off this hemisphere and vowed support for the nascent democratic republics of Latin America. By opposing extra-hemispheric entanglements, our forefathers intended to protect the New World from falling prey to the balance of power rivalries of the Old World. Even today, reference to the Monroe Doctrine is thus a sure-fire way for the U.S. government to signal a powerful U.S. interest in regional security and warn extra-hemispheric actors to watch their steps. It may also mobilize nationalist sentiments among the U.S. public. During the early twentieth century, however, the Doctrine was reinterpreted and corollaries applied that allowed the United States to pursue hands-on policies toward its neighbors. As a result of the profusion of U.S. interventions in Central America and the Caribbean between 1903 and 1934, the Doctrine began to symbolize the imperialist, hegemonic, and militarist tendencies in past U.S. policies toward Latin America. Thus today, renewed references to the Doctrine risk arousing interventionist tendencies on the U.S. political right, and inevitably excite profoundly resentful, anti-U.S. passions among most of the governments and peoples of Latin America.

Is the Monroe Doctrine worth reviving in today's world? This paper argues that the strategic principles behind the Doctrine, including its various transformations, are as valid and relevant as ever. Compared to just listing specific U.S. interests, the principles provide a clearer picture of why the Caribbean Basin is important to U.S. security, and what U.S. policy and strategy should emphasize. Properly done at the right time, the elaboration of a doctrine may help an administration galvanize public support and direct policy behavior. However, since mere mention of the Monroe Doctrine may provoke automatic public criticism at home and throughout Latin America, this paper does not recommend renovating it by name. People mainly remember its negative repercussions, not its

[1] See the analysis by Stuart Taylor, Jr., "Washington Revival of Monroe Doctrine Gets Mixed Reviews," The *New York Times,* November 13, 1984, p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

positive elements. Other prudent language and symbols should be developed if the Reagan administration moves from listing interests to defining a doctrine that is supposed to benefit our neighbors' interests as well as our own.[2]

Four Key Principles and a Strategic Imperative

For the United States, a secure Caribbean Basin has traditionally served two strategic functions: preventing extrahemispheric powers from threatening the U.S. mainland and its approaches, and enhancing U.S. capabilities as a global power (especially through the use of sea lanes and resources in the Basin). To serve these functions, U.S. strategy has traditionally relied on the application of four principles:

(1) The Caribbean Basin should be secure and friendly for U.S. presence, power, and passage;
(2) Potentially hostile foreign powers should be prevented from acquiring military bases and facilities in the area;
(3) Foreign balance-of-power struggles should be excluded and prevented from destabilizing the area;
(4) Few U.S. military resources should be dedicated to protecting U.S. interests and assets there.

These principles are interconnected. The first may hold only if the second and third are accomplished. Upholding the second and third may not assure the first, however, if underdevelopment and instability within the region create indigenous challenges to U.S. interests. The fourth principle, essentially a modern economy-of-force doctrine for the U.S. military, may be sustained only if the preceding principles are accomplished.

Together, the four principles describe an ideal situation that U.S. strategy should strive to approximate. The principles serve a strategic imperative, rarely noted anymore, which fits the Basin into the broader context of U.S. global strategy: The ability of the United States to act as a world power in a global balance-of-power system is greatly enhanced by the exclusion of that system and its related threats and struggles from the Basin. Otherwise, instability and insecurity in the Basin may divert the United States to an extent that constrains its ability to play its global roles from a position of strength, especially if the restoration of regional security should require large, prolonged U.S. military measures that contradict the fourth principle above.

[2] The central argument of this paper is synthesized from David Ronfeldt, *Geopolitics, Security, and U.S. Strategy in the Caribbean Basin,* The Rand Corporation, R-2997-AF/RC, November 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In combination, these principles and the imperative have been unique to the Caribbean Basin. They have not all applied to South America, where it has been much more difficult and less important to exclude extra-hemispheric powers and their rivalries. The principles have applied even less to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, where security has often depended on maintaining a balance among outside powers and on the dedication of sizable U.S. military resources to regional defense. In sum, the principles and the imperative explain why, for most of this century, a relatively secure southern perimeter has enabled the United States to give priority to its interests in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

Current Violations of the Strategic Principles

Today the United States faces massive violations of these principles. Only the first remains operative: The Caribbean Basin is still largely secure for U.S. power, passage, and presence. Petroleum and other resources remain accessible. Most governments are friendly to the United States. The insurgencies in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia are nearly manageable. And Mexico remains relatively stable despite its mounting domestic difficulties and its exposure to Central America's conflicts.[3]

The second principle, exclusion of hostile military powers, is seriously violated. As the paramount superpower of the 1960s, the United States could tolerate the Soviet outpost in Cuba after 1962 because, after the Soviet missiles were removed, the threat seemed minor and the Caribbean still resembled an American lake. Since the 1970s, however, the strategic and nuclear balances have shifted away from clear U.S. superiority, and the Soviet military has developed a global presence. By incrementally expanding the use of Cuba over two decades, the Soviet military now regularly visits the island with submarines, destroyers, and long-range reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft. A large electronic intelligence-gathering facility is located there. And Cuban forces are heavily armed with a wide range of advanced Soviet equipment, some of it suitable for offensive as well as defensive missions. Thus the United States must now assume that Soviet-Cuban forces could pose at least a plausible diversionary threat in some crisis situations.[4] The continued expansion of these military capabilities, especially if accompanied by a military build-up in Nicaragua that facilitates Soviet military operations up the Pacific

[3] See David Ronfeldt, ed., *The Modern Mexican Military: A Reassessment,* monograph series, 15, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 1984.

[4] See Edward Gonzalez, *A Strategy for Dealing with Cuba in the 1980s,* The Rand Corporation, R-2954-DOS/AF, September 1982.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Coast, would undermine the U.S. economy-of-force doctrine for the Caribbean Basin, open vulnerabilities in the U.S. and NATO defense postures, complicate U.S. defense planning for crises elsewhere, and damage perceptions of U.S. power around the world.

The third principle, exclusion of foreign balance-of-power rivalries, is virtually inoperative. Perhaps because a bipolar international system has characterized contemporary history, many present-day strategists have lost sight of the difference between the second and third principles. From the 1950s into the 1970s, keeping the Soviets out of the Caribbean Basin would satisfy both principles. But the world is again evolving toward a more multipolar system in which these two principles are separately important. The third means that regardless of whether extrahemispheric powers are friendly or hostile toward the United States, strong roles by them in the Basin will naturally tend to internationalize local conflicts and link them to broader aspects of global competition. The conflicts in Central America reflect this: They are fractured not only by the U.S.-Soviet struggle but also by growing U.S.-European competition, Euro-centric rivalries between Christian Democratic and Social Democratic political parties, and Israel's struggle against the PLO and Libya. The Basin has recently been the world's most internationalized laboratory for revolutionary conflict.

Keeping our West European allies out of the Basin is not at all the point of the third principle. They contribute to economic development through trade, investment, and financial assistance programs, and they are the source of Christian Democratic and Social Democratic ideals that help strengthen democratic tendencies among moderate and center-left sectors in the region. These constructive roles benefit U.S. interests and should be selectively encouraged. But it would be a mistake to give the Europeans carte blanche for ever greater political involvement in the Basin. As revealed by various episodes of support for Nicaragua, opposition to U.S. policy in El Salvador, and tolerance of communist ideological penetration, European interests and objectives differ from those of the United States. European political roles cannot substitute for strong U.S. roles in resolving the Basin's conflicts.

The fourth principle, economy of the U.S. military presence, remains barely in effect. The U.S. military has been circulating more forces through the Caribbean Basin than ever before. Despite post-Vietnam constraints on U.S. military involvement abroad, the intervention in Grenada (whose brevity and scale did not violate the fourth principle) proved successful and popular, terminating views that the United States would posture but not fight. Large, frequent military exercises in Honduras and the Caribbean have also served notice that the United States has the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ability to use force alongside diplomacy. All this activity reassures local allies who depend on U.S. military assistance programs. And it reminds Nicaragua that if it acquires MiG fighters or other advanced weapons, the United States may destroy them with air strikes or other precision methods that minimize civilian casualties. However, U.S. planning estimates for major contingencies (e.g., against Cuba or Nicaragua) yield such large, costly numbers, potentially violating the fourth principle, that hardly anyone wants to prepare seriously for them.

Conditions in Central America and the Caribbean may seem more stable now than two years ago. Yet these cross-cutting violations of the strategic principles still jeopardize, for the first time this century, the historic imperative that explains the Basin's role in U.S. global strategy: To enhance U.S. abilities to act in the global balance-of-power, extra-hemispheric threats and struggles should be excluded from the Basin. If current adverse trends continue unabated, the United States may have to divert excessive military and other resources to deal with regional insecurity — to the detriment of U.S. strength and flexibility elsewhere, and to the angry distress of our Latin American neighbors.

The Future Importance of Caribbean Basin Security

In the 1970s, for the first time in U.S. history, global "interdependence" became more important than regional "geopolitics" in strategic thinking. Traditional arguments about the Basin's importance began sounding like an anachronistic litany, and Basin security no longer seemed crucial to U.S. global security and strategy.

Now, it appears, we have entered a new historical phase of the Basin's importance. As in the past, this rising importance derives largely from basic changes in the global and domestic conditions of U.S. power, as well as from changes and conflicts in the region. Indeed, the logic of the strategic principles and imperative has been most easily understood in periods of global systemic change, including the rise of new power contenders, when an intrusion into the Basin by one foreign power has prompted competitive intrusions by others that ultimately threaten to divide and balkanize the Basin. The following global and domestic trends may thus assure the Basin's — and Latin America's — increasing importance to U.S. security for the rest of this decade.

Global balance of power patterns are in flux: The residue of bipolarity is strong, but the international system is becoming more multipolar, with the Western alliance system seeming especially loose. Patterns of conflict, competition, and cooperation are in flux around the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world, largely because of the continuing resurgence of the major West European nations, Japan, and China as global actors.

A new naval power is on the rise: The growing blue-water capabilities of the Soviet Navy are enabling the USSR to challenge the U.S. presence around the globe. Soviet naval flotillas have visited Cuba regularly since 1969.

New technologies enhance the efficacy of overseas bases: For both the United States and the Soviet Union, the development of ever more sophisticated weapons, transportation, and electronic communications systems is increasing the geopolitical and military value of having overseas bases and other facilities contiguous to their adversaries. Such facilities enhance medium-range power projection, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering.

The growing likelihood of confrontations in Third World regions: A NATO-Warsaw Pact war in Europe and a U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Persian Gulf will remain the most dangerous threats — but also the less likely ones. Geopolitical and technological trends suggest that the Soviet Union and the United States are likely to test each other in far-flung locations where geographic positions, raw materials, or power perceptions are at stake. Both governments are having to face and are working to create "threats from the South," formerly their flanks of greatest security.

Potential for greater regionalism in global economic relations: In many industrialized nations, the rise of protectionist sentiments has combined with a re-evaluation of national economic interests to weaken the formerly strong support for further liberalizing the international trading system and emphasizing global economic interdependence. Now that the United States may no longer dominate international trade, investment, and technology relations, the major alternative being voiced here and abroad is the construction of trading blocs along regional lines. The United States already anticipates that a Pacific Basin orientation will succeed our former Atlantic and global orientations. A new trend toward regionalism also appears in the Caribbean Basin Initiative and other measures to strengthen U.S. economic relations with Canada and Mexico.

Potential for domestic spillovers from regional unrest: Caribbean Basin politics intrude on domestic U.S. politics more than ever before, and more so than for any other Third World area. Law, order, and security concerns within the United States cannot be isolated from major events and trends in the Basin. The primary linkage is through massive immigration, refugee, and exile flows: The United States receives more immigrants and refugees than all the rest of the world combined and many of these come from within the Basin. The (unlikely) extension

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Central American conflicts into Mexico or Puerto Rico would thus have dangerous and unpredictable domestic consequences. Meanwhile, the prognosis is for continued large immigration flows. Terrorism and low-level violence represent another domestic connection. This includes violence conducted within the United States by revolutionaries from the Basin (e.g., Puerto Rican FALN), by local right-wing exiles (e.g., Cubans, El Salvadorans, or Nicaraguans in Miami), by left-wing exiles or sympathizers supporting revolution abroad, and by narcotics smugglers.

In sum, the Basin's importance to U.S. security will remain high throughout this decade if global and domestic trends keep raising the ultimate concerns of U.S. security in the Basin: the effect of local threats and conflicts on U.S. positions, responsibilities, and priorities around the world; and the exposure of the U.S. mainland to potential threats and spillovers.

General Implications for U.S. Policy

As a framework, the four strategic principles and the imperative thus direct U.S. policy to treat the Basin as a geopolitical zone of unique importance for U.S. security. Translating the principles into long-term objectives would mean that U.S. security strategy should emphasize (1) reducing the revolutionary conflicts and restoring stability; (2) arresting Soviet and Cuban military expansion; (3) diminishing the divisive intrusion of all external rivalries, including European ones; and (4) accomplishing the above without major reliance on military instruments.

This does not specify precisely what steps the United States should take in Central America and the Caribbean, but some guidelines may be inferred. For example, the framework does not rule out military action to eliminate potential threats; but the fourth principle argues against the militarization of the Basin as the solution to local security problems. The framework cannot instruct whether to convene negotiations to settle a regional conflict; but should negotiations be desirable, the framework would imply that European participation be minimized. Although the framework opposes the intrusion of intra-European and U.S.-European rivalries into the Basin, it does not object to normal commercial competition or the influx of European political ideas. The framework does not claim to prefer democracy, dictatorship, or some other form of local government; yet it is inherently biased against Marxist-Leninists because they are prone to establish regimes that would eventually align with the Soviet Union or other foreign power. The framework is not inherently biased against revolutionary regimes that have socialist economic tendencies, if those regimes deny extra-hemispheric entanglements and ob-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

serve U.S. security and military interests. The framework does not define how central a role the United States should play in the Basin; yet its principles can be met only if the United States is the paramount power and has broad political, economic, and military involvement.

As I have proposed at length elsewhere, U.S. policy should therefore respond to the four classic, positive challenges that have faced the United States ever since it became involved in this region a century ago: (1) engaging and accommodating Latin American nationalism; (2) strengthening moderate democratic forces; (3) fostering socioeconomic development; (4) building constructive military relations. In the past, the United States has responded to these challenges in a reactive on-and-off fashion, with the Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930s and the Alliance for Progress in the 1960s being the most positive efforts. Today, sustained progress with each challenge is required to achieve a new long-term partnership based on mutual respect, responsibility, and reciprocity.[5]

This should appeal to our Caribbean and Central American neighbors. Any notion of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine per se would be anathema to them; nor would U.S. interests be served well by applying principles that may meet Soviet/Cuban threats but that end up alienating our friends and allies in the region. However, the strategic principles identified here, which depart from traditional U.S. needs to protect its own security, lead to a policy framework that requires the United States to listen to its neighbors, support political democracy and economic development, and enhance collective security.

For these principles truly to appeal to our neighbors, however, they would have to make their own assessments of why a secure Basin and good U.S. relations are important to their interests. The nature of nationalism suggests that they would want to see themselves gaining more than material benefits (e.g., economic aid, trade concessions) from a close partnership with the United States that, in effect, resists extra-hemispheric entanglement in favor of hemispheric solidarity. Contemporary nationalism in most Caribbean Basin countries subscribes to a doctrine of diversification that calls for expanding economic and political relations with outside powers and actors in order to reduce the area's tremendous dependence on the United States, and give local leaders greater bargaining leverage with the United States. The principles advocated in this study would thus require nationalist leaders to question whether their long-range interests are truly served by inviting extra-hemispheric actors to

[5] See Ronfeldt, November 1983; and Edward Gonzalez, Brian Jenkins, David Ronfeldt, and Caesar Sereseres, *U.S. Policy for Central America: A Briefing*, The Rand Corporation, R-3150-RC, March 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

balance U.S. influence and allowing local conflicts to become so internationalized as to risk a balkanization of the region.

The Reagan administration has made some halting progress along the lines proposed here. Without discussing this progress and the many difficulties that remain, however, I would like to conclude by commenting on two issues that loom for the second term of the Reagan administration: the scale of U.S. involvement in Central America, and the possible initiation of a broad U.S. policy for Latin America and the western hemisphere. The strategic principles identified above provide some guidance for both issues.

Toward Moderate U.S. Involvement

It is often argued that the United States should pursue either much lower or much higher involvement in Central America and the Caribbean, as though the ultimate U.S. goal should be virtual disengagement or hegemony. Critics of U.S. policy have been particularly vocal in claiming that the growing U.S. involvement will arouse nationalist anger and create more conflict.

Both sides in these arguments have missed an important consideration: In general, relatively "moderate" levels of U.S. political, military, and economic involvement may have more favorable and fewer adverse effects on U.S. interests and local political and military conditions than do "low" or "high" levels. Moderate U.S. involvement may best meet the expectations of Central American political elites, whereas a diminished or excessive U.S. presence may drive them to look elsewhere for allies — contrary to the strategic principles.

U.S. involvement seems most likely to have adverse consequences when the United States disengages politically, economically, and militarily, as it did during the 1970s, or when it overreacts to events and imposes highly interventionist policies. For example, the U.S. disengagement from Central America during the 1970s probably helped foster the internationalization of the area's conflicts: It motivated local elites and counter-elites to seek new allies outside their countries, and opened the door for other regional and extra-hemispheric actors to get involved in the Nicaraguan revolution. In contrast, warning signs have appeared recently that the expansion of U.S. involvement in Honduras has begun to disturb civil-military relations and arouse nationalist antipathy.

Just as the Carter administration may have retrenched too far, the Reagan administration may have to beware of trying to do too much too quickly for our neighbors. In a very general sense, U.S. involvement should help each recipient cope with its security and development prob-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lems in a way that strengthens the hand of moderate, democratic forces and matches local capacities to absorb U.S. economic and military assistance. If appropriate scale is exceeded, the recipient may put the burden of responsibility and proof on the United States; bitter nationalist criticisms may be mobilized against U.S. imperialism and paternalism; moderate civil-military coalitions may fragment; and local economic conditions may be distorted. Little is actually known about how and why the scale (not to mention the style and substance) of U.S. involvement may affect U.S. influence, political stability, and other local conditions. The answers may vary for each country, depending on its history. Yet there are enough experiences — e.g., Iran under the Shah, the Alliance for Progress — to warn against the potential ill effects of high U.S. involvement.

Our neighbors should have a say in this. It was not a good sign when some countries' leaders presented terribly excessive requests for economic aid to the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (the Kissinger Commission). A more balanced expression of hope comes from army commanders in El Salvador who have claimed that before long their forces may need fewer U.S. military advisers and trainers.

Toward a New U.S.–Latin American Partnership

The Reagan administration has had to focus on Central America and the Caribbean during its first term. A policy window is opening, however, to seek a new U.S. partnership with Latin America as a whole — perhaps even to develop an initiative of historic proportions that would compare favorably with the Good Neighbor Policy and the Alliance for Progress. President Ronald Reagan has long harbored a dream of strengthening mutual cooperation throughout the western hemisphere; he sustains a Jeffersonian belief that the New World remains man's best hope for peace, progress, and freedom.[6]

The opportunity arises because conditions in U.S.–Latin American relations have improved in the last two years. By now, the guerrilla insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala may be nearly manageable. The debt crisis in South America has eased and no longer dominates the policy agenda there. The anti-U.S. reactions to U.S. support for Great Britain in the Falklands crisis have quieted down throughout Latin America. The intervention in Grenada has strengthened cooperation in the eastern Caribbean. The progress toward democracy occurring throughout Latin

[6] See the speech by President Reagan, "The United States and Brazil," delivered to U.S. and Brazilian leaders, Sao Paulo, Brazil, December 2, 1982, reprinted in *Realism, Strength, Negotiation: Key Foreign Policy Statements of the Reagan Administration,* United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., May 1984, pp. 122-24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

America has lifted the spirits of many Americans, north and south, who have opposed the prevalence of military dictatorships. Various leaders in South America and the Caribbean who have complained that U.S. attention to Central America is excessive would like to see renewed U.S. attention to socioeconomic development needs throughout the hemisphere. And the U.S. public, responding to immigration as well as security issues, has grown more aware of U.S. interests to the south.

There are sound strategic reasons for exploring this opportunity. Some have to do with changes that I noted earlier in the global distribution of economic and military power that are raising Latin America's general importance to U.S. interests. In addition, a newly hemispheric approach to U.S. policy would help the United States cope with a major change looming for the region: The implementation of the Panama Canal treaties requires the U.S. military to end most of its traditional presence in Panama by the year 2000. Thus, the United States faces major decisions on the kinds of U.S. military bases, force postures, and command structures that will be needed in this hemisphere to prevent threats to U.S. interests and facilitate hemispheric cooperation. These decisions would be easier to make and implement were U.S.–Latin American relations strengthened first.

What a U.S. initiative toward Latin America should look like is a question that lies beyond the present focus. However, the administration's current policy toward Central America and the Caribbean — especially the four parts to support political democracy, economic development, the security of threatened nations, and dialogue and negotiations in the region — already provides the building-blocks for a broader initiative.

The major obstacle would be Nicaragua. A U.S.–Latin American initiative would not have to incorporate Cuba, but Nicaragua's evolving situation touches too many sensitive nerves to be ignored or circumvented. If the Reagan administration really does want to expand its policy focus and consolidate a new hemispheric relationship, it will have to settle the Nicaraguan problem in the first year of its second term. If our neighbors want the United States to broaden its policy horizons, it would behoove them to support us in dealing with Nicaragua. What is ultimately needed in the Basin is a collective security approach that engages the larger nations — Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela — to act in concert with the United States and the smaller Basin nations, on the basis of mutually agreed goals and methods. It will not be possible to build a healthy U.S.–Latin American partnership if conditions in the Caribbean Basin continue to violate the strategic principles and imperative identified above.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMPOUND DETERRENCE VS. NO-FIRST-USE: WHAT'S WRONG IS WHAT'S RIGHT *

by Richard K. Betts

Debate about NATO strategic doctrine is in danger from too much of a good thing: renewed interest in improving conventional deterrence to reduce reliance on nuclear escalation as a counter to a Warsaw Pact invasion. Many American critics have long argued that NATO's official policy of first-use of nuclear weapons in the event that a Warsaw Pact conventional attack succeeds is at best a bluff never to be implemented were the time to come, or at worst a dangerous illusion excusing lethargy in conventional defense preparations, and leading to holocaust were war ever to occur.

A statement of this view that is particularly significant because of its source is Robert McNamara's recent revelation that when he was Secretary of Defense, "in long private conversations with successive Presidents — Kennedy and Johnson — I recommended, without qualification, that they *never* initiate, *under any circumstances,* the use of nuclear weapons. I believe they accepted my recommendation." [1] This starkly contradicts the official commitment he gave to European allies in the May 1962 Athens meeting: "the United States is also prepared to counter with *nuclear* weapons any Soviet *conventional* attack so strong that it cannot be dealt with by conventional means." [2] Reaffirmation of the U.S. guarantee of nuclear first-use at that time was meant to soften the allies' alarm at the Kennedy administration's proposal to increase reliance on conventional defense and to dissuade them from developing their own independent nuclear forces. NATO did increase conventional military capabilities in the early 1960s, but significant improvement of the balance was short-lived — Vietnam thinned U.S. forces in Europe and after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the number and quality of Soviet forces

* Among almost two dozen helpful critics of an earlier draft, the author wishes especially to thank Andrew Goldberg, Michael Handel, Samuel Huntington, Thomas McNaugher, John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Lt. Colonel Richard Sinnreich.

[1] Robert S. McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions," *Foreign Affairs* 62, no. 1 (Fall 1983), p. 79; emphasis added.

[2] Declassified text quoted in David N. Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 160; emphasis added.

Richard K. Betts is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. This article is based on Parts I and III of a Working Paper forthcoming from the UCLA Center for International and Strategic Affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arrayed on the Central Front was increased. And by the end of the 1960s, the erosion of U.S. nuclear superiority had further weakened the credibility of threatening first-use, which had already been in severe doubt for a decade.

Reliance on nuclear threats is dangerous, but so are the alternatives, and probably more so. This is true even if conventional capabilities are improved. The first part of this article discusses what is obviously and logically wrong with NATOS's doctrine, and the second discusses why it is still strategically and politically right.

Grand Illusion, White Lie, or Awful Truth?

For most of the postwar era, even in brief periods of optimism about the military balance, the conventional widsom in the West has been that Soviet superiority is too overwhelming for NATO to have much hope of repelling attack with conventional forces alone. Secretary of State Alexander Haig reflected this traditional view when he asserted that adopting a nuclear no-first-use (NFU) doctrine would require tripling NATO budgets for conventional forces. Serious analysts recognize this as overstatement, and the past few years have brought a spate of useful studies and essays attempting to demonstrate the feasibility of conventional deterrence within tolerable budgetary bounds.[3] Improvement of conventional capabilities to forestall escalation is highly desirable. The danger is that some current arguments supporting moves in this direction may pose deceptive alternatives and unnecessary choices, encourage false hopes, or sharpen consciousness of issues in a way that could ultimately divide the Alliance and weaken deterrence.

Rationality and Policy

Part of the problem is due to the different dynamics of analytical debate and policy reform. Debate tends to emphasize optimization and consistent rationality, focusing on polar alternatives, while policy tends to "satisfice," compromising between contending preferences. In this sense the current situation is reminiscent of the 1960s, when the U.S.

[3] For example, European Security Study, *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence: Proposals for the 1980s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); John Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); F. W. von Mellenthin and R. H. S. Stolti with E. Sobik, *NATO Under Attack* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1984); John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal, eds., *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983); Barry R. Posen, "Competing Views of the Central Region Conventional Balance," in Keith Dunn and William Staudenmaier, eds., *Military Strategy in Transition* (Boulder: Westview Press, forthcoming); Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," *International Security* 8, no. 3 (Winter 1983-84). Most of these authors do *not* endorse nuclear no-first-use, but some NFU advocates have used the studies to justify their case.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tried to push NATO toward conventional deterrence, against the allies' resistance. After much internecine conflict, the allies responded to U.S. pressure, adopting the doctrine of Flexible Response. The nuclear option was no longer planned as an immediate response to Soviet aggression, but was retained as a last resort. Even then alliance solidarity rested on divergent views of what Flexible Response meant. U.S. strategists planned for prolonged conventional operations (for weeks or perhaps months) while most European defense establishments thought of the nuclear last resort as something that would occur earlier (perhaps in a matter of days) if Moscow did not halt the attack.[4] Americans also focused on graduated escalation — starting with tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) on the battlefield, moving to limited strikes with central strategic forces if the initial uses failed to halt the attack, and then to full-scale nuclear war only if all else failed. Europeans emphasized the "seamless web" of escalation, citing TNWs more as a trigger to ensure full escalation than as a substitute for it. Allied elites feared that diminution of the nuclear threat in kind or in degree would weaken deterrence of a Soviet decision to initiate conventional war. Most European leaders preferred to avoid confronting the ambiguities. The one great exception was Charles de Gaulle, who recounted a meeting with President Kennedy:

> As regards the possible use of atomic weapons, he affirmed that America would certainly resort to them rather than allow Western Europe to fall into the hands of the Soviets. But in answer to specific questions I put to him, he was unable to tell me at what point and against what targets, far or near, strategic or tactical, inside or outside Russia itself, the missiles would in fact be launched. "I am not surprised," I told him.[5]

This transatlantic tension has not been due to obtuseness on either side but to the objective differences of interests — between the United States and Europe, and between the Federal Republic of Germany and other NATO states — that underlie the Alliance. Too many U.S. analysts mistakenly assume the validity of the myth that NATO leaders must declare for political reasons — the myth that interests and risks of members are identical, so that NATO is "all for one and one for all." Strategists acting as publicists should indeed promote this idea of natural solidarity for the sake of deterrence, but when acting as analysts should remember that its real limits are unfortunately greater than European leaders wish. In the reality created by governmental declarations and actions, the identity of risks which does not exist automatically or in the logic of distinct national interests may not be a myth after all if such

[4] Schwartz, *NATO'S Nuclear Dilemmas,* pp. 169-70, 177-78.

[5] Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor,* Terence Kilmartin, trans. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 257.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

identity is artificially induced by strategy. Despite whatever plans there might be to control escalation and carefully limit it in degree and scope, once nuclear weapons begin detonating anywhere the risk that the superpowers' homelands will become involved rises. Coupling of U.S. intercontinental nuclear forces is induced by the prospective dynamics of the process more than by plans.[6] This is what NATO doctrine does. But solidarity that rests on artifice, while it may succeed if strategy is skillfully managed, is uncomfortable. Latent conflict between national interests and risks is an ever-present threat to a coalition's confidence in itself. The problem remains that while Americans and Europeans have equal reason to fear escalation to total nuclear war, Europeans have far more to lose from prolonged conventional war, or limited nuclear exchanges within the theater. Soviet conventional forces cannot conquer the U.S. homeland, and only nuclear escalation could destroy it. In the tradeoff between goals of maximizing deterrence of any wars at all, and minimizing the danger of nuclear devastation if war occurs, Europeans naturally have more reason to put greater weight on the former.

This difference will never change as long as the Atlantic Ocean protects Americans from the devastation of a conventional World War III. Indeed, too many Americans tend to forget that in World War II, fought with less destructive conventional weaponry than is available today, probably fifty million people were killed — *less than one percent of whom were Americans,* and almost none of whom were American civilians. World War II was a great success for the United States, leaving it economically vibrant and globally pre-eminent; it was a disaster for European nations, ravaging societies, guzzling wealth, and hastening the end of their status as world powers. All can agree that nuclear war would be an unthinkable catastrophe, but Americans have less reason psychologically to believe the same about conventional war. When some NATO statesmen aver that conventional war would be just as awful for Europe as nuclear war, they are engaging in foolish exaggeration. But if U.S. statesmen had to think of the costs in lives and property in terms of a hundredfold multiplication of both the Vietnam War and the San Francisco earthquake, they might have a bit more sympathy.

The difference in debate today is that, in contrast to the traditional positions of their governments, European as well as American *publics* appear as unhappy with reliance on nuclear first-use as American analysts and policy makers have been for over twenty years. This results from the cumulative impact of publicity about the neutron bomb, deployment of new NATO intermediate-range missiles, and maladroit statements by U.S. officials about limited nuclear war. Such anxiety has a

[6] I owe this observation to Richard Sinnreich.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

silver lining to the degree that it encourages governments to increase conventional capabilities, but that degree is likely to be marginal at best. The danger from some of the current optimistic analyses is that, first, they erroneously present slight conventional improvements as sufficient for high confidence in successful defense, and second, they abet the inference that such calculated probabilities of defense will pose a deterrent equal to the threat of nuclear first-use. The first conclusion represents a triumph of logical analysis over the lessons of historical experience — false assumptions that the military variables susceptible to a priori calculation, rather than myriad unquantifiable political as well as strategic uncertainties, can predict the outcome of initial engagements. The second confuses deterrence and defense, assuming that an aggressor's uncertainty of victory in West Germany will deter him as much as the even remotely possible destruction of his homeland should his attack succeed. Optimism about deterrence based on what would appear to be a satisfactory conventional balance of forces also ignores the implications of a posteriori analysis, based on past outcomes. Conventional deterrence and conventional defense in the initial phase of war both failed more often than they succeeded, even when the defender was nearly equal or superior to the attacker in military manpower and firepower.[7]

NATO *should* improve conventional capabilities, to help offset the degraded credibility of first-use threats for deterrence, and to have some hope of a fallback and alternative to holocaust if deterrence fails. In any case this course is in the U.S. interest, so U.S. analysts making policy recommendations should support it. But this aim must be kept in perspective so that analysis of conventional options does not promise too much and delude politicians about the advisability of shifting to an NFU doctrine. Conventional improvements can be helpful as long as they are seen as only partial solutions. Let us consider in more detail the essence of the dilemma — why NATO's elites have clung for so long to a dangerous doctrine, and why consideration of revoking the doctrine risks damaging the Alliance even as the danger has become more clearly evident to NATO's populations.

The Appeal of the Nuclear Precipice

Whether one focuses on empirical indications of incredibility such as De Gaulle's conversation with Kennedy and McNamara's revelation in 1983, or on simple normative logic, the U.S. declaratory doctrine

[7] This article assumes the validity of these arguments, elaborated at length in Part II of my UCLA Working Paper, which also appears as "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence," *World Politics* 37, no. 2 (January 1985).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of deliberate escalation is a Grand Illusion or Great Lie, a pretension that we would allow America to be destroyed in an attempt to save Europe. Maintaining the doctrine does not require the United States to destroy itself, but only to *risk* such destruction were the Soviets to march; but the potency of the risk as a deterrent bears some relation to its sensibility. The idea that a U.S. president would purposely allow half or more of the American people to be turned into cinders rather than let European people be turned into slaves is either absurd or terrifying. Proponents of extended deterrence obscure this with arguments to the effect that the choice would really only be between immediate suicide and slow suicide (as the loss of Western Europe to Moscow would lead eventually to strangulation of the United States). That argument is desperate hyperbole motivated by the political imperatives of deterrence and Western cohesion, and by the psychological unwillingness in peacetime to admit the dishonorable notion that surrender would be preferable to the alternative in event of war. (The United States would be left in severe danger from the radical change in the balance of power, but it would be undestroyed and unoccupied, with more hope and options than if its cities were radioactive craters.) The ultimate absurdity is that even if the threat were credible it would not save Europe, because a nuclear war would engulf all — the problem so evident to European anti-nuclear peace movements. The doctrine has had a tragically special appeal to West German strategists, however, because they have neither territorial buffer nor independent deterrent alternative to back up conventional defense. The Federal Republic would be the first to be overrun, while the British and French have nuclear forces whose use does not depend on American authorization to dissuade the Soviets from further advance. As for other Europeans but more so, the imperative for the Germans is to avoid becoming *either* a conventional or nuclear battlefield. Except for the alternative of forswearing deterrence (thus living at the sufferance of Soviet restraint), reliance on nuclear threats is the only way to *try* to minimize both alternatives at the same time. Otherwise, when it comes to the respective risks of conventional war and nuclear war, reducing the latter raises the former. For this and other reasons NATO has clung to the fiction that the United States would provoke mass immolation, rather than let Moscow impose an East European political and economic order on Western Europe.

If the doctrine is a Great Lie, it is a Great White Lie — a benign deception — as long as it supports deterrence, and thereby seems to preclude the danger that the bluff would ever be called. It allows the allied nations on both sides of the Atlantic to unite amicably for deterrence even though interests would diverge if it came to defense. And like any Great Lie, if repeated often enough and with apparent conviction, it can

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

come to be believed — especially by cautious Russians who often consider U.S. leaders to be erratic and imprudent. And it *could* be illusion rather than deception — believed by an impetuous U.S. president — and in the heat of war and hysteria of imminent defeat could turn into an awful truth. This possibility perversely salvages some credibility for extended deterrence. (Perhaps there is comfort in the fact that the accession of the two presidents the Soviets seem to consider most unrealistic or adventurous — Carter and Reagan — coincided with the low point of relative U.S. nuclear capability.) The tranquilizing effect of the illusion made it easier for U.S. leaders to focus in peacetime on the manifest reality that the Soviet Union is the greatest threat to American *security,* rather than on the latent reality that in wartime it is the first-use commitment to NATO that is the greatest threat to American *survival.* The fact that few informed observers really fear that deterrence is likely to fail allows them to blur the meaningful distinction between security and survival. Moreover, the deterrent function of the doctrine is buttressed by the possibility of *accidental* escalation in the fog of war, independent of a president's potential for sober and deliberate decision to court suicide. Although normal command and control arrangements for nuclear weapons are extraordinarily tight, they are attenuated in a full-scale crisis alert.[8] Once thousands of tactical nuclear weapons are widely dispersed, and communications are confused in the fog of war, the odds of unauthorized use by some isolated commander — even if still low in absolute terms — become relatively greater than in peacetime. (Or what if some panicky sergeant on either side thinks he sees a mushroom cloud after a secondary explosion from a conventional munition and reports an enemy nuclear attack to his superiors?) [9]

The notion that the danger of accidental nuclear escalation contributes to deterrence resembles Herman Kahn's idea of a "doomsday" machine. If this were embraced explicitly as a desirable deterrent, rationalizing NATO's tactical nuclear weapons posture would be undesirable, but no responsible figures would openly endorse this idea. In a different way, however, it is endorsed implicitly in the European rationale for the new intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deployed in conformance with NATO's 1979 decision. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) were cited as a necessary "evolutionary upward adjustment" to allow U.S. systems to strike the Soviet homeland *from*

[8] Paul Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 165-69, 231-32.

[9] See also Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank," *International Security* 7, no. 2 (Fall 1982).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe.[10] Given the traditional U.S. commitment to include intercontinental forces in the nuclear escalation commitment to Europe, however, there is no logical need for new Pershings or GLCMs — as opposed to more MX ICBMs — unless it is believed that Washington would renege on that commitment.[11] If that is indeed the case, the only logical reason that *Americans* would have to deploy INF would be to have an option for limited escalation — stronger than use of short-range battlefield nuclear weapons, but weaker than intercontinental exchanges. But allies can rely on the Soviet insistence that they would regard INF attacks as identical to attacks from U.S.-based forces, and would respond accordingly. Our allies embraced the plan primarily as a way to ensure the coupling of U.S. intercontinental forces — to guarantee escalation rather than avert it. If Washington is willing to implement the traditional commitment, INF are qualitatively superfluous. If it is not willing, launching INF would only logically be meant as a *substitute* for intercontinental exchange, to restrict escalation to the theater, which the Europeans do not want and believe the Soviets would not accept. In that case, Soviet counter-escalation against the continental United States would be "accidental" in terms of American intent. So European governments' embrace of INF (contrary to the resistance of their publics, who feared that they *do* augur nuclear war limited to the theater) logically represented a conspiracy to deter Moscow by ensnaring Washington in a commitment it might otherwise try to betray.[12] INF deployment may be advisable because of this confusion rather than despite it, if doctrinal incoherence bolsters deterrence by circumventing obstacles to NATO cohesion.

The fiction of deliberate escalation or the danger of accidental escalation are fine as long as deterrence cannot fail, but the dramatic rise in East-West tension since the late 1970s focuses attention on the possibility that deterrence could fail after all, which makes incoherent doctrine alarming. Both dangers (deliberate or accidental escalation), good for deterrence, are then revealed as disastrous for defense. There are only two hypothetical ways to resolve the contradiction: to make escalation "safe," or to eliminate the possibility that conventional deterrence would fail. The latter is not feasible, even at an economic price beyond what NATO politics will ever choose to bear; movement in that direction,

[10] Raymond L. Garthoff, "The NATO Decision on Theater Nuclear Forces," *Political Science Quarterly* 98, no. 2 (Summer 1983), p. 202.

[11] McNamara articulated that commitment in the Athens speech — "we have undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a global basis." Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas,* p. 158. Reliance on new Minuteman ICBMs was the rationale for withdrawing Thor and Jupiter missiles from Europe in the early 1960s.

[12] Richard K. Betts, "Uncertainties, Complexities, and Dilemmas," in Betts, ed., *Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 547-48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

however, is the best choice to ease the problem. The former is not feasible, and any misbegotten attempt to make it so would be dangerous.

Hypothetical ways to make reliance on escalation sensible include (1) establishment of a nuclear disarming first-strike capability; (2) construction of an effective defense against Soviet nuclear retaliation; (3) development of decisive tactical or intercontinental counterforce nuclear "warfighting" capabilities to thwart the Soviet conventional attack without further escalation to countervalue exchanges. The first is impossible without technological breakthroughs that make Soviet submarines vulnerable, U.S. air defenses against bombers nearly perfect, and hardened or mobile land-based Soviet ballistic missiles more certainly vulnerable in practice than they are in theory. The second is the hope of the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative but while it may have promise for site defense of ICBMs, few reputable scientists believe that low-leakage area defense of civilian society is anything but illusionary.[13] Effective defense against missiles would also have to be matched by defense against other means of delivery. The third alternative might appear feasible but, even with "mini-nukes," enhanced radiation weapons ("neutron bombs"), and precision-targeting technologies, it would involve too much collateral damage to be accepted by European members of NATO. Soviet response in kind against Western conventional forces would neutralize the benefits of TNWs for holding the line. The latter point reflects the pertinent fact that the efficacy of all three alternatives for salvaging escalation as a strategy to defeat Soviet attack would be negated if the Soviets achieved the same options. (This is not quite true for the first, but that would be a horrendously dangerous form of crisis instability which would encourage Soviet pre-emption.) And usually the USSR does eventually match (or exceed) U.S. military options.

Some who support moving toward conventional deterrence do not demand a declaratory shift to no-first-use in principle, but do recommend a posture shift toward no-first-use in practice. At least, they recommend reconfiguring tactical or intermediate-range nuclear forces so that they are not technically destabilizing — so vulnerable or stationed so close to the front that they pose an irresistible temptation for Soviet pre-emption or force hasty decisions for NATO to use them early in the battle or under command so decentralized that one case of panic could unleash a nuclear detonation.[14] Although this sort of reform is advisable on balance, it does lessen the potency of the danger of escalation as a deterrent to Moscow's decision for war. This leaves conventional deter-

[13] See Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., *Ballistic Missile Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984).

[14] Arguments for reorganization of TNWs are by no means new. Helmut Schmidt, for instance, made them over two decades ago. See his *Defense or Retaliation: A German View,* Edward Thomas, trans. (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 188-93.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rence the more attractive solution, but high-probability conventional defense would still not produce the same deterrent effect as low-probability but high-intensity nuclear threats.

Compound Deterrence and the Muddle of Risk

Enthusiasm for conventional deterrence feeds on a natural, but not entirely desirable, abhorrence of incoherent or irrational doctrine. Incoherence is inevitable because NATO has several inconsistent goals but can only have one comprehensive strategic doctrine; and because the best doctrine to serve deterrence cannot be the best one to serve in war if deterrence fails, unless the East lacks the retaliatory options of the West. Since the Soviet Union developed a secure nuclear deterrent, *the West has used nuclear doctrine to serve two fundamentally contradictory aims:* to deter nuclear war and to deter conventional war. The best way to make nuclear war impossible is to make its initiation suicidal; the best way to deter conventional war is to make initiation of nuclear war (in response to conventional attack) credible. Doctrine arguably avoided this contradiction when U.S. nuclear superiority and vulnerability of Soviet nuclear forces both appeared so great that Washington could contemplate a disarming counterforce strike that might make damage from Soviet retaliation limited enough to be deemed more acceptable than Soviet conquest of Europe. If that situation ever existed — and the belief of nostalgic analysts today that it did before the mid–1960s exceeds the confidence of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy — it ended long ago and can never be regained. Strategists have sought to salvage the doctrine by schemes for limited escalation to prompt Moscow to halt a conventional invasion. Formal NATO discussions and decisions (developed in the Nuclear Planning Group) have never progressed beyond agreement on first-use of a small proportion of tactical or theater weapons to signal Western resolve.[15] But this would work only if the Soviets believed that NATO would indeed go the rest of the way and prefer *Götterdämmerung* to defeat. The essence of the doctrine rests on the ultimate threat of full-scale nuclear war.

The enduring problem is that (1) if the chips are down, nothing is really worth nuclear war, but pretending otherwise helps minimize odds that the bluff will ever be called; and (2) substituting conventional insurance sufficient to override all the uncertainties about capability to defend is intolerably expensive for democratic societies as long as odds that the chips may fall are very low, as they have been in Europe since 1945.

[15] J. Michael Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response,* R-2964-FF (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, April 1983), pp. 19-20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Strategists' lust for coherence flows from focusing on the credibility of strategy more than on the cost of consistency. If incoherence cannot be resolved, it can be reduced. The best course is to reduce reliance on nuclear threats but not terminate it, to improve conventional deterrence but not rely on it, to reform doctrine incrementally rather than radically. The deterrent credibility of either conventional defense or nuclear escalation are matters of degree; within the realistic bounds of change in capability on either side the former can never be 100 percent and the latter can never be zero — the same can also be said of the risks in either course — so it is best to focus on them as complements rather than alternatives.

Calculations and Incentives

The official doctrine of Flexible Response manages risk by raising capabilities for conventional defense above a trip-wire function, thus enhancing deterrence by denial, while retaining nuclear deterrence by punishment as the ultimate threat. This hedges against the incredibility of deliberate first-use without renouncing the residual deterrence inherent in the possibility that NATO might escalate despite the irrationality of doing so. As opposed to the old Massive Retaliation rationale, the Soviets must gamble *twice:* first, that NATO will not retaliate with first-use of nuclear weapons in some fashion that prevents Soviet victory at an acceptable price; second, that NATO's conventional defense will fail. (The logical calculus is even more daunting, as subsequent discussion will show, when the probability of avoiding escalation is broken down into the cumulation of odds from four separate probabilities of escalation by deliberate decisions of the United States, Britain, or France, or by some accident. In this sense the Soviet gamble *logically* would depend on multiplication of *five* separate probabilities — four in regard to escalation, one in regard to NATO conventional defense — although it is unrealistic to believe that an actual decision in the heat of crisis would be made by such a consciously refined calculation.) This makes the *cumulative* odds of Soviet success lower than if they need gamble on only one of the questions. The larger cumulative odds of deterring Soviet attack are further increased if the probability of Soviet success in attack is multiplied by the odds that the Kremlin would have a strong *desire* to conquer Western Europe by military force. The latter odds are at least less than 100 percent, and probably very much less.

The logic of pure conventional deterrence by denial only requires Moscow to gamble *once;* it rests on the single probability of successful NATO conventional defense (denial) rather than the cumulative

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

probability of Flexible Response (denial *or* punishment). The standard arguments that first-use threats are incredible, or that no-first-use declarations cannot eliminate the possibility of escalation in the Soviet decision for war, mean that an official shift to NFU should only have a small impact on the Russian risk calculus. But to the extent that there is an argument for changing policy to NFU the change should have some meaning — thus, *some* credibility, which implies further degradation of the nuclear component of deterrence of Soviet conventional attack. Indeed, "it would be impossible for the Alliance to continue a first-use option in its military planning, since this would inevitably become publicly known."[16] But the costs of an aggressor's miscalculation of the probability of nuclear escalation are astronomical (destruction of the attacker's society), while the costs of miscalculation of the probability of conventional offensive success are only appreciable (failure to conquer much Western territory, but no loss of Pact territory). In this light it is doubtful that substantial increase in deterrence by denial would compensate fully for even a slight reduction in deterrence by punishment.[17]

If one assumes deterrence may well fail, reliance on denial or punishment can be seen as alternatives. If combat stays at the conventional level, nuclear capabilities are irrelevant; if limited escalation suffices to stop the war, it falls under the rubric of denial; and if full escalation occurs, moderate differences in the defender's conventional capabilities will scarcely matter. For the maintenance of deterrence, however, threats of denial and punishment are complements rather than alternatives.

The probability of escalation if conventional defense fails is distinct from the probability that conventional defense will fail. The probability of succeeding in attack at an acceptable price, however, is a compound of both, and the aggregate probability of failure of deterrence is further compounded by the limits of Soviet incentives to attack. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate this point heuristically. The numbers in the table are only my own subjective estimates. *The tables do not pretend to represent actual probabilities,* nor the full range of possible combinations of separate hypothetical probabilities. *Nor do they mean to suggest that Soviet leaders would make a decision according to such ratiocination.*[18] The separate risks, however, must all figure in a decision somehow, so even if calculations are not made formally according to the refined logic presented, the tables should at least reflect the *direction* of Soviet judgments about

[16] Ibid., p. 49.

[17] There is an argument for conventional deterrence by punishment, which *could* threaten loss of Pact territory (Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe"). This argument is also criticized in my "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence."

[18] For arguments against hyper-rationalistic forms of deterrence theory see John D. Steinbruner, "Beyond Rational Deterrence," *World Politics* 28, no. 2 (January 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

HYPOTHETICAL PROBABILITIES OF AVOIDING ESCALATION

Notional Cases	Individual Probabilities: No Deliberate NATO Escalation[1] by USA	by UK	by France	No Accidental Escalation	Cumulative Probability of Avoiding Escalation
I. Trip-wire Optimism (Escalation credible/ Soviet desire for war negligible)	.1	.1	.1	.5	<.01
II. Extended Deterrence Pessimism/NFU Optimism	.9	.9	.9	.9	.66
III. European Government Views	.5	.5	.5	.9	.11
IV. "Reality" (Author's judgment)	.8	.8	.8	.7	.36
V. Desired Reform (Reduced danger of accidental escalation)[2]	.8	.8	.8	.9	.46

Assumptions

[1] "Warning shot" or battlefield use of TNWs subsumed under "Defense"; "Escalation" here refers to ultimate threat of punishing strikes against Soviet interior, i.e., the element of extended deterrence that makes price of Soviet military success in attack unacceptably high.

[2] No plausible change in posture can overcome rational arguments against escalation if deterrence fails. Reduced probability of accidental escalation desirable as hedge against possibility deterrence could fail, and should be balanced by increase in changes of conventional defense (see table 2).

chances for military success at an acceptable price. The numbers in the table are indeed artificial, but the argument rests on the direction of change in cumulative probabilities, not on the specific values stipulated.

The notional figures suggest several conclusions. First, table 1 reflects the significance of autonomous British and French capabilities — insignificant relative to those of the United States, but significant in absolute terms — to wreak destruction on the Soviet Union. U.S. analysts rarely pay much attention to this dimension of escalation, but only foolhardy Soviet leaders could ignore it. In strictly logical terms the chance

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of avoiding escalation is a compound of four separate probabilities. Even if all the separate probabilities against escalation are extremely high, the cumulative probability is far lower (table 1, case II). The threats that have negligible credibility in rational terms do not have negligible utility when aggregated.[19] Second, improvement in chances for conventional defense can partially offset degradations of nuclear credibility. If the separate probabilities of escalation were very elastic, nuclear improvements would be the most economical means to increase deterrence (consider case I in both tables — arguably close to the logic of the old Massive Retaliation era). But at present levels of countervalue capability on both sides, and without a plausible way to re-establish counterforce advantages sufficient to guarantee substantial escalation dominance, nuclear credibility is not very elastic. Probabilities of conventional success, however, are more elastic. I do not believe any amount of investment in conventional forces that is remotely realistic for NATO could reduce odds of defeat to a negligible level (such as in case II (b), table 2), but they could make a significant difference (compare notional estimates in cases IV and V).

Third, cumulative probability that deterrence will fail can be as sensitive to the Soviets' intent (the intensity of incentives to resolve a crisis by war) as to their estimate of capability (compare cases II (b) and V, table 2). This is quite obvious, but it points to an important disjunction between theory and policy. Formal deterrence theories usually ignore the estimation of intent, positing it as constant — the enemy will attack if he thinks he can get away with it. But the question is always central in policy-makers' minds, as they balance *potential* military risks in a crisis against *actual* economic costs of military investment for deterrence in normal times. The possibility that Moscow could desire to solve its problems by war cannot safely be excluded, but there is no reason to assume it as probable when the price of rendering military risk negligible is far higher than NATO has ever been willing to pay.

Critics who favor a no-first-use doctrine implicitly fear that the Soviets have a high incentive to attack. McNamara, for example, argues that if NATO's first-use policy does have any credibility, it will induce the Soviets to initiate the war with nuclear strikes of their own because they are deprived of the option of winning at the conventional level. This

[19] Two important related points should be noted. First, French strategists particularly have argued that the autonomous *force de frappe* could be used to draw U.S. intercontinental forces into play irrespective of U.S. desires, since the initiation of any large nuclear strikes against the USSR would create irresistible incentives to unload rather than absorb likely Soviet indiscriminate retaliation. Second, this vitiates the goal of NFU, if it were adopted by Washington. The probability that the United States would move to NFU is small, and the probability that all three NATO nuclear powers would do so is close to nil. In that case, a U.S. NFU policy would offer the worst of both words — weakened deterrence and a divided Alliance on one hand, and a substantial probability that escalation would occur despite NFU, on the other.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

HYPOTHETICAL COMPOUND RISK CALCULATIONS IN CRISIS

Notional Cases	*Individual Probabilities*			*Cumulative Probability*
	Nato Defense Will Fail[1]	*Escalation Will not Occur*[1]	*Soviet Desire to Attack*[2]	*Deterrence Will Fail*
I. Trip-wire Optimism	.9	.01	.1	<.01
II. (a) Extended Deterrence Pessimism	.9	.66	.8	.48
(b) NFU Optimism[3]	.1	.66	.8	.05
III. European Government Views	.8	.11	.2	.02
IV. "Reality"	.7	.36	.3	.08
V. Desired Reform	.3	.46	.3	.04

Assumptions

[1] "Warning shot" or limited use of TNWs subsumed under "Defense"; "Escalation" refers to major strikes against Soviet interior.

[2] Soviets believe military success at acceptable price is possible.

[3] Increases in NATO conventional capability. For example of such optimism about chances of defense see W. W. Kaufmann, "Nonnuclear Deterrence," in J. D. Steinbruner and L. V. Sigal, eds., *Alliance Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1983), p. 89.

contradicts McNamara's other argument that nuclear weapons are useless except to deter nuclear use by the opponent; [20] it says that nuclear threats are not credible enough to deter but are credible enough to provoke. But if this is true in regard to theater nuclear weapons despite either side's inability to pre-empt so thoroughly as to deprive the victim of residual retaliatory capability, then this problem should also be an admissable issue in debate about the higher balance of strategic intercontinental forces — in which case the idea supports arguments of strategists like Paul Nitze or James Schlesinger rather than McNamara's endorsement of survivable "assured destruction" capability as the standard for adequacy of strategic forces. McNamara's arguments, whether contradictory or not,

[20] McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons," pp. 75, 79.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

do support the case for minimizing any Soviet perception that NATO has a nuclear first-strike capability, but there are no grounds for fearing that the latter may be plausible without also fearing that the same capability also exists on the Soviet side. In any case, the idea that NATO's posture would trigger Soviet initiation of nuclear war before any conventional combat had broken out suggests that Moscow would choose "suicide for fear of death" — Bismarck's characterization of preventive war. If McNamara's point applies to Soviet incentives for nuclear pre-emption *after* conventional war breaks out, this highlights a powerful Soviet incentive not to start the conventional war in the first place — thus refuting the premise that nuclear weapons cannot deter conventional attack. If the Soviets do not fear that NATO would use nuclear weapons *after* it is attacked by Soviet tanks, why would they fear that it would use them *before* being attacked? Moscow always has three choices: initiate a conventional war, a nuclear war, or no war at all. By assuming that Moscow would choose nuclear war rather than no war at all in the circumstance he mentions, McNamara must assume that Soviet inclination to attack is very high. When motives are so extreme they usually involve a focus on the perceived high cost of *not* attacking, and are unlikely to be overcome by a requirement for *confidence* in conventional success when the costs of failure (bogging down in West Germany) are not so extreme.

If one is sure that deterrence is immutable, then deterrence is also insensitive to incremental variations in Western capabilities, and it is hard to make the case for investing billions of extra dollars, marks, pounds, and francs in such increments. If danger does indeed exist that deterrence could fail, NATO should improve capabilities for conventional defense, but belief that improvement could guarantee NATO's holding the line betrays a disregard for military uncertainties and the record of history. Some of the most enthusiastic proponents of conventional deterrence seem more willing to accept optimistic bases for judgment about defense than to hold any optimism on the question of whether Soviet leaders would start a war. They implicitly exhibit worst-case assumptions about enemy intentions, but not about capabilities. According to what evidence, logic, or scenario can one really argue that the analytical grounds for worst-case pessimism about Soviet interest in attacking Europe are greater than analytical grounds for worst-case pessimism about conventional defense? Those who do not recognize the arguments in the first section of this article and are blithely willing to rely completely on first-use, place too much faith in deterrence and not enough in defense. The error of their critics lies in doing just the reverse.

The final danger in using faith in a conventional deterrent to move to a "safer" doctrine of NFU is that the Soviets could turn the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doctrine against its purpose, or no-first-use could even increase the danger of nuclear war. As Henry Kissinger argues:

> [No-first-use could] trigger one of the not infrequent reversals of Soviet strategic doctrine, from hints of abjuring first-use to the reassertion that a war in Europe could never be limited to conventional weapons . . . facing the West with the choice of surrender or the kind of war of which our countries will then be incapable as a result of years of renouncing and stigmatizing nuclear weapons. . . . For centuries wars have started between seemingly evenly matched forces. There is no blinking the fact that deterrence, when only conventional weapons were involved, has frequently broken down. And we probably could not then guarantee that we would live up to our no-first-use declaration. Faced with the collapse of Europe we might well reverse our proclaimed doctrine, thereby bringing about the worst of all possible outcomes: a failure of conventional deterrence *and* a nuclear war.[21]

Against Coherence

Public debate about conventional defense is often damaged by the tendency to pose the question in simplistic categorical terms: Would NATO's line hold or wouldn't it? At that level of discussion there is no answer but sweeping assertion. Serious analysts know that innumerable uncertainties preclude any answer unburdened by complex qualifications. The analytical debate is bedeviled by the problem that the answer to which side would win a NATO-Warsaw Pact war is completely scenario dependent. On a good day, forward defense (or attack into Eastern Europe) could work quite well; on a bad day, NATO could crumble quickly. It is easy to construct a plausible scenario whereby either side wins (or at least does not lose). This does not mean, however, that the debate must be a draw. Two other considerations tilt the balance of uncertainty against NATO if we assume that any war is initiated by Moscow. First, a reactive defender can only hedge against a finite number of scenarios. If he tries to multiply the number of scenarios that he can cover, the defender must suboptimize, compromising the perfection of any one option in order to hold other options open. Second, an attacker with the initiative, in contrast, can optimize. He usually has the privilege of exercising greater choice over the military scenario, so he can concentrate on one option that the defender has not covered sufficiently.

In conventional war, several general ways to thwart the advantages of the attacker are theoretically available to a defender, but not practically available to NATO. One among them is pre-emption, to steal the strategic initiative. This is obviously politically foreclosed. Even if it were not, it is unimaginable that a *coalition* of several states could

[21] Henry A. Kissinger, "Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance," *Survival* 24, no. 5 (September/October 1982), p. 197.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

expeditiously agree to and coordinate an effective conventional pre-emption and, unlike the Warsaw Pact (in which the Soviet Union provides two-thirds of the forces), no individual NATO member has a large enough share of the Alliance's military power to mount a conventional first strike. A second alternative is defense in depth. This too has been politically foreclosed for NATO, though it is certainly more conceivable than preemption. Operationally, though, there is scant depth to use on the Central Front (whereas Moscow has vast depth — as the Germans found in the 1940s — if it fears having to cope with a Western attack). A third alternative is "overinsurance" in force levels — maintaining a cushion of power (as the Soviets do) against worse-case circumstances, so that one can recover and win even after losing a great deal to the enemy's initial attack. This too is politically foreclosed to the West. Periodically NATO's relative position in the conventional balance has been improved, and could be again, but not to the point of reversing the imbalance so that *it* has the same size cushion Moscow has had.

So much emphasis on political obstacles suggests timid resignation to tradition. Yet the political barriers are linked paradoxically to NATO's greatest strength. Two over-arching asymmetries between East and West dominate the strategic calculus, however forces and strategies are adapted at the margins. One is geography, which favors the Pact operationally — interior lines of communication, as opposed to the Atlantic Ocean which separates the NATO front from its principal source of power, the United States. The other is economic and political power, which favors NATO. Wealth provides great advantages in the peacetime competition (and military advantage in a long war, if NATO averts defeat and has time to mobilize its industrial and manpower potential). The greatest advantage is the affinity of democracy, the essential adhesive in the coalition. And in terms of maximizing operational power, any conceivable military improvements pale in significance compared to the importance of allied solidarity. Any scheme for improved conventional deterrence that ignores implications for that solidarity risks damaging military potential as much as helping it. In the current political and economic climate, aggressive arm-twisting for much larger and sustained defense spending increases might do this. The strategic problem in the Alliance now is that traditional obstacles to conventional solutions have been matched by strident opposition to nuclear offsets.

The pressure to move to a no-first-use policy comes from two contradictory constituencies: public antinuclear movements and elite defense analysts. The latter favor substituting conventional deterrence but there is no evidence that many of the former do. Leftist elements in antinuclear movements are either disinterested in or opposed to deter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rence, while few of the moderates appear willing to pay for lower reliance on nuclear weapons by higher defense spending. There is also no reason to believe that the second group, which is small and concentrated in the United States, will carry more political weight than the collection of groups in the first category, which is large and transnational and though weakened since 1982–83, still influential in domestic debates.

Aside from overwhelming doubts about political feasibility there are compelling doubts about the political desirability of explicitly embracing NFU even if NATO would markedly improve conventional forces. That improvement should be pursued in any case, and it *might* provide *sufficient* defensive capability, but it would still not create *equality* in the conventional balance. Unless the increase could only be engineered by offering no-first-use as the quid pro quo to the domestic antinuclear constituencies, which would be a reasonable bargain, what is to be gained by relieving Moscow of overt risk in the nuclear dimension without securing equal risk in the conventional dimension? Why not instead offer no-first-use in exchange for an acceptable agreement (conventional parity as estimated by the West) in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations? This could probably not be negotiated,[22] and, if it were, would not eliminate the risk of defeat that is the warrant for nuclear threats. But political benefits — either of just making the offer or having it accepted — might gain as much strategically as it loses in objective military risk. Linking no-first-use to MBFR provides Washington with a reasonable bargaining position vis-à-vis three crucial groups whose cooperation is required to achieve conventional improvement if not equality: U.S. and European antinuclear movements, West European governments, and the Soviet Politburo. The sorry history of MBFR negotiations (more than a decade without an accord), and the disastrous state of current U.S.-Soviet relations, do not offer grounds for much optimism. But the odds of success in the negotiating forum are not lower than the chances of securing alliance-wide increases in Western defense spending. If vigorous and publicized linkage of MBFR and NFU does not induce Moscow to reduce its conventional forces, it might at least marginally encourage whatever political inclination there is in the West to improve NATO forces. (Recall that initiation of MBFR helped to derail the Mansfield Amendment.)

As long as East-West confrontation in Europe endures, there will be a contradiction between minimizing the danger of war (by threats of retaliatory escalation) and minimizing the danger of suicide if war occurs (evoking the need to implement the threat). A reasonable way to straddle

[22] MBFR has not succeeded even with bargaining on the basis of manpower totals. Putting a higher premium on parity would lead the West to consider factoring more complex firepower criteria into the calculus, which would further complicate bargaining.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the horns of the dilemma would be to exchange the nuclear component of deterrence for an equal level of conventional deterrence between the two sides. The West would still not have good analytical grounds for high confidence in conventional defense, but the East would have lower grounds for confidence in conventional offense. While risk would still exist, the West would not have the disproportionate share. Residual risk is preferable to either alternative: a huge and infeasible NATO conventional build-up, mimicking the Soviet penchant for maximal insurance, or excessive reliance on the nuclear Grand Illusion and acceptance of Soviet conventional advantage. Without equalization of risk across the spectrum of military capability, however, and as long as the probability of Soviet attack remains low, there is no obvious reason to compromise deterrence in order to reduce the danger of escalation if deterrence fails.

The issues of military deterrence and defense must be addressed in the context of the political aspects of the East-West conflict. Military capabilities become a direct and primary concern only in the rare instances when the possibility of war looms into view. At most this has occurred in Europe only on four occasions since World War II: The Berlin crises of 1948, 1958, and 1961, and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Most of the time military factors remain an indirect concern, the background against which diplomatic relations and political initiatives between and within the two alliances take place. For these purposes there is an importance to the principle of military equality that transcends the odds for deterrence and defense. There is nothing to be gained from any more explicit acceptance of net Soviet military superiority, even if the overall imbalance would not guarantee victory to Moscow in war. Since the USSR achieved strategic nuclear parity and a quantitative edge in theater nuclear forces, while retaining a conventional edge, one cannot make a credible case that NATO can assert net equality. But the breathtaking principle of resorting to first-nuclear-use before surrender in war blurs the fact of peacetime inequality and allows — albeit less credibly than in past decades — an inchoate but useful impression of offsetting options. Official renunciation of the nuclear counter to the Warsaw Pact's conventional edge would not necessarily produce the sorts of drastic political changes implied by the crude image of "Finlandization," but it would in a sense promote the creeping legitimacy of Soviet hegemony in Europe. Perhaps this might not prove disastrous but it certainly could not be advantageous and would be utterly gratuitous.

If the danger of war from premeditated Soviet aggression is significant, a posture of pure conventional deterrence based on an abstract, finely calibrated assessment of sufficient capability would be recklessly overconfident. The prudent course then would be a large rather

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than modest NATO buildup. If, on the other hand, the danger of war would arise only from defensive Soviet paranoia, and the concern is reassurance of Moscow rather than deterrence, it is difficult to justify even a modest buildup, which Moscow would cite as provocative. The real problem of course is that neither possibility can be completely dismissed, and that in a future crisis the problem may lie in a mixture of motives and miscalculations between the simple extremes. This requires a compromise in doctrine to cover alternate dangers suboptimally, rather than a fully coherent doctrine that would completely cover one of the goals of deterrence or reassurance and thereby damage the other.

Coherent doctrine can exist only if there is no contradiction between deterring conventional war and avoiding escalation if deterrence fails, and only if it makes sense to sacrifice enormous sums to insure completely against worst-case estimates of Soviet capability when there is no basis for worst-case estimates of Soviet intent to attack Europe. Domestic costs of such an option are a prescription for fracturing the Alliance and underline the fact that there is no risk-free alternative. Modestly incoherent doctrine simply accepts *some* risk in several dimensions rather than incurring *high* risk in *one* of the dimensions, in the process of eliminating it completely in another. This Hamlet-like approach cannot satisfy the appetite of intellectuals for rationalization of muddled policy. But inconsistency is politically logical. It can — as it has in various ways for several decades — offer a solution to politicians and diplomats who are professionally well attuned to the virtues of muddling through. Preserving a muddle that satisfies the minimum requirements of several contending interests and views is better than resolving contradictions in a way that threatens NATO solidarity and undermines one part of deterrence while strengthening another. Muddling is necessary to preserve NATO because either extreme alternative — nuclear or conventional — aggravates the suppressed differences in European and U.S. interests, differences that are a greater potential threat to Western deterrent capability than any incremental difference in the military balance.

Finally, continued muddling does not preclude improvements. The basic elements of desirable reform *within* the doctrine of Flexible Response include

(1) As much incremental improvement of conventional capabilities as can be politically managed.

(2) Reaffirmation of commitment to nuclear escalation before surrender, but linked with the declared intention of no *early* first-use (to be justified by progress of the first recommendation). This is no de facto change in the U.S. conception of Flexible Response, but European public anxieties about nuclear war now constitute grounds for pressing European

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

governments to accept this version, and thus also reinforce the political case for conventional improvements.

(3) Strengthening restraints against accidental escalation, for example by keeping TNWs further to the rear (at least keep them out of armored cavalry regiments in the covering force), reducing their number (which NATO already did once in 1980 and plans to do again), and reinforcing central control over firing.[23] This does weaken the compound credibility of escalation, but it is a worthwhile hedge against the possibility that deterrence could fail, in which case undesired escalation would be disastrous.

These are all half-measures or nuances that do not resolve the inconsistencies in NATO doctrine between what is best to do for deterrence, and best to do if deterrence nevertheless fails. As long as nuclear war is unthinkable, what is right for deterrence is wrong for defense, and what is wrong for war is right for peace. There is no way out of this circular problem short of *absolutely* credible nuclear threats (100 percent confidence in deterrence) or conventional defense (100 percent confidence in denial capability) — neither of which is attainable. So within limits, some wise confusion straddles the dilemma better than does a foolish consistency. In a world where many desirable goals have prerequisites incompatible in their pure form, debate should avoid the trap of assuming that clarity of analysis — the focusing on categorical alternatives in order to sharpen understanding of the issues — should be matched by clarity of policy.

[23] Some dual-capable systems might be eliminated, such as aircraft which should be available for conventional operations rather than held back for the nuclear role, while others would not, for example howitzers, which by their number make effective Soviet pre-emption impractical. To match the latter with restraints against accidental use, warheads might be dispersed *separately* from artillery delivery systems, with provisions to ferry them quickly by helicopter if release authority is given.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC OPINION AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY *

by Peter Schmidt

Allied perceptions of Germany have undergone remarkable shifts. After World War II, the discussion centered on a possible revival of German militarism and authoritarianism triggered by a political and economic crisis. In the 1970s there was a transformation "from problem to model," [1] and today many believe that Germany is a problem again. These shifting attitudes deserve serious attention especially in Washington and Paris. The focus, however, has totally changed: no longer being the danger of militarism and authoritarianism, but rather neutralism and pacifism. The emergence of a significant peace movement in the Federal Republic has altered this view. It is now possible to see France and not West Germany as "a solid anchor of the West." [2]

All doubts and criticisms focus on whether the Germans still accept the fundamentals of NATO: the perception of a military threat from the Soviet Union, a close relationship between West Germany and the United States, and a strategy of deterrence, traditionally strongly supported in the Federal Republic.[3] The typical critical view of West Germany's stand on these three issues can be described as follows:

- The traditional threat perception has unrealistically diminished.
- Perhaps Germans still accept deterrence, but their preparedness for real battle, as one precondition for deterrence, is very weak. They tend to replace deterrence and defense with a policy of détente.

* I had the opportunity to undertake this study during a visit to the Rand Corporation. The visit, part of an exchange program between the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Ebenhausen, FRG) and Rand, was sponsored by the Thyssen Foundation (Germany) and the Ford Foundation (U.S.). I am grateful to Ingo Schadt who gave me access to the polls done by EMNID-Bielefeld and the Institut fuer Demoskopie, Allensbach. An expanded version of this article is published as a Rand Paper (P-7016).

[1] Peter J. Katzenstein, "Problem or Model? West Germany in the 1980s," *World Politics,* July 1980, p. 578.

[2] "An unexpected anchor," *Los Angeles Times,* March 21, 1984, p. II, 6. For an overview of the American criticism, see Gebhard Schweigler, *West German Foreign Policy. The Domestic Setting* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 1-5.

[3] For the consensus based on these essentials in Germany see, for the mid-1960s, K. W. Deutsch, L. J. Edinger, R. C. Macridis, and R. I. Meritt, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance* (New York: Scribner's, 1967); for the mid-1970s, Dietmar Schoessler and Erich Weede, *West German Elite Views on National Security and Foreign Policy Issues* (Koenigstein/Ts.: Athenaeum, 1978).

Peter Schmidt is a Research Associate at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen (Federal Republic of Germany). He has studied economics, political science and pedagogy at the University of Heidelberg and the University of Mannheim, where he took his doctorate.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

- The close relationship with the United States is in danger, and there is a growing tendency to conform to Soviet ideas and policies.

The following analysis concerns the public view of these fundamental questions and criticisms as reflected in data obtained from polls. The central question is whether this critical view can be confirmed by the results of public opinion polls. In examining public opinion, this study will distinguish between the general public, the national security elite, and the general elite. The German data will be compared with data on public opinion in important allied countries. Using polls to describe and explain security policy gives only partial insight into the nature of policy, and requires several strategies to eliminate some of the pitfalls: (1) several polls with similar questions will be examined in order to eliminate those false results produced by the phrasing of the question; (2) marginal differences will be ignored; (3) where possible, the results of security elite and general elite studies will be compared, in an effort to avoid bias; (4) in addition, a time-series perspective will be taken so that long-term tendencies may be perceived.

Data were obtained from several representative public opinion polls; the SIPLA study — a mail survey of the national security elite in West Germany (1980-81); [4] the Science Center Berlin Mail Survey of Security Elites in Five Nations of the International Institute for Comparative Social Research in Berlin (1983); [5] and from "Fuehrungsschicht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1981," an investigation of the opinions and attitudes of the German elite conducted at the University of Mannheim.[6]

[4] SIPLA stands for "Sicherheitspolitische Planungsprobleme." Six hundred and twenty questionnaires were returned. The sample consists of members of the following groups: committees of security policy of the parties (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU]; Social Democratic Party, [SPD]; Free Democratic Party [FDP]) and the party factions of the Bundestag; representatives of the armament industry and trade unions; journalists of the press, radio broadcasting, and television; scientists; representatives of interest groups with a security background; high-ranking members of the Bundeswehr; and members of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik. An overview gives the analysis of Erich Weede, Dietmar Schoessler, and Matthias Jung, "West German Elite Views on National Security Issues: Evidence from a 1980/81 Survey of Experts," *Journal of Strategic Studies,* 1/1983, pp. 82-95. The results are documented in Dietmar Schoessler, and Matthias Jung, "SIPLA-Umfrage 1980/81, Tabellenband," Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik Universitaet Mannheim, Mannheim 1982.

[5] The survey was conducted in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. Four hundred to 600 individuals in each country were polled. The available data set contains 786 cases: 211 from FRG, 70 from France, 147 from Great Britain, 211 from the Netherlands, and 147 from the United States. Besides the formal elites in government, politics, and the military, opinion-makers in the media, science, the business community, trade unions, the churches, and the peace movement were included. For further information see Heinrich Siegmann, "The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey of Security Elites in Five Nations: Codebook and Marginals of Responses," *IIVG Papers,* Berlin: Veroeffentlichungsreihe des Internationalen Instituts fuer Vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung Wissenschaftszentrum IIVG/dp·83-106, August 1983.

[6] The study used the "positional approach" to select 3,580 elite members in the Federal Republic in ten sectors (politics, administration, enterprises, economic interest groups, trade unions, mass media, science, military, culture, and others). The study comprised 1,744 interviews. The personal interviews, based on a formal questionnaire, were conducted from March to July 1981 (Rudolf Wildenmann, Max Kaase, Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, Albrecht Kutteroff, and Wolf Gunter, *Fuehrungsschicht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,* [Mannheim: Universitaet Mannheim, Juni 1982]).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In 1980, the peace issue had about the same importance as at the beginning of the 1950s when the high tension between East and West climaxed in the Korean War.[7] Other issues, such as the Berlin problem or the reunification issue, lost almost all significance. And even the top German issue of economic prosperity decreased in importance, despite a growing unemployment rate at the end of the 1970s. Mirroring the political climate, these results reflect the prominence of the peace issue.

At the same time, the nature and necessary content of security policy caused difficulties within the Alliance. Most important in considering the origins of these problems is whether they are due to differences in threat perception or can be attributed to a distinct strategy toward the threat. While the distinction is somewhat artificial it has practical analytical benefits. The first and central question is the German view of the threat, and whether this perception indicates differences with important allies.

The Threat Perception

The great importance of threat perception for an alliance arises from the experience that common threat perception unifies allies, whereas different views of the threat produce problems in coordinating policies. In the case of the Alliance, this question is of even greater importance, because the assumption of a general military threat from the East underpins NATO. When this threat perception disappears, it will be necessary to find a new legitimacy for the current structures or to rebuild the whole security system. In West Germany this question is crucial, because the view of an aggressive or at least offensive Soviet Union was the basis for the German armed forces.[8]

An analysis of threat perception from the West German viewpoint must consider certain circumstances that are more relevant for West Germany than for the United States. There is some truth in the old saying "Where you stand depends on where you sit." In the 1970s West Germany accepted the territorial status quo in Europe, including the Oder-Neisse border and the de facto partition of Germany. While juridicial and political reservations exist,[9] there are no major conflicts today, in a con-

[7] See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, *The Germans. Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980,* (London: Westport, 1981), p. 144.

[8] Trust in the Bundeswehr's peacekeeping function is very high. No legitimate crisis for the German armed forces is therefore visible. During the 1970s trust in the Bundeswehr even increased from 69 percent in 1974 to 91 percent in 1979 and decreased only slightly to 86 percent in 1983 (EMNID Sample Enquiry no. 2000, members of the electorate).

[9] Empirical findings even suggest that this is also true on the level of the "national consciousness" (Schweigler, 1984, pp. 43-49). That does not mean that you cannot find positive statements regarding reunification. At the security elite level a positive view is demonstrated in the results of the SIPLA study. Asked whether they are prepared to give up the reunification goal, 72.2 percent said "no." However, this goal is understood in a tactical sense, or is a mere hope. The close attachment to the West has a much higher priority than the reunification goal (see table 1 and Schweigler, 1984, pp. 47-48).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crete sense, between East and West in Germany.[10] In particular, the current status of West Berlin is not in question.[11] Some problems such as the automatic firing devices on the border and the amount that West German visitors to East Germany must exchange per day in Eastern currency are not prime public concerns as were, for example, the crisis in Hungary in 1956, the wall between the two Germanies in August 1961, or the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The main conflicts have been far away: Vietnam, the several conflicts in Africa, and the invasion of Afghanistan.[12] The military buildup of the Soviet Union is also an abstraction because it is not easy to see why the Soviet Union should invade the Federal Republic. And there is also the question of whether the Soviets and the other Warsaw Pact countries are strong enough — or will become strong enough — to conclude that they can overrun West Germany to great benefit and at acceptable cost.

What remains is the danger of blackmail and the long-term internalization of Soviet objectives, a subtle process that merits less public attention than a full-scale Soviet intervention. In this political context, it is astonishing that the threat in the view of the general public increased during the 1970s.[13]

At the beginning of the 1970s, the golden age of détente, only 30 percent of the general public believed that the communist threat was real. The perception grew to 50 percent in 1981, and declined only moderately to 47 percent in 1984. Other data show that in the 1970s there was a somewhat balanced situation between those who perceived a threat and those who did not.[14] Noelle-Neumann shows that in 1980, 44 percent of the public thought there was a threat from the Russian side contrasted with the 34 percent who perceived no threat.[15] Probably the increase in threat perception, in the latter study from 28 percent in 1971 to 44 percent in 1980, was generated by *Ostpolitik*'s running out of steam after having established important contracts with some Eastern countries. People who believed that there would be still more progress

[10] See Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1979: Necessities and Choices," Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., *West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1979,* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 15-36.

[11] The Soviets have not yet taken countermeasures against the deployment of Pershing-II and cruise missiles in West Germany and have not threatened the status quo in Berlin or the traffic lines between West Berlin and the FRG.

[12] It is remarkable that the German security elite do not perceive a high threat for the next five to ten years from economic dependencies on oil and natural resources. But this kind of threat perception also is not very high in other European countries or the United States (see Siegmann, "The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey," pp. 4 and 6).

[13] See EMNID-Bielefeld, Meinungsbild zur Wehrpolitischer Lage, August 1984, p. 14.

[14] See Noelle-Neumann, *The Germans,* p. 430.

[15] A significant segment is "undecided" (1980 = 22 percent).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

must have become disillusioned, because it was impossible to overcome the fundamental political confrontation: the separation of Europe.

Even more interesting is the period after 1976. In that year, U.S. President Ford shelved détente because of international communist activism, especially in Africa. There was not a large increase in threat perception in Germany during that period. Threat perception increased following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, then decreased. The German public, having accepted the political realities in the middle of Europe, tend to understand that international conflicts are not their own. *Ostpolitik* detached the Germans to some degree from the course of international conflicts as seen by Washington and other allies. Besides the problem of what the objective threat is — another topic — the question arises of whether Germany is really an exception in this respect. The answer from poll results in several important countries is yes, but only to some extent.

An international poll conducted during the spring of 1983 suggests that the German people tend to interpret the political developments of the 1970s in a positive way, to generalize from their own situation, and to see their security problems solved to an important extent by the results of *Ostpolitik*.[16] In Germany, fewer people than in other allied states believe that Soviet world influence is expanding.[17] The majority of 51 percent think that Russia's influence is stable. Most other countries have a more sceptical view: in the United States, 35 percent of those polled believe that Russia is not expanding its influence; in Great Britain, 35 percent; and in France only 28 percent. The majority of people in these allied countries believe that Soviet influence is expanding (United States, 55 percent; Great Britain, 51 percent; France, 50 percent). The optimistic German attitude accompanies a positive view of Western political efficiency and the ability to cope with the Soviet Union. The same study shows that Germans believe to a greater extent than citizens in other NATO states that the Western democracies can stop an expansion of Soviet influence. In the Federal Republic 68 percent chose this response, whereas only 53 percent of the respondents in the United States, 42 percent in Great Britain and 40 percent in France share this view. The differences indicate only a tendency among West Germans to see their nation detached from the international situation; it is not the dominant attitude.

[16] The positive image of *Ostpolitik* was as high in 1980 as in 1973: "Do you think that *Ostpolitik*, that is, coming to an understanding with the socialist states of Eastern Europe, has been worth the effort so far or not?" The answers: "Worth the effort": 5/1973 = 49 percent, 1/1980 = 51 percent. "Not worth the effort": 5/1973 = 29 percent, 1/1980 = 28 percent. "Undecided": 5/1973 = 22 percent; 1/1980 = 21 percent. Source: Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, and Edgar Piel, *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1978-1983*, (Muenchen: Saur, 1983), p. 637.

[17] See Institut fuer Geopolitik, Paris, Sample Inquiry by EMNID-Bielefeld, April/May 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A look at several dimensions of the threat shows that the general public shares this more moderate view with the national security elite. The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey (spring 1983) confirms some differences between the Federal Republic and the United States, but they are not striking. In comparison with the United States and other countries, the national security elite of West Germany

- Place less emphasis on Soviet expansionism (FRG, 18 percent; France, 36 percent; United States, 23 percent; Great Britain, 16 percent; Netherlands, 19 percent).
- Stress slightly more the dangers caused by the confrontation of the United States and the USSR (FRG, 25 percent; France, 7 percent; United States, 22 percent; Great Britain, 21 percent; Netherlands, 19 percent).
- Are more critical of the possible destabilizing effects of modern weapon systems (FRG, 22 percent; United States, 16 percent; Great Britain, 17 percent; Netherlands, 18 percent. This response was not chosen by the French security elite.).[18]

It is remarkable that the differences between the German and the French security elites are greater than those between the German and the American elites.

The SIPLA study shows the character of threat perception among the German security elite in distinguishing between aggressive, offensive, and defensive images of the Soviet Union:

- Less than 30 percent believe that the Soviet Union is *aggressive* — prepared to fight a war to expand its influence.
- Approximately 60 percent believe that the Soviet Union is not an aggressive but an *offensive* power. They believe that the USSR sees its military power as a political instrument to change the correlation of forces in order to expand its influence more indirectly.
- Only slightly over 10 percent see the USSR in a *defensive* position.[19]

Threat perception permits a comparison of the opinions of the general elite and the security elite in the Federal Republic. One question

[18] See Siegmann, "The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey,", p. 4. The question was: "What do you perceive as the *primary* threats to your nation's security today and in the next five to ten years, if any?"

[19] See Peter Schmidt and Matthias Jung, "Militaerische Entspannung in Mitteleuropa aus der Sicht sicherheitspolitischer Akteure und Experten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland — das Beispiel MBFR," in Dietmaer Schoessler, ed., *Militaer und Politik. Das Sowjetunionbild in der sicherheitspolitsichen Analyse,* (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe, 1983), pp. 37-38. An English translation will be published in *Armed Forces and Society.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concerning this variable was posed in both the Fuehrungsschicht and the SIPLA study with basically the same results:[20]

- The USSR is above all interested in the continuance of its empire and the maintenance of its Eastern European pawns. It is primarily defensive and thinks in terms of maintaining stability (security elite, 15.1 percent; general elite, 18 percent).
- The USSR aims only at the domination of Europe and is therefore offensive both in the political and military fields toward Western Europe (security elite, 1 percent; general elite, 0.7 percent).
- In addition to its offensive security policy, the USSR takes advantage of all opportunities to expand its influence (security elite, 51.9 percent; general elite, 65 percent).
- The USSR aims at global hegemony in the long term (security elite, 32 percent; general elite,17 percent).[21]

There is a small difference between the opinion of the security elite and that of the general elite concerning the type of Soviet "offensive objectives," but basically the difference is not great. Combining the third and fourth responses above, over 80 percent in both groups believe the Soviet Union to be an offensive power.

The German view of the threat can be still better illustrated when considering a possible scenario for war in Europe. Which scenario most threatens Germany in the view of the security elite? The SIPLA study asked the probability of these several scenarios for war:

- Conventional surprise. After secret preparation, the Warsaw Pact attacks the Federal Republic of Germany and thrusts through to the Atlantic coast by means of a large conventional breakthrough employing tank armies.
- Nuclear surprise. By a nuclear strike, the USSR attacks strategic targets in the United States and Europe, and moves through Europe with conventional troops.
- Pre-emptive conventional attack. A serious political conflict occurs between East and West in Europe. The Warsaw Pact attacks in Europe to forestall an attack from NATO.
- Oil supply crisis. The oil supply lines of the West are interrupted. The United States intervenes in order to secure the supply. The Soviet Union employs countermeasures in Europe. The escalation gets out of hand and leads to the outbreak of war by Soviet intervention.
- Spillover from the Third World. In the Third World, a war of proxies escalates and draws superpower intervention. The conflict spills over to Europe.

Combining the answers for "probable" and "possible" reveals that most

[20] See Schoessler and Jung, "SIPLA-Umfrage 1980/81" and Wildenmann et al., "Fuehrungsschicht," pp. 74-75.

[21] The sector "party elites" reveals differences between the CDU/CSU and the SPD that mirror the current political situation quite clearly with regard to threat perception. Both parties prefer the third answer (CDU/CSU = 59.2 percent; SPD = 54.2 percent). In both party elites, a view of the Soviet Union as aggressive dominates, but the SPD has a very strong group favoring the first defensive view (42.5 percent) whereas this group does not exist in the CDU/CSU. In second place among Christian Democrats is the view that the Soviet Union aims at global hegemony (40.8 percent).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

members of the national security elite in Germany believe that the reasons for an outbreak of war in Europe will stem from non-Europeans. The responses were distributed as follows (multiple answers were possible):

- Conventional surprise = 23 percent.
- Nuclear surprise = 19.5 percent.
- Pre-emptive conventional attack = 52.9 percent.
- Oil supply crisis = 79.2 percent.
- Spillover from Third World = 62.8 percent.[22]

The German security elite do not believe that a war will arise from a European conflict. This result conforms to the foregoing statement about the German view of a rather stable political situation in Europe. Most people do not see the Soviets attacking Western Europe because of a deep conflict of interest located in Europe itself. The German government, therefore, has very limited influence over this kind of threat.[23]

Some perception of a threat from the communist side remains. This perception increased in the 1970s, but was stable in the second half of that decade. The differences between West Germany and important allies, especially the United States, are a matter of degree and character. In quantitative terms threat perception is not as great in West Germany as in other important allied countries. The basic view of the threat is political; Germany feels more threatened by a possible spillover of a conflict from the Third World and the oil supply countries. While the differences are not great, it is probable that this kind of threat perception influences priorities in security policy.

Deterrence, Defense, and Détente

Two strategies define the differences between Germany and important allies in security matters: deterrence, which means to increase the costs of a Soviet attack to an unacceptable level by military means; and détente, which can be understood as an instrument to lower the interest in an armored conflict by strengthening diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties. Germany is often blamed for putting too much emphasis on détente, and neglecting deterrence and defense. That estimation is based less on an evaluation of the adequate military burden in terms of

[22] See Schoessler and Jung, "SIPLA-Umfrage 1980/81," pp. 164-68.

[23] Nevertheless, the German security elite apparently do not believe that even this scenario is likely. When asked what the primary threats to the nation's security are likely to be in the next five to ten years, only 5 percent see the economic vulnerabilities of the West (such as dependence on oil and natural resources) as being of primary importance (see Siegmann, "The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey," p. 4).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

troops or money than in attitudes toward the military.[24] How do the Germans view both these policies?

Deterrence/Defense

Under modern conditions, the main problem of the deterrence concept is the question of what happens when deterrence fails. Since the publication of Weizsaecker's basic study *The Consequences and the Prevention of War,*[25] this problem has received considerable attention in the FRG's scientific debate.

On the level of public opinion, this discussion has been accompanied by an increasing belief in the likelihood of a new world war.[26] In 1971, only 11 percent of those polled thought a new world war likely in the next ten years, but by 1981, this proportion had risen to 32 percent. The increase occurred between 1977 — the year of the discussion about the Enhanced Radiation Warhead — and 1981. In 1977, only 13 percent believed in the possibility of a new world war; in 1981, 32 percent of the sample believed a world war possible. The decrease in this fear in 1982 to 19 percent shows, however, that people tend to react to political circumstances and domestic debates and do not hold hard opinions that deterrence will fail because of inherent and structural difficulties. More moderate tones on the U.S. side and the beginning of arms control talks about medium-range missiles in Europe have probably contributed to this decline. If one takes a comparative view, one can see that the fear of war is not solely a German concern.[27] An even greater proportion of people in France, and almost as many in the United Kingdom, believe that a world war is certain or has more than a fifty-fifty chance. In the Federal Republic this belief grew from 12.1 percent in October/November 1977 to 21.9 percent in April 1980, and decreased to 16.1 percent in October 1982. In France, the question was posed at the same times with the following results: 12.4 percent (1977); 32.4 percent (1980); and 20.3 percent (1982). In Great Britain the results were roughly parallel: 12.1 percent (1977), 36.1 percent (1980), and 15.9 percent (1982). This phenomenon seems to be more a European than a German problem.[28]

[24] See Horst Mendershausen, "The Defense of Germany and the German Defense Contribution," The Rand Corporation, P-6686, September 1981, pp. 17-20.

[25] Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, ed., *Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhuetung,* (Muenchen: Carl Hanser 1971).

[26] *Euro-Barometer,* "Die Oeffentliche Meinung in der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft," Nr. 18, December 1982, p. 9.

[27] *Euro-Barometer,* "Die Oeffentliche Meinung," pp. A 11-A 16.

[28] And even in the United States the people are concerned about the possibility that the world will be plunged into a nuclear war. In November 1983, 59 percent of a representative sample said that they are very concerned about that possibility (*World Opinion Update,* January 1984, p. 13).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A similar situation can be found at the security elite level. The question by the Science Center Berlin Mail Survey is not on world war but on limited war in Europe. In spite of its being a more critical question for Germany, a great percentage of the sample do not believe that a limited nuclear war in Europe is likely within the next five to ten years. Indeed, the German elite is more critical on this issue, but the differences with some important allies are not too great. In Germany, 18 percent of the security elite tend to agree or agree strongly with the statement that a limited nuclear war in Europe is likely in the next five to ten years; in France, only 10 percent; in Great Britain, 12 percent; in the Netherlands, 6 percent; and in the United States also only 6 percent.[29] There is, in this respect, no special "German symptom."

What is the reason for this result? Is the strong belief that there will be no world war or limited nuclear war due to the fairly stable situation in Europe or to deterrence and defense preparedness? The polls show that Germans have confidence in deterrence, with 53 to 58 percent of those polled believing deterrence to be a good way of preventing possible attack in the second half of the 1970s. The support declined, however, from 55 percent in December 1982 to 46 percent in June 1983.[30] The security elite in Germany seem to support deterrence to an even greater degree than does the general public. The SIPLA study, in querying whether deterrence is an approved concept, found three views:[31]

- The first group (62 percent) expressed a positive view of deterrence because it avoids war, at least in better ways than other measures do.
- The second group (18 percent) had a moderate view of deterrence, believing that deterrence creates the preconditions for détente and at least reduces the danger of war.
- The evaluation of the third group (20 percent) was negative. They believed that deterrence should be replaced by another concept of security, at least in the long run.

The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey of 1983 confirms our presumption that acceptance of deterrence requires a positive view of military strength:[32]

- 61 percent believe that military strength is very important or fairly important for national security.
- Only 37 percent see military strength as not at all important for national security or as not very important.

A comparison between countries shows, however, that there are remarkable differences between West Germany and important allies. Es-

[29] Siegmann, "The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey," p. 16.
[30] *Institut fuer Demoskopie,* Allensbach.
[31] Schmidt and Jung, "Militaerische Entspannung," p. 23.
[32] Siegmann, "The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey," p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pecially in comparison with France and the United States, the German security elite are much less convinced that military strength is important to national security. In France, 90 percent of the security elite sample rate military strength as "very important" or "fairly important"; in the United States, 89 percent.[33] There is a difference between Germany and these two allies of almost 30 percent.[34]

This result is supported by the responses to the question of how important military *balance* is. The differences among the elites are not as great here as in respect to military strength. Asked, "Do you think that the existence of a military balance between the East and the West is important for your country's security," 69 percent of the elite sample answered yes. In France, this response was chosen by 96 percent; in the United States, by 87 percent.[35] The dispersion of opinion is almost the same as in the case of military strength. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that within the West German security elite and among security elites of important allies, this question elicits a higher consent on military balance than on military strength. The term "military strength" seems to be connected to some degree with a more active use of military power than the term "balance" which has a clear relationship to present policy.

In Germany this result corresponds to public opinion. In February 1981, two-thirds of the people believed that the long-term goal of the West should be military balance between East and West; only 16 percent preferred military superiority.[36] That gives some insight into German thinking in relation to the usefulness of the military today. The military's function is to protect the status quo and to permit some freedom of action. It is not an active instrument for policy in any respect. Therefore, in Germany, one cannot find much sympathy for the view that gained ground in the United States in the last few years: that military superiority creates advantages.[37] Besides an adequate military potential, deterrence has another precondition: it must be supported by some preparedness to

[33] The results for the other countries: Great Britain = 74 percent, Netherlands = 78 percent.

[34] This difference is probably to some degree a product of the bias in the French sample in that no member of the Communist party was asked. There is also no peace group activist in the sample. Nevertheless that is not as important, because in comparison with other countries there is no influential peace movement in France.

[35] In Great Britain 79 percent voted in favor of "yes," in the Netherlands 83 percent (Siegmann, "The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey," p. 7).

[36] "Militaerische Staerke: Gleichgewicht genuegt," *Der Spiegel,* March 2, 1981, p. 36.

[37] "Do you think the military strength of the United States should be superior to the Soviet Union, should be about equal in strength, or does the United States not need to be exactly as strong as the Soviet Union?" In June 1979, 42 percent of the general public in the United States called for superiority; in August 1980, 51 percent; in September 1980, 51 percent and 61 percent; in October 1980, 56 percent; and in February 1981, 52 percent (Tom W. Smith, "The Polls, American Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union and Communism," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 47/1983, p. 284). Another study shows that in the United States between 1974 and 1978 the tendency grew to stress military dimensions in foreign policy at the elite and the mass level (Robert W. Oldendick, and Barbara Ann Bardes, "Mass and Elite Foreign Policy Opinions," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 46/1982, pp. 374-75).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fight. This is the basis for a sophisticated reproach to West Germany. The argument is that the Germans accept only the deterrence side of the strategy but lack the political and psychological preparedness for real defense. Many Americans believe that their own demilitarization policy in Germany after World War II was too successful in this respect.

The argument that Germany does not want to fight for freedom can easily be disproved by a public opinion poll of 1982 indicating that "given the horrors of war today," the Germans would resist a Soviet attack with force, and not give in to Soviet domination. Almost 74 percent held this opinion; only 19 percent were prepared to accept Soviet domination.[38] Polls of the EMNID institute reveal the development of this opinion in the 1970s. Responses to the issue of preparedness to fight grew from 42 percent in 1975 to 64 percent in 1982, with a slight decrease to 61 percent in 1984.[39]

The more crucial question is about nuclear war. Time series show a growing concern about *nuclear* war, which influences people's readiness to fight. Over time, more and more Germans were prepared to live under a communist government than to fight a nuclear war on German soil. The *acceptability of the current military strategy depends on its perceived ability to avoid nuclear war.* In July 1960, 38 percent wanted to avoid war at all costs; in April 1976 and March 1979, 52 percent; after that a small decrease to 48 percent in May 1981; and 45 percent in July 1981.[40] However, Germany is not alone in this opinion. In the United States as well, many people are not willing to risk the destruction of their country if faced with potential Russian domination. In March 1982, 32 percent of the U.S. public held this opinion.[41] While that does not seem to be as significant a proportion as in Germany, the question was less definite than the German and referred to an unrealistic scenario.

In Germany the percentage of the security elite that does not want to fight is almost as high as at the public opinion level. The question

[38] See Herman Kahn and Michael Redepennig, *Die Zukunft Deutschlands. Niedergang oder neuer Aufstieg der Bundesrepublik,* (Wien: Molden 1982) p. 307. The readiness to fight in other countries: Great Britain = 75 percent, France = 57 percent, Belgium = 49 percent, Denmark = 56 percent, Italy = 48 percent, Suisse = 77 percent, and the United States = 83 percent.

[39] The question was "How would you react to an armed attack on the Federal Republic. Would you fight with an arm, would you, when you are not educated for that, fight somehow and defend yourself, or would you deny both?" (See EMNID-Bielefeld, Meinungsbild zur Wehrpolitscher Lage, August 1984, p. 20, Verteidigungsklima 1972-1983).

[40] *Institut fuer Demoskopie,* Allensbach (see Kenneth Adler, and Douglas Wertmann, "Is NATO in Trouble? A Survey of European Attitudes," *Public Opinion,* August/September 1981, p. 11). The question was: "No one knows what will happen, but what do you think — if we are confronted with the choice of either letting Europe become Sovietized or resisting the move with every means at our disposal, which is more important — to defend democratic freedom, even if it leads to a nuclear war, or to avoid war above all, even though it means having to live under a Communist government?"

[41] *Public Opinion,* April/May 1983, p. 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Question 15: "A number of options are often discussed in public debates on the justification of the use of military force. In the following list of statements, please pick the one which comes closest to your own opinion."

	FRG $N = 207$	*F* 78	*GB* 142	*NL* 234	*US* 143
Military force should never be used.	37	8	6	9	4
Conventional military force is justified in case of an attack, but the use of nuclear weapons can never be justified even if Western Europe is attacked by nuclear weapons.	18	0	31	25	4
The use of nuclear weapons by NATO is justified if Western Europe is attacked from the East with nuclear weapons	25	31	44	34	50
The use of nuclear weapons by NATO is justified if Western Europe is attacked from the East with conventional weapons in order to bring the war to a speedy end.	14	55	13	24	22
Other possibilities	7	8	8	7	10

SOURCE: Heinrich Siegmann: The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey, p. 22.
NOTE: Results in percentages.

does not refer to personal preparedness, although those polled might understand the question in that way. Thirty-seven percent of the German elite sample believe that military force should never be used (38 percent of the general public would refuse to fight). In other countries this kind of response is infrequent (see table 1). Even conceding some bias in the West German sample, because "should" does not mean that the use of force is forbidden under all thinkable circumstances, the security elite critical of the use of military force is large,[42] especially compared with other countries. There is also little support for the use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack from the Warsaw Pact to bring the war to a quick end. This basic option of the NATO strategy of "flexible

[42] The German sample is not weighted along party lines. Such a procedure would likely change the results in favor of "fighting." Even if we concede that the bias within the other samples is the opposite, the difference remains rather great.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

response" is accepted by only 14 percent of the German sample. The support for this option, however, is not very different from that in other countries. The only true believers are the French. Fifty-five percent of the French security elite sample favored this idea. The German sample also showed a significant opposition to all uses of nuclear weapons in Europe. Combining the third and fourth possibilities, indicating the readiness to use nuclear weapons, finds only 29 percent prepared to use nuclear weapons in response to either a nuclear or a conventional attack in Europe.

These results indicate that the Germans have not actually become pacifists, although there is a large group that seems to prefer pacifism. The majority of the general public and the security elite believe in deterrence and are prepared to fight for freedom. But deterrence is not as highly esteemed as in other NATO countries. Deterrence from the German point of view is defensive; the Germans do not want to cause unnecessary conflicts by military means. Therefore, they prefer military balance to military strength or superiority.[43] The most crucial point is the question of nuclear defense. In the view of the German public — and in other countries too — the credibility of the current military strategy depends on its ability to avoid nuclear war.

Détente

Détente is characterized by the intention to lower interest in an armed conflict by strengthening diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties. During the beginning of the 1970s, *Ostpolitik* — the essential German contribution to détente — created considerable domestic discord between the ruling social-liberal coalition and the CDU/CSU opposition. Nevertheless, there is a broad consensus today between the ruling coalitions of the CDU/CSU and the FDP, the SPD, which constitutes the main party in opposition, and even the Greens. Many divergent ideas and intentions lurk behind this consensus, but, on the whole, Germans want détente. And they would like to see progress in arms control. This interest can be demonstrated by the results of a public opinion poll conducted in January 1980, just after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At that time,74 percent of the general public and even a majority of the CDU voters believed

[43] This kind of thinking can be demonstrated by a 1969 statement of Helmut Schmidt: "Our policy of relaxing tension requires that our defence measures be clearly recognised by the outside world as defensive. The principle of defense calls for a basically defensive structure of the Bundeswehr as regards its military build-up and size. The weapons and equipment of the Bundeswehr must correspond to the defensive missions assigned to it in the framework of the Atlantic alliance. The defensive principle requires moderation in all declarations on the subject of defence policy — moderation in style, speech or writing. From the viewpoint of politics, psychological factors are no less important than the military facts." (Helmut Schmidt, *The Balance of Power. Germany's Peace Policy and the Super Powers,* [London: William Kimber, 1971] pp. 231-32).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the Federal Republic should continue the policy of détente.[44] This interest in détente did not change afterwards. In May 1981, only 6 percent fewer people were in favor of the continuation of détente; [45] and in 1983, 87 percent believed the continuation of détente to be an adequate instrument to make peace secure.[46]

This support of détente can also be seen at the security elite and the general elite levels. The SIPLA security elite poll and the Fuehrungsschicht study asked an opinion of three statements regarding "détente policy after Afghanistan": [47]

- Détente policy has never corresponded to the realities in security policy (security elite, 31.2 percent; general elite, 18 percent).
- Détente policy no longer corresponds to the situation in security policy (security elite, 15.9 percent; general elite, 22 percent).
- In spite of drawbacks and problems, there is no alternative to détente policy (security elite, 52.9 percent; general elite, 60 percent).[48]

The differences between the security and the general elites again are not great. There is only a small bias in favor of more hard-line views in the security elite. More than half in both samples see no alternative to détente. For these people, there is no way back to cold war. However, support of détente does not exclude reliance on deterrence. Just the opposite is true. We can say that the great majority of the German security elite believe in détente based on (some) deterrence as shaped by the Harmel report of 1967.[49]

The security elite poll of the Science Center Berlin confirms this interest in détente by revealing much concern for special détente policies. In this sample the support for détente appears to be even stronger:[50]

---

[44] See Noelle-Neumann, *The Germans,* p. 466. The question was: "Should the Federal Republic continue the policy of détente in the future or does it make no sense to continue this policy?" Seventeen percent voted for "should not continue"; "undecided," 9 percent. Eighty-nine percent of the people with a party preference for the SPD voted in favor of continuing détente; 85 percent with a FDP preference; and 59 percent with a CDU preference.

[45] See Noelle-Neumann and Piel, *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1978-1983,* p. 637.

[46] See SINUS-Institut, *Sicherheitspolitik, Buendnispolitik, Friedensbewegung. Eine Untersuchung zur aktuellen politischen Stimmungsla im Spaetherbst 1983,* (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, October 1983), p. 26.

[47] See Schoessler and Jung, "SIPLA-Umfrage 1980/81" p. 6 and Wildenmann et al., "Fuehrungsschicht," pp. 73-74.

[48] The party sector of the general elite study shows again the differences between the two principal parties. A good percentage of the CDU/CSU elite believes that détente was never realistic or is not yet realistic (92 percent); whereas in the SPD, this view is only shared by 0.8 percent.

[49] See the section on "Deterrence/Defense." The Fuehrungsschicht study shows this too with a slight tendency in favor of détente. Asked for preferences among twenty-five political goals and evaluation on a scale the result was that in seven sectors the goal "preparedness for defense" was esteemed higher than "détente." In five sectors the order was reversed.

[50] See Siegmann, "The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey," p. 8-11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

HOW TO DEAL WITH THE EAST-WEST PROBLEMS

"In the following, a number of options to deal with the present problems of East-West relations are listed. Do you tend to agree, or disagree, with them?"

Selection *Détente/Military Balance*	*agree or agree somewhat*	*disagree or disagree somewhat*
Détente should be pursued independently of the military balance.		
Federal Republic of Germany	66	34
France	30	69
Netherlands	57	40
United States	48	54
Strategic Arms Control		
The U.S. and the USSR should reach an agreement on strategic arms reductions based on the concept of parity.		
Federal Republic of Germany	96	3
France	73	15
Netherlands	87	10
United States	87	11

SOURCE: Heinrich Siegmann: The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey, pp 8 and 10f.
NOTE: Results in percentages.

- 66 percent agree or agree somewhat that détente should be pursued independently of the military balance.
- 96 percent believe that the United States and the USSR should reach an agreement on strategic arms reduction based on the concept of parity.
- Only 19 percent agree or agree somewhat on the question of whether the West should agree on a list of economic sanctions to be used against the USSR in case of future events such as those in Afghanistan or Poland.
- 86 percent believe that the West should seek to increase trade with the East to establish a cooperative relationship, and thus support the progress of détente in mutual interest.

These results indicate a détente-minded view that is only shared by important allies to some degree. And indeed, it is an important question whether Germany is isolated in this respect. A comparison of the results in Germany, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States indicates, however, that with the exception of France, other

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2 — *Continued*

Economic Sanctions	*agree or agree somewhat*	*disagree disagree somewhat*
The West should agree on a list of economic sanctions, and on procedures on when and how to apply them, to be used against the USSR in case of future actions such as in Afghanistan or Poland.		
Federal Republic of Germany	19	78
France	62	34
Netherlands	68	28
United States	72	25
Peace by Trade		
The West should seek to increase trade with the East to establish a cooperative relationship, and thus support the progress of détente in the mutual interest.		
Federal Republic of Germany	86	10
France	38	49
Great Britian	80	18
Netherlands	85	11
United States	72	25

alliance partners share Germany's opinion.[51] The one exception is the problem of economic sanctions. The elite of the Federal Republic are isolated in neglecting such a strategy almost completely. However, Germans have never had great confidence in the efficacy of economic sanctions.[52] Such a view might be caused by the thesis that economic contacts will improve the relationships between East and West. The German elite apparently do not distinguish between general positive thinking about East-West trade and the acceptance of economic sanctions in special situations. However, most FRG allies seem to like the idea of promoting peace by trade almost as much as the Germans — even the security elite in the United States.

[51] See table 2. The study of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations also shows a surprising high support at the elite and the mass levels for détente-related policies. See John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1983,* (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1983), pp. 14-15.

[52] See Friedemann Mueller, "Economic Sanctions in the East-West-Conflict," *Aussenpolitik* (English Version), 1/1984, pp. 67-79.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is interesting to note that the French security elite put more emphasis than do the U.S. elite on such issues as not pursuing détente independently of the military balance, not seeing trade as an instrument to support détente, and looking at military strength as an important factor in international relations. Thus, a closer relationship between Germany and France — projected by some scholars as a partial substitute for German-American relations — will not occur without conflict.

There is no doubt that West Germany is more détente-minded than are other allies. But analysis of the opinions of the security elites on specific détente policies finds other Western countries very close — mirroring the difference between public opinion and policy. An interesting point is that France, often accused of being *the* weak link in the Alliance, seems to be the real hard-liner in NATO at the elite level.[53]

The Alliance

From the German point of view the keystone of the Alliance is a close relationship with the United States.[54] This is important for the effectiveness of the general security and defense policy of the Alliance, and crucial for the functioning of deterrence. Deterrence within an alliance needs a close relationship between the smaller countries and the superpower. The smaller countries have to accept the leadership of the superpower to some degree to make deterrence effective.[55]

At the public opinion level, the Germans seem to fulfill this condition. From the German point of view, America is and will be the preferred partner. When asked their overall opinion of the United States, about 73 percent of Germans are very favorable, or at least somewhat favorable. The Gallup poll conducted in February 1982 shows that no other nation fares better.[56] Even when asked the more crucial question, how confident are the people that the United States deals wisely with world problems, the Gallup study shows that a positive view prevails in the Federal Republic. Fifty-seven percent have this confidence "a great deal" or "a fair amount." This positive view of the United States is shared in Great Britain by only 35 percent, in France by 40 percent, and in Belgium by 45 percent of the respondents.[57]

---

[53] Two reasons are predominant in that French turnaround: the fear of losing the political and military area on an immediate front, West Germany, and a reassessment of the Soviet threat.

[54] For the unchanged strong support of NATO see Schweigler, *West German Foreign Policy*, pp. 59-62. For the positive view of NATO in the United States see Rielly, *American Public Opinion*, p. 21.

[55] See Erich Weede, *Weltpolitik und Kriegsursachen im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine quantitativ-empirische Studie*, (Muenchen und Wien: Oldenbourg, 1975) pp. 72-77.

[56] See *World Opinion Update*, 3/1982, p. 70. A "very favorable" or "somewhat favorable" opinion held in Great Britain 46 percent, in France 55 percent, and in Belgium 49 percent.

[57] See *World Opinion Update*, 3/1982, p. 70.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Experience shows that overall good feeling does not prevent great differences on important issues. As to more concrete acceptance from the Germans — despite the knowledge that foreign troops in a country cause problems — a large percentage of Germans declared U.S. troops indispensable for their security. Even the peace discussion in 1982 and 1983 did little to change this opinion. After an increase from 65 percent in 1972 to 83 percent in 1978, the positive vote decreased only to 72 percent in 1983.[58]

The national security elite shows a strong preference for a close relationship with the United States.[59] Regarding the statement that the security of Germany be guaranteed only by a close alliance with the United States, 71 percent agree or agree strongly; only 27 percent disagree or disagree strongly.[60] Compared with other countries, Germany's result is not the most positive, but Great Britain, the old partner of the United States, who often refers to its special relationship, is least supportive of this view. The difference with other countries is not very great. The desire for a close alliance with the United States is shared in France by 81 percent, in Great Britain by 69 percent, and in the Netherlands by 81 percent. In Europe the French elite — together with the Dutch elite — have at 81 percent the highest positive proportion in favor of a closer relationship with the United States.[61]

There is much public confidence in Germany in the U.S. ability to master current world problems, in comparison with other countries. A closer look at the data shows, however, that change has occurred over time (see table 3). From 1981 to 1983, the percentage of people who have confidence in the United States in this respect, decreased from 62 to 43 percent, combining the categories "very confident" and "fairly confident." The rate of disbelief increased from 36 to 55 percent — a

[58] See EMNID-Bielefeld, Meinungsbild zur Wehrpolitischer Lage, August 1984, p. 41.

[59] See Siegmann, "The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey," p. 14.

[60] In 1981-82 SIPLA found a different result. To "what kind of relationship is desirable between West Germany and the United States," 89.9 percent declared that they prefer a close and constant relationship in defense matters. The results are, however, not directly comparable because the SIPLA question is on "defense" and not on general "close alliance." The fact that only 53.8 percent of the SIPLA panel favored close and continuous cooperation between West Germany and the United States suggests that there is no remarkable erosion of attitudes (see Schoessler and Jung, "SIPLA-Umfrage 1980/81", pp. 44-45). And even when asked whether small and medium-sized nations should accept superpower leadership, 62.9 percent support such leadership (see Schoessler and Weede, *West German Elite Views*, p. 22). The Fuehrungsschicht study shows that the general elite also highly values a good relationship with the United States. Asked how important 25 political goals are, the goal "good relationship with the United States" receives high values in all sectors (between 6.01 and 8.81 on a scale of 10 possible values). Value "0" means "no importance"; value 10, "very important." In all sectors the goal "good relationship with the United States" is more highly valued than that of a "good relationship with the USSR."

[61] Even the young best-educated group, often blamed for neutralist tendencies, favors NATO over neutrality (only 28 percent favor neutrality in Germany). In a comparative view other countries like France (33 percent), Italy (39 percent), Netherlands (30 percent), and Norway (36 percent) have more neutralists in this group (see Kenneth Adler and Douglas Wertmann, "Is NATO in Trouble?" p. 10).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3

CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES OVER TIME

Question: "How confident are you concerning the ability of the United States to master current world problems?"

	10/1981	2/1982	1/1983
Very confident/fairly confident	62	57	43
Not very confident	28	33	44
Not at all confident	8	7	11

SOURCE: Hermann Kahn, Michael Redepennig, *Die Zukunft Deutschlands,* p. 306.
NOTE: Results in percentages.

difference of almost 20 percent within fourteen months. It is clear that the increase had much to do with the first bellicose statements of the Reagan administration and critical discussion in Germany about new U.S. foreign policy.[62] Some statements, especially those emphasizing the benefits of U.S. superiority and the aggressive nature of Soviet communism, contrasted with the German desire for military balance and the view that the Soviets were more a political than a military threat.

This developing criticism is intensified by an increasing confidence in Soviet interest in a reconciliation with the West. Since 1980 the percentage of people who believe in the USSR commitment to seek a reconciliation with the West increased from 16 percent in January 1980 to 45 percent in January 1983.[63] This remarkable change occurred within three years, even though Soviet credibility in 1980 was very low in comparison with previous years, certainly because of the intervention in Afghanistan (see table 4). The Soviet Union has been very successful in improving its peace image in Germany.[64] This is especially true in the evaluation of behavior in the negotiations about Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Geneva.[65] In this context the Soviet Union and the

[62] Asked in February 1981 whether West Germany shall follow the policy of the new Reagan administration, only 38 percent agreed, but 60 percent opposed and pleaded for more political distance from the new administration (see: "Militaerische Staerke: Gleichgewicht genuegt. Spiegel-Umfrage ueber Washingstons neuen Kurs, Polen-Krise und Kriegsfurcht," *Der Spiegel,* March 2, 1981, p. 34). The SINUS study indicates too that many people disagreed with the policy of the Reagan administration. The percentage of people disagreeing with the policy of the U.S. president increased from 31 percent, 1980 (Carter) to 43 percent, 1981 (Reagan), and 61 percent, 1983 (see SINUS, Sicherheitspolitik, p. 21).

[63] Comparing the images of the United States and the Soviet Union from 1980-83 the SINUS study concludes that negative features are increasingly ascribed to both the United States *and* the USSR, and not only to the Soviet Union (see SINUS, *Sicherheitspolitik,* p. 15).

[64] Especially in peace groups can one find a very low confidence in the ability of the United States to solve the current world problems and a rather high degree of confidence that the USSR is prepared for détente.

[65] For a short but significant assessment of the so-called dual-track-decision see David S. Yost, "European-American Relations and NATO's Initial Missile Deployments," *Current History,* April 1984, pp. 145-48 and 184-86.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 4

THE INTEREST OF THE RUSSIANS IN RECONCILIATION

Question: "Do you feel that the Russians are basically committed to seeking a reconciliation with the West at present or don't you think so?"

	April/ May 1959	April 1965	March/ April 1970	July 1974	Feb. 1977	Jan. 1980	July 1981	Mid- Jan. 1983
Think so	17	23	33	29	27	16	36	45
Don't think so	57	56	46	55	60	70	48	37
No opinion/ undecided	26	21	21	16	13	14	16	18

SOURCE: Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap: The German Press and Public Opinion," in *Public Opinion,* October/November 1983, p. 48.
NOTE: Results in percentages.

United States have almost the same status. The majority of people who believe that both superpowers have not done enough to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion believe that the United States *and* the Soviet Union are responsible for this failure (see table 5).[66] Even conceding that the question was posed in a manner that must have influenced people to regard the United States and the Soviet Union as equals, that remarkable result supports the argument that the Soviet Union has greatly improved its image.[67]

In summarizing the German view of the United States, it is possible to say there is a strong demand for a close relationship in security matters. Nevertheless, two negative tendencies reinforce each another. On the one hand the credibility of the United States in foreign and security policy matters seems to be declining; on the other hand the Soviet Union has been quite successful in improving its own image, especially in the context of the INF negotiations.

CONCLUSIONS

Data indicate that West Germany has a positive view of the fundamentals of the current security structure. However, this evaluation contains some significant problems. The danger exists of a growing opinion

[66] One finds similar results when asking whether the United States or the Soviet Union negotiates seriously in Geneva. Thirty-seven percent believe that both superpowers negotiate seriously; 36 percent that both are not serious negotiators; 11 percent agree that the USSR is not a serious negotiator; whereas only 5 percent believe that in the case of the United States (see SINUR, *Sicherheitspolitik,* p. 44).

[67] Sixty-eight percent believe that the superpowers have not done enough, of which 70 percent hold the opinion that both are responsible for that fact. This means that 45.6 percent of the whole sample see the United States and Soviet Union as equal powers in this respect.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 5

THE SUPERPOWERS' COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL

Question: "What do you believe? Have the superpowers done enough to bring the disarmament negotiations in Geneva to a successful end or have they not?"

		CDU/CSU adherents	*SPD adherents*	*FDP adherents*	*Adherents of the Greens*
The superpowers have done enough	10	12	8	7	4
Haven't done enough	68	65	75	76	84
Impossible to say	22	23	17	17	12
"Who has not done enough? United States or Soviet Union?"					
United States	6	1	10	1	12
Soviet Union	22	37	11	23	4
Both	70	60	77	76	83
Impossible to say	2	2	2	—	1

SOURCE: "Angst vor den Raketen: Umfrage zu Nachrüstung und Friedensbewegung," *STERN* Oct. 20, 1983, p. 76.
NOTE: Results in percentages.

gap between Germany and other important allies, especially the United States and France. This danger is due less to a strong difference of opinion over one issue than to a product of accumulated controversial ideas and policies. Therefore the debate over whether the difficulties are due to a difference in threat perception or to different strategies in coping with the threat is misleading. Factors concerning all four areas of central interest are interrelated: the threat perception, the view of deterrence and defense, the estimation of détente, and the relationship between the Federal Republic and the United States. A comparison of the current difficulties in the Alliance and the differences documented in data presented here, suggests that some of the problems are rooted not in different views at the level of the security elites or public opinion, but in differences among the political forces in power.[68] Nevertheless, the polls explain some of

[68] The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations study reveals important differences between the policy of the Reagan administration and public opinion at the elite and mass level. Public opinion is much more moderate and détente-minded than the government and closer to European opinions (see Rielly, *American Public Opinion*, pp. 35-38.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the basic differences within the Alliance, as seen in a summary of the critical issues from the German point of view:

(1) The emphasis is on a political rather than a military view of the threat, which is critical to all tendencies to see the Alliance mainly as a military instrument.

(2) The idea that the probable scenario for a war in Europe will be a spillover of conflicts from the Third World and the oil supply countries assumes confidence in the United States to act wisely in these areas. In this respect, it is dangerous that an increasing number of people do not express much confidence in the United States.

(3) The idea of nuclear war in Europe and any discussion about the possibility of a limited nuclear war in Europe produce problems.

(4) Because Germans have a defensive understanding of the military, all ideas promoting an active role for the military find little agreement in Germany. The idea that military superiority has its benefits is one critical issue within this point.

(5) Détente is highly esteemed in the Federal Republic. The main reasons might be that the German view of the threat does not exclude the possibility of success, and that part of the public, regarding deterrence as a dangerous instrument, believes in the necessity of détente. The impression that détente is not taken seriously, especially in the field of arms control, produces negative reactions.

(6) The most critical development is an increasing belief that the Soviet Union is looking for reconciliation with the West and a decreasing belief that the United States is acting more responsibly than the Soviet Union.

If one takes these results for granted, the deployment of Pershing-IIs and cruise missiles and the course of U.S. foreign policy can be seen as the starting point for increasing problems between Germany and the United States, in terms of the general confidence of the German public in U.S. foreign and security policy. There is a danger that current criticism will become a constant and growing attendant of the Alliance. But the Alliance has never had a "golden age" in a realistic view.[69] Critics from different and changing groups and countries have constantly participated in NATO. Each member of NATO has had and continues to have his own view of the costs and benefits of the current security system, and there is room for positive crisis management despite hard conflicts. NATO is still an alliance of nation states. Within this system, flexibility and some freedom of action are necessary for each of the partners. The leaders in

[69] See Horst Mendershausen, "Outlook on Western Solidarity. Political Relations in the Atlantic Alliance System," The Rand Corporation, R-1512-PR, June 1976, p. 20: "In terms of projections made or visions espoused, but not in terms of realities prevailing, one can find a 'golden age' of Atlantic Relations."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Alliance must be guided by realistic expectations. The Alliance can only suffer from a policy that expects a totally shared and detailed overall strategy. That is not the way to a perfect solution. In this case the familiar adage "less is more" seems true. Or as Neustadt said in his study about the difficulties of bringing two political machines in the Alliance into step, "What remains? Simplicity."[70]

[70] Richard E. Neustadt, *Alliance Politics,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 149.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE DIALECTICS OF DETENTE AND DISCORD: THE MOSCOW-EAST BERLIN-BONN TRIANGLE

by Ronald D. Asmus

On September 4, 1984, the East German diplomatic envoy in Bonn, Ewald Moldt, officially informed his West German hosts that the planned visit by East German party and state chief Erich Honecker to the Federal Republic had been indefinitely postponed, thereby ending weeks of speculation and suspense over the likelihood of that visit.[1] Perhaps most surprising about the East German postponement was the fact that it had not been announced sooner, as one could hardly imagine a less fortuitous set of circumstances for a precedent-setting visit. With U.S.-Soviet relations seemingly in a state of deep-freeze prior to the American elections, and with an increasingly dark shadow over relations between Bonn and Moscow as the Soviet press continued its vicious polemic against West German "revanchism," the planned Honecker visit had become the focal point not only of Western press attention, but Soviet criticism as well. Although the postponement was ostensibly the result of criticisms made by several leading West German politicians, particularly Christian Democratic parliamentary floor leader Alfred Dregger,[2] the more likely primary factor behind this move was Moscow's growing opposition to Honecker's cultivation of a "coalition of reason" between the two German states. Such a policy was increasingly out of step with Moscow's emphasis on bloc unity in the wake of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deployment in Western Europe.

The open differences that emerged between Moscow and East Berlin in the course of 1984 concerning relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) led to the most serious strains in Soviet-East German ties in over a decade.[3] Although the postponement of the Honecker visit

[1] See *Neues Deutschland,* September 5, 1984.

[2] See Dregger's interview in the conservative West German daily, *Die Welt,* August 23, 1984, in which he stated "Our future does not depend upon whether or not Mr. Honecker pays us the honor of his visit."

[3] For an English translation of a set of articles documenting the evolution of this dispute, see Ronald D. Asmus, "East Berlin and Moscow: The Documentation of a Dispute" (East-West Relations), *Radio Free Europe Research,* August 25, 1984.

Ronald D. Asmus is Senior Analyst for German Affairs at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich, Federal Republic of Germany. He is currently a Research Associate at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies in Washington, D.C., and has written extensively on German affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would appear to have closed a fascinating chapter of disunity in the fraternal relations between these two countries, it should not distract attention from the fundamental causes of this split and their implications, both in terms of Soviet-East German ties and in terms of Soviet policy towards Germany as a whole. The real issue was not the Honecker visit itself, but rather the traditionally loyal and orthodox East German regime daring to challenge an old, decrepit, and divided Soviet leadership on an issue vital to Moscow's interests in Central Europe: East-West German relations. Moreover, the manner in which this dispute was resolved — with long drawn-out polemic and open discord — can hardly be interpreted as a reassertion of vigorous, far-sighted Soviet leadership within the Warsaw Pact. From the outset, Moscow reacted to, rather than shaped, events relating to its key interests in Germany. Coupled with the vacillations of Soviet policy toward Poland under Solidarity, Moscow's disordered policy toward Germany serves as another gentle reminder of the current decline of Soviet authority within the bloc, and Moscow's difficulties in shaping developments in line with its own wishes.

The divisive debate preceding the Honecker postponement was replete with irony. In the fall of 1983, few Western observers would have predicted that the disagreements within the Western alliance over INF deployment would find their counterparts within the Warsaw Pact. Just as the FRG became the focal point of the Euromissile debate in Western Europe, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the efforts of the Honecker regime to preserve its "special relationship" with Bonn catalyzed controversy in the East. Bonn was no longer the only force attempting to insulate inter-German ties from an increasingly chilly East-West climate. A trend could be seen not only in East Berlin's handling of the INF issue, but in its reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the actions of Solidarity in neighboring Poland.[4] West German hopes about the "divisibility of détente" now seemed to be shared by East Berlin as well; aptly expressed with Honecker's calls for a special "community of responsibility" between the GDR and the FRG.

But the significance of two issues central to the rift between East Berlin and Moscow transcended inter-German ties. The first issue involved the right of a fraternal communist party to develop its own views and national interests based on its historical experience. This question has been central to every major dispute within the world communist movement. However, the GDR had always vociferously backed Soviet

[4] For two excellent analyses of the SED's handling of inter-German relations following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and during the Solidarnosc period in Poland see James McAdams, "Surviving the Missiles: The GDR and the Future of Inter-German Relations," ORBIS (Summer 1983), pp. 343-70; and Bernard Von Platte, "Deutschdeutsche Beziehungen und Ost-West-Konflikt," *Das Parlament, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 15, April 14, 1984, pp. 27-39.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

precepts of "proletarian internationalism," thereby helping it earn its well-deserved reputation as thoroughly hard line and loyal. In 1984, East Berlin was to find itself suddenly in the novel position of invoking those rights it had criticized so often in the past, now insisting that differences between and among fraternal allies were "natural," and to be resolved through "comradely discussion." In blazing this new trail, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) was to find itself in unusual company with Budapest, much to the chagrin of East Berlin's traditional ally and bulwark of orthodoxy, Prague. The second point of controversy concerned the appropriate path for Warsaw Pact foreign policy after INF deployment in Western Europe. Soviet policy was nebulous at best following the death of Yuri Andropov; and an intense debate arose within the bloc over the relative priority of continuing contacts with the West, the role of smaller countries within both alliances in terms of overcoming the superpower stalemate, and the compatibility of national and international interests. The theoretical parameters of this debate were staked out not in East Berlin, but in Budapest, where Hungarian Central Committee (CC) secretary for international affairs Matyas Szuros, former ambassador in Moscow and East Berlin, penned an article that radically refined the traditional precepts of bloc unity.[5] Not Hungarian words, but East Berlin's de facto practice of Szuros's views, however, eventually led to further intra-bloc dispute, complete with the symptoms of yet another step in what Richard Lowenthal once termed the "disintegration of a secular faith."[6]

In the Shadow of INF

From the outset, the controversy over the Euromissiles represented a litmus test for the viability of the special relationship so carefully nurtured by Bonn and so grudgingly accepted by East Berlin in the 1970s. Despite radically different long-term goals and strategies, both Bonn and East Berlin had nonetheless managed to establish a functioning modus vivendi. Bonn's ongoing interest in inter-German relations was self-evident. And, to a remarkable degree, the GDR overcame many of its early fears over inter-German détente, as East Berlin came to enjoy not only the economic but also the political fruits of its relations with Bonn. INF, however, threatened repercussions of a more serious magnitude — primarily because the Soviets and East Germans had openly attempted to use East-West German relations as a lever to influence Bonn's position on deployment. Given the crucial West German role in NATO deployment

[5] See Matyas Szuros, "The Reciprocal Effect of National and International Interests in the Development of Socialism in Hungary," *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, No. 1, January 1984, pp. 13-21.

[6] See Richard Lowenthal's classic analysis of the background of the Sino-Soviet split entitled *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plans, East Berlin was literally predestined to play a key role in Warsaw Pact attempts to halt the dual track decision. The special relationship between the two German states created an obvious opportunity for Moscow to remind Bonn of both the fruits of détente and the costs of any serious deterioration in the East-West climate. As far back as late 1979, East German spokesmen rarely missed an opportunity to remind Bonn that, in the words of Honecker, inter-German ties could not flourish "in the shadow of American missiles." Such threats continued throughout the summer and fall of 1984 as well, with the East German and Soviet media picking up on Andropov's warning to Kohl about a "palisade of missiles" being erected between the two German states. Honecker himself resorted to a dramatic open letter to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in October 1984 wherein he warned about the possibility of an "ice age" in inter-German affairs and appealed "in the name of the German people" for a cancellation of NATO's deployment plans.[7] In the eyes of some Western observers, East Berlin's own *Deutschlandpolitik* had been largely reduced to a tool of Soviet diplomacy and all-out efforts to halt INF deployment.[8]

Any hopes in Moscow, East Berlin, or elsewhere that a bloc-wide policy of "negotiation from above" and "propaganda from below" — the former focused on Western governments and the latter on Western peace movements — could succeed in halting deployment must have already received a sobering blow in October 1982 with the fall of the Schmidt government, and its replacement by a Christian Democrat-led coalition firmly committed to deployment. Following the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union-Free Democratic Party's (CDU/CSU-FDP) resounding electoral success in federal elections in March 1983, Moscow and East Berlin debated an appropriate response to the likely prospect of Western deployment. Indeed, an increasingly open debate had been raging in both the Soviet and East German academic press since 1980 over precisely this issue: how to punish Bonn for its role in the NATO dual track decision.[9] The Honecker regime's quandary was twofold. First, the direct linkage of the INF issue with the future of inter-German ties threatened to become a double-edged sword: it was

[7] The warning concerning a "palisade of missiles" was first issued by Andropov to Kohl during their talks in Moscow in July 1983, and was subsequently picked up by both the Soviet and East German press. See Honecker's letter to Kohl published in *Neues Deutschland,* October 10, 1983.

[8] See Joachim Nawrocki, "Im Schlepptau Moskaus. Eine eigene Aussenpolitik kann die DDR nicht fuehren," *Die Zeit,* No. 7, February 8, 1980; and Peter Jochen Winters, "Das deutsch-deutsch Verhaeltniss 1982," *Deutschland Archiv,* No. 12, 1981, pp. 1233-36; and Winters, "Die DDR in Moskaus Doppelstrategie," ibid., No. 2, 1983, pp. 113-15.

[9] For the Soviet anti-missile campaign see Elizabeth Pond, "Andropov, Kohl, and East-West Issues," *Problems of Communism,* (July-August 1983), pp. 33-45; on the debate within the Soviet and East German elites, see an unpublished paper by Michael Sodaro, "In the Shadow of the Missiles": East German Soviet Perceptions of West German Foreign Policy."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clear that Bonn would follow through with deployment barring a last minute breakthrough in Geneva, and that East Berlin would have to bear the major burden of any sanctions imposed by the Warsaw Pact. Given East Berlin's extensive economic ties to the FRG, this could not have been an appealing set of circumstances — especially as transfusions of hard currency remained very important in view of a tight economic situation at home and a heavy debt load.[10] Second, East German policy considerations were also undoubtedly influenced by the quiet but persistent diplomatic efforts of the CDU-coalition in Bonn. Despite their past harsh criticism of Social Democratic policy towards the GDR and Eastern Europe, Chancellor Kohl and other leading figures in the new coalition had expressly indicated their willingness to continue on the path of their Social Democratic predecessors. In fact, the primary political motivation behind the initial East-West German Deutsche mark (DM) 1 billion credit deal of June 1983 was the Kohl government's desire to emphasize its serious commitment to the inter-German dialogue by making an advance concession to the GDR — in apparent contradiction of past proclamations over the necessity of quid pro quo in such matters. In effect, Bonn was trying to counter the joint Soviet-East German linking of INF, and inter-German linking of INF and inter-German affairs by signaling its interest in "business as usual," regardless of the outcome of the Geneva negotiations.[11]

With the deployment deadline approaching in the fall of 1983, there were indications that Bonn's message had been well understood in East Berlin, such that the SED was not willing to sacrifice the benefits of its special relationship with the Federal Republic. In addition to announcing several small measures reducing travel restrictions between the FRG and the GDR in September, East Berlin also agreed to revive negotiations on a cultural treaty stalled for almost eight years.[12] In addition, signs of a clear lack of East German enthusiasm for threatened Warsaw Pact countermeasures to INF deployment soon became evident. On October 25, 1983, the USSR, GDR, and Czechoslovakia announced an "acceleration" of preparations for the locating of additional missiles on East German and Czechoslovak territory. This announcement had been preceded by the

[10] Western figures on total East German debt in the West vary considerably depending in part upon whether one examines solely obligations to Western banks, or whether one also includes supplier credit and inter-German debt in accounting units. The GDR's end-1983 debt to Western banks was reported at some $6.7 billion by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), a reduction of nearly one-third since end-1982, with estimates on total Western debt referring to a figure of $8-9 billion (U.S.). Although the first inter-German credit deal of June 1983 was clearly motivated by financial considerations, many Western experts believe that the second credit was not necessary for purposes of debt-management and may instead indicate a switch back to increasing Western imports of technology and investment goods. ("Successful Productions Efforts: The Situation of the GDR Economy, in mid-1984," *DIW Wochenbericht,* August 9, 1984).

[11] See Ronald D. Asmus, "East and West Germany: Continuity and Change," *The World Today,* April 1984, pp. 142-51.

[12] See Asmus, "Signals" from East Berlin," RAD BR/242 (GDR), RFER, October 21, 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

publication in *Neues Deutschland* of two letters from church groups in East and West Germany expressing their horror over the prospect of the deployment of such missiles in the GDR and their fear of a possible "ice age" in East-West relations. The letters further proposed unilateral disarmament as the only way to end the escalating arms race.[13] The appearance of such views in the official party organ was nothing less than sensational, and reflected an awareness within regime circles of the domestic costs of its own merciless campaign against the dangers of missile deployments.

When the SED central committee met in the last week of November — a few days after the West German *Bundestag* had officially sanctioned the start of INF deployment in the FRG — it became clear how East Berlin had resolved its quandary of how to respond to Euromissile deployment. Speaking at the seventh CC plenum, Erich Honecker defended the necessity of these "unavoidable" countermeasures by the Warsaw Pact, and calmly added that these measures had "evoked no joy in our country."[14] According to the SED secretary general, "We have never been proponents of the arms race and never will be." In a key speech, the harbinger of subsequent Soviet-East German differences over relations with the FRG, Honecker claimed that although the start of deployment had altered the basis of inter-German relations, the key task now was to "limit the damage" resulting from this development, adding that past treaties would remain the basis for East-West German ties in the future. Of dual significance, this statement appeared to disavow past Soviet-East German claims that West German deployment would constitute a violation of the Eastern Treaties concluded by Bonn in the early 1970s. Second, it implied that East Berlin's threatened "countermeasures" would be limited to those military steps already announced and that vital economic and political contracts would remain unaffected. While the Soviets were to use the start of Western deployment as a pretext to break off arms control negotiations with the United States in Geneva and Vienna, Bonn and East Berlin continued to negotiate in fourteen different forums on an array of bilateral issues. With U.S.-Soviet relations in a deepfreeze, the two German states hammered out the final details of an agreement transferring operating rights for the Berlin overground railway to West Berlin authorities in late December, a small but politically symbolic step.[15]

[13] See Asmus, "*Neues Deutschland* Prints Dissenting Views on Arms Control," RAD BR/254 (GDR), *RFER*, October 31, 1983.

[14] See Honecker's speech at the seventh CC plenum published in *Neues Deutschland*, November 26-27, 1983.

[15] For further details on the Berlin S-Bahn agreement see the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, December 30, 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Honecker's "Coalition of Reason"

East German words and actions in the early months of 1984 repeatedly underlined the SED's continued interest in pursuing dialogue with the West — especially the FRG — despite the start of Euromissile deployment. Moreover, in an interview with the French communist weekly *Revolution* on January 6, Honecker adopted a surprisingly optimistic note regarding the possibility of a resumption of arms control negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR, emphasizing his conviction that "sooner or later there will be negotiations on a new basis that will make a practical solution possible" — at a time when Moscow was stridently demanding a withdrawal of all missiles deployed as a precondition for such a resumption.[16] Differences between Moscow and East Berlin were also hinted at during the visit in early January of East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer to the Soviet capital for talks with his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko.[17] East Berlin's commitment to "political dialogue" and a "return to détente" was also reflected in a major speech delivered by Honecker to district party leaders on February 12, only two days following the official announcement of the death of Yuri Andropov. The SED secretary general again took up the theme of a special German responsibility for peace in Europe, urging the two German states to "use every possibility so that reason and realism will prevail, so that cooperation instead of confrontation will come to the fore, and so that disarmament will proceed and the process of détente based on the principle of equality and equal security revived." [18]

This "community of responsibility" between the two German states had already been illustrated in January when a quick diplomatic solution was found for several groups of East German citizens who had sought refuge in either the American Embassy or the West German diplomatic mission in East Berlin in a desperate attempt to gain passage to the West. East German flexibility remained evident in similar incidents involving the West German embassy in Prague, and repeated attempts by East Germans to use the FRG's diplomatic mission in East Berlin to

[16] See Honecker's interview in *Revolution,* January 6, 1984.

[17] See the dinner speeches delivered by Gromyko and Fischer published in *Neues Deutschland,* January 4-5, 1984. Whereas Gromyko harshly attacked the West and reconfirmed the removal of Euromissiles as the Soviet precondition for a resumption of arms control talks, Fischer simply stated that responsible politics in the current dangerous situation meant re-establishing a degree of "predictability" in East-West relations in order to preserve and, if possible, expand the "toilsomely achieved" fruits of détente of the 1970s.

[18] See Honecker's speech reprinted in *Neues Deutschland,* February 13, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

escape the country.[19] In mid-February, Honecker met Kohl at the funeral ceremonies for Andropov, following which they issued a joint statement on the "existential importance" of avoiding nuclear war and of using "common sense" to prevent "the course of international affairs from getting out of control." Kohl also used the opportunity to reconfirm Honecker's invitation to visit the FRG.[20] Shortly thereafter, East Berlin initiated an officially sanctioned emigration wave that was eventually to include over 30,000 East Germans, a figure that more than quadrupled official emigration in 1983.[21]

That economic considerations were a key component of Honecker's "coalition of reason" was obvious. Bonn's financial compensation for the emigration wave, as well as the announcement in February of a DM 600 million joint-production and barter project between the GDR and the West German automobile manufacturer Volkswagen, clearly demonstrated that East Berlin, aware of its economic needs, had adjusted to the realities of doing business with a conservative West German government.[22] Despite marked progress in reducing its Western debt, East Berlin remained interested in expanding economic and financial cooperation, both for the purposes of future debt management and to obtain the investment funds and technology necessary to modernize East German industry. The special West German role in East German considerations was highlighted not only by the VW project or the credit deals, but also by the fact that Bonn had in past years supplied up to DM 1 billion annually in funds from the federal and West Berlin budgets for a long list of East German services rendered. Western estimates of the GDR's total DM intake annually — including visa fees, minimum exchange rate revenues, private contributions, etc. — refer to a figure of nearly $1 billion (U.S.), which does not include de facto East German membership in and tariff-free access to the Common Market. Finally, in recent years the GDR

[19] On January 22, a group of six East German citizens entered the American Embassy in East Berlin, demanded political asylum, and were eventually allowed to leave directly for West Berlin by the East German authorities. Two days later a group of twelve East Germans entered Bonn's diplomatic mission in East Berlin, also demanded passage to the West, and were quietly allowed to leave as well. In the spring and summer of 1984, there were several additional incidents involving East Germans attempting to gain Western passage through West German diplomatic missions, either in East Berlin or at the embassy in Prague, eventually leading to the closing of Bonn's mission in East Berlin in the summer, as well as the temporary closing of the embassy in Prague in the fall. See Asmus, "Crisis at the West German Diplomatic Mission in East Berlin," RAD BR/121 (East-West Relations), *RFER,* July 2, 1984.

[20] See Elizabeth Pond in the *Christian Science Monitor,* February 22, 1984.

[21] In 1983, some 7,700 East Germans were allowed to emigrate legally to the Federal Republic. For further details, see Asmus, "A New Wave of East German Emigration," RAD BR/45 (East-West Relations), *RFER,* March 28, 1984.

[22] As envisaged, VW will provide the GDR with a Hannover motor production line along with an initial shipment of some 2,000 VW vans, along with 2,300 vans annually starting in 1988. In return VW will receive 100,000 motors annually from the GDR with the remaining capacity — 170,000 motors — remaining for domestic consumption. Nearly half of the deal is to be covered with federal credit guarantees. See the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* February 9, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also has been turning to inner-German trade, where it benefits from the "swing credit" that allows it to obtain goods often purchased elsewhere in order to save hard currency.[23]

However, the SED's cultivation of ties with Bonn was not motivated solely by economic considerations. It became increasingly clear that, at least in the eyes of East Berlin, economic and political considerations were all components converging towards a common good — regime stability. An insight into Honecker's motives was provided in late January by a commentary in the Polish daily *Trybuna Ludu* claiming that East Berlin was trying to prevent the development of an even more dangerous situation, and that one should view "the engagement of the GDR in the context of the search for points of reference . . . that offer hope for the recovery of a peaceful atmosphere in the heart of Europe."[24] Furthermore, according to the Polish paper, East Berlin was trying to "bring about a return by Bonn and its allies to a policy of arms control negotiations." The same point was made openly to several Western journalists visiting East Berlin in the spring. In the words of one East German official: "If we Germans don't talk to each other about the future, we may find ourselves talking in Valhalla . . . We don't have to love one another, but reason and realism tell us that the only way for both of us to live is in peaceful coexistence."[25] Finally, there is little doubt that East Berlin also perceived that its cultivation of contacts with Bonn could foster its primary goal of regime legitimacy in two additional ways. First, Honecker's "damage limitation" policy considerably enhanced East Berlin's international prestige, as reflected in the long and impressive list of West German and Western visitors to the GDR in 1984. Most notable were the visits of CSU chairman and long-time opponent of Social Democratic *Deutschlandpolitik* Franz Josef Strauss to the spring Leipzig Fair, the visit of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt to East Berlin in February, as well as the visits of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, and Italian Premier Bettino Craxi in the summer. The GDR's growing weight within the bloc was being recognized throughout the West.[26] Second, there was little doubt that Honecker's own brand of *Deutschlandpolitik* was extremely popular domestically as well, contributing to what Gunter Gaus, Bonn's first diplomatic envoy to East Berlin, called a process of "internal and external emancipation."[27] Popular sen-

[23] For the effects of the GDR's debt situation on inter-German trade see Horst Lamprecht, "GDR's Western Debt Favors Inner-German Trade," *DIW Wochenbericht,* March 10, 1983.

[24] See the *Trybuna Ludu* commentary reprinted in *Neues Deutschland,* January 30, 1984.

[25] As quoted in the article by Henry Tanner, *International Herald Tribune,* March 20, 1984.

[26] See Asmus, "Western Leaders Visit East Berlin," RAD BR/137 (East-West Relations), *RFER,* July 30, 1984.

[27] See Gaus's article in *Die Zeit,* June 1, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

timents may rarely be a guide to the decision-making process in communist regimes, but a convergence of public sentiments with elite priorities, if only temporary, is clearly welcome. In the case of East Berlin, the regime was clearly attempting to tap such sympathies as a source of surrogate legitimacy at a time when the old promises of consumer socialism — regular increases in consumption and a steadily increasing standard of living — could no longer be met easily. Indeed, Honecker's key role in East German efforts to preserve inter-German détente contributed to his new image in the Western mind as a "German" communist leader who had mellowed in his older years, an elder statesman devoted to peace and dialogue with the West — in sum, a sort of East German Kadar trying to do his best for his country at a difficult time.[28]

Honecker's motives merged with West German interests in one critical regard. Before and after the start of INF deployment, the CDU-led coalition was itself engaged in broad efforts to ensure a continuation of dialogue between East and West, and to prevent the dissolution of the entire web of East-West ties into a question of missiles.[29] These actions, in turn, reflected Bonn's desire to reassure a West German public still unsettled from the INF controversy that neither nuclear armageddon nor a new ice age in East-West relations was around the corner, as well as evolving attitudes within the CDU / CSU on how best to deal with the GDR, a change certainly reflected in the Eastern travels of Franz Josef Strauss.[30] After more than a decade in parliamentary opposition, the CDU / CSU and Kohl clearly felt a need to establish themselves as serious and competent negotiators in the inter-German arena. By successfully insulating inter-German relations from the INF controversy and by negotiating a series of concrete agreements in a relatively short period of time, the new coalition in Bonn was able to enhance its domestic standing and, equally important, to pre-empt Social Democratic accusations that Atlantic fidelity would come only at the expense of special "German interests." In short, Kohl was following a dual policy. While more assertively defending the FRG's legal positions on the unity of the nation, the CDU-led coalition was willing to make advance concessions that de facto would stabilize the East German regime in order to facilitate more flexible behavior and eventual concessions; the latter — an old Social Democratic

[28] The image of Honecker as a German communist leader with the emphasis on "German" was fueled in the West by the presentations of Honecker in books by Bonn's first two diplomatic representatives in East Berlin, Guenther Gaus and Klaus Boelling. See Guenther Gaus, *Wo Deutschland liegt: Eine Ortbestimmung* (Hamburg: Verlag Hoffmann & Campe, 1983); and Klaus Boelling, *Die fernen Nachbarn: Erfahrungen in der DDR* (Hamburg: Verlag Gruner & Jahr AG & Co., 1983).

[29] See for example the article issued by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher immediately after the start of INF deployment in the FRG, "How Are We to Proceed After Deployment?" and reprinted in *Europa Archiv,* No. 24, 1083.

[30] For an excellent discussion of the flexibility in Strauss's views on *Deutschland-* and *Ostpolitik.* See Theo Sommer in *Die Zeit,* No. 32, August 5, 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

principle — was harshly criticized by many Christian Democrats in the 1970s. As some CDU officials were to confide in the spring of 1984 with considerable pride, they had produced tangible results in this sensitive area at least as well as, if not better than, their Social Democratic predecessors — all without any visible irritation arising in Washington or other major West European capitals. A broad consensus among the major West German political parties seemed to be emerging over the contours of *Deutschlandpolitik* at a time when the past consensus over Western security policy appeared to be crumbling.[31] The passionate West German debate over *Ostpolitik* of a decade ago had been overtaken by equally heated discussion about deterrence, defense, and security policy.

The View From Moscow

Although Honecker's cultivation of his "coalition of reason" with Bonn was eventually to catalyze open discord not only with Moscow but also with the GDR's orthodox ally Prague, few Western observers noticed the early indications of submerged conflict evident in the early months of 1984. Most outside observers attributed occasional nuances in language or repeated East German proclamations on the need to "return to détente" to ongoing attempts to woo Bonn in the desperate hope of somehow influencing West German attitudes toward continuing INF deployment. Although signs of a serious breakdown in communication and in Soviet bloc management were already visible, East German overtures toward the FRG were basically assumed to have received Moscow's blessing, with several West German officials implying that Honecker had received a green light from the newly elected CPSU Secretary General Konstantin Chernenko during talks at Andropov's funeral in February.[32] Moreover, East Berlin was also engaged in overt acts of symbolic fraternal solidarity, such as the visit of a high-ranking East German military delegation led by a Politburo member and Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann to the USSR later that month. Hoffmann also met with Chernenko, and ostensibly "reached full agreement on the military-political situation that has developed in Europe and questions pertaining to the future of relations between the USSR and the GDR."[33] In choosing Hoffmann, East Berlin could not have sent a more sturdy pillar of the unbreakable bonds of Soviet-East German friendship. That his visit coincided with an article in

[31] In mid-February 1983 the major West German political parties in the West German *Bundestag*, with the exception of the Greens, passed a joint resolution on the goals of West German *Deutschlandpolitik*. See Asmus, "East and West Germany," *The World Today*, p. 149.

[32] See James Markham in the *New York Times*, February 18, 1984.

[33] See *Neues Deutschland*, March 21, 1984. Hoffmann survived Stalin's purges in the Soviet Union, speaks fluent Russian, and still travels there frequently for vacation for the treatment of injuries received during the Spanish Civil War.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pravda clearly tailored for a Soviet audience by another SED Politburo member, Horst Dohlfus, underlined the point.[34]

In late March, an article appeared in the Czechoslovak party daily *Rude Pravo* that initiated a series of high-level polemics throughout Eastern Europe, thereby baring the emerging differences over how to deal with the West following INF deployment. Written by two orthodox members of the International Department of the Czechoslovak CC associated with the hard-line Politburo member Vasil Bilak, the article sternly criticized "national deviations" in unnamed fraternal parties, and was a clear response to the aforementioned article by Hungarian CC Secretary Matyas Szuros that had appeared in January.[35] Szuros had broken several taboos by redefining the reciprocal effect of "national" and "international" factors in determining the interests of an individual socialist country, as well as the interests of the socialist community as a whole. What Prague found most alarming apparently was not only Szuros's assertion that "national interests" could be subordinated to common interests of the bloc only "in an extraordinary situation," but also his bold claim that relations between individual capitalist and socialist countries could continue to develop despite a deterioration in East-West and U.S.-Soviet relations, and that such developments did not represent any "special privilege," but rather served the broader interests of the bloc by encouraging a return to dialogue. Not surprisingly, *Rude Pravo* harshly criticized any notion of "independent" foreign policy initiatives within the bloc or "discussion about the 'role of small states' that should allegedly assist the reaching of compromises between 'great powers,' " going on to warn that "fundamental socialist interests" should not be sacrificed to achieve "momentary 'national' advantage"; moreover, "opportunism" ran the risk of falling prey to an imperialist policy of "differentiation." Czechoslovakia, *Rude Pravo* assured its readers, was not one of those countries, but as the solution to such tasks touched upon the success of social progress and the preservation of world peace, such issues had to be the concern of *all* parties.

Budapest immediately responded to Prague's criticism with a series of articles marking Hungary's "liberation" by the Red Army at the end of World War II, including a long interview with Szuros in which he strongly defended his views.[36] East Berlin then showed where its sympathies lay by reprinting the Szuros interview and following it with excerpts from a Kadar interview in which the Hungarian leader made similar points.

---

[34] See *Pravda*, March 20, 1984.

[35] See Michal Stefanek and Ivan Hvilka, "The National and the International in the Policy of the CPCS," *Rude Pravo*, March 30, 1984; and also Czechoslovak Situation Report/7, *RFER*, April 18, 1984, Item 1.

[36] See Hungarian SR/5, *RFER*, April 13, 1984, Item 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The following passage from the Szuros interview was nothing less than sensational for the readers of *Neues Deutschland:*

> In the future Europe will certainly remain the initiator and propagator of détente. . . . Those small and medium-sized European states that belong to either alliance can have a positive effect upon the international atmosphere through dialogue and through constructive relations, through which more possibilities could arise for the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. This could have a decisive influence upon the process of détente. It is a fact that several capitalist countries, based on historical ties or current conditions, demonstrate interests of varying intensity in socialist countries. Austria, Finland, or the FRG, for example, have developed more active relations with our country than with other socialist countries. These are not special privileges, since precisely this type of attention is also received, for example, by Bulgaria from its Balkan neighbors Greece and Turkey, or by Cuba from Spain, and by GDR from the FRG. This also applies in reverse. It is not only our conviction but also our concrete experience that one can use these specific opportunities for the good of common goals while concurrently pursuing national interests.[37]

The vague Soviet position in this emerging debate became explicit when the April issue of the Soviet foreign affairs weekly *Novoe Vremya* carried a slightly edited version of the *Rude Pravo* article — milder in tone but equally critical in content. This article was followed by another hard-line piece that appeared in the Soviet journal *Voprosy istorii KPSS,* written by O. V. Borisov — apparently the pseudonym of Oleg Borisovich Rakhmanin, First Deputy Head of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries.[38] Rakhmanin's article took up the same themes, namely a harsh rejection of any "independent" foreign policy initiatives or any attempts "to define the role of large and small countries outside the context of the class struggle and the fundamental contradiction between socialism and imperialism," claiming that such efforts may simply lead "to an artificial division between large and small countries whereby smaller countries — independent of their class affiliation — concentrate only on the positive functions in the development of international relations such as overcoming conflicts, working out reasonable compromises, and facilitating East-West dialogue." Finally, according to Rakhmanin, such "errors" were particularly dangerous at a time when the imperialist countries were intensifying attempts to estrange and divide the socialist camp as well as to exploit ideological weaknesses through a policy of differentiation.

---

[37] See Asmus, "GDR Supports Hungarian Position on Bloc Relations," RAD BR/75 (Eastern Europe), *RFER,* May 9, 1984.

[38] For the *Noveo Vremya* reprint of the *Rude Pravo* article, see Czechoslovak SR/8, *RFER,* May 4, 1984, Item 2; and for the *Voprosy istorii KPSS* article, see Sallie Wise, "CPSU Journal Outlines Soviet Stance on Warsaw Pact Policy Dispute," *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 173, April 30, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If any doubts remained as to Moscow's position on the question of continued contacts with Bonn, they were erased in late April with the beginning of a major anti-West German revanchist campaign in the Soviet media, climaxing in early May with the thirty-ninth anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. Such campaigns have been a traditional weapon in Moscow's arsenal of political-psychological warfare in the postwar period, and have been designed to pressure Bonn, and to enforce fraternal unity within the Soviet bloc. As in the past, it was apparent that this attempt to revive the ghost of West German revanchism was intended to gain leverage vis-à-vis the FRG — partly by reviving the INF issue, as West German support of INF deployment was seen as proof of its revanchist amd militarist tendencies. It was equally clear, however, that this issue was deliberately being revived in conjunction with calls for greater ideological vigilance to end disarray and to strengthen cohesion in Eastern Europe. Such issues lay behind the Soviet boycott of the Olympic games in Los Angeles, and pressure from Moscow to ensure that the rest of the bloc followed suit. The message was clear: the old dangers and enemies are active again and bloc unity is the task of the day.[39]

Although East Berlin immediately supported Moscow's position on the Olympic boycott, despite obvious disappointment in the GDR, the Honecker regime proved reticent in following the Soviet line on West German revanchism, particularly when compared with Prague, as it reprinted key articles late or not at all. The same was clearly the case when Moscow launched another major round of revanchist attacks following the mid-June decision by the West European Union (WEU) to officially lift restrictions on West German production of strategic and long-range bombers.[40] In general, East Berlin carefully tried to balance its strong interest in political dialogue with the West with the prerequisites of bloc solidarity. This was aptly illustrated in mid-May when Moscow announced the deployment of "additional" countermeasures in the GDR in response to NATO's continued INF deployment. On May 15 *Neues Deutschland* carried the full text of the *TASS* announcement about the missiles on its front page, but balanced this by reprinting on the same page the full text of a Honecker letter to a group of French resistance fighters. In his letter, the SED secretary general reconfirmed the East German position by underlining the importance of dialogue "with all forces of reason," praising the Helsinki Final Act as having established a "code of international behavior," and lauded the importance of Lenin's concept of "peaceful

[39] See Asmus, "Moscow Revives Its Campaign Against West German Revanchism," RAD BR/91 (East West), *RFER*, June 5, 1984.

[40] See Asmus, "Bonn and Moscow: Revanchism Revisited," RAD/BR/138 (East-West), *RFER*, July 30, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

coexistence." Although Lenin's concept of "peaceful coexistence" is notoriously elastic, Honecker himself had defined it moderately only a few weeks earlier in an article in *Problems of Peace and Socialism* — excerpts of which appeared in *Neues Deutschland*.[41] When the SED eighth CC plenum met in late May, the Politburo report strongly reconfirmed Honecker's policy of "limiting the damage," and lauded the GDR's active diplomacy of past months as "forward-looking and mobilizing," as well as promising a continuation of "offensive peace engagement and political dialogue," despite mounting criticism from Moscow and Prague.[42] In defending its course, the SED claimed that its goal had been the maintenance of the strategic balance and the "winning over and bringing together" of all pro-peace forces in East and West, and that this policy served the common interests and strengthened the unity of the Warsaw Pact. Although accusing Bonn of a deficit in fulfilling its special German responsibility for the maintenance of peace in Europe, East Berlin nonetheless reconfirmed its desire to continue the inter-German dialogue.

Discord over Détente

In June 1984 the journal of the GDR's leading international affairs institute, the Institute for International Politics and Economics, published a round-table discussion on the consequences of the start of INF deployment for the GDR and the Warsaw Pact.[43] The publication of the article was well timed; it cogently explained and justified the course that East Berlin had adopted, and simultaneously highlighted the emerging conflict with the SED's critics. First, the participants, all leading East German academics, noted that although the start of the deployment had led to a new and very dangerous situation on the continent, the situation was not "irreversible," as the increase in tension had also had the dialectical effect of strengthening the consciousness of all pro-peace forces. They concluded, therefore, that East Berlin's own "peace policy" was more important than ever. Second, several speakers repeatedly emphasized the need to differentiate between the leaderships of different imperialist countries and factions therein, and to recognize the existence of "realistically minded circles." Special emphasis was placed on differences between Washington and Bonn, and the possibility of exploiting diverging American and West German views: "differentiation" in reverse by cul-

[41] See excerpts of Honecker's article on Lenin and "peaceful coexistence" in *Neues Deutschland*, March 24-25, 1984.

[42] See Asmus, "SED Politburo Speaks Out on East-West Relations," RAD BR/92, *RFER*, June 6, 1984.

[43] See the "round-table discussion" published under the title "The Globality and Aggressive Nature of the Imperialist Course of Confrontation — Forces and Possibilities to Stop It," in *IPW Bericht*, No. 6, June 1984, pp. 1-13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tivating Bonn's interest in cooperation with the East. The third key point was the positive effect of détente for Europe as a whole and for the GDR in particular. Détente, according to the journal, had demonstrated that fundamental political arrangements and compromise were possible between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The main task for the future, therefore, was to encourage and exploit opportunities for political dialogue with sober-minded circles in the West in order to foster a "return to détente," a task in which both Germanies bear a special responsibility due to their geopolitical location and the burden of German history.

This debate was of more than academic significance, as it undoubtedly represented a post facto justification of the regime's decision to actively cultivate ties with Bonn despite Euromissile deployment. Moscow appeared to have arrived at an entirely different conclusion, repeatedly underlined by its vociferous revanchist campaign against Bonn. In essence, Moscow now argued that the start of deployment had led to a fundamentally new international situation fraught with dangers for the socialist camp. The threat now was no longer simply the aggressive policies of the Reagan administration, but also the revanchist policies of a West German government in cahoots with Washington, with the goal of destabilizing the GDR and revising the postwar European status quo. Given this new situation, Moscow now openly proclaimed bloc unity to be the top priority, leaving little room for the type of initiative advocated in East Berlin or Budapest. Far from backing down in the face of Soviet pressure, however, East Berlin continued to laud the virtues of dialogue and proved reluctant to categorize the CDU-led coalition of Chancellor Kohl as revanchist. Reversing its past role, East Berlin defended the rights of fraternal parties to develop their own views based on their own historical experience. In the East German foreign affairs monthly *Horizont* (Summer 1984) an article suddenly claimed that it was "natural" that differences of opinion would arise both between and within communist parties over such issues, and that such disputes had to be accepted and resolved through "comradely discussion" as the international communist movement was a "voluntary community of equal and independent parties." [44]

The differences between Moscow and East Berlin might have remained on the level of a heated theoretical dispute for some time had it not been for the pace of inter-German relations in the summer of 1984. Tentative plans for a precedent-setting visit of SED Secretary General Erich Honecker to the FRG became increasingly real with Honecker's program and agenda, and questions of protocol openly discussed in the West

[44] See the article by Prof. Harold Neubert, Director of the Institute of the International Labor Movement at the GDR Academy of Sciences "The Actual Tasks of Communists," in *Horizont*, No. 8, August 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German press. Moreover, Bonn and East Berlin engaged in intense negotiations to hammer out the final details of a visit that was rapidly becoming a test case of the degree or limits of East German autonomy within the bloc. In a move widely perceived as setting the stage for the forthcoming Honecker visit, West German State Minister Phillip Jenninger announced on July 25 that Bonn had agreed to guarantee a second major credit of DM 509 million for the GDR. Although carefully avoiding any public linkage, Jenninger went on to announce that as of August 1, the GDR would be implementing a series of eleven measures that would alleviate travel restrictions between the two German states.[45] On July 27, *Pravda* carried a long article that harshly attacked relations between Bonn and East Berlin. Penned by Lev Bezymensky, a Soviet journalist who has written extensively on German affairs, and published under the arresting title "In the Shadow of American Missiles," the article was ostensibly an attack against Bonn and "the FRG's new and aggressive policies towards the East," an accusation that struck most observers as absurd, given the degree of continuity between the CDU-led coalition's *Ostpolitik* and that of its Social Democratic predecessor. The article then singled out Bonn's ties with East Berlin as evidence of the "dangerous thrust" of West German policy, claiming that the Kohl government was attempting to use "both economic and political levers" to "solicit concessions on matters of principle that affect the GDR's sovereignty." For Bezymensky, the Bonn coalition was certainly not a "realistically minded" force with whom one should pursue "political dialogue," but rather an active revanchist force in cahoots with the Reagan administration in attempting to destabilize the Soviet bloc. By dredging up old Honecker quotations from his hard-line speech delivered in Gera in October 1980 — such as the East German leader's demands on the recognition of East German citizenship, the resolution of the Elbe border dispute, the abolition of the Salzgitter monitoring center, and the question of full embassies — *Pravda* clearly delineated East German priorities in its relationship with Bonn. That Honecker had since quietly dropped these demands as preconditions for improvements in ties in order to concentrate, in the SED secretary general's own words, on "practical issues," was ignored. Finally, in the key passage of the article, Bezymensky claimed that inter-German relations could not be viewed in isolation from the broader international context — characterized by a "transition on the part of aggressive NATO circles to a broad attack against détente and a crusade against socialism" — going on to resurrect an old Honecker statement that "good neighborly relations cannot flourish in the shadow of first-strike nuclear missiles." The fact

[45] See Asmus, "A Second Credit for the GDR," RAD BR/142 (East-West), *RFER*, August 3, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that inter-German relations had indeed flourished in 1984 despite Euromissile deployment was clearly not, or no longer, to Moscow's liking.

On August 2 *Pravda* escalated its charges with an unsigned editorial entitled "On the Wrong Track." Similar to the Bezymensky article, this editorial went further in attacking East Berlin. The recently concluded East-West German credit deal was explicitly mentioned for the first time as evidence of West German revisionist ambitions; and the East German concessions on travel were viewed as new opportunities for Bonn to exert political and ideological influence. More striking was *Pravda's* criticism of what it labelled the "pharisaical logic" of the cynical West German policy of "limiting the damage" in inter-German ties following INF deployment. Here, *Pravda* resorted to a trick already employed by Bezymensky who had attributed the phrase "security partnership" to West German chancellor Kohl, criticizing it as a cynical effort to avoid the consequences of deployment. This time, *Pravda* attributed a policy of "damage limitation" to the West German chancellor. In both cases, the formulations had never been used by Kohl, but were instead key phrases from past Honecker statements. By openly attacking codewords so closely associated with the SED secretary general, Moscow had issued a serious warning to the SED leadership.

Those Western observers who had predicted that East Berlin would adopt a low profile or attempt a tactical retreat following this blast were soon proved wrong. While reprinting the full text of the initial Bezymensky article on July 28, *Neues Deutschland* immediately followed this with an article from the Hungarian trade union daily newspaper *Nepszava* on July 30 defending the East German view. Far from criticizing Honecker, *Nepszava* came out in favor of the Honecker visit, and lauded the East German leader for his cultivation of ties with Western statesmen, emphasizing that relations between the two German states were important for Europe as a whole.[46] An even stronger defense appeared in the East German party daily on August 1 in the form of an editorial commemorating the ninth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Signed with the initials "A.Z.," an indication that the article reflected the authoritative views of the East German Politburo, *Neues Deutschland* stated that the GDR had repeatedly proved that its policies serve the cause of peace, détente, and stability in Europe. Although noting that INF deployment had created a new situation in Europe, the editorial insisted that East Berlin had fulfilled its alliance commitments by installing "countermeasures." Adding that the current task was to "limit the damage" resulting from INF, the editorial asserted that it was "now more important than ever" to maintain dialogue between different social systems, "including

[46] See the article by Tibor Thurzu, "GDR Diplomacy: A Sense of Responsibility and Activity" from *Nepszava*, July 28, 1984, reprinted in *Neues Deutschland* on July 30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those of NATO and the Warsaw Pact." Finally, the editorial underlined the positive results of détente for Europe, and noted the existence of "sober-minded circles" in the West also "seeking paths to return to détente." The editorial noted as "obvious" that its relations with Bonn were determined by East Berlin's desire to preserve peace and that both states were "independent in their internal and external affairs." In a striking departure from standard practice, *Neues Deutschland* simply ignored the *Pravda* editorial of August 2, and instead carried excerpts of a *TASS* commentary on the Helsinki anniversary by CPSU CC-member Lev Tolkunov, former editor in chief of *Izvestia* and chairman of the Soviet Committee on European Security and Cooperation. Tolkunov implicitly backed East Berlin by noting the existence of "sober-minded" circles in the West in favor of "peaceful coexistence," and by claiming that détente was not a part of the past, but of the future. The Tolkunov commentary, along with excerpts of another *Izvestia* commentary excerpted in *Neues Deutschland* praising economic and financial cooperation between East and West, fueled Western speculation about major differences within the Soviet leadership on this issue.[47]

In a short time the increasingly open dispute between Moscow and East Berlin spilled over into the rest of the bloc media. Moscow's continued barbs were immediately picked up in Prague; in return East Berlin met with open sympathy in Budapest, and used meetings with several Western politicians to maintain its stand.[48] The Bulgarian position remained ambiguous, no doubt in part because Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov was himself scheduled to visit Bonn but a few days prior to Honecker. Despite Warsaw's enthusiastic participation in the anti-West German revanchist campaign, there were indications that the Jaruzelski government was not as opposed to Honecker's course as some Western newsmen claimed.[49] Outside of the bloc, East Berlin received considerable support from the Yugoslavs as well as the Italian Communist Party (PCI),

[47] *Neues Deutschland* of July 31, 1984, excerpted an *Izvestia* commentary which implied Soviet approval of East-West financial transactions at a time when *Pravda* was criticizing the recently concluded East-West German credit deal.

[48] See the East German press coverage of Politburo member Herbert Haeber's talks with Armando Cossutta, a known pro-Soviet figure on the executive committee of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), in *Neues Deutschland,* August 10, 1984; as well as those of Politburo member Egon Krenz with Andreas Papandreou in the party daily on August 15, 1984.

[49] Despite Warsaw's enthusiastic participation in the anti-West German revisionist campaign, some observers believed that the Polish regime also realized that principles involved in the Moscow-East Berlin dispute could affect future Polish room for maneuver within the bloc, and that Warsaw's hostile remarks were not necessarily directed against East Berlin as well, a view shared by some West German officials. When asked about the Polish stance on the inter-German rapprochement and Honecker's planned visit to the FRG, Polish press spokesman Jerzy Urban stated: "We fully trust our GDR ally, the first German state to have recognized our borders on the Oder and Neisse rivers. On the other hand, we refer with distrust to the FRG's intentions lying at the foundation of some moves taken by that country, for example, towards the GDR. This distrust stems from our known assessment of FRG policy." (PAP (in English), August 7, 1984). In addition, there is the fact that the East German press has on several occasions reprinted Polish press commentaries that would seem to support East Berlin's stance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with favorable commentaries appearing in the Yugoslav party weekly *Kommunist* as well as in *Borba*. *Borba* noted that the appearance of totally different views and arguments in *Neues Deutschland* and *Pravda* reflected a "significant evolution of relations in the bloc and the strengthening of a new consciousness and national responsibility for the cause of peace." [50] Similarly, the PCI, through its correspondents in Bonn and Moscow, openly supported Honecker's course as evidence of a natural process of differentiation taking place in Eastern Europe.[51] *L'Unita*'s Bonn correspondent immediately recognized Honecker and the inter-German "mini-détente" as the true target of *Pravda*'s criticism, adding that "from the time of the Polish crisis until now there has not been recorded such harsh and explicit criticism by the Kremlin of the leaders of a fraternal country." [52]

In mid-August *Neues Deutschland* carried a long interview with Honecker carefully crafted to meet some of the points of past Soviet criticism, while maintaining East Berlin's general stance on the importance of political dialogue and the special responsibility of the two German states for the maintenance of peace in Europe.[53] More specifically, the East German leader addressed Soviet sensitivities by openly talking about revanchist tendencies in the FRG and again raising the "Gera demands." However, Honecker avoided directly accusing the Bonn government of revanchism and refused to make the Gera issues a precondition for future progress in inter-German ties. Finally, according to the East German leader, there was "just as little an alternative to political dialogue as there is to peaceful coexistence." An initial *TASS* report on the interview in English carried all of Honecker's key statements on the importance of "dialogue" — the special responsibilities of both German states, as well as references to "limiting the damage," thereby implying Soviet support. In fact, one West German newspaper promptly claimed that the text of the interview had been discussed with Soviet diplomats in advance.[54] A Russian version of the *TASS* report issued the following day, however, deleted these passages and instead stressed Honecker's remarks supporting relations with Moscow, rejecting national reunification, and strongly criticizing Euromissile deployment. If Honecker's intention had been to put

[50] See *Borba*, August 9, 1984, as well as the commentary in the Yugoslav party weekly *Kommunist*, August 10, 1984.

[51] See Kevin Devlin, "PCI Backs Two Germanies 'Little Détente,'" RAD BR/166 (East-West Relations), *RFER*, September 4, 1984.

[52] As quoted from the article by *L'Unita*'s Bonn correspondent Paolo Soldini, "Little Détente in Question," August 4, 1984.

[53] See Honecker's interview in *Neues Deutschland*, August 18-19, 1984.

[54] For further details on the differences between the two *TASS* texts as well as East Berlin's coverage of bloc and Western reactions see Asmus, "Honecker on Inter-German Relations," RAD BR/161, *RFER*, August 30, 1984. An article in the West German conservative daily *Die Welt* on August 20 claimed that the text of the Honecker interview had been discussed in advance with Soviet diplomats.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an end to unwelcome publicity over differences between the Soviet and East German leadership by bringing East Berlin's position somewhat closer to that of Moscow, the appearance of two very different versions in *TASS,* one supporting and the other censoring Honecker, simply fueled further speculation. The SED, in turn, reprinted a translation of the Russian version of the *TASS* report, along with excerpts from the reaction of over twenty-five newspaper and news agencies in East and West, including strikingly different commentaries from the bloc countries, thereby exposing the differences with Moscow and the differing positions of the GDR's fraternal allies. Honecker flew off to Bucharest to attend the fortieth anniversary of the Romanian national holiday and to laud the virtues of dialogue, repeating his call for a "coalition of reason." This visit could only be construed as an affront to Moscow, given Bucharest's known stand on principles of bloc autonomy, the particularly nationalist tone of this year's events, and the fact that Honecker was the only top-ranking representative of a Warsaw Pact country in attendance.[55]

In Quest of Détente

With speculation rising in both East and West over the likelihood of a Honecker visit to the FRG, Alfred Dregger, parliamentary floor leader of the CDU/CSU in the West German *Bundestag,* gave an interview to the West German conservative daily *Die Welt,* in which he stated his view that the "future of the Federal Republic does not depend upon whether Mr. Honecker pays us the honor of his visit," and warning about the benefits in prestige that would accrue to East Berlin from such a visit.[56] Dregger's comments immediately elicited a domestic outcry, largely because it was assumed that Dregger's views were representative of a powerful minority among West German conservatives who were increasingly uneasy over Kohl's cultivation of ties with East Berlin, the prospect of the Honecker visit, and the coalition's de facto practice of a type of *Deutschlandpolitik* once harshly criticized by Christian Democrats. Although Chancellor Kohl immediately attempted to dampen the effect of the Dregger interview, East Berlin jumped on the statement as proof of a conscious attempt to sabotage the scheduled Honecker visit.[57] Honecker's subsequent behavior at the fall Leipzig Fair where he ignored West German diplomats was an additional sign that the visit was in trouble, and on September 4, the visit was officially postponed on the pretext that the style of West German public debate about the visit had been

[55] See Romanian SR/12, *RFER,* September 4, 1984, Item2.
[56] *Die Welt,* August 23, 1984.
[57] See the commentary "Mr. Dregger knew what he was doing" in *Neues Deutschland,* August 25-26, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

undignified and harmful. The announcement several days later, however, that Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov had also postponed his visit to Bonn confirmed Western suspicions that Soviet pressure had vetoed all contacts with Bonn.[58] Although the Social Democratic parliamentary opposition attempted to make a domestic issue out of Kohl's handling of the affair, it was clear to most that Dregger's comments or Kohl's attendance at a conference of West German expellee groups would have made little difference had Moscow openly supported a policy of inter-German rapprochement.[59]

Although the Soviet veto of Honecker's visit would appear to have set very clear limits on the pace of inter-German détente, it by no means ended the disarray within bloc ranks, as was illustrated by differing echoes following the announcement of a visit between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and U.S. President Reagan in September (1984). Moreover, both Bonn and East Berlin immediately reconfirmed their interests in maintaining the inter-German dialogue despite the postponement of the Honecker visit.[60] Signs of Soviet discomfort over East Berlin's course continued as *Pravda* pursued its attacks against Bonn, with explicit Soviet dissatisfaction apparent in *Pravda*'s "editing" of a Honecker telegram to Chernenko on his seventy-third birthday. The SED secretary general's best wishes were offered in a more militant fashion than was the case.[61] Despite continued speculation over opposition to Honecker within SED ranks, the East German leader appeared to have emerged from this dispute relatively unscathed.[62] With open Soviet pressure continuing, however, Honecker

[58] *New York Times,* September 10, 1984.

[59] On September 2, 1984, Chancellor Kohl delivered a speech in the West German city of Braunschweig before a gathering of West German expellee organizations that was subsequently constructed as being a provocation and contributing to the East German decision to postpone the Honecker visit. For the text, see *Bulletin,* No. 99 (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government), September 5, 1984.

[60] The continued East German interest in maintaining good relations with Bonn was reflected in how East Berlin handled the announcement of the postponement, as well as the fact that Honecker chose to use a meeting with a group from the West German peace movement the following day to express his interest in eventually coming to the FRG. *Neues Deutschland* also reprinted excerpts from a Honecker article for the theoretical monthly *Einheit* on September 6 that also indicated ongoing interest in "dialogue." A similar message was delivered by subsequent meetings between SPD Opposition leader Hans-Jochen Vogel with the Politburo member responsible for relations with the FRG, Herbert Haeber, in East Berlin as well as talks between an SED delegation headed by Hermann Axen that visited Bonn for talks with the SPD. See the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung,* September 24, 1984. At the same time the fall issue of *Einheit* contained several articles in which the SED more assertively raised charges of West German revanchism. See *Einheit,* No. 9-10, 1984.

[61] See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* September 29, 1984. See the communiqué issued by ADN, October 8, 1984.

[62] Despite repeated speculation over opposition to Honecker's course within the SED Politburo, there was no clear evidence that his leadership was being challenged. Moreover, Honecker appeared to have strengthened his internal position significantly with a major reshuffle of the Politburo at the eighth CC plenum in late May where the retirement of Honecker's past rival Paul Verner as well as the elevation of several Honecker proteges such as Herbert Haeber was announced. Figures assumed to be possibly in opposition to the Honecker course such as Hemann Axen have either delivered statements — in the case of Axen — that would appear to support Honecker's "coalition of reason" or, in the case of Konrad Neuman who went on record harshly attacking Bonn for its role in INF deployment last November at the seventh CC plenum, remained remarkably silent. Rumors on opposition within party

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

finally initiated a tactical retreat in late September, sharply attacking so-called "Ultras" in Bonn in a speech delivered before East German, Polish, and Soviet graduates of East German military academies. The escalation in East German rhetoric immediately received official approval in Moscow; *Pravda* reprinted a series of articles portraying the GDR as a key loyal ally, including a contribution by Honecker himself, in anticipation of the GDR's thirty-fifth anniversary celebrations on October 7. The staged re-establishment of fraternal harmony was completed during the actual celebration as Gromyko, the alleged architect of Moscow's past criticism, headed the Soviet delegation to the anniversary celebration for a triumphal visit to rediscovered unity, officially blessing the GDR as an example of "socialist internationalism in action." [63]

Whether the rediscovered harmonious rhetoric reflected reality remained questionable. Indeed the official communiqué that followed talks between Gromyko and Honecker during the October 7 celebrations spoke of the need for more "effective" coordination of the foreign policies of the USSR and the GDR, an implicit confession of serious differences.[64] Perhaps most remarkable in this saga of discord was the fact that it had been allowed to simmer and to remain unresolved for so long, despite the overwhelming influence that Moscow continues to enjoy in the GDR. This in turn was related to a constellation of factors that weakened Moscow's ability to implement a coherent policy of bloc management. First, although the absolute power position of Moscow in Eastern Europe as a whole — and in the GDR in particular — remained unchanged, Soviet authority had experienced a relative decline resulting from a sustained succession crisis spanning the final days of Brezhnev, the brief interregnum of Andropov, and the colorless onset of the Chernenko era. The inability of an old, ill, and divided Soviet leadership to impose a coherent and assertive bloc policy, already evident in the Soviet handling of the Polish crisis and in increasing elements of disarray in the final months of the anti-Euromissile campaign, had now culminated in Moscow's difficulties in forging a new consensus to react to the fait accompli of INF deployment. This situation was exacerbated by clear evidence of conflicting signals from Moscow. Evidence of dispute and conflict within the Soviet leadership had already emerged during the final phase of Brezhnev's reign, illustrated by the Soviet reaction to the famous "walk in the woods"

ranks have nonetheless continued with the West German daily *Die Welt* claiming that the SED CC and the Soviet embassy in East Berlin had received numerous letters from party members complaining that Honecker had "sold out" to the class enemy. See *Die Welt,* September 17, 1984.

[63] See Honecker's speech delivered before the graduates of the military academies in *Neues Deutschland,* September 25, 1984; the articles on the "indivisible" bonds of Soviet-East German friendship in *Pravda,* October 1, 1984; Honecker's own article in *Pravda,* October 5, 1984; and the speeches by Honecker and Gromyko at the GDR's thirty-fifth anniversary celebrations in *Neues Deutschland,* October 8, 1984.

[64] See the communiqué published by *ADN,* October 8, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

compromise worked out by the chief Soviet and American negotiators in Geneva in July 1982.[65] That such disagreements persisted under Andropov was hinted at in an article in December 1982 in the authoritative Soviet journal *Kommunist* which warned of the dangers of "clannishness and factionalism." [66] Similar evidence of differences has persisted under Chernenko as well, reflected in debates over economic policy, the subtle shifts in the Soviet position for a resumption of arms control negotiations, the censoring of Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in a study of speeches from the CC plenum where Chernenko was elected CPSU secretary general, vacillations in the Soviet position on "star wars" talks, as well as additional articles in *Kommunist* and *Pravda* on the dangers of factional infighting. Finally, the sudden and unexpected removal of Soviet Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov as Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces also seemed to indicate an intensifying power struggle in the Kremlin.[67] Under such circumstances, the potential for a breakdown of communication between elites, the misreading of signals, and/or the likelihood of miscalculating the limits of bloc autonomy increase dramatically.

In the case of Soviet attitudes toward Bonn and inter-German relations, the launching of the revanchist campaign, coupled with the open attacks on East-West German relations in the summer of 1984, seemed to indicate that Moscow had resolved its own debate over how to punish Bonn for its part in INF deployment. Several other articles portraying Bonn in a different light continued to appear in the Soviet academic press, an indication that the consensus might not be solid.[68] More suggestive was an article that appeared in early August in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* at the height of polemics between East Berlin and Moscow that recalled disagreements between Lenin and Trotsky in 1918 over whether the newly founded Soviet state should sue for peace and negotiate with imperialist Germany, complete with Lenin's lament over his frustration in dealing with factions and getting his views accepted among his cohorts. Such a blatant historical reference tempts one to raise the tantalizing question of who had adopted the role of Lenin in 1984 and who was in favor of or opposed to talking with "the Germans." Siding with

[65] See "Geneva Behind Closed Doors," The *Times*, May 31-June 2, 1984.

[66] *Kommunist*, No. 13, December 1982. See Elizabeth Teague, "Factions in the Kremlin?" *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 353, September 18, 1984.

[67] Ibid.

[68] See, for example, Vadim Sagladin, "The Contemporary International Crisis in the Light of Leninist Teaching," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia*, April 1984, pp. 3-24; Prof. N. Shmelyov, "Credits and Politics (On East-West Relations)," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 4, 1984, pp. 66-74. Further traces of Soviet support for the East German position could be found in an interview published in the East Berlin *Berliner Zeitung* on July 19 with *Izvestia's* political commentator Aleksandr Bovin in which Bovin stated: "I must note first of all that the GDR's foreign policy has recently been activated. I think that this is not accidental. In such difficult times each socialist country is called upon to intensify its activities. This is precisely what the GDR is doing."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lenin, the article seemed to throw its weight behind proponents of dialogue and détente.[69] Such a view would appear to be confirmed by the impressions of West German officials that Honecker had cleared his visit with Chernenko during their meeting following the CEMA summit in Moscow in early June.[70] The fact that Honecker, himself a veteran of many an intra- and inter-party dispute and a man with an intimate knowledge of the Soviet elite, clearly believed that he had at least some support for his overtures toward Bonn goes a long way toward explaining the course of events in the summer of 1984.

Moreover, Honecker's negotiating position with Moscow was probably strengthened not only due to his intimate knowledge of diverging views in the Kremlin, but also because of his relatively unchallenged position at home. In sharp contrast to the chaotic leadership scene in Moscow, Honecker's careful stacking of his own Politburo with loyal supporters along with his promotion of younger figures into positions of authority would appear to make the SED leadership a model of stability by Eastern bloc standards. With the benefit of hindsight, the removal of the Soviet ambassador to the GDR and de facto procounsul Piotr A. Abrasimov in June 1982, apparently at Honecker's request following his May meeting with Yuri Andropov, was a key step in East Berlin's efforts to enhance its own leverage within the bloc, concomitant with its growing economic and political weight.[71] With Poland still in shambles following the experience with Solidarity, the GDR has emerged not only as Moscow's key economic partner in Eastern Europe, but as an increasingly

[69] *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* August 8, 1984.

[70] Many observers have long assumed that Honecker's close ties with Konstantin Chernenko implied that Chernenko backed the SED secretary general, a view that would help explain Honecker's strong stand. For the ties between Honecker and Chernenko, see Fred Oldenburg, "Die SED und Konstantin Chernenko," *Aktuelle Analysen,* Bundesinstitut fuer ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (Cologne), No. 16, March 16, 1984; and Oldenburg, "Is the SED Going its Own Way in the Soviet Empire?" *Deutschland Archiv,* No. 5, 1984, pp. 491-96. West German officials appeared under the impression that Honecker had received Chernenko's backing during their meeting following the CEMA summit in Moscow in early June, also noting that the key attacks against Honecker came while Chernenko was away from Moscow on vacation. The West German weekly *Der Spiegel* even went so far as to claim that Honecker rejected an opportunity to travel to Moscow in late August because Chernenko was still away and he would have been forced to deal with Gromyko, often assumed to be behind Moscow's attacks. (See *Der Spiegel,* No. 37, September 10, 1984.)

[71] On May 31, 1984, Radio Moscow announced that Piort A. Abrasimov, USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in the GDR, had been "released" from his duties to assume the post of chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Tourism, a clear demotion for a man who had played an active role in shaping Soviet policy toward Germany for over two decades, spending two stints in East Berlin for a total of seventeen years as ambassador. Abrasimov's dominating style, often referred to as one of an old Roman proconsul, and his lack of concern for East German sensitivities on questions of sovereignty are reported to have irritated East Berlin, particularly Honecker, for some time. Abrasimov's replacement by an old Honecker confidant, Vyacheslav I. Kochemassov, would appear to confirm the view that Abrasimov's removal was upon Honecker's request. For further details on Abrasimov's removal see Asmus, "Abrasimov Removed as Soviet Ambassador to the GDR," RAD BR/136 (Eastern Europe), *RFER,* June 14, 1983; and for further details on his successor Kochemassov see Karl Wilhelm Fricke, "Andropov's Man in East Berlin," *Deutschland Archiv,* No. 8, August 1983, pp. 789-90.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vital political ally as well. The changing role of these two bloc allies was already symbolically underlined back at the CPSU Congress in 1981 when the very protocol-conscious Soviet leadership gave Honecker and the SED the honor of being the first Eastern bloc ally to speak, an obvious affront to Warsaw which had traditionally occupied this role. Similarly East Berlin has also started to adopt the past Polish role of launching trial balloons for Warsaw Pact foreign policy or security initiatives such as Honecker's call for a nuclear-free zone for Germany.[72] Although it is doubtful that East Berlin will ever enjoy the same type of image and special status that Poland enjoyed under Gierek in Western circles in the 1970s, what is noteworthy is the increased attention given the GDR.

A final factor that undoubtedly contributed to East German reticence to follow Moscow's lead in "punishing" Bonn was an obvious lack of enthusiasm for the nebulous alternative that the Soviet leadership offered: a return to East-West confrontation, self-isolation, and pre-détente days. While other fraternal critics may have been casting aspersions upon the dangers of Western credits and trade, regime elites in East Berlin and other countries such as Hungary were only too aware of the pressing need for additional Western economic assistance. Upbeat regular reports on plan figures in East Berlin could not hide a lack of investment and stagnating standards of living. Although the debt situation appeared quite stable, the East German economy could clearly use additional assistance, assistance that Moscow could hardly provide, if it were to keep pace with the FRG — always the standard of comparison for Germans in the GDR.[73] This in turn led to a merger of views between a reformist Hungarian

[72] The new role that the GDR appears to be adopting within the framework of Pact policy has been underlined in its proposals for nuclear-free and chemical-weapon-free zones that would encompass most of Germany. Whereas it was Warsaw in the 1950s with the Rapacki Plan and Gierek in the 1970s who initiated the Pact campaign for a European security conference on disarmament, it has been East Berlin that has been taking the initiative and testing Western, particularly West German, waters in recent years with various security schemes. See Asmus, "Honecker Proposed Nuclear-Free Zones for Germany," RAD BR/33 (East-West Relations), *RFER*. February 16, 1983. For an interesting East German view advocating the concept of "common security" see the article by Max Schmidt, "Conditions and Possibilities for a Continuation of a Policy of Peaceful Coexistence in Europe," *IPW Bericht,* No. 9. 1984, pp. 1-9. Most striking is the position adopted by Schmidt, head of the GDR's prestigious Institute for Politics and Economics, on the issue of a "security partnership" between East and West and his adoption of what is essentially the position of the West German Social Democratic Party.

[73] Although official East German statistics on the performance of the economy and the fulfillment of plan figures have indeed been impressive, they should not distract from the fact that the dramatic improvement in foreign trade performance, for example, has come at the cost of the domestic consumer, and there have been numerous reports of food shortages and lacking consumer goods in the past two years. The situation would appear to have stabilized somewhat in 1984, but East Berlin is still faced with not only a large Western debt, but also the largest cumulative trade deficit within the bloc with the Soviet Union, currently estimated at about 5 billion U.S. dollars. In sum, the GDR is still confronted with considerable challenges in the economic sphere. See Hans-Dieter Schulz, "Plan Fulfillment for the First Time since 1984," *Deutschland Archiv,* No. 3, 1984, pp. 296-307; on the effects of the export drive on domestic consumption see Doris Cornelson, "Consolidation at the Expense of Private Consumption," *DIW Wochenbericht,* No. 51, February 2, 1984; on the comparison with the FRG one might simply note that Honecker acknowledged at the fifth CC plenum in late November 1982 that the average East

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leadership and an East German regime whose reputation had been traditionally based in orthodoxy; a mini-East German-Hungarian axis, certainly a novelty in view of the often cool bilateral ties of the past.

Towards More "Room for Maneuver"

The development of open differences between Moscow and East Berlin in the summer of 1984 had all the symptoms of another incipient rift within the communist bloc. Yet, there was never any question of Honecker becoming another Tito or even a second Ceausescu or Hoxha. Such a possibility was excluded not only by geopolitical realities, but also by the very strong political, economic, and military bonds that continue to bind East Berlin and Moscow. Western speculation over such a possibility misread the real motivations in East Berlin. The SED was not trying to substitute its strong Eastern bonds with new dependencies in the West, nor were there any indications of East Berlin diluting its harsh internal policy of "delimitation" in favor of greater internal liberalization. Instead, Honecker was quietly striving to complement his loyalties to Moscow and a more open Western orientation that would transform the role of the GDR as a front-line state on the East-West divide to a partner in a broader process of European détente where East Berlin could further establish its own profile, maintaining, of course, that such a policy tended Soviet interests as well. Indeed, bloc loyalty remained, in the view of East Berlin, the essential precondition for a more open stance vis-à-vis the West, and above all Bonn — an argument that paralleled Bonn's claims in the early 1970s that *Ostpolitik* was merely a natural and long-overdue complement to Adenauer's truncated *Westpolitik,* and in no way implied a dilution of the FRG's alliance commitments. A second, less-discussed West German goal in the 1970s, however, was to use rapprochement with the East to enhance West German leverage and maneuverability within the Western alliance. Similarly, it is equally clear that East Berlin was also redefining its traditional bloc role within the parameters set by the Warsaw Pact and Soviet hegemony. As an official East German commentary on the eve of Honecker's trip to the Soviet Union in May 1982 for talks with Yuri Andropov noted, "The German Democratic Republic is a sovereign socialist state firmly anchored in the Eastern alliance. Its room for maneuver *(Spielraum)* exists there where it can serve the cause of peace and foster cooperation between states." [74] The use of the phrase "room for maneuver," an apparent first in official East German vocabulary,

German worker was still 30 percent less productive than his West German counterpart, failing to add, however, that Walter Ulbricht had mentioned a figure of only 20 percent in the early 1960s. See Honecker's speech in *Neues Deutschland,* November 27-28, 1982.

[74] See *Neues Deutschland,* May 3, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or the adoption of such formulations as a "coalition of reason" or a pan-German "community of responsibility," are themselves indications of the changing perceptions in East Berlin. In fact, they may very well be the initial tentative steps in a process of psychological emancipation resulting in a more assertive East German leadership both willing and able to articulate its own national interests.

What East Berlin now chooses to describe as its "room for maneuver" may ironically be a product of the détente of the 1970s, a détente which was bitterly opposed and greatly feared by the East German party elite at the time. Indeed, the most remarkable aspect of this story is not Moscow's being challenged by one of its most loyal and orthodox Leninist allies in Eastern Europe, as some of the greatest blows to Soviet authority have come from countries considered at the time to be stalwart orthodox allies — e.g., Tito, Mao, etc.; nor was it the existence of differences between the East German and Soviet elites over policy towards the FRG, as such disputes can also be documented.[75] Instead, the greatest irony was the terms of conflict between Moscow and East Berlin and the parallels with the last phase of open discord between the SED and the CPSU, namely during the late 1960s and early 1970s under Ulbricht and the question of how to respond to the overtures of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. In 1984 the issue was the same, namely relations with Bonn, but the roles seemingly reversed with East Berlin now defending a policy towards the FRG that it so bitterly opposed at the time. During the opening phase of the West German *Ostpolitik* initiated under Willy Brandt, Ulbricht had attempted to blunt Bonn's initiatives, and bind the hands of Moscow by setting very stringent preconditions for any rapprochement with the FRG, insisting on full de jure West German recognition of the GDR. As it became clear, however, that Moscow was indeed willing to compromise on the key issues of East German recognition, the status of Berlin, and was even prepared to accept West German language in treaties asserting that the national question remained "open," Ulbricht responded by being obstructionist, and in some cases attempted to sabotage the complex set of negotiations underway. Ulbricht's increasing obstinance and his refusal to accept changes in Soviet policy were all major factors leading to his forced "retirement" in May 1971.[76] East Berlin was therefore a very unenthusiastic participant in the early days of East-West détente, with its frustration over the inability to achieve full West German diplomatic

[75] For an excellent history of Soviet-East German relations and differences that have arisen between Moscow and East Berlin see Fred Oldenburg, "Die Autonomie des Musterknaben: Zum Politischen Verhaeltnis DDR-UdSSR," in Richard Loewenthal and Boris Meissner, eds., *Der Sowjetblock zwischen Vormachtkontrolle und Autonomie* (Cologne: Markus Verlag, 1984), pp. 153-97.

[76] For further details see Gerhard Wettig, *Community and Conflict in the Socialist Camp* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1975).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

recognition exacerbated by fears concerning the destabilizing domestic consequences arising from a dramatic increase in East-West German travel and personal contacts. The official response chosen by the SED was its policy of "delimitation," stepped-up emphasis on ideological vigilance, military instruction in the schools, and the sudden categorization of well over one million East German citizens as "carriers of state secrets" and therefore banned from any Western contact. Official policy focused on the accentuation of all differences between the two German states, as reflected in East Berlin's new stance on the German nation, and a process of renaming institutions to de-emphasize the common German past, a process that one West German newspaper termed the *Entdeutschung* of the GDR.[77]

With the benefit of hindsight, however, East Berlin may have proved far more adept at controlling the domestic consequences of détente than many Western observers deemed possible. Delimitation or *Abgrenzung* certainly did not eliminate the existing potential for sociopolitical or economic disaffection, a point vividly underlined by estimates in 1983 of nearly half a million East Germans having officially applied for emigration to the West or repeated attempts to gain passage to the West via West German embassies elsewhere in Eastern Europe, but it has kept it well under control and within tolerable limits, in part thanks to the very efficient work of the East German security organs. In recent years, the SED has shown itself to be surprisingly flexible and sophisticated in handling sources of potential domestic unrest and in dealing with Western "contamination," as can be seen in Honecker's skilled handling of a limited rapprochement with the East German Evangelical Church Federation, the regime's handling of an "independent" peace movement, and the party's rewriting of German history to create a new basis of national legitimacy.[78] When questioned recently by a Soviet newspaper about the dangers of "bourgeois influence" resulting from the fact that nearly all East Germans watch West German television, Honecker replied in a very relaxed fashion, simply stating that this influence was not solely negative as it forced socialist youth in the GDR to "mature" under very strident conditions.[79] Détente may not have led to the type of internal sociopolitical change that many in West Germany hoped for, and that

[77] See Asmus, "The GDR and the German Nation: Sole Heir or Socialist Sibling," *International Affairs,* (Summer 1984), p. 409.

[78] For a broader treatment of the regime's handling of the peace movement in the GDR and the regime's evolving posture on German history see Asmus, "Is There a Peace Movement in the GDR?" *ORBIS,* (Summer 1983), pp. 301-41; and Asmus, "The GDR and Martin Luther," *Survey,* vol. 28: 3, (Autumn 1984), pp. 124-56.

[79] See Honecker's interview with *Komsomolkaya Pravda* printed in *Neues Deutschland,* July 24, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was deeply feared in East Berlin, but it has produced a more self-confident and secure party elite.

The same trend can be seen in foreign policy, where détente may very well have proved to be a liberating experience.[80] The achievement of U.N. membership coupled with a wave of international recognition in the 1970s certainly helped to reduce some of the regime's deeply felt insecurities over sovereignty and its doubts about its viability as an actor on the international scene. In a certain sense, inter-German relations have therefore been "normalized." The brutal reality of the border, of partition, and the nature of the SED regime remain of course, but both German states have in their own way adjusted to doing business with each other under very novel circumstances, attempting at all times to further their own policy goals. In sum, the SED has also developed its own brand of *Deutschlandpolitik,* and, as its handling of inter-German affairs during the crises of Afghanistan, Poland, and INF have well illustrated, it has slowly evolved from a passive player to one capable of launching its own inter-German initiatives. Although West German recognition remains the key to the full legitimacy of SED rule, it is no longer a precondition for international recognition, nor does it prevent the GDR from playing a more active role on the European scene. The strong interest in East Berlin in a Honecker visit to the FRG can be in large part attributed to the fact that, in East German eyes, such a visit symbolically would have represented the closest thing possible to de facto West German recognition of the East German state, and therefore of Germany's partition. At the same time, the GDR has been expanding its ties with other key Western countries, as reflected in the recent visits of Western statesmen, and the persistent rumor of a possible Mitterrand visit to East Berlin. The same would appear to apply in the case of Washington where the GDR has, for the first time, also been viewed in its own right and not through the prism of U.S.-Soviet or U.S.-West German relations.[81]

East Berlin has thus far reacted to the increased Western attention in a somewhat schizophrenic fashion: clearly enjoying, on the one hand, the gains in prestige resulting from Western, above all American,

[80] For a more in-depth argument that détente proved to be a liberating experience for the SED in foreign policy terms see McAdams, "Surviving the Missiles"; for the similar view that the experience of the 1970s has led to a more European-oriented regime, see von Platte, "Deutsch-deutsche Bezuhunger und Ost-West-Konflikt."

[81] One interesting aspect of the entire saga of inter-German relations in 1984 hardly noticed by the press has been the position adopted by Washington. The Reagan administration has not only been providing low-key but consistent support for Bonn's attempts to establish a better functioning modus vivendi with East Berlin, but for the first time American officials also appear to be viewing the GDR in its own right and not through the prism of U.S.-Soviet or U.S.-West German ties. The latter trend can be documented in the visits of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt to East Berlin in February 1984, the follow-up visit by Burt's Deputy Tom Niles in May, as well as the meeting between U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer in New York in early October.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attention; but, on the other hand, uncomfortable with the publicity devoted to open differences with the Soviet leadership. As one East German official responded to the prodding questions of a Western journalist, "In some places we have been seen as a tame seal who jumps through the trainer's hoop when he snaps the whip. So we are not. Is that news?" [82] What is news is the fact that East German officials now matter-of-factly refer to the revolution of a greater degree of pluralism within the bloc as a natural state of affairs, a remarkable solution given the fact that the word "pluralism" had long been singled out for special attack by party ideologists as a particularly dangerous bourgeois concept.

This in turn underlines the incremental changes that have indeed taken place in the perceptions of the East German elite as a result of its experience with détente. West German *Ostpolitik* did not lead to "change through rapprochement," but it did foster a more self-assertive mindset that has influenced not only East Berlin's handling of its special relationship with the Federal Republic, but also its "indissoluble" ties with Moscow. The taboo of the "compete unanimity of views" between Moscow and East Berlin has been broken and its restoration will undoubtedly require more than stale reconfirmations of fraternal harmony. One can hardly imagine anything stirring up anti-Russian sentiment more in the GDR than the Soviet-led boycott of the Olympic games in Los Angeles and Moscow's veto of the planned Honecker visit.

Perhaps never in the history of the Warsaw Pact have differences over security policy been so publicly aired and so prominently displayed as in 1984. Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe, already seemingly reduced to little more than crisis management during the Polish crisis, now also appeared incapable of stemming centrifugal tendencies among some of its closest allies spawned by its handling of Euromissile deployment. The open breakdown in communication resulting from the unsettled leadership situation in Moscow allowed divergent perceptions within the Soviet bloc over the fruits of détente. It was, as the Soviets say, hardly an accident that the Soviet-East German polemic climaxed on the eighth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in early August, symbolically underlining differences over the gains of past détente policies. For Moscow, Helsinki represented the height of success for Soviet détente policy towards Western Europe and the closest thing possible to a surrogate peace treaty and Western recognition of the postwar territorial status quo. It did not, however, lead to the type of political and military security envisioned by Moscow, with the Polish crisis illustrating the fragile political basis of communist rule in Eastern Europe, and INF demonstrating West European unwillingness to accept Soviet precepts on military security

[82] See James Markham in the *New York Times,* September 25, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as well. The aspersions cast by Moscow evoked little enthusiasm among small and medium-sized allies such as East Berlin or Budapest. Faced with serious economic woes and little probability of increased Soviet economic assistance, the elites of these regimes banded together to form a new lobby within Pact circles resisting such views and advocating nothing less than a "return to détente."

Despite the Soviet veto of the Honecker visit, it has been the subsequent sign of a possible shift in Soviet policy towards the West that most defused tension in Moscow's relations with the GDR and other détente-minded allies. The meeting between Politburo member and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in late September, followed by the announcement after Reagan's re-election that Gromyko would meet U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in Geneva in early January to set the agenda for a resumption of arms control talks go a long way toward easing past strains within the Soviet bloc. Whether these moves will eventually be complemented by a reassessment of Soviet policy towards Bonn as well remains uncertain, with the real crescendo of Soviet charges of revanchism threatening to come in the spring of 1985 with the fortieth anniversary celebrations of the defeat of the Third Reich. Should a resumption of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue portend a change in Soviet attitudes towards Bonn as well, it would, perhaps the greatest irony of all, mark a return by Moscow to precisely the type of policy so forcefully advocated by East Berlin and criticized by the USSR in 1984. Speaking at the ninth CC plenum one year after the start of INF deployment and his "damage limitation" speech that proved the harbinger of discord within the bloc, SED party chief Erich Honecker carefully avoided this contentious phrase, but confirmed his commitment precisely to that policy. "The view presented at the 7th CC plenum," according to the SED secretary general had "been proven correct" by the events of the past year.[83]

[83] *Neues Deutschland,* November 23, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF THE POPE

by Thomas P. Melady and John F. Kikoski

On October 26, 1984, in Rome's central courthouse, Judge Ilario Martella formally announced that four Turks and three Bulgarians would be tried on charges of complicity in a plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II on May 13, 1981. This followed a May 1984 Italian judicial report that asked for the indictment of a slightly larger group of six Turks and three Bulgarians in this case.[1] Worldwide interest in the affair, which had waned following the July 1981 trial, conviction, and life sentence of Mehmet Ali Agca, the sole assailant in custody, waxed again. With the indictments of individual actors, attention also focused upon the grave accusations that have been levelled both directly and indirectly against Eastern bloc state-actors, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, as responsible for the conception, planning, and full support of the execution of this crime.

These indeed are weighty charges. To attempt to assassinate the Pope, given his unique status for people of all backgrounds is shocking enough, even for our era. But the implication of members of the world community could make this the gravest act of attempted destabilization of the decade, if not the postwar era. It is also evident that should a clear, credible case be made for the involvement of Bulgarian agents, worldwide conclusions would be drawn about the role in this affair of the chief Warsaw Pact state. We are deeply concerned that nothing should imperil the maintenance of sound relations between the West and the Soviet Union and her allies. But this affair must be confronted; it will not go away, given the slow but steady pace of Italian justice, and worldwide doubts, suspicions, and rumors. This matter will continue to intrude upon

[1] *New York Times,* October 27, 1984. Two Turks, Agca and Omer Mersan, whose indictments and trial were requested in the May 1984 report were not listed in the formal indictment of October 1984. The remaining seven individuals were indicted. The Turks who will be tried are Musa Serdar Celebi, right-wing Gray Wolf leader in West Germany; Bekir Celenk, high-ranking Turkish Mafia boss; Oral Celek, the Pope's co-assailant in St. Peter's Square; and Omer Bagci, a minor Gray Wolves figure. The Bulgarians included Todor Aivasov and Zehlyo Vasilev, Bulgarian embassy employees, and Sergei Antonov, a manager of Bulgaria's Balkan Air — all three of Rome. In addition, Judge Martella also stated that one of the indicted Turks, Oral Celik, fired a third shot that wounded the Pope. The other two shots came from Mehmet Ali Agca.

Thomas P. Melady is Professor, and **John F. Kikoski** is Assistant Professor in the Department of History and Political Science at Sacred Heart University, Fairfield, Connecticut. Professor Melady, who is also President of the University, is the former U.S. Ambassador to Burundi and Uganda. He formerly served as Senior Adviser to the United States delegation to the United Nations General Assembly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the world's conscience and its consciousness until, upon full examination, the truth obtains.

Given the unique situation, this article explores three questions: (1) What circumstances led to the attempted assassination; (2) What actors — individuals and states — were involved in those circumstances; and (3) Was there indeed a conspiracy to kill the Pope?

The authors understand (as should the reader) that conspiracies are not intended by their perpetrators to be uncovered. Therefore, this work does not seek to answer definitively each of the many and complex questions this case poses. While drawing upon a number of sources, it essentially follows what we term (and shall shortly explain as) the Albano Report on the assassination attempt and the events leading up to it; for that is by far the most thoroughly investigated and corroborated account.

This article first treats the published reports both of Italian judicial authorities and a handful of investigators as they determined the nature of the affair. Second, it examines Mehmet Ali Agca's background, and sketches the links leading to the events of May 13, 1981. It then focuses upon a series of significant episodes or puzzles about the case from which a pattern or mosaic may emerge. Next, it examines the interests of the indicted and accused actors. Last, it suggests a second option open to the world community in dealing with this affair.

Published Reports About a Conspiracy

The reports about a possible conspiracy started within days of the shooting. *La Stampa* of Turin reported that Judge Luciano Infelisi, the magistrate who signed Agca's original arrest warrant on May 14 stated: "For us, there is documentary proof that Mehmet Ali Agca did not act alone."[2] In September 1981, two months after Agca's July trial, Judge Severino Santiapichi, in his fifty-one-page *Statement of Motivation* summing up the evidence at hand and relating the rationale for Agca's life sentence concluded:

> It is unthinkable that he could have undertaken this difficult project in absolute autonomy, or for his private reasons. . . . Grave questions arise concerning the possibility of material complicity in the crime and a plot at high levels. . . . Everything points to the conclusion that Agca was no more than the emerging point of a deep conspiracy, complex and threatening, orchestrated by secret forces, carefully planned and directed down to the smallest detail.[3]

This conclusion was at variance with both the Western and communist

[2] Claire Sterling, *The Time of the Assassins* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983), p. 3, citing *La Stampa* of Turin, May 15, 1981. Sterling, more than any other journalist, has pursued this case doggedly and, because of her efforts, helped to bring the facts to light.

[3] Ibid., p. 10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

press which loosely and initially labelled Agca a lone, deranged gunman, a religious fanatic, a right-wing neo-fascist ideologue, or a "meta-terrorist" — one who engages in such an act for its own sake — labels and labeling which persist to the present. Following Agca's conviction, the media generally lost interest in vigorously pursuing the case, whether because of its apparent closure, the difficulty of securing reliable information in this affair, or due to a marked reluctance by some of the elite press to confront the possible international implications that might result from a searching investigation.[4] But authorities within the Italian judiciary did not see Agca as having acted alone. Indeed, the evidence in hand (even within hours of the act) and the suspicion it raised were sufficiently strong, that in November 1981 Judge Ilario Martella was given the charge of re-opening the case.

There matters rested publicly until journalist Claire Sterling placed Agca's attempted assassination in a new light in a September 1982 *Reader's Digest* article, "The Plot to Kill the Pope," in which she wrote, "As I learned in months of investigation, there is hard evidence that Agca was an instrument in an elaborate international plot."[5] She proceeded to connect Agca to shadowy figures of the gun-running and drug-smuggling "Turkish Mafia" that had close ties with the Bulgarian secret service.

In an NBC White Paper, *The Man Who Shot The Pope: A Study in Terrorism,* broadcast on September 21, 1982, Marvin Kalb added a searing motive for the attempted assassination. Karol Wojtyla left Poland in the fall of 1978 a cardinal; he returned in the summer of 1979 a Pope. His triumphal homecoming in June triggered a tremendous surge of Polish pride, enthusiasm, and self-assertion. By August 1980, Poland was convulsed by mass demonstrations and strikes demanding the freedoms of speech and assembly, a freer Church, and, most significantly of all, an autonomous Solidarity. The chance for Soviet military intervention loomed large. But the Polish regime compromised, and Solidarity, surprisingly, was recognized by the Government as an independent trade union, while the threatened Soviet invasion never materialized. This occurred, Kalb reported, because

> . . . in early August, as the crisis escalated, the Pope sent an envoy to the Kremlin, whom we are pledged not to identify. He delivered an extraordinary handwritten letter, in Russian, from the Pope to Soviet leader Brezhnev. It said that though the Pope was the head of a universal Church, he still was a Pole, and deeply

[4] For a thorough treatment of media coverage of this affair and of the reluctance of the "elite press" to more actively pursue this story, see Michael Ledeen, "The Bulgarian Connection and the Media," *Commentary,* June 1983, pp. 45-50. The first break in this general media treatment came on December 30, 1981, when ABC Rome Bureau Chief Bill Blakemore reported on *World News Tonight* that Italian authorities were investigating the case as a possible international conspiracy (ABC News, *World News Tonight,* broadcast December 30, 1981).

[5] Claire Sterling, "The Plot to Murder The Pope," *Reader's Digest,* September 1982, p. 72.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

affected by developments in Poland. And if the Russians moved against Poland, he would lay down the crown of St. Peter and return to his homeland to stand shoulder to shoulder with his people.[6]

In 1983 two separate book-length treatments of the attempted assassination were published: *The Time of the Assassins* by Claire Sterling, author of the authoritative work on international terrorism, *The Terror Network;* and *The Plot to Kill the Pope* by Paul B. Henze, former member of the National Security Council under President Jimmy Carter, who had a strong prior background in Turkish affairs, and presently is a research scholar with the Rand Corporation.

In her book, Sterling expanded in thorough detail upon her earlier 1982 thesis. She held that the Turkish Mafia had carefully selected an assassin with a right-wing Gray Wolf-terrorist image that deliberately was burnished as he was handled by the Gray Wolf network in Europe in the months before the attempted assassination.

> In reality the Gray Wolves involved here were working for the Turkish Mafia, which was controlled by the Bulgarian secret service, DS (Darzhavna Sigurnost), which was working for the Soviet KGB. This last was my conclusion. Readers could draw their own.[7]

Concurring with Sterling's thesis, Henze is less circumspect in his judgment:

> Historical, inferential, circumstantial and solid factual evidence all point in the same direction to explain the plot against John Paul II — toward Moscow. The probability that the Kremlin leadership and the KGB were the architects of the plot to kill John Paul II is far greater in 1983 than it seemed in 1981. It is likely to be even greater in 1984 and 1985.[8]

Henze's words were prescient in light of the unofficial publication on June 10, 1984, of excerpts from a seventy-eight-page report filed by Italian State Prosecutor Antonio Albano. This report in turn was based on approximately 25,000 pages of testimony, information, and corroborating investigation assembled by Judge Martella since November 1981.

Albano's report, actually filed on May 8, 1984, asked for the indictment of six Turks and three Bulgarians for conspiring to assassinate the Pope, and accused the Bulgarian secret police of recruiting Agca to shoot John Paul II, thus seeking to weaken the Solidarity movement and to dampen the convulsions accompanying it. The report concluded: ". . . some political figure of great power took note of this grave situation and, mindful of the vital needs of the Eastern bloc, decided it was nec-

---

[6] *NBC White Paper. The Man Who Shot The Pope: A Study in Terrorism,* broadcast September 21, 1982, pp. 13-14. NBC was extremely active in its investigation of this case.

[7] Sterling, *The Assassins,* p. 113.

[8] Paul B. Henze, *The Plot to Kill The Pope* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983), p. 194 provides a most sound and scholarly treatment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

essary to kill Pope Wojtyla."[9] There has been prior reference to the seven indictments which were handed down and trials ordered on October 26, 1984. Understanding the common thrust of these separate published reports, we now turn to an examination of the background of the assailant we most know about to this point.

Mehmet Ali Agca and the Trail to St. Peter's Square

Born to a poor family in 1958 and largely raised in the provincial Turkish city of Malatya, Mehmet Ali Agca was an unusual child. Quiet, somewhat of a loner and aloof, studious and highly intelligent, he was not marked by excessive, or even mild Islamic religiosity. Nor is there any record of Agca's involvement during his adolescence with any political group amidst the waves of political convulsions and terrorism that wracked Turkey from 1969 to 1980. Perhaps it should be remembered later that during the last year of his studies in Malatya, Agca told his brother, "I won't be a teacher for T.L. 10,000 a month [then equivalent to about $250]. I will find a way to earn a lot more money in this system."[10]

Remembered as a top student at his secondary school, in 1976 Agca took and passed a university entrance examination (particularly difficult for a student from the provinces), and earned admission to the Faculty of History and Geography at the University of Ankara which he entered that fall. Two years later he submitted himself to a second such examination and earned a score high enough to gain admission to the prestigious Economics Faculty at the University of Istanbul. While again there is no record of any religious or political involvement by Agca during this period, several points are worth noting here.

During his interrogation, Agca told Italian authorities that in the summer of 1977 he had forty days of terrorist training in a PLO camp in Syria, helped there by two friends from Malatya, Sedat Sirri Kadem and Teslim Tore, both violent young leftists. Further, on December 13, 1977, Agca began to be paid. From that date until December 29, 1978, Agca received at least $16,000, deposited into his accounts at various locations throughout Turkey — certainly a fortune to an impoverished student fresh from the provinces.

The Albano Report helps us here for it states that for some years prior to 1980, Agca earned "lucrative sums" for smuggling "arms, cigarettes, drugs, anything" working under Turkish Mafia bosses Abuzer Ugurlu and Bekir Celenk. It should be noted that both Ugurlu and Celenk

[9] *New York Times*, June 10, 1984, hereafter cited as Albano Report.
[10] Henze, *The Plot*, p. 33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were in charge of tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars of drugs shipped from Turkey to the West, and arms shipped from the East to Turkey. The entrepôt point for these shipments was Bulgaria, the most obedient of East European states, and the official, hugely profitable and subversive Bulgarian state import-export agency, Kintex, which is run by the Bulgarian secret service, DS.[11]

Henze, who possesses a special expertise in Turkish affairs, observed that during this approximate period "the Soviet Union has invested more in destabilizing Turkey through terrorism and subversion than it has spent on any single country since Vietnam." Henze cites Turkish authorities who believe the cost from 1977-1980 alone was over $1 billion. He further points to large arms shipments from Bulgaria (among other sources), terrorist training, and the provision of large sums of cash to subversive groups.[12]

In December 1978 the largest single deposit, $8,000, was made to Agca's accounts. This is significant, for on February 1, 1979, the influential editor of the respected Istanbul daily, *Milliyet,* Abdi Ipekci was murdered. Shot outside his home on a snowy night by two or three only fleetingly seen men, one of Turkey's most moderate-liberal, pro-Greek-Turkish reconciliation, and pro-Western voices was silenced in an act that shocked Turkish society. Despite massive police activity, and rewards of over $100,000, no break in the case occurred for months.

On June 25, 1979, an anonymous telephone caller told police to pick up "Ali" at the Marmara Cafe, a rightist-Gray Wolf gathering place in Istanbul. Upon arresting Ali — Mehmet Ali Agca — Turkish police were surprised by his ready confession to the Ipekci assassination — especially since the automatic penalty was death by hanging. This particularly intrigued Nahir Erman, the attorney who represented the Ipekci family at Agca's trial and the man who discovered the trail of bank deposits. "Nobody would ask to be hanged when not a thing could be pinned on him," was Erman's conclusion.[13] His Turkish interrogators found Agca to be mentally normal, of quick intelligence, self-possessed, and a master obfuscator — qualities he evidenced again to Italian authorities. Agca stated that he had taken neither money nor instructions from anyone and claimed to be what might be termed again a "meta-terrorist" — one above political ideologies, engaging in terrorism for its own sake. He made no mention of religion. The Albano Report sheds light here; it states that "on orders from the Turkish Mafia — that is,

[11] Sterling, *The Assassins,* p. 208.

[12] See Paul B. Henze, "The Long Effort to Destabilize Turkey," *Wall Street Journal,* October 7, 1981, for a condensed but thorough account.

[13] Sterling, *The Assassins,* p. 49.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Abuzer Ugurlu — Agca participated in the murder of the Turkish editor Abdi Ipekci."

Much Turkish public opinion, the Western press, and the Soviet and communist media in particular branded Agca a rightist and a Gray Wolf, despite the fact that then and to this writing no evidence of Agca's membership in, or sponsorship by, any political group has ever been produced. What Agca did establish in this affair was his efficiency at murder, his coolness and toughness under pressure of interrogation, and his rightist credentials worldwide.

Four months after his arrest, on October 24, 1979, Agca announced to a shocked courtroom "I did not kill Ipekci, but I know who did." As though a signal to his conspirators to arrange his escape, a month later, on the night of November 23, Mehmet Ali Agca walked through a series of locked doors in Turkey's tough Kartal-Maltepe prison in a soldier's uniform and out the main gate — certainly not the act of a man without the help or money of others. A day after his escape, Agca dropped a letter to Ipekci's *Milliyet* threatening the life of Pope John Paul II due in Turkey for a visit two days later, a letter that added another layer to Agca's international image — papal assailant.

There has been speculation concerning Agca's whereabouts between the fall of 1979 and the summer of 1980 (Turkey, Iran and the Soviet Union have been suggested). What is certain is that Agca crossed from Kapikule, Turkey, into Kapitan Andreevo, Bulgaria, bearing a false Indian passport made out to Yoginder Singh "without particular controls or formalities."[14] Agca was in Bulgaria for about two months. While in Sofia, Agca claimed to have stayed at several deluxe hotels; he certainly stayed quite openly at the Hotel Vitosha — one of Sofia's newest and most plush. The Vitosha was a known gathering place for the Turkish Mafia and, "as he was advised to do in Turkey," Agca met in room 911 with Omer Mersan.[15]

A fellow Turk, Mersan was connected with the Vardar Export-Import Company in Munich, Germany. More than that, Mersan was listed in Swiss and German police files as a heroin trafficker, was described as a "wheeler-dealer agent extremely well-connected with the Bulgarian authorities, dedicated to a traffic of arms, drugs and contraband of all kinds," and had close dealings with both Abuzer Ugurlu and Bekir Celenk.[16] He not only had reserved Agca's room at the Hotel Vitosha, but, according to the Albano Report again, provided money and documents that allowed Agca to stay well beyond the thirty hours normally

[14] Albano Report.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Sterling, *The Assassins,* pp. 223-25; see also Albano Report.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

allotted Turks in Bulgaria. Mersan also helped furnish Agca with the passport he carried when he was seized in Rome. The Turkish passport number 136635 was issued August 11, 1980, to a Faruk Ozgun who genuinely lived in Nevsehir, Turkey. Mersan also arranged contact with high-ranking Turkish Mafia Godfather Bekir Celenk who, in turn, set up a number of meetings with a Bulgarian secret service agent "Sotir Kolev." Kolev in fact was Todor S. Aivasov, ostensibly the treasurer of the Bulgarian Embassy in Rome.[17] Oral Celik, one of Agca's Malatyan friends and a "rough right-wing hood from early youth" who also worked for Mafia chieftain Bekir Celenk was present as well.[18] Celik was to be with Agca in St. Peter's Square on May 13, 1981.

Here, as the plan was being discussed in the summer of 1980, it is worth noting that Solidarity was emerging in Poland as an autonomous trade union. Its autonomy directly contradicted the ideologically legitimated monopoly of power of the Polish communist party, and posed a mortal and pervasive threat to Kremlin rule not only in Poland, but in Eastern Europe, and among minorities in Russia itself. Solidarity and the widespread popular turmoil it both reflected and inspired provided the backdrop to these meetings during the summer of 1980.

The mechanics of the plan were as follows. First, with the highly placed, proven, and reliable Bekir Celenk as the middleman, the Bulgarian secret service contracted with Agca and Oral Celik to plan and assassinate the Polish Pope, John Paul II. Second, through Celenk, the Bulgarians would pay Agca, Celik, and Musa Sedar Celibi three million Deutsche marks ($1.25 million) to be divided equally. Celibi, right-wing Turkish Gray Wolves leader in West Germany and Celenk associate, would provide cash, assistance, and rightist cover during Agca's coming peregrinations in Europe, in effect leasing Celebi's continental Turkish organization for fee. Next, after the assassination, the Bulgarians would provide for Agca's and Celik's flight from Italy to Bulgaria via TIR truck or diplomatic means. Last, "safe and undisturbed refuge" in the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Varna would be provided.[19]

On Bekir Celenk's instruction, Agca called Gray Wolf leader Celebi in Frankfurt from Sofia to initiate the plan. On August 30, 1980, Agca and Oral Celik met another Turk with a Gray Wolf–Turkish Mafia background, a lieutenant of Ugurlu, Abdullah Catli, who provided Agca with his fake Ozgun passport. Agca then exited Bulgaria to begin many months of criss-crossing European travel with Gray Wolf assistance. From then until May 13, 1981, Agca is thought to have visited up to twelve

[17] Albano Report.
[18] Sterling, *The Assassins*, p. 92.
[19] Albano Report.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European countries and to have spent approximately $50,000. During that period, he lived lavishly, sought no work, wore expensive clothing and accessories, possessed ready cash, and placed frequent international telephone calls. While Agca was enjoying the good life, plans were being formulated and agreements made which would culminate in his actions on May 13, 1981.

During November and December of 1980, and January, April, and May of 1981, Agca met frequently in Rome with Aivasov (whom he had met in Sofia as Sotir Kolev); Zhelyo Vasilev, secretary to the Bulgarian military attaché; and Sergei Antonov, deputy director of Bulgarian Balkan Air in Rome. All were Bulgarian secret service agents. A number of meeting spots have been specifically identified, including Aivasov's apartment at 36 Via Galiani. According to the Albano Report, during January 1981 there was discussion among these conspirators about the possibility of assassinating Solidarity leader Lech Walesa who visited Rome and the Pope for five days that month. There even was talk of simultaneously assassinating the Pope.

Among other stops on Agca's itinerary was a November stay in the luxurious resort of Hammamet, Tunisia, not too distant from the Libyan border. In December 1980, Agca and Celebi met for the first time in a Milan hotel. Agca, his friend Oral Celik, Gray Wolf Musa Serdar Celibi, and Turkish Mafia boss Bekir Celenk met at Zurich's Hotel Sheraton on March 31, 1981, to provide final agreement on the cash "provided by Bulgaria and paid over by Bekir Celenk."[20] Prior to this, Agca and Celik had contacted Otto Tintner in Vienna to secure a 9mm semiautomatic pistol he had obtained from Horst Grillmayer. Grillmayer came from a family of Nazis, had a reputation as a gun-runner, and traveled frequently to Eastern Europe (he was a frequent guest at the Hotel Vitosha) and to the Middle East (Turkey and Syria in particular). He also had ties with Ugurlu and Celenk.[21] Transported to Switzerland, the weapon was left with another Gray Wolf, Omer Bagci, for later pickup.

Following further contact in Rome with the Bulgarians, Agca enrolled, paid his fees and attended one class at the Foreign Language School in Perugia to obtain Italian student status. Upon settling additional details with the Bulgarians in Rome, Agca then spent two weeks in Palma, Majorca. From Majorca, Agca called Celebi in Frankfurt, Celenk in Athens, and later Bagci in Switzerland, the latter to arrange for the pistol's pickup at the Milan railroad station. Upon his return to Rome on May 10, Agca met frequently with Celik and the three Bulgarians, Vasilev, Aivasov, and Antonov, to arrange the final details.

---

[20] Ibid.
[21] Henze, *The Plot*, p. 175.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the appointed day, Antonov drove Agca and Celik to St. Peter's Square, stopping near his apartment to provide Celik with two pistols and two panic bombs. Aivasov apparently made his way to St. Peter's Square himself.

> Around 3 p.m., they drove on to the Vatican, parking in front of the Canadian Embassy. . . . Together they made a final inspection of the Square. Aivasov left. The other three had coffee in a nearby bar. Around 4 p.m., Antonov left also. Agca and Celik returned to St. Peter's Square, where Agca fired on the Pope shortly after 5 p.m.[22]

At the moment of its execution, the plot began to unravel. Oral Celik was to have set off the panic bombs to cover Agca's escape. Instead, he ran, by happenstance photographed from behind by an American, Lowell Newton. Why did Celik not follow through? The Albano Report indicates that Celik was Agca's best friend, "dearer to him than a brother." Sterling speculates that he was unable to kill Agca as instructed, that he lost his nerve and ran.[23] Agca himself has no final answer to this question: "I still ask myself this," he is quoted as saying, "because if the bombs had gone off, I would not be here now in my cell."[24] Celik may have escaped Rome according to a plan previously drawn up by the Bulgarians. It was at this point that Agca was seized and interrogated.

The Mosaic

Byzantine civilization is virtually synonymous with an art form that reached a zenith under its aegis, the mosaic—tiny, individual bits of variously hued material which constitute a form only when viewed together from some distance. It is perhaps fitting that we use this metaphor in more closely scrutinizing certain aspects of the circumstances that led to Mehmet Ali Agca's attempted assassination of John Paul II. For us as well, by examining specific and individual episodes, perhaps a form or pattern will emerge in this affair.

The Bank Deposits

As noted above, from December 13, 1977 (a date after his Palestinian training, but while still a student in Ankara), until December 29, 1978, Agca was paid. And paid what must have been, for a poor provincial boy, a munificent sum. Beyond the suspicions of who was paying sums to an assassin before his self-confessed act, a number of

[22] Albano Report.
[23] *New York Times,* June 10, 1984.
[24] *New York Times,* October 29, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interesting points bear examination. Under handwriting analysis, not one deposit slip bore Agca's genuine signature, while all of his withdrawal slips did. Further, accounts were opened for him in Istanbul nine months *before* he arrived there as a student and even before he took the spring exams that qualified him for entrance. While deposits were made at a variety of locations throughout Turkey, withdrawals were always made in Istanbul. Henze calls this a classically clandestine modus operandi and states that Agca may have been "handled at arm's length" by Turks in collaboration with Bulgarians or Russians. He speculates: "All that we know is that somebody was in contact with him, somebody was seeing that he was kept obscure and clean and uncontaminated by ordinary terrorist connections that could have drawn him into premature trouble. But he was doing something for them—or at the very least absorbing well the training he was being given." [25]

Although he registered for courses at the University of Istanbul for the 1978-79 academic year, there is no record of his academic activity and he took no final examinations. Nor is it known where he lived. The room he said was his seemed to have been unoccupied for months; the address given for one new bank account actually was a gas station.[26] Nor again is there a record of any political activities or associations by Agca during this period. We already have cited the Albano Report which stated that Agca had earned large sums through involvement with Abuzer Ugurlu's and Bekir Celenk's vast drug and gun smuggling operation with Bulgaria's Kintex. Henze suggests that Agca could have come to the special notice of Teslim Tore, his fellow Malatyan, during his summer, 1977, terrorist training. In the twisted world of Turkish terrorism, Tore then could have recommended him for particular assignment once Agca returned to Ankara.[27] While we are still uncertain about the nature of his activities in Istanbul, we do know that the largest single deposit made to Agca's new bank account, approximately $8,000, was made one month before the Ipekci assassination.

The Ipekci Assassination

Mehmet Ali Agca may not be the real murderer of Abdi Ipekci. *There was no evidence.* The only thing they had on him was a composite drawing that looked something like Agca and any number of people. There were no witnesses before he confessed. The pistol was never found. Read the file. They had no case.[28]

So spoke an unnamed senior policeman to Claire Sterling in Ankara.

---

[25] Henze, *The Plot,* p. 136.
[26] Ibid., pp. 136-37.
[27] Ibid., p. 135.
[28] Sterling, *The Assassins,* pp. 45-46, emphasis in original.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Why did Agca so readily affirm his guilt to a crime punishable by hanging? Who made the anonymous telephone call telling police to pick up "Ali"? Why did the tipster send police to a cafe with a reputation as a right-wing hangout? Why was he so quickly labeled by the press as a rightist Gray Wolf, even without evidence to substantiate the allegation? Why did no one come forward to collect the sizeable reward? Why did Agca tell the Court during his trial on October 24, 1979, that he had not killed Ipekci, but at the next session would tell who did? How, thereafter, did two pistols come into the hands of Agca and another inmate on November 5, 1979, in Kartal-Maltepe military prison, Turkey's toughest? [29] Persuaded that he could not escape, even if he killed the hostages he had taken, Agca surrendered, his escape attempt foiled. Even more surprising after this episode, how could Agca have walked out of that same prison about three weeks later, on November 23, through a series of locked doors, and out the main gate without interested friends and rich assistance?

The Albano Report states: "on orders from the Turkish Mafia — that is, Abuzer Ugurlu — Agca participated in the murder of Turkish editor Abdi Ipekci." [30] Turkish courts hold that Ugurlu ordered Abdi Ipekci's murder to stop Ipekci's exposure of Ugurlu's connections with the Turkish Mafia and the Bulgarians.[31]

Agca's Threat to Pope John Paul II During His Visit to Turkey

On November 26, 1979, Agca threatened the life of Pope John Paul II who shortly was due in Turkey for a papal visit. By means of a garbled, rightist, Islamic fundamentalist message Agca drew nationwide and worldwide attention to himself.

> Western imperialists, who fear that Turkey may establish a new Political, Military and Economic Force in the Middle East with brotherly Islamic countries, have rushed at a sensitive time to send Crusader Commander John Paul to Turkey under the mask of a religious leader. If this ill-timed and pointless visit is not cancelled, I will definitely shoot the pope. This is the only reason I escaped from prison. Besides, U.S. and Israeli responsibility for the repression in Mecca should be raised. Otherwise please don't exaggerate my quiet, bloodless and simple escape.[32]

This letter, could hardly have been motivated by Agca's Islamic faith — written by one who had seldom attended a mosque, drank alcohol, and

[29] Henze, *The Plot,* p. 151.
[30] Albano Report.
[31] See David Shiflett, "Solving the Plot to Kill The Pope," *Reader's Digest,* October 1984, p. 88 for the latest *Digest* effort in this case.
[32] Henze, *The Plot,* pp. 4-5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was engaged in the sort of sordid life he led. While the letter siphoned off police strength to further protect the Pope (and aid Agca's escape), it also could have been intended to provide Agca with credentials of a future sort. A point to recall here is the tumultuous welcome the Pope received during his earlier homecoming visit to Poland in June 1979, and the impact it had upon the formation of Solidarity in 1980.

The Bulgarian Summer

Agca entered Bulgaria around July 10, 1980, under a false Indian passport "procured by Abuzer Ugurlu." [33] He stayed there until August 31, 1980. There are two related points here: first, Bulgaria has a deserved reputation as Eastern Europe's toughest, most efficient police state; second, in the summer of 1980, Agca was a criminal of worldwide notoriety. As the *New York Times* editorialized: "Mehmet Ali Agca, a wanted killer in Turkey, came to Rome from Bulgaria where his record and face should have been known. His behavior was hardly furtive; he checked into Sofia's best hotels." [34] The Bulgarians, particularly, should have known of Agca's identity and presence. And they did. There is evidence. He met there with Sotir Kolev, really Todor Aivasov. Aivasov's passport itself indicated he was in Sofia when Agca says he was. Further, there is the matter of the passport.

When police seized him in Italy, Agca still was traveling under the counterfeit passport of Faruk Ozgun. It carried a Turkish exit stamp for Kapikule, Turkey, dated August 30. It also carried a Bulgarian entry stamp for Kapitan Andreevo, Bulgaria, for August 31. Kapikule and Kapitan Andreevo are only a few hundred yards apart. Further, while the Bulgarian stamp may be genuine, the Turkish stamp is a forgery.[35] In Bulgaria, of all states, such a feat, clumsy as it proved to be, can be accomplished only with the full cooperation of the state secret service.

The Turks

Many intimate connections of geography, association, and criminal business activity, bound this group of Turks together and to the Bulgarians. Abuzer Ugurlu, the Mafia boss who supervised so many of Agca's activities and movements came from Malatya, and had many years of close and hugely profitable criminal business dealings with Bulgaria and especially Kintex. Claire Sterling stated that one Western intelligence

[33] Albano Report.
[34] *New York Times,* December 18, 1982.
[35] Henze, *The Plot,* p. 165.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agency believed Ugurlu had been "recruited by the Bulgarian DS around 1974." [36] Ugurlu has been in a Turkish jail since March 1981 facing criminal charges unrelated to this case.

Bekir Celenk, his fellow Mafia chieftain came from Gaziantep, near Malatya. For years he oversaw vast shipments of contraband, including drugs from, and arms to, Turkey via Bulgaria's Kintex (which, for its services, exacted a percentage of each shipment's value). During a December 17, 1983, Sofia press conference, Celenk admitted being in Sofia at the Hotel Vitosha during July 1980, when Agca said he had met him, though Celenk denies any encounter. He has been in Bulgaria since October 1982, arriving just two days before Judge Martella issued an arrest warrant. He has not left. Again, according to Sterling's source, he had been a DS agent "long before Ugurlu." [37]

Omer Mersan was a close and trusted associate of both Ugurlu and Celenk for years. He was deeply involved with them in a vast traffic in weapons, drugs and other contraband through the Vardar Export-Import Company of Munich, Germany, a front for the smuggling activity. Further, upon information Agca provided, Mersan admitted to German police very soon after the assassination that he had met with Agca in Sofia during the summer of 1980, but claimed he knew him only as "Metin." Extradited to Italy in late 1983, he admitted to Italian authorities that he had given false testimony "to safeguard Celenk from any possible connection to Agca." He also admitted giving money to Agca in Sofia on the instructions of Abuzer Ugurlu.[38]

Musa Sedar Celebi was, through the Turkish Federation, head of the Gray Wolves in West Germany and had rightist-Gray Wolf connections throughout Europe. In addition, he was closely connected to Ugurlu and Celenk and was rumored to be involved with Turkish smuggling activities. He was extradited from Germany to Italy in October 1982 where he is still being held. Oral Celik, also from Malatya already has been described as a right-wing thug, long on Celenk's payroll. As such, he could have been a valuable connective link to Celebi, Celenk, and especially to his friend, Agca. He has not been seen since May 13, 1981, when he aided Agca in St. Peter's Square.

Agca in Europe

According to Claire Sterling, between August 1980 and May 1981, Agca criss-crossed twelve countries: Yugoslavia, Germany, Switz-

[36] Sterling, *The Assassins,* p. 225.
[37] Ibid., p. 226.
[38] Albano Report.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

erland, Tunisia, Austria, France, Great Britain, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Spain, and, in particular, Italy.[39] Additional serious questions arise here. How could a poor boy travel for as long and as luxuriously as Agca did — wearing expensive clothes, a gold Rolex watch on his wrist, dining in the finest restaurants, staying at exclusive hotels and resorts, while never working, never cashing a check and never short on funds? How could a provincial boy who had spent all but four years of his life in a Turkish province, who spoke only halting English besides his native Turkish, make travel and other arrangements so smoothly. The watchful and quiet support of a far-flung organization (such as Celebi's Gray Wolves) was both necessary and invaluable here.

According to the Albano Report, in November Agca made contact with Zhelyo Vasilev at the Bulgarian Embassy in Rome. Vasilev knew of the initial plans laid in Sofia and directed the operation in Rome, giving orders both to Aivasov and Antonov, and provided for Agca's financial needs, totaling about $50,000, during his European travels. During November, December, January, April, and May, Agca often met with Vasilev at a number of confirmed spots in Rome: The Hotel Archimede, Doney's Via Veneto Cafe, the Piccadilly Bar on the Plaza Barberini, and Aivasov's 36 Via Galiani apartment among others. Agca provided a most detailed and accurate description of Aivasov's apartment, its layout, furniture, and even the bathroom, to Italian authorities. He also provided, according to the Albano Report, Aivasov's unlisted telephone number 327-2629 which, in a central point in their defense, Bulgarian authorities denied even existed. Agca also provided comprehensive, detailed, and verified physical and other descriptions of Vasilev, Aivasov, and Antonov — their habits, likes and dislikes, hobbies, language capabilities, families — and other information that only could have come from sustained and close personal contact.[40] The Bulgarians were, according to the exhaustive corroboration of the Albano Report, in the locations where Agca said they were during this period.

The same was true of Agca's Turkish collaborators. In December 1980, Agca met Gray Wolf Celibi face-to-face for the first time in a Milan hotel. Agca and Celibi then met Celik and Celenk in Zurich's Sheraton Hotel on March 31, 1981. It was agreed there that Agca, Celik and Celebi were to equally divide DM 3 million "provided by Bulgaria and paid over by Bekir Celenk."[41] Between these two meetings Agca and Celik secured the Browning semiautomatic pistol in Austria, on telephoned instructions provided Celik by Bekir Celenk, from Otto Tintner

[39] Sterling, *The Assassins,* pp. 20-21.
[40] Albano Report.
[41] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who, in turn, had secured the weapon from Horst Grillmaier. The Gray Wolf operative, Omer Bagci, in prison in Italy since June 1982, verified that he held the weapon for Agca during the period Agca specified and turned it over to him in the Milan railroad station on May 9, 1981.[42]

Then there were the telephone calls. Following his April contact with the Bulgarians in Rome and registration for Italian student status in Perugia (on Vasilev's advice), Agca spent two weeks in Palma, Majorca. There he placed some significant calls. The first was to Musa Celebi in Frankfurt. Celebi was arrested by German authorities on November 3, 1982. Under interrogation, he first denied knowing Agca, then admitted having met a "Murat" in difficult financial straits in Milan during December 1980. He also initially denied being a party to the final agreement made in Zurich's Sheraton Hotel whereby Celenk promised to pay middleman's funds to Agca and to him. According to the Albano Report, Agca telephoned Celebi in Frankfurt from Majorca and was told that he, Celebi, and Celik had received payment from Bekir Celenk. According to a tape of this call made by authorities, Agca told Celebi: "I have received the money. . . . I will now go to Rome and finish the job." [43] The Albano Report states as "a certainty" that the money deposited in Celebi's account in Frankfurt was made during Agca's stay in Majorca.

Agca then called Celenk to make sure about the payments. Celenk (who was in Athens) verified payment during the call and stated that everything "was set to go." [44] Four days later Agca telephoned Bagci in Switzerland to arrange for pickup of the gun in Milan on May 9. Back in Rome from Milan, Agca and Celik met Vassilev in a YMCA hotel room from whence Vassilev reserved a room for Agca at the Pensione Isa near the Vatican. This fact dispelled one of the intriguing details that cropped up early in the case: who, in fluent Italian, had reserved a room at the Pensione Isa in the name of Agca when Agca spoke only the most rudimentary Italian?

The Abortive Plot Against Lech Walesa

One of the most bizarre episodes in this case concerns an abortive plot to assassinate Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa during his visit to Rome in January 1981. During that month, Agca met at Rome's Hotel Archimede with Sergei Antonov, and with all three Bulgarians at Aivasov's apartment to discuss the possibility of assassinating Walesa. According to Agca's statement, Walesa was to have been murdered by

[42] Ibid.
[43] Henze, *The Plot*, p. 170.
[44] Albano Report.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

means of a bomb placed in a small Fiat, parked just outside the Hotel Victoria, to be detonated by remote control. But the plan was called off because of an increased police presence there on the determined day. Yet, "Agca's detailed knowledge of Walesa's Rome schedule astounded Italian investigators. He knew which hotels Walesa had occupied and was familiar with the routes between the hotels. As he scouted the Hotel Victoria, Agca says he saw some painters at work — an accurate detail." [45]

Agca possessed such astounding knowledge because of Luigi Scricciolo. Scricciolo, head of the Foreign Department of the Italian Socialist Labor Confederation, had travelled to Poland to help Walesa establish Solidarity, had funneled Western labor union material support to Solidarity, was Walesa's host and coordinator of security in Rome—and had been a Bulgarian agent since 1976.[46] Scricciolo has said that his control, Ivan Tomov Dontchev, DS spy chief in Rome, pumped him for the smallest details of Walesa's visit which presumably then were passed on to Agca. Agca also identified Dontchev as a Bulgarian contact present at Aivasov's apartment. He said as well that he and Antonov discussed Walesa's possible assassination during a meeting at the Hotel Archimede — a meeting that Italian authorities also verified.[47]

The Assassination

There has been previous mention of the Albano Report's chronology of the movements and activities of the Bulgarian agents and Turkish assassins on May 13 after a 1:00 p.m. lunch together "at the usual bar near Piazza Republica." [48] Oral Celik did not execute his part of the plan which included the detonation of panic bombs and the possible murder of Agca following the shooting of the Pope. Consequently, Agca was arrested and two notes were found on him.

The first was a note in Turkish of thorough final instructions that included suggested attire, avoidance of the Vatican or any place where attention might be drawn, down to the time for breakfast — 9:00 a.m. Most interesting were the entries for "May 13, Wednesday, appearance in Square; May 17, Sunday, perhaps appearance on the balcony; May 20, Wednesday, Square *without fail*." [49] The second note had five telephone numbers listed on it: those of the Bulgarian Embassy and consulate; the Balkan Air office where Antonov worked; and Aivazov's un-

[45] *Newsweek,* June 20, 1983, p. 41. See also Nicholas Gage's account in *The New York Times,* March 23, 1983.

[46] Henze, *The Plot,* pp. 72-74.

[47] Sterling, *The Assassins,* p. 208-09; see also Sterling's more complete report, "Agca's Other Story: The Plot to Kill Walesa," *New York Times,* October 27, 1984.

[48] Albano Report.

[49] See Sterling, *The Assassins,* p. 31 for the complete note; emphasis in original.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

listed residence telephone number.[50] Although the Bulgarians, in their defense, claimed that Aivazov had no such unlisted telephone, in fact he did. And Agca's number was correct. The organized thoroughness of the first note, and the direct links of the second provided ample, initial proof to the Italians during the very earliest stages of the case of the existence of a conspiracy. Perhaps the Italian authorities were wise to be so prudent and discreet as not to disclose these small leads until they were able to pursue and develop them into something much more substantial.

The TIR Truck and Escape

Another layer of specific evidence of conspiracy to add to the growing mosaic concerns the planned escape of Agca and Celik from Rome to Bulgaria via Transport International Routier (TIR), trucks sealed by customs in their departing nation which, by international agreement, pass freely across borders unchecked until clearance by customs at their destination. At 6:00 p.m. on the day the Pope was shot, shortly after the assassination attempt, the Albano Report states, a "Bulgarian TIR Magirus, license number CK3572 and trailer number CE6176" left the Bulgarian Embassy in Rome for the Yugoslav frontier carrying "books, crockery, personal effects and so on." It had arrived from Sofia the day before containing an equally pedestrian cargo. Despite the listed ordinariness of the cargo, the Bulgarian Embassy had urgently asked TIR passage for the vehicle with customs procedures on embassy grounds — the *only* occasion the Bulgarians have requested such a procedure. To quote the Albano Report:

> What was so immensely important and useful in the TIR's cargo that the Bulgarian Embassy should make such unique demands for urgency — EXACTLY ON MAY 13, 1981?
> We must conclude that on board that TIR track, hidden among those personal effects, was Oral Celik.
> . . . .The circumstances surrounding this TIR truck are of fundamental relevance (in) giving Agca the right to be believed. (emphasis in original)

The Maniarov Affair

In March 1983, Nicholas Gage of the *New York Times* wrote that a defecting Bulgarian official had told French intelligence "the plot to kill the Pope was devised by the KGB, the Soviet intelligence agency, and by the Bulgarian secret service, which many Western intelligence specialists consider subservient to Moscow." [51] Iordan Mantarov, then age 48, ostensibly a deputy commercial attaché stationed at the Bulgarian

[50] *Newsweek*, December 20, 1982. p. 59.
[51] *New York Times*, March 23, 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Embassy in Paris was identified by Claire Sterling as ranking Bulgarian secret service officer in Paris from 1979 to 1981.[52] Mantarov told French authorities that he was a close friend of Dimiter Savov, a high-ranking official in the DS counterintelligence division in Paris. According to Mantarov: "when unrest mounted in Poland and the Pope supported the aspirations of Polish workers to organize into independent unions . . . the KGB began discussions with the Bulgarian intelligence service on a way to eliminate John Paul II." [53] Mantarov told French debriefers that Agca was selected to be the Pope's assassin because of his worldwide notoriety as a rightist after the Ipekci assassination, and because he had no association with a communist country. Mantarov also stated that after the Pope's assassination, Agca was to be killed. Gage continued that French intelligence agents who debriefed Mantarov "say they believe the account because other information he told them he learned from Mr. Savov has checked out. They would not offer examples." [54]

Mantarov's information is important because it is the first contribution from a high-ranking Bulgarian defector *in place* during the time of the assassination. The Mantarov disclosures are intriguing for another reason. French intelligence claims that Mantarov defected in the summer of 1981. Yet there are some reports that he defected during the spring of that year.[55] If the latter is true, it would account for two occurrences. At a Mass a week before the assassination attempt, John Paul II told his Swiss Guards: "Let us pray that the Lord will keep violence and fanaticism far from the Vatican's walls." Next, *Le Quotidien de Paris* reported that French intelligence "dispatched two high-ranking officers to the Vatican on April 20, 1981, to personally convey warnings to the Pope of a possible attack."[56] If there is truth to the speculation that Mantarov defected not during the summer, but the spring of 1981, it could have been his information that provided the basis for the French warning to the Papacy. Moreover, if this is so, there is the chance that among the information that "checked out" (no examples given) is much if not all of Mantarov's story, including KGB initiation, coordination, and timing of the assassination plot, as well as the selection of the assassin.

Cui Bono? Cui Prodest?

Cui bono? Cui prodest? Whose good is served? Who is interested in this affair? These questions must be asked now that we have a

[52] Sterling, *The Assassins,* p. 116.
[53] *New York Times,* March 23, 1983.
[54] Ibid.
[55] *Time,* April 4, 1983, p. 38. The exact reported date of Mantarov's defection is April 11, 1981.
[56] *Le Quotidien de Paris,* December 18, 1982, cited in Sterling, *The Assassins,* p. 8. See also the Pope's words to his Swiss Guards also cited by Sterling from *Il Giornale Nuovo,* July 31, 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

better understanding of both the trial that led to St. Peter's Square on May 13, 1981, and the particular mosaic that brought it about. In sum, the pattern of facts appears to be this: Mehmet Ali Agca shot Pope John Paul II with the close, intimate support of the Turkish Mafia, the Gray Wolves in Europe, and the planning of the Bulgarian secret service, most likely at the direction of the KGB.

Whose good is served by this? Who would be interested in the commissioning and execution of such an act? As Vatican observer Peter Hebblethwaite put it in a slightly different context just two months after the assassination attempt in 1981: "Everything the most rigorous judge could require is here, except for one thing — a clear motive." [57] Let us examine the motives of the various actors.

The various labels affixed to Agca soon after the shooting included: lone deranged gunman, Islamic fanatic, and right-wing terrorist. *The facts are that Agca executed his act only with the aid of a complex,* organized, and well-financed effort and that he was judged by psychologists, both in Turkey and Italy, to be mentally normal. Neither do his background, associations, or actions indicate any deep strain of religiosity. Indeed, the converse is more true. Nor can a case be made for his actions being motivated by deep-seated political beliefs; it is more accurate to say that no political associations or orientation of any depth ever have been verified. To agree even with his self-identification as a meta-terrorist strains belief. More likely, for an individual born to poverty, who placed international telephone calls to inquire about payment, he merely is a "gun for hire." [58]

Nor can one rationally draw a motive from the various members who constituted the Turkish Mafia. Thieves, thugs, smugglers, murderers, men who, for pay, collaborated with age-old enemies of their nation to subvert Turkey—no reasonable person can extract a motive for them, alone and by themselves, to set out to murder a Roman Catholic Pope. The same is true for the Gray Wolves. A fanatically nationalistic, right-wing, paramilitary political party, which emphasized more the Turkish Central Asian past than Islam, no aims or actions of Pope John Paul II alone could trigger from them such a response as to cause his assassination at their hands.

This leaves the Bulgarian secret service and the government that stands behind it. In their active efforts to destabilize Turkey, Italy, and other European countries through the training and provision of arms to terrorists, and the supply of heroin and other drugs to foster the moral degradation of the West, the Bulgarian DS and its creature Kintex, in

[57] *National Catholic Reporter,* July 17, 1981.
[58] Although we know far less about Oral Celik, much the same may be true for him.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

particular, have established wide networks of terrorists, criminals, and corrupted officials throughout Europe, Turkey, and beyond. Kintex, in particular, through its handling of contraband cigarettes, liquor, jewelry, and high-tech products (among other legitimately traded commodities) was ideal for these purposes. Tightly controlled by the Russians to serve their own purposes, KGB officers at the top level and in each of DS seven departments report directly to Moscow. Moreover, Bulgaria is not shy about foreign assassinations—its agents in 1978 most probably having murdered one defector, Georgi Markov, and attempted the murder of another, Vladmir Kostov. But the fact remains: Bulgaria had no reason *per se* to assassinate the religious leader of the Catholic church; its Christian population is overwhelmingly orthodox and is relatively immune to a Roman Catholic Pope's appeal. Henry Kissinger agrees: "It had to be the Soviets. The Bulgarians have no interest in coming after the Pope." [59]

There remains the Soviet Union. Richard Pipes, formerly President Reagan's senior specialist on Soviet affairs has stated: "If the Bulgarian intelligence service was involved, there is little doubt that the KGB would know." [60] Colonel Stefan Sverdlov, the highest ranking DS officer to defect to the West, stated it more plainly: "I do not doubt for one instant the role of the Bulgarian secret service in this attack. But if they did it, it was not of their own initiative.[61] This squares with the famous statement of Todor Zhivkov, the Bulgarian leader who once stated as a matter of great pride that: "our political watch-dial is exact to the second with the watch of the Soviet Union . . . our watch is working toward Moscow time." [62] The close, connective links between this, the most subservient and responsive of Russian East European satellites, and Moscow are well known. The same is true for the interstitial ties between the DS and the KGB. And the Russian motives are familiar.

The Russian Stakes

Of immense geostrategic and political importance to the Soviet Union, Poland sits astride the traditional European invasion route, which in modern history the French used once and the Germans twice. At the core of Eastern Europe, inhabited by a people who have never forgotten either their nationalism or their millennia-old Catholicism, Poland reflects the highest stakes for the Kremlin rulers. Iordan Mantarov related to French intelligence what he learned from Dimiter Savov, a fellow DS officer:

[59] *Washington Post,* January 3, 1983.
[60] *New York Times,* December 18, 1982.
[61] *Time,* December 27, 1982, p. 42.
[62] James Brown, *Bulgaria Under Communist Rule* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), p. 129.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In 1979 the KGB concluded that the election of Karol Wojtyla as Pope the year before was engineered by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, who was born in Poland. Mr. Brzezinski's purpose, in this account of the KGB thinking, was to take advantage of the growing unrest in Poland and break its ties to Moscow. It is not clear on what basis the KGB might have reached such a belief.[63]

Certainly, even without this byzantine and unproven hypothesis, Cardinal Wojtyla's words and actions following his election as Pope on October 16, 1978, gave credence to the KGB's fears. The outright challenge he laid down to communist rule during his triumphal return to Poland in June 1979 stimulated a euphoric wave that helped lead to the establishment of Solidarity in the 1980 "Polish Summer." The nationwide work-stoppages, demonstrations and general ferment that ensued led a scandal-ridden, ideologically bankrupt Communist Party and debt-ridden Poland to accept the Gdansk Agreement of August 31, 1980, in which, for the first time, a communist regime recognized an autonomous, free trade union as a legitimate power-contender — a concession anathema to Marxist doctrine.[64]

But the stakes were even higher than Poland. In a Rand Corporation study, Alex Alexiev pointed out that with the accession of Karol Wojtyla to the Papacy, the Vatican's stance toward the East changed. Heightened Vatican interest and increased Radio Vatican broadcasting time to East European and Soviet listeners signified that this no longer was a "Church of Silence" toward its Eastern brethren. In Czechoslovakia and Lithuania, in Latvia and East Germany, in the Ukraine as in Poland, Uniate as well as Roman Catholics rallied and took heart from Karol Wojtyla's message; underground churches grew, religious practice became more open, and the faithful more publicly self-assertive:

> From the very first day of the election of Karol Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II it was clear to Moscow that it had to deal with a formidable opponent. . . . In the person of Wojtyla the Kremlin rulers found themselves faced with a convinced and outspoken opponent of communist totalitarianism and a man with a proven record of standing up to the regime in the defense of the human rights and dignity of his people.[65]

Even more, his message transcended borders, rejecting Soviet domination of a divided Europe, and emphasized its shared Christian heritage: "The Pope's expressed vision of a Europe united on the basis of Christian ideals,

---

[63] *New York Times*, March 23, 1983.

[64] Neal Ascherson, *The Polish August: The Self-Limiting Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1982), passim, is one of the more thorough accounts. Jan Nowak, "The Church in Poland," *Problems of Communism*, January/February 1982, pp. 1-16 present a focused yet broad treatment principally examining the Church in postwar Poland.

[65] Alex Alexiev, *The Kremlin and The Pope* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, April 1983), p. 2. Alexiev presents an incisive treatment of John Paul II's shift from a "Silent Church" to a "Church Defiant," the larger East European response and the Soviet stakes and reactions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

however unrealistic given existing political realities, is the logical antithesis of Soviet totalitarian ideology and thus an ideological challenge to its very legitimacy." [66] As Alexiev summed it up elsewhere: "For Moscow, John Paul II was and continues to be much more than a narrow Polish problem." [67]

Much has been made of the handwritten letter in which, according to NBC's *White Paper* of September 21, 1982, the Polish Pope told Brezhnev that ". . . if the Russians moved against Poland, he would lay down the crown of St. Peter and return to his homeland to stand shoulder to shoulder with his people." [68] Neal Ascherson in his authoritative book, *The Polish August: The Self-Limiting Revolution* wrote that in early December 1980:

> . . . an official from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Vadim Zagladin, had arrived at the Vatican for discussions. Their content remains a secret, but a few days later two different sources reported that the Pope had told Zagladin that if Poland were invaded he would simply fly home to be with his own people.[69]

Claire Sterling, citing the above report, also states that Cardinal Wyszynski spoke explicitly of the "Holy Father's . . . letter to Brezhnev." [70] Letter or message, the thrust and open challenge of John Paul II's person and words were all too clear to Kremlin rulers who may have believed they faced a formidable and mortal danger.

Global Stakes

The global stakes are enormous. The *New York Times* editorialized: "Assassinations are the poison gas of diplomatic conflict, as dangerous to the user as the victim. . . . The command to eliminate a statesman is the last resort of a bankrupt diplomacy." [71] On one level, the employment of assassination of a world leader is dangerously precedent-setting for, like the first use of poison gas in warfare, it both models and invites emulation by others.

Harry Gelman, Rand Corporation senior staff member and retired assistant national intelligence officer for the USSR and Eastern Europe, posed the stakes on another plane. He asks if the long-held assumption that:

> . . . the Politburo is fundamentally cautious, reluctant to accept serious risks, disinclined to take 'adventurist' actions, and particularly averse to involvement in the

[66] Ibid., p. 10.
[67] Alex Alexiev, "The Battle Between the Kremlin and the Pope," *Wall Street Journal,* March 30, 1983.
[68] *NBC White Paper,* pp. 13-14.
[69] Ascherson, *The Polish August,* p. 223.
[70] Sterling, *The Assassins,* p. 123.
[71] *New York Times,* December 18, 1982.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assassination of major Western public figures . . . [proves erroneous]. . . . What dealings with the Soviet Union would then be appropriate? What place would the whole panoply of present Western interactions with the U.S.S.R. — from arms control to commercial relations — have in a universe in which it was known that that was Soviet policy? And if the Soviets would do this, what else would they do? [72]

The gravity of changing their assumptions inhibits some; the implications for world stability make others reluctant. But in the end all must confront Gelman's two questions: "What dealings with the Soviet Union would then be appropriate? . . . And, if the Soviets would do this, what else would they do? Any basis for a sound foreign policy, any basis for the accurate assessment of another nation's actions must be realistically grounded. Would a moral Munich, would passive, avoidant, non-judgmental appeasement of such an act be the proper policy? Would a world view of the Soviet Union's behavior that is partial be better than one that is complete? Delay, deferral, ambiguity, ambivalence — all are nearly understandable. One co-author of this article, himself the Ambassador of the United States to Uganda during the reign not only of terror, but horror by Idi Amin, is especially sensitive to the reluctance, the wish to shun, the cruel and tragic nature of the world and some of its inhabitants. But he also came to understand personally the necessity, in the end, to confront such a reality. In the end, this limbo will not be perpetual, and final conclusions will have to be drawn. In the end this question must be confronted and, more than that, will confront each of the globe's governments. When that happens, "We must be the kind of people who are prepared to think that such an evil is possible. We must recover the imagination that the political world requires. Without it, we may be played for suckers. The principles for which we stand may go down if we see them everywhere." [73]

The Need for a Reckoning

We have come far quickly. Well-known student of conspiracy Edward Jay Epstein, reviewing the book-length treatments of this affair by Paul B. Henze and Claire Sterling, reflected the skepticism common even until January 1984:

To substantiate their theory [of an Agca-Turkish Mafia-Bulgaria link] Mrs. Sterling and Mr. Henze would have to show not merely that the Bulgarian secret service was in contact with Turkish organizations that dealt with Mr. Agca but that it

[72] *Washington Post*, December 26, 1982.
[73] *The New Republic*, January 24, 1983, p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

purposefully controlled him, directly or through intermediaries, when he shot the Pope.[74]

There now is such substantiation. The Albano Report, excerpts of which were published on June 10, 1984, stated that though Agca is "a despicable mercenary" and a "liar," yet

> Every statement by Agca, every circumstance he reported, every detail offered to the investigation was subjected to verification, to comparison, to checks, to inquiry . . . Agca is convincing in his reconstruction of the historical case of the attempt on the Pope's life.[75]

Sterling, who has read the as yet unreleased Albano Report in its entirety wrote that: "Judicial belief in Mr. Agca's confession was apparently fortified by a mass of corroborative evidence." [76]

Here the case now rests. The facts of this affair usually are termed "circumstantial," for they have not yet been presented in a national court of law. This will occur in the near future; for on October 26, 1984, Judge Ilario Martella ordered three Bulgarians and four Turks to stand trial in this case, charging them with complicity in the conspiracy to assassinate Pope John Paul II. Sergei Antonov, Todor Aivazov, and Zhelyo Vasilev are the Bulgarians indicted. Antonov is in Italian custody in Rome; Aivazov and Vasilev are in Bulgaria, a nation with which Italy has no extradition treaty. Of the four Turks who also were indicted, Bekir Celenk also resides in Bulgaria where he is afforded the same protection against extradition; Musa Serdar Celebi and Omer Bagci are in Italian prisons, while Oral Celik has not been seen since May 13, 1981. Aivazov, Vasilev, Celenk, and Celik will be tried in absentia. Mehmet Ali Agca will face separate charges of illegally importing into Italy the pistol he used in St. Peter's Square. Omer Mersan, whose role now appears to be smaller than once believed, lives under police surveillance in Germany.

But the facts already in the public domain — the facts that this article purposefully has presented at such length — are of such a mass as to be undismissable, of such detail as to be unaccidental, and of such a pattern as not to be random. The facts simply will not go away.

Again we ask *Cui bono?* Is the good to be served by silence? Would such behavior by the world community further the good of discouraging the repetition of such an act in the future? Would it serve the good of any nation's proper foreign policy, of any nation's proper assessment of another's behavior? In the nuclear age, as Secretary of State George Shultz recently stated, the United States may need to follow an eclectic policy in its dealings with the Soviet Union. We need to maintain

[74] *New York Times Book Review,* January 15, 1984, p. 6.
[75] *New York Times,* June 10, 1984, October 26, 1984.
[76] *New York Times,* June 10, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a relationship and to proceed in areas such as arms control talks, despite Soviet behavior in other areas knowing that: "they have acted in ways that violate our standards of human conduct and rule of law and that are repugnant to us — and they will likely continue to do so in the future." [77]

Cui prodest? Who is interested in this affair? The Papacy has a unique and special status in the world because of its universal character. Is this merely a question of the guilt or innocence of the accused individuals? Is the investigation of an attempted assassination of a world religious leader merely the interest, the domain of a national judiciary? Is it not the interest, the domain, the stake of the entire world community? Should not all nations be interested in this affair? We ask these questions, for they have not always been asked in the past. As the *New Republic,* newly noted for its non-dogmatic pursuit of truth, put the issue:

> The system of nations is not a system of laws in which you are presumed innocent until proven guilty. Based upon what we now know about the manner in which states vie for power, and about the relationship of means to ends in Soviet history, and about the role of international terrorism in the struggle between East and West, the presumption of guilt is surely as plausible as the presumption of innocence.[78]

At present only one option, only one manner of dealing with this affair conventionally is considered: a state trial of the indicted individuals in the nation, Italy, where the crime occurred. We suggest a second option; we call for a broader investigation. Certainly (and perhaps most particularly) those implicated in the reports and rumors would want at least one world body to report on the facts of what did occur. The United Nations General Assembly consequently should act to appoint a Board of Inquiry with the mandate to carry out a full public investigation of this affair and to issue its own report.

The remarkable evidence of Bulgarian state involvement with strong rumors implying KGB knowledge must be critically studied by the one world body that has a universal membership. The results of this investigation should then be made available to the Italian judicial authorities. It is important that an international body with a universal constituency speak to the facts of this most unusual case involving the alleged complicity of government agencies in an attempt to kill the leader of the Christian community.

In some ways we would wish that this was the single act of a crazed man with no international conspiracy involved. The revelation of a conspiracy could serve to complicate the already sensitive relation-

[77] *New York Times,* October 31, 1984, citing an excerpt from a speech Secretary of State Shultz delivered in Los Angeles on October 25, 1984.

[78] *The New Republic,* January 24, 1983. p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ships between the major powers and the world community at large. But in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, does not "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind" suggest that the world community through the United Nations "declare the causes" of this affair?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AN INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE...



GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ARMS CONTROL

edited by **Adam M. Garfinkle**

At a time when nuclear strategy and arms control have become a source of urgent concern to the world community, *Global Perspectives on Arms Control* brings together diverse perspectives in the field from leading scholars of several countries. Eugene V. Rostow, former Director of the Arms Control & Disarmament Agency offers his insightful overview of the debate, and experts from the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, the U.S., Japan, India, and West Germany provide a range of ideological and analytical perspectives that makes this volume a unique contribution to the active study of arms control negotiations.

(A Volume in Foreign Policy Issues: A Foreign Policy Research Institute Series)

CONTENTS

Foreword/N. Wessell. Preface/A. Garfinkle. Introduction: The Great Nuclear Debate/E. Rostow. PART I: ARMS CONTROL, STRATEGIC INSTABILITY, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. 1. Challenges to Global Stability in the 1980s/W. Van Cleave. 2. Challenges to Global Stability in the 1980s: A Soviet View/G. Trofimenko. PART II: ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. 3. Arms Control and West European Security in the 1980s/P. Williams. 4. Superpower Competition, Detente, and European Security/W. Schreiber. PART III: ARMS CONTROL AND ASIAN SECURITY. 5. Arms Control in East Asia/H. Kimura. 6. Nuclear Proliferation and the Balance of Power in South Asia/K. Subrahmanyam. PART IV: STRATEGIC THREATS OF THE FUTURE. 7. Subnational Proliferation, Technology Transfers, and Terrorism/F. Luchaire. 8. U.S. Military Space Policy/C. Gray. Appendices.

192 pp. January 1984 $27.95 0-03-069658-5

Available through your local bookseller, or order directly through:

PRAEGER PUBLISHERS
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10175



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EUROPE'S ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ILLUSIONS AND REALITIES

by Harvey Sicherman

Assessing the prospects for the emergence of a West European "superstate" in the early sixties, the late Raymond Aron concluded that "the present mixture of cooperation and integration in Europe and within the Atlantic Alliance is sufficient to assure the achievement of prosperity and security."[1] In the seventies, this assertion was undermined by events, perhaps the major upheaval being the October 1973 Middle East war and the subsequent escalation of oil prices. Now in the eighties, both Europeans and Americans are groping toward a new mixture of cooperation to achieve prosperity and security. Not surprisingly, their respective approaches to the Middle East form a kind of litmus test: whether the Europeans, acting together, can provide an additional dimension of security; whether the United States and its European allies can find a way to work successfully on security issues that go beyond the formal boundaries of NATO but still affect it.

The Middle East is unforgiving ground for the development of these new relationships. American and European attempts to deal with its violent and enduring conflicts have been marked by unseemly rivalries, if not outright antagonism. It was there, after World War II, that the British and French fought unsuccessfully to retain their imperial influence; it was there, at Suez in 1956, that their chief NATO ally, the United States, broke dramatically with Europe on an "out of NATO area" crisis; it was there, too, in 1973-74, that the United States and its allies clashed over the oil crisis and how to handle it. Yet it remains the case that the Middle East's importance to Europe and the United States — and the danger of failure — is so great that the allies can shrink from the task of working together only at their mutual peril.

For Europe, the Middle East offers an additional challenge. The quest for European integration, despite its emphasis on economic relationships, always had at its core a belief that such integration would redound to the benefit of European and world peace. Sooner or later,

[1] Raymond Aron, "Old Nations, New Europe," in Stephen Graubard, ed., *A New Europe?* (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 61.

Harvey Sicherman is a consultant on International Relations living in the Washington, D.C. area. Currently an Adjunct Scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, he was FPRI's Associate Director from 1978 to 1980. Dr. Sicherman served as Special Assistant to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr., from 1981-82.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this historic "turning in" of the European nation-states would have to "turn out," to deal with Europe's international role. While Western Europe has experimented with the forms of integration, West European interests abroad have also grown. But how can those interests be protected? The empires, their armies, and fleets are no more, and utter dependence on either American policy or economic self-interest seems a poor and vulnerable substitute.

Thus, the difficult quest for a collective European role in the Middle East has taken place in the context of an equally uneasy search for transatlantic cooperation in dealing with the region's troubles. Neither can be said to have been entirely successful and sometimes, the achievement of one has come at the expense of the other. In April of 1982, a multinational force including U.S. and West European troops, took up positions in the Sinai desert to support the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, an act of reluctant transatlantic cooperation that shook European pretensions to an independent role. But on February 6, 1984, when the United States informed the British, French, and Italian governments of its intention to redeploy its Marine Amphibious Unit from the Beirut airport area to ships offshore, a promising experiment in such cooperation came to a disastrous conclusion.[2]

Can a European Middle East policy stand on its own? Is a unified European approach to the Middle East necessarily incompatible with American policy? Can the United States and its allies find some successful pattern for dealing with the Middle East that can be extended to other out-of-NATO-area crises? The story of the search for both the common European policy and its relationship to transatlantic cooperation is a convoluted tale, rendered more complex in the telling by the interplay of mixed motivations and interests. Nonetheless, the record is well worth examining, especially the Sinai and Beirut chapters. These episodes have a great deal to tell about what works and what does not work as the United States and the Europeans deal with the Middle East — and each other.

Origins of the European Policy

The sources of a common European policy toward the Middle East are to be found in two trends that accelerated after the 1967 Arab-

[2] In announcing the redeployment on February 7, 1984, Reagan said that "to enhance the safety of American and other multinational force personnel in Lebanon," U.S. ships and aircraft would target "any units firing into greater Beirut from part of Lebanon controlled by Syria" and "any units directly attacking American or multinational force personnel or facilities." See *New York Times,* February 27, 1984, for an account of the ambiguity that enveloped both the Administration and its critics on the issue of whether this meant U.S. naval forces would aid the Lebanese government directly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Israeli war. The first was the progressive increase in Europe's dependence on Middle Eastern oil (rather than indigenous coal) as crucial to European economic growth. The second was the progressive loss of direct influence over events in the area, as the British and French empires passed into history. Almost in confirmation of the waning European role, the four-power talks on the Arab-Israeli conflict, proposed by deGaulle in 1969, were overshadowed by the more intimate two-power talks between the United States and the Soviet Union the same year. Both ended in stalemate, and after de Gaulle left the scene, the illusion of a "four-power" settlement was never revived.[3] Finally, further to the east of Suez, the British gave up their historic security functions in the Persian Gulf in 1971, despite the importunings of the smaller Gulf states. The era of European domination was over.

Hard as it may be to recall today, the push for European unity was then in full flower, with Britain's entry into the Common Market the key issue. A "coordinated" foreign policy to complement a "harmonized" economic policy was a crucial objective and the Middle East, so important to Europe and so much a part of her history, appealed for a variety of reasons. The British and French saw European unity as a way to reassert influence from a stronger base. The smaller states saw the opportunity to act on a larger stage. The Germans, whose postwar policy sought both safety and identity in a larger European grouping, were interested in a less risky approach that would enable the Federal Republic to go beyond the politics of atonement for Nazi crimes in dealing with the Middle East. As a consequence, the Middle East became prime subject matter for the new European Political Cooperation System, established in the early seventies.[4]

The first fruits of the search for a common position were distinctly unwelcome to the United States. The European states had been much quicker than the United States to appreciate what the American need for Middle Eastern oil imports in 1971-72 meant for the overall balance between demand and supply. When the October 1973 war broke out, they were well advanced in the belief that only a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on terms that went well beyond Israel's negotiating positions would protect European interests. The extent to which oil de-

[3] Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 350 et passim.

[4] See, for example, R. B. Sostendorp, "Dutch Foreign Policy with Respect to the Middle East"; Claude Imperiali and Pierre Agate, "La Politique Extérieure de La France et Le Proche Orient"; and Udo Steinbach, "German Policy on the Middle East and the Gulf," papers prepared for a Colloquium on European Foreign Policy Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, organized by the Europa Institute of the University of Amsterdam in collaboration with the Trans-European Policy Studies Association (Brussels and the Interdisciplinary Study Group on European Integration [The Hague]) Amsterdam, February 3-4, 1983. The key documents on the European Political Cooperation System were the 1970 Davignon Report and the 1973 Copenhagen Report which called for a European position as a "distinct entity."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pendency guided European actions and resolutions during the war shocked American officials, with the French assuming their customary role as most abrasive.[5] But the European stance did not protect Europe from oil shortages, and the unwillingness of the British and French to support the Netherlands — singled out by the Arab embargo as a state reputed to be pro-Israeli and also the center of the West European oil network — shattered many illusions about the strength of Europe's unity.[6]

In the wake of the war, the Europeans acted to repair their relations with the United States while still hoping to obtain a favorable position with the Arab oil exporters. On the one hand, resolutions were passed to show the Saudis and others that Western Europe supported a settlement more favorable to Arab interests than the United States. On the other hand, Europe cooperated with the United States in taking protective measures, such as the International Energy Agency and, for all practical purposes, pursued a diplomacy that left the main action to the United States. Thus, Europe moved gradually toward the Arab position that an independent Palestinian state to be led by the PLO was the only acceptable outcome of the quarrel, but not far enough beyond American positions to interfere seriously with the U.S.-sponsored disengagement talks of 1974-75.[7]

Risks and Rewards

This process necessarily involved the risks of increasing friction with all parties but especially with Israel and the United States. The Europeans did not seem too concerned about friction with the Israelis, perhaps because the purpose of their diplomacy was to become a friend in court between the United States and the Arab oil producers, rather than an intermediary between the Arabs and Israel. This was difficult enough, involving fractious verbal compromises among the British, French, and Germans, who had to reconcile their own preferences with the wishes of the smaller states, yet not to over-promise the Arabs or over-endorse Washington when either excess was sure to risk Arab or U.S. retaliation for failure to deliver.

This line became increasingly difficult to follow in the late seventies as U.S. policy seemed to veer toward the Europeans at the beginning of the Carter administration, then reversed course to conclude the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, only to

[5] Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), p. 905 et passim.
[6] See Romano Prodi and Alberto Clo, "Europe," *Daedalus*, Fall 1975.
[7] See Udo Steinbach, "Western Europe and EEC Policies Toward Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Countries," in Colin Lagum, ed., *Middle East Contemporary Survey* (London: Holmes and Meier, 1947).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

change direction once again thereafter. Carter's position on the Palestinian homeland and the comprehensive approach (an international conference at Geneva to include the USSR) took the Europeans by surprise. The Palestinian homeland idea, however, enabled the Europeans to step closer towards endorsement of the Rabat Resolution of 1974 (which gave the PLO exclusive custody of the Palestinian claims), than they could have done without arousing American ire. Subsequently, the Europeans hailed the Camp David Accords of September 1978, only to distance themselves from the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty under the pressure of the energy crisis after the fall of the Shah. They were spared the weight of U.S. displeasure by the Carter administration's *own* conclusion that the best response to the crisis was to expand the Camp David process, even if it meant an indirect overture to the PLO.[8]

Assigned a special role by Washington to increase pressure on Israel, the Europeans, led by the Germans, began the diplomacy that led to the Venice Declaration of 1980, urging that the PLO be "associated" with any negotiation.[9] But by that time, Carter's original maneuvers had been defeated by the Andrew Young affair and election year sensitivities.[10] The Camp David Process would have to wait. And Venice, out of which grew the notion of a "European initiative," left the Europeans well positioned if the new U.S. administration chose to take up where Carter had been forced to stop.

The European Consensus

At this point, the European position on the issues of the Middle East had hardened into a characteristic approach:

(1) The Arab-Israeli conflict was considered by many, especially the British and French foreign policy establishments, as the most important threat to oil supplies. In their view the rapid resolution of this conflict was the most significant, perhaps the only way, to eliminate that danger. Neither the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, nor the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, all posing a threat to the oil fields but none concerned with Israel or the claims of the Palestinian / Arabs, changed this assumption.

(2) The European experts and a growing number of politicians believed that at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict lay the Palestinian

[8] See Hedrick Smith, "U.S. is Urging Speed in West Bank Talks," *New York Times,* August 2, 1979, and Harvey Sicherman, "The Politics of Dependence," ORBIS, Vol. 23, No. 4, Winter 1980, pp. 852-54.

[9] Text to be found in Adam Garfinkle, *Western Europe's Diplomacy and the United States* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Policy Papers, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1983) Appendix G.

[10] Sicherman, "Politics of Dependence." See the *New York Times,* October 29, 1979, for a good summary of the Young affair.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

claims for self-determination or a state, increasingly endorsed as morally and politically just. In the European view, the exchange of territory captured by Israel in 1967 for peace, as ordained by UNSC242 (1967) would, therefore, have to include a Palestinian state as part of the solution.

(3) The PLO was seen as an essential participant in the peace process and the probable leader of a nascent Palestinian state. To many European analysts, the PLO and Arafat were a typical native elite, heirs of the only elite in the Middle East who had failed to gain statehood following the breakup of the Ottoman empire and the various semi-colonial regimes run by the British and French until the end of World War II. In the seventies this view was reinforced by Israel's loss of support among the European "left," such as the Socialist International, that began to regard the PLO as a typical national liberation movement.[11]

(4) Except for continuous endorsement of Israel's right to exist, the European statements were usually sharp critiques of Israeli policy.

(5) The European diplomatic role was not precisely defined. There were occasional references to participation in peace-keeping forces and guarantees, but the specifics of both the European diplomacy and ways to insure a lasting settlement were vague.

(6) The Europeans granted to the United States the primacy of initiative and mediation, but preferred an enlarged process eventually to include the USSR (and themselves) at some Geneva-style conference. Partisans of a comprehensive settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict, they criticized U.S. approaches that tended to exclude the USSR and to deal piecemeal with parts of the conflict — for instance, the disengagement agreements and, to some extent, Camp David itself.

These positions were strongly opposed by Israel, mostly favored by many in the American policy establishment — though not by formal American policy — and deemed worthy of encouragement by such pro-Western Arab states as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

The Evolution of European Politics

In the spring of 1978, France, Holland, and Ireland, acting under U.N. auspices with the European Community's (EC) blessing, added another dimension to the common policy. They joined the UNIFIL force in Southern Lebanon which was intended to preserve peace on the Israel-Lebanon border after Israel's "Operation Litani." UNIFIL failed for a variety of reasons: residual PLO and Israeli-sponsored forces insisted that each be removed first before U.N. control could be extended; the U.N. forces themselves were responsive to a Security Council that the Israelis regarded as hopelessly biased. Faced by a Soviet veto on the one side

[11] See Carl Gershman, "The Socialists and the PLO," *Commentary*, October 1979.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Israel's pleas on the other side, Washington despaired of doing anything constructive in New York. As a consequence, though their forces were at risk in southern Lebanon, the French and the other Europeans found the U.N. — their chosen forum of diplomatic influence — to be useless.

The UNIFIL experience, which should have given pause to any further contemplation of a European role, was reinforced by two new developments, already visible in early 1981, that further undercut the rationale for fresh European initiatives on the Middle East. The *first* was a rapid change in the European public agenda which left little room and less incentive to try risky business elsewhere. The successive economic crises of the past decade were now joined by a security crisis — the impending deployment of U.S missiles under the NATO two-track decision of December 12, 1979. Caught between economic distress and the defense issue, long-governing Social Democratic parties in Europe were fractured both at home and abroad. Prime Minister Thatcher won a resounding victory over a Labour Party that sounded increasingly neutralist and anti-American. After a prolonged political agony, Chancellor Schmidt resigned, having lost the confidence of his party rather more than the approval of his countrymen. In France and the southern tier, Social Democrats gained office, but their rhetoric was transformed not long afterwards into economic policies as austere as those of their more conservative predecessors. In view of these events, the Middle East seemed a poor place to try one's reputation or to expend political chips. Only in France, where the constitution gave the presidency much greater authority than a typical parliamentary democracy, was Mitterrand free to pursue his vision of expanded French influence. His was a vision, however, that did *not* include a common European approach based on Venice.

The *second* was a rapid change in the oil markets which, when combined with a rising U.S. dollar, had peculiar effects on Europe. The second oil crisis of 1979 had been alleviated in part by a falling dollar (the oil trade uses the dollar as its medium of exchange), cushioning Europe from the full impact of the price rise even as it alarmed Europeans once more about the prospect of shortages. Now in 1981, years of conservation induced by higher prices, the search for alternatives and ailing economies had depressed demand for OPEC oil dramatically.[12] The resulting oil surplus relieved the upward pressure on prices, strained

[12] In 1973, for example, the European Community imported 61.3 percent of its oil. In 1982, owing in large part to British North Sea production, this was reduced to 36 percent (see *European Economy,* no. 16, July 1983). As for the United States, in 1973 the United States imported just over 6 million barrels per day (mbd) of which almost half came from OPEC. In 1982, U.S. net imports fell to just 4.2 mbd, of which, again, less than half came from OPEC. In percentage terms this represents a 30 percent decrease. Unlike the European case, however, the percentage of OPEC oil imported remained roughly constant (U.S. Dept. of Energy, *Monthly Energy Review,* March 1983, pp. 39, 44, cited in Robert J. Lieber, *The Oil Decade,* [New York: Praeger, 1983] p. 97).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OPEC's capacity to resist a falling market and dulled the cutting edge of a potential embargo. Simultaneously, the rising U.S. dollar, pegged to high U.S. interest rates, increased the European oil bill.[13] There was little that the Europeans could do on the political front to affect these events, undercutting a policy direction often justified obliquely as essential to economic stability.

These political and economic developments eroded the European focus on the Middle East and the urgency to do "something" about the Arab-Israeli conflict. Paradoxically, however, the two states most supportive of the original search for a common policy — Britain and France — now embarked on fresh initiatives. For British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington, who was due to become President of the European Council, it was the desire to turn Venice into something operational, a real European initiative rather than just diplomacy by resolution. For French President François Mitterrand, it was an opportunity to relieve France of the deadening hand of Venice and to reassert French influence in the region, even if it meant a tilt toward Israel to establish French credibility. The formation of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in late 1981, as part of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in mid-1982 demonstrated the limits of both approaches. When the dust had settled, the Europeans had participated in one great success at the cost of eliminating any pretensions to an independent initiative and one great failure at the cost of eliminating any pretensions to an independent role — singly or together.

Venice, Europe, and the Reagan Administration

The Europeans began 1981 still full of rhetorical resolve to pursue a common initiative based on Venice. On December 2, 1980, the European Council reviewed "the action taken" since the adoption of the Venice Declaration on the Middle East. Finding the principles of Venice to incorporate the "essential elements" for comprehensive settlement, the council encouraged its president to undertake more contacts, seeking formulas for agreement on such subjects as Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian self-determination, and Jerusalem.

The newly elected Reagan administration was thus faced by European allies with well-established views on the Middle East contrary in many respects to U.S. policy. The administration itself had no pronounced view on how to proceed. The president's own strong pro-Israeli

[13] This phenomenon continued. See the *New York Times*, August 7, 1984, p.D1, for an account of an International Energy Agency report that estimated that the changing value of the U.S. dollar has cost Japan the equivalent of an 8 percent oil price increase in 1984; for Europe the figure was 9 percent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

expressions remained to be translated into policy. His Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., was not well known for his views on the Middle East, though he had dealt extensively with the Arab-Israeli conflict as Kissinger's deputy in the Nixon-era NSC, including the Jordanian crisis of 1970. Europeans were more familiar with Haig's stint as NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR); he was widely expected to support the strengthening of U.S.-European ties. Following their customary practice on Middle East issues, the European foreign ministers who saw Haig in the winter and spring of 1981 indicated that the European community was prepared to "wait" until U.S. policy developed more fully before proceeding on their own "initiative."

U.S. policy, however, hardly pleased the Europeans. Rejecting a return to a Carter-style comprehensive approach with eventual Soviet participation, Haig wanted to complete the Camp David process through the achievement of an autonomy agreement that pointedly excluded both Palestinian self-determination and the PLO. Simultaneously, he worked to finish the unfinished business of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty: Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. By the terms of the treaty, the U.S. had agreed to seek U.N. support for a multinational force to patrol Sinai or, failing that, to supply an alternative force.

In Haig's view the peace process alone could not deal with the full range of U.S. interests and problems in the Middle East. It had to be joined to another concept, the so-called strategic consensus whereby the United States and its friends in the Middle East, working bilaterally, would concert measures to deal with Soviet and Soviet-sponsored threats to regional security. Haig understood that regional conflicts more often than not overshadowed the superpower rivalry.[14] He believed, however, that bilateral cooperation to deal with the Soviets could not await the will-o'-the-wisp comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This approach differed fundamentally from the concepts embodied by the Venice Declaration. As noted earlier, Venice was premised on the need for a rapid resolution of the conflict — especially through self-determination for the Palestinians. Furthermore, Haig's strategic consensus was dismissed quickly in Europe as misplaced anti-Soviet zeal. There was to be no transatlantic meeting of the minds on either the approach or the substance of Middle East policy.

As for European diplomatic efforts, Haig saw Venice as an obstacle to the completion of Camp David. His conversations during his first Middle East trip in April 1981 persuaded him that the European

[14] See Haig's testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sept. 17, 1981 (U.S. Dept. of State, Current Policy, No. 312). See also Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *CAVEAT*, (New York: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 169-70.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

activity had been less than constructive. When the initiative was examined closely, it lacked any real mechanism for proceeding and any real credibility with the parties, especially the Israelis. But it did obstruct U.S. policy, if only by contributing to the illusion that persistent Arab opposition to the Camp David Accords would leave the United States isolated even from its own allies. Clearly, the Sinai withdrawal with its requirement for an international force, would be a test of America's capacity to sustain the treaty and to enlarge support for it.

Haig's objective then was to gain European support for the peace process from which, in his view, they also benefited even as they criticized it. He wanted to do so without straining the Atlantic Alliance, already in the midst of a strenuous security debate over the impending deployment of U.S. missiles and arms control. And it had to be done in a way that would not dilute Camp David in order to accommodate the advocates of Venice, lest the United States break faith with its Egyptian and Israeli partners in the peace process.

Europe Joins the Sinai Multinational Force

American policy toward the peace process — and the European role — unfolded in several stages. Washington decided to await the outcome of the June 1981 Israeli elections before undertaking a strenuous effort to complete the autonomy negotiations. After the LIKUD coalition was unexpectedly returned to power, both Sadat and Begin visited Washington in the late summer. Between their two visits, Sadat and Begin met together in Alexandria and announced the reconvening of the autonomy negotiations. Buoyed by this evidence of political resolve, Haig then decided to make a determined push for an autonomy agreement before the year was out, well ahead of the Sinai withdrawal date set for April 1982.[15]

In the meantime, the Israelis clearly identified U.S. participation in a Sinai multinational force as essential, and President Reagan had agreed to contribute American units. The Egyptians, for their part, had been opposed to *any* U.S. force lest it appear that Egypt was providing a military base to a "foreign power." After an appeal by Haig to Sadat and further exchanges with the Israelis, all parties rediscovered the original compromise implied in the peace treaty: a multinational force with U.S. participation. Now it was up to the United States to produce the others.

Haig began with the Australians but they deferred to the Europeans. Among the Europeans, the British, with Lord Carrington due to

[15] The reported indignation and surprise on the part of U.S. officials at the renewal of the talks (*New York Times,* August 28, 1981) certainly did not characterize the reaction of Haig and his immediate staff. It was precisely the signal of political resolve the U.S. needed to revive the peace process.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

become the president of the EC Council in September, thought it a bad idea. The French position, under the recently elected François Mitterrand, (he won the presidency on May 10, 1981) was unclear. Mitterrand was widely known as a friend of Israel and had been strongly supported by French Jewish voters. His government's first act on the Middle East, however, had been to join the U.N. condemnation of Israel for its June 7 bombing of the French-made OSIRAK reactor in Iraq, during which one French technician was killed. Among the other Europeans consulted, the Dutch and the Italians deferred to the British and French. In that disturbed summer of 1981, (the Lebanon missile crisis occurred in May, the Osirak raid in June, the Beirut bombing in July) the result, as Haig put it, "had been a sort of hanging back from the dance floor." [16]

The dance quickened perceptibly in the fall of 1981. On September 23, visiting New York, Lord Carrington, newly elected president of the EC, spoke to the Foreign Policy Association. Arguing that Washington should welcome European political cooperation, Carrington portrayed the Venice Declaration as an initiative launched when Camp David was already in the doldrums. He reaffirmed the "balancing principles" of the European approach — "security for Israel and self-determination for the Palestinians" — concluding that the United States and Europe could agree on overall objectives while applying diverse methods.[17]

Carrington's renewed interest in a diverse "method" coincided with French policy in at least one respect — the desire somehow to go beyond Camp David. Mitterrand's policy had become clearer if not entirely coherent through a series of pronouncements and state visits: French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson's tour of the area in late August which culminated in a meeting with Arafat; the visit of Crown Prince Fahd to Paris on September 8; and Mitterrand's own trip to Saudi Arabia a fortnight later. The French had now gone beyond the Venice formulation to embrace the PLO and Palestinian statehood, as a necessary part of a lasting settlement. The socialist government was also promoting closer ties and arms sales to Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, the latter the source of 53 percent of its oil. To this end, Mitterrand had praised openly the so-called Fahd plan, announced by the Saudi Crown Prince in early August (and rejected by Israel) as a signal contribution to the search for peace.[18]

---

[16] Haig, *Caveat*, pg. 327.

[17] See the article by Carrington, based on this address, in *International Affairs* (London) Winter 1981-82, especially p. 6.

[18] The "Plan" was launched in an interview with Fahd on August 7, 1981, as reported by FBIS, August 10, 1981, C4-5. Sadat, then visiting the United States, described Fahd's remarks as "nothing new" (NBC, "Meet the Press," August 9, 1981). Most Israelis rejected the Plan but some were intrigued by Fahd's willingness to speak out. Speculation focused on point seven of eight points, which stipulated that all states in the region should be able to live in peace. The Saudis refused to declare specifically that this meant Israel as well. (See, for example, Fahd interview on November 2, 1981, as quoted by FBIS, November 3, 1981, C-1 et passim.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Overshadowed by all of this activity, however, was the other side of Mitterrand's approach to the Middle East; strengthening ties with Israel *as well* as with the Arabs. Not so visible, for example, was the renewal of cooperation between French and Israeli intelligence.[19] Before becoming president, Mitterrand had favored the Camp David Accords as a vital step forward, even if incomplete.[20] Cheysson had disparaged Venice publicly as early as May 1981.[21]

These ingredients — Haig's push for a Sinai force, the Fahd Plan, Carrington's desire to advance the Venice "initiative," and Mitterrand's "more Palestinian, more Israeli" approach — soon exploded in a bitter controversy. The catalytic event was the murder of Anwar Sadat on October 6, while reviewing a military parade. Shortly thereafter an unseemly rush began to undo the Camp David Accords. Only five days after the murder, Cheysson allowed that the way was now open to "other Arab approaches," presumably the Fahd Plan. Speaking to reporters on the way home from the funeral, former Presidents Carter and Ford emphasized the need to bring the PLO into the negotiations.[22] The Saudis, who had refused to attend the funeral, prepared to press the Fahd Plan.

Haig now feared the worst, possibly the unravelling of the entire peace process and a dizzying descent once again towards war. At an early September meeting in Spain, he had explained to Fahd why the U.S. opposed the prince's plan: it was a restatement of "non-negotiable" Arab positions except for a tantalizingly vague expression on the right of all states to live in peace and security; among other things, it lacked any mechanism for direct negotiations with Israel. He had reiterated the U.S. position on the PLO and neither the approach of intermediaries (the so called Mroz mission) nor the hints of Arab officials had indicated any change.[23] At Sadat's funeral, Haig had angry words with Carrington for opposing European participation in the Sinai Force.

Subsequently, Haig sought Mrs. Thatcher's approval directly and made a similar appeal to Mitterrand at the Yorktown Summit (October 16–19, 1981). His arguments were very basic: if Europe, after Sadat's murder, failed to participate in the MFO for Sinai, then the peace treaty might collapse; a decade of progress toward peace would come undone

---

[19] See Frederick Seager, "New Directions in French Middle East Policy," *Middle East Review*, Spring/Summer, 1982.

[20] *New York Times*, June 3, 1981.

[21] *LeMonde*, May 28, 1981.

[22] *New York Times* October 1981.

[23] See *New York Times*, February 19-20, 1984, for an account of the Mroz "mission" and Flora Lewis, "Middle East Record" *New York Times*, February 23, 1984, for an account of yet another PLO venture. Haig authorized State Dept officials to hear out Mroz but to respect stated U.S. policy on dealing with the PLO. In this instance, as in several approaches by Arab officials, Haig reiterated the U.S. stand. He was never informed of the subsequent "dialogues" alleged by these articles probably because the PLO's position itself never changed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and in its wake, neither the Fahd Plan nor Venice would be of any avail whatsoever. The Europeans had to support Camp David or the entire process might go down the drain. Mrs. Thatcher agreed; so did Mitterrand. Thus armed, Haig set about securing the approval of the Netherlands and Italy.

Translating such agreement into the MFO, however, proved a treacherous task. On October 29, Haig was astounded to hear President Reagan praising the Fahd Plan in the wake of the Senate vote in support of the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia. On November 2, Fahd thanked the president and spoke openly of the plan as a substitute for Camp David. But in the meantime, Reagan, apprised of the impressions that might be afloat, took the occasion of King Hussein's visit to Washington to *reaffirm* Camp David.[24] Privately, the United States informed the Saudis of its continued opposition to the Fahd Plan.

The most incendiary act fell to Carrington. His state visit to Saudi Arabia was marked by lavish praise for the Fahd Plan and criticism of Camp David for its failure to deal with Palestinian self-determination.[25] This provoked Haig to a public diplomatic protest and a private, widely reported suggestion to Carrington that he "cool it." [26]

With the PLO split over its implications, the Saudis as early as November 10 had to admit that the plan lacked support, especially in Washington.[27] The subsequent Arab summit at Fez on November 26 was suspended rather than risk humiliating Prince Fahd. With the Fahd Plan not even enjoying unanimous Arab approval, the alternative to Camp David once again fell into the limbo of the ethereal — the European initiative.

All attention was therefore focused on the meaning of European participation in an MFO for Sinai. On November 23, the EC foreign ministers approved the intentions, announced that day, of the British, French, Dutch, and Italian governments to participate in the force. But their statement declared that the multinational force in Sinai met the "wish" of the community to facilitate "progress" towards a comprehensive peace that included "the need for the Palestinian people to exercise fully its right to self-determination." Predictably, this crude attempt to link the MFO somehow with Venice outraged the Israelis, who promptly

[24] See the *Washington Post* November 3, 1981.

[25] Carrington's comments had been preceded by utterances by the British Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, both of whom pronounced Camp David dead. See *New York Times,* November 10, 1981.

[26] Ibid. Subsequently, the *Washington Post* reported Haig as having told a staff meeting in mid December that his British counterpart was a "duplicitous bastard." See the *Washington Post,* February 19, 1982.

[27] See Foreign Minister Saud's statement after the meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council as quoted by FBIS, November 12, 1981, p. c.3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rejected European participation on such a basis. Haig demanded a clarification from the Europeans and also asked Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzchak Shamir to come to Washington. On the twenty-sixth, the four European participants declared in writing that the role of the MFO was defined only in the Egyptian-Israeli agreements and "that they have attached no political conditions, linked to Venice or otherwise, to their participation." Thus equipped, Haig convinced Shamir to ignore the European rhetoric. One of his more persuasive arguments was Arab reaction to prospective European participation; with Egypt's exception, they interpreted it to mean support for Camp David at the expense of the European "initiative." On December 3, the United States and Israel issued a lengthy statement: it cited the European declaration of the twenty-sixth, reiterated that the treaty of peace and the Camp David Accords were the basis of the MFO, and renewed U.S. and Israeli commitment to the peace process — especially the autonomy talks.[28]

Now it was the turn of the Europeans to be upset. Prime Minister Menachem Begin continued to complain about statements by Carrington and others which, in his view, diluted the MFO commitment. The EC partners, their own amour propre offended in the engagement, responded with a bureaucratic tour de force. On January 13, 1982, *three* sets of statements were issued: the original EC document *linking* the MFO to Venice; a reiteration of the November 26 statement by the four participants, *disavowing any linkage;* and parliamentary statements in each of the four countries explaining the decision to participate, some with reference to Venice, some not. (Not surprisingly, Carrington's speech roused Begin to a denunciation of British policy.) Only in late January of 1982, on his second trip that month to the Middle East, did Haig finally persuade the Israelis not to bother further with Carrington.

The European initiative — embryonic at best — had been aborted. Confronted by the choice of supporting Camp David and the United States versus the unknown of what was at best a resolution rather than a diplomatic mechanism, the Europeans had chosen to go with Washington. Even without the murder of Sadat, if pressed they probably would have done so, simply because most Europeans had never envisioned their own efforts as a substitute but at best a complement: Europe would function as a go-between for the U.S. and the oil producers rather than a go-between for the Arabs and the Israelis. The ideal circumstances for this kind of maneuver existed in 1979-1980 when the U.S. administration, uncomfortable with the limitations of its own handiwork at Camp David, did not mind European pressure on behalf of the PLO so long as

[28] For this and other EC statements, see Garfinkle, *Western Europe's Diplomacy and the United States,* Appendixes I, J.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it did not get out of hand. When it did, at Venice, it was too late. It had fallen to the Reagan administration and its reputedly pro-European Secretary of State to disallow Europe the luxury of benefiting from the peace treaty while pretending to offer an alternative.

The Sinai MFO experience had revealed more than just the limitations of a European proto-policy. The French had already broken with the Venice approach because, after ten years, it no longer served as a vehicle to assert French influence in the Middle East. Mitterrand's ambitions also required a credibility, especially with Israel, that Venice had made impossible. He climaxed this part of his policy with an unprecedented visit to Israel on March 2, 1982. The French president was well received by his hosts, who appreciated his decision to relieve Israel's diplomatic isolation. Mitterrand's forceful plea for Palestinian self-determination fell on less enthusiastic ears.[29]

Europe and the Beirut Multinational Force

On April 25, 1982, precisely as laid down in the peace treaty, Israeli troops left Sinai, turning over the peninsula to a regime of carefully delineated security zones. A multinational force, with European participation, was in place to supervise the details. Unfortunately for the proponents of Camp David, however, the successful evacuation of Sinai, the end of the Fahd Plan, and the demise of the Venice initiative did not lead to a revival of the peace process. The agenda was dominated increasingly by the probability of war between Israel and the PLO in Lebanon, a war that might easily involve the Syrians and even possibly the superpowers.

Since the summer of 1981, the United States had been working unsuccessfully to relieve the sources of tension in Lebanon, including a strengthening of the UNIFIL mandate in the south. These efforts had been frustrated by the U.N. Security Council's preference for dealing with the zone dominated by Israel's local surrogate, Major Haddad, rather than the PLO. Saudi pressures on Syria and the PLO proved to be weak and episodic. The Syrian missiles deployed in the Beka'a valley, which had occasioned a crisis in May 1981, were not moved; the inter-Arab political process stimulated by Ambassador Philip Habib to alter the Lebanese political deadlock, and with it to restrict the Syrian and PLO presence, petered out in irresolution. After a series of violent incidents, the Israelis had indicated that their patience was at an end. Haig's final efforts to promote a diplomatic alternative, including an international conference, were overtaken by events.[30]

[29] See Seager, *New Directions*.
[30] Haig, *Caveat*, pp. 334-35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, had been preceded two days earlier by an attack on Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador to Great Britain, Israeli air raids on targets in and near Beirut, and a heavy PLO artillery barrage against Israel's northern towns. These developments caught the United States and its European allies in the midst of the Versailles summit. It had not been a particularly good trip for the U.S. team. Bickering amongst the president's national security adviser, the White House staff and the secretary of state had peaked. A crucial negotiation with the Europeans on the Soviet gas pipeline sanction issue had fallen through. Now the Europeans were immensely disturbed by what they regarded as Washington's failure to restrain Israel. They lost no time in condemning the Israeli action and pressuring Reagan to do likewise.

European — and other — perceptions notwithstanding, no green light had been given to the Israelis for Operation Peace Galilee.[31] Those who knew the Lebanon problem in 1981-82 understood clearly that if nothing changed, sooner or later Israel and the PLO would do battle. Despite U.S. efforts at the U.N. and through Ambassador Habib, nothing had changed. Haig carried on a strenuous dialogue with Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Sharon, urging restraint.[32] As he pointed out then and later, neither he nor anyone else proposed to tell Israel *not* to defend herself; he could and did stress that Israel's response must be in proportion to an internationally recognized provocation. The charge that this gave a green light for an operation that reached into Beirut was belied not only by the Israeli cabinet's action,[33] which authorized much less of an expedition, but was also based on the misconception that Israel was incapable of independent behavior. In the 1956 Suez War, the 1967 Six Day War, the latter days of the October 1973 war, and in 1978 (the Israeli advance to the Litani River in Lebanon), the Israelis had shown their capacity to press rapid military actions to the limit before international pressure could be mobilized against them. The Lebanon war fit this pattern.

---

[31] See Zeev Schiff, "Green Light, Lebanon," Foreign Policy, Spring 1983, and Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). The book is far less sharply drawn than the article; the chapter devoted to the U.S.-Israeli relationship, for example, is entitled "The Illusion of Collusion," rather than "The Green Light." Schiff's original charge was apparently attuned to Israeli domestic politics. In the war's aftermath, various "moderate elements" in both the Likud government and the Labour party opposition tried to excuse their initial support of Begin's policy by pointing to Washington's failure to condemn Israel. See Schiff, p. 83. The "green light" thesis remains a convenient rather than an accurate idea.

[32] Sharon described U.S. officials as "absolutely, totally against" the war and corroborated Haig's own account on the issue of provocation. See his interview with Oriana Fallaci in the *Washington Post,* August 29, 1982, especially p. A19. See also Haig, *Caveat,* p. 335.

[33] See *Maariv* Special Supplement, "The War Without An End," June 3, 1983, (Hebrew).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Precisely because the United States could not tell an ally simply to take losses without retaliation, U.S. officials were of divided mind about Israel's attack. At first, the United States adopted an understanding position, based largely on Israel's self-proclaimed goal of a forty-kilometer advance. Later, the mood soured abruptly, when the dramatic events of the fourth day of the war made clear that the Israeli operation would go much further. A week after the invasion had begun, the Syrian air defenses in Lebanon had been demolished, the Syrian air force had lost eighty jets to none for Israel and Syrian ground armor had suffered serious defeat. Beirut was cut off and the PLO trapped.

U.S. policy, as preached by Secretary Haig, was to take advantage of these events to rid Lebanon of *all* foreign forces, to establish a working central government in Beirut, and to make new arrangements to protect the Israel-Lebanon frontier. Once this had been secured or at least was well under way, the United States could resume its efforts to advance the peace process: the defeat of the PLO and the Syrians, combined with the Iraq-Iran war had devastated the most powerful Arab opposition to the Camp David Accords. It had also removed a basic Israeli objection to a more broadly defined autonomous regime for the West Bank and Gaza — fear that the PLO might gain control. Standing immediately in the way of this far-reaching concept were the 12,000 PLO fighters (and a small number of Syrian troops) in Beirut, surrounded by Israeli forces.

Frightened by the Israeli advance, abandoned by all its allies, including the USSR, the PLO seemed ready to leave Beirut without demanding more than a safe-conduct from the newly constituted Lebanese Committee of National Salvation. But attitudes were changing rapidly in Washington. Newly ascendant was the view that the Israelis, if they were not to be punished for the invasion itself, must not be permitted to capture Beirut for both political and humanitarian reasons. This gave rise to a host of mixed signals about U.S. direction and intent.[34] A different U.S. policy, perhaps opposed to Israel, seemed imminent. The result was to blunt at a critical moment the very instrument with which Haig had hoped to pry out the PLO: the *fear* of an Israeli assault.[35] The PLO decided instead to play for time.

Oddly enough, the Israelis themselves seem to have had neither the intention nor the desire to enter West Beirut. It had not been part of even the most ambitious version of Sharon's plan, on the grounds of both political complexity and the cost in Israeli casualties. Instead, the Phalange forces were supposed to deal with the PLO. When the Christians

[34] See for example the *New York Times,* June 21, 1982, and Haig, *Caveat.* pp. 343-44.
[35] Haig, ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

failed to act, the Israelis were caught in a conundrum, unwilling to assault West Beirut head-on but equally unwilling to let the PLO remain intact. Psychological warfare and occasional heavy cannonades could not disguise entirely Israel's indecision.[36]

The frustration of Haig's policy in Lebanon concluded the increasingly mutual disaffection between the secretary of state and the Reagan administration. On June 25, 1982, Haig resigned. Surprisingly, he was asked to stay on to manage the crisis, which he did until early July when he was relieved by George Shultz. In the meantime, the military and political pressure of the developing stalemate around Beirut had overwhelmed the fragile Lebanese consensus formed in the aftermath of the PLO and Syrian defeat. The Muslim members of the Committee of National Salvation could not sanction an assault on West Beirut; the Christians, especially the Phalange, were not about to inaugurate their renewed political ascendancy by joining the Israelis in battle. This stalemate left no effective agency with whom Washington's envoy, Philip Habib, could work to arrange a peaceful removal of the PLO. And it was this void that the Multinational Force (MNF), conceived by Washington and supported by London, Paris and Rome, was intended to fill.

Soon after returning to Washington from the Versailles summit, Haig had contacted the French, among others, about cooperation in handling the Lebanon crisis. Cheysson had made such cooperation contingent on doing something for the Palestinians. Subsequently, the French had devised a U.N. resolution in concert with the Egyptians that was intended to give the beleaguered PLO a strong political boost even at the nadir of its military fortunes. Haig saw this as another attempt to rescue Arafat for no worthwhile purpose; it also held the danger of persuading the Israelis that the capture of West Beirut might be necessary. On June 25, after several attempts to delay the resolution, which was supported by fourteen members of the Security Council, the United States vetoed it.

Despite the veto, Haig believed that the French would cooperate in the end. They had historic interests in Lebanon, and Mitterrand had been anxious to reassert French influence in the Middle East all along, independent of his European partners if necessary. The French had allied themselves with Syria's enemies, especially Iraq, and a nasty undercover war between the two secret services had taken casualties for two years already — notably the French ambassador to Lebanon, murdered in September 1981. If the MNF was to fill a void that would lead to PLO evacuation, the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and a Syrian defeat, then Paris could hardly refuse.

[36] *Maariv,* Special Supplement.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By the time Haig left office in early July, the French, along with the Italians and British, had agreed in principle to a MNF to be deployed only after Israel, Syria, the PLO and the Lebanese assented to the withdrawal of *all* foreign forces. (Syria, which claimed not to be a foreign force because of its 1977 Arab League mandate to enter Lebanon, was to be "disinvited" by the Lebanese.) In Haig's original scheme, the PLO (and Syrian) departure from Beirut was to be the first but not the final step. The MNF's function would be to ensure that this took place under peaceful circumstances. It was to be neither a buffer between Israel and the PLO nor a substitute for a Lebanese army responsive to a new Lebanese government.

Whatever the prospects for such a scheme, they dimmed rapidly after Haig's removal from operational authority on the evening of July 5. The new secretary of state, George Shultz, was known to be less enthusiastic about Haig's policy of support for Israel, and his confirmation testimony two weeks later sounded a note of solicitude for Palestinian rights.[37] Even earlier, on July 6, responding to rumors in Jerusalem, the president announced U.S. willingness to participate in a Multinational Force. This was a stunning surprise, which provoked an angry Soviet response. The negotiations in Beirut stalled, pending further developments.

Despite Habib's efforts, it took another six weeks, two ferocious Israeli bombardments and an inconclusive Israeli-American crisis for Arafat to conclude finally that he could not remain in Beirut. When the 2,200-strong MNF entered the city (800 French, 800 American, 400 Italians and 200 British in a logistics unit), its function was to assist in the removal of the PLO, a task supposed to take up to thirty days. The idea that all parties should commit themselves to a withdrawal *before* deployment of the MNF seemed no longer relevant to such a limited objective. When the evacuation was completed two weeks ahead of schedule, the United States abruptly removed its Marines on September 10, 1982, and the Europeans followed suit.

Four days later, Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel was murdered. The Israeli army entered West Beirut to "restore order" but on September 16-18, several hundred residents of the Sabra-Chatila refugee camps were massacred by Phalangist troops. In the midst of mounting outrage directed against Israel and its Christian allies, the United States and the Europeans responded to the government of Lebanon's request for a return of the MNF, an act approved by the European Council on September 21. (The French and Italian troops arrived on the twenty-sixth and the Marines on the twenty-ninth.) The new mission, at least as it was defined for the U.S. contingent, was "to establish an environment which

[37] The *New York Times*, July 14, 1982.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will permit the Lebanon Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area."[38] Their presence was to be governed by "peacetime" rules of engagement — use of force allowed in self-defense. The French role was defined by Mitterrand himself as contributing to "a return of security and the respect of the people's rights."[39] The Italian Prime Minister talked more expansively of re-establishing Lebanese national sovereignty and "the withdrawal of all the forces of occupation."[40]

A Wasting Asset

These dramatic events placed the Europeans, especially the French, in a sharp dilemma. They had chosen to follow a U.S. policy that they deemed to be in their interest, that would prevent an Israeli attack on Beirut, rescue the PLO, and offer a fresh opportunity for action, perhaps along the lines that the Venice Declaration had sketched out. Shultz's confirmation statement had been greeted by European diplomats as a step forward. Yet the U.S. policy, as evidenced in the president's September 1 initiative, had chosen Jordan, not the PLO, as the critical Arab interlocutor. Only eight days later, the Arab Summit meeting issued the Declaration of Fez, a modified version of the Fahd proposal which emphasized anew both the PLO and Palestinian statehood, but still omitted reference to recognition of Israel or any call for direct negotiations.[41]

As for Lebanon itself, the U.S.-led MNF had been removed even before the political future of Lebanon had been settled. Now the Europeans were returning with the Americans to Beirut to stabilize the situation. But what was the long-term purpose of the Force? And what was the European policy it could serve?

There were no answers to these questions except to say that the MNF underwrote for the moment the U.S. diplomatic effort to remove all foreign forces, to train a Lebanese army and through these actions, to support what was presumed to be a unified Lebanese government under the presidency of Amin Gemayel, Bashir's brother.

---

[38] Report of the Department of Defense Commission on the Terrorist Act at Beirut International Airport, (December 20, 1983) Part I, The Military Mission.

[39] Mitterrand's statement of September 20, 1982, reported by FBIS, September 21, 1982, VII, K1.

[40] As quoted by FBIS, September 22, 1982, VII, L1.

[41] See the *Washington Post,* September 10, 1983, for an account of the Fez Summit which was the scene of some complex exchanges. Notably, in addition to the "unified" position of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the summit supported Iraq against Iran over Syrian objections. Syria, for its part, was relieved of any pressure for a specific timetable of withdrawal from Lebanon despite the Lebanese government's request to be free of the "Arab Deterrent Force." (This title was the last remnant of the Arab League compromise of 1976-77, which justified the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon. Token Kuwaiti and Saudi contingents were also deployed in the country. By 1981, they had been withdrawn after their governments quarreled with Syria.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the broader political issues, the Europeans endorsed all approaches — Venice, Fez and the Reagan Plan. The U.S. proposals were hailed as the most realistic, though clearly disappointing because of Washington's pointed rejection of the PLO and the Palestinian state.[42] The Europeans soon learned that the PLO *had* a crucial role to play even in the U.S. plan; the king of Jordan was not expected by Washington to join a negotiation without PLO sanction. The British, among others, cautioned Hussein not to trust too much in U.S. assurances until the Israelis had delivered some concessions — such as a settlement freeze. It is not clear what effect such views had on the king, who did not need European advice to be cautious. (In fact, Washington did not insist that Hussein actually sit down with Israel *before* a settlement freeze, only that he indicate his willingness to do so once that condition was met.)[43] But the advice was surely consistent with the still prevalent European conviction on the need to do business with the PLO. Perhaps most characteristic was Italian Foreign Minister Colombo's hope that a merger of the Fez declaration with the Reagan Plan "would pave the way to that global solution we have been advocating for a long time as the only way to a joint and lasting settlement of the controversy."[44]

Unfortunately for their political objectives, the French, the Italians, the British — the French in particular — had chosen the Palestinian horse in Lebanon at the moment it was being expelled from the barn. Despite periodic efforts to revive the vetoed Franco-Egyptian resolution, or to advocate a synthesis of Venice, Fez, and Reagan, none of these efforts had much of an effect. Once Jordan refused the Reagan initiative in April 1983, the only game left was Lebanon. For Europe to "play" in Lebanon meant participating in the MNF. And to participate in the MNF meant to play more or less by U.S. rules.

The trouble with the U.S. rules was that they became increasingly irrelevant to the situation on the ground. A fuller account of the Lebanese tragedy would be out of place here. Suffice to say that the Europeans made little impact on the main elements of the drama: the Soviet rearmament of the Syrians; the U.S.-Israel-Lebanon negotiations leading to the stillborn accords of May 1983; the Israeli withdrawal from the Chouf; President Gemayel's inability to divide and rule his opponents among the Druse, the Shiites, and the Christians.

---

[42] See, for example, the French and German reactions as quoted by FBIS, September 3, 1982, pp. J1, K1.

[43] See interview of Secretary of State George Shultz in the *Washington Post*, April 24, 1983. "What the President said (to King Hussein) was 'if you enter the negotiation, say you are ready to enter the negotiation, I will not press you to actually sit down at the bargaining table unless we can find some form of freeze.' "

[44] May 8, 1983, as quoted by FBIS, VII, May 16, 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the end of September 1983, when American warships bombarded the hills overlooking Beirut in support of the Lebanese Army, the confusion about the MNF's role was laid bare. The Europeans regarded U.S. intervention as a folly, taking sides in a civil war, yet they had no answer to deal with either Syrian-supported military pressure or their own vulnerability to attack. The French had enlarged their forces but they were not to be used offensively. Victims for two years past of Syrian terror tactics, they too were victimized on the bloody Sunday of October 23 — when fifty-eight of their troops were killed just moments after two hundred forty-one American Marines died in the explosion at their airport headquarters.

Brought to the moment of truth, the Europeans wavered. The British and Italians, whose contingents had not been attacked, wished to leave but neither government wanted to be guilty of either "pulling the plug" or succumbing to fear of terrorism. In Paris, the French government was torn by indecision. The larger dictates of an independent role in the Middle East, especially the alliance with Iraq, required a harsh response. But the reason for being in Lebanon — the Palestinian issue — had all but disappeared, at least from Lebanon. Were the French prepared to take the offensive for the sake of the Gemayel government, to return to the abandoned policy of upholding a Christian Lebanon with French lives? The answer was no. After weeks of paralyzing discussion, the French Air Force raided Baalbek in search of the Iranians who were presumed to be the perpetrators of the October bombings. By all accounts except the official one, the raid was a failure.

The month of December was marked by increasing allied tension as the United States, through Secretary Shultz, strove to keep the MNF together. In the European view, increasing U.S. military activity in behalf of the Gemayel government entailed large and unpredictable political risks. They argued for a face-saving political solution which would recognize the preponderance of Syrian influence, even at the cost of repudiating the Israel-Lebanon Accords, in exchange for a Lebanese government that could give the MNF an honorable exit. But the Geneva Conference in December 1983 only postponed these issues and abruptly, the Americans, who seemed to be leaning toward a political solution, turned once more in a different direction. When Gemayel visited Washington later that month, he was told that the Accords were not for sale. The newly consecrated strategic alliance with Israel, and Washington's own role in arranging the Accords, ruled out such a volte-face. The president, brandishing the success of the Grenada intervention (which occurred the same day as the Marine disaster), sought reinforcement

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

against congressional critics through popular indignation over terrorism and rhetorical resolve to stay the course.

Diplomatic Dénouement

Sixty days into 1984, it was all over. In Washington, an already shaken congressional support for the Marine presence disintegrated after the Long Commission Report of December 20, 1983, pointed out the ambiguities of the president's policy in the course of investigating the destruction of the Marine compound. The MNF had become a combat force in a combat zone but without a combat mission. Lacking such a mission, it could prove its value only by taking casualties. This was not a test that could be passed for long; it made no sense. The alternatives were to reduce the political objectives of American policy in Lebanon or to increase the military force necessary to achieve them. The United States would do neither; the Europeans alone could do neither. The original U.S. objectives were unattainable; the original European objectives had departed with the PLO. Lebanon was no longer a place for the French to put pressure on Syria or for the Europeans to leverage the Americans to adopt a fresh approach to the PLO.

Instead, the Europeans, led by the French, attempted to fashion a position that recognized the new facts of life on the ground, preserved a European "role," yet did not break with Washington. The next American surprise — the abrupt announcement of the "redeployment" of the Marines on February 7, even as the Lebanese army was disintegrating under attack — found Paris, in particular, attempting yet another diplomatic maneuver. This took the form of an ambitious approach to the USSR, appealing in part to wider European sentiment about Washington's mishandling of relations with the Kremlin.

The French, British, and Italians agreed that American emphasis on Soviet mischief in the Lebanon situation was both unwise and overdrawn. In part, this was due to a much deeper cleavage between European and American policies, deriving from the view that détente had worked in Europe and should be extended elsewhere, in contrast to what many Europeans saw as an American return to the cold war, extended to Europe through the controversies over missile deployments and sale of high-technology to Moscow. Thus, a European policy toward the Middle East which had set itself a distinctive role to play in strictly regional terms became briefly an attempt to distance itself from the general U.S. policy toward the USSR.

The trouble with this on both regional and international levels was elementary and devastating. The Syrians were not interested in ne-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gotiating with the Europeans because they did not believe the European tail could wag the American dog, even in Lebanon itself. To go above the Syrians in the hope that Moscow would pressure Damascus, endorsed Washington's view of a significant Soviet role in the trouble. But what was the incentive for the Soviets to cooperate with European plans?

For three weeks after the American "redeployment," the French strove vainly at the U.N. to construct a resolution justifying the presence of French troops. They could not deliver the Americans to a resolution that spoke of a broader forum on the peace process with Soviet participation. They could not persuade the Soviets to do with less. Once apprised that the Europeans would not break with Washington to deal with Moscow, the Soviets lost interest. On February 29, 1984, the Soviet Union vetoed the French-sponsored resolution on a U.N. force in Beirut.

On March 24, the French Defense Ministry announced that French troops would leave Beirut by March 31. A hasty and futile negotiation to prevent an additional battle over their positions, especially on the "green line" dividing the city, then ensued. On the thirty-first, only a few French gendarmes armed with pistols remained of the MNF. As if to remind the world once more of the connection, the final days of the French withdrawal were punctuated by the announcement in Washington on March 30 that American naval forces would be withdrawn, their presence "no longer a necessary or appropriate means of achieving these (U.S.) goals."[45] An Arab diplomat likened the American statement to the announcement that a man had died a month after his funeral. As the French left, shelling broke out anew between rival militias.

The Future of European Policy in the Middle East

The European experience over the last several years in the Middle East testifies conclusively to the illusions fostered by the search for a common policy, and the realities that revealed Europe's ability to act in the shadow of American policy but not independently of it. It was an illusion to believe that Europe could mediate between the United States and the oil producers, because Europe could not persuade the United States to do what it did not wish to do in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and because in the end, the Europeans would not risk lasting injury to the transatlantic connection despite oil dependency. It was an illusion to believe that Europe as a whole or a state such as France could mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict, because neither Europe as a whole nor France itself was prepared to lavish the money and the military power to make of itself a major player. Like the United States in Lebanon, the Europeans,

[45] *New York Times*, March 31, 1984, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through their resolutions, offered excessive rhetoric supported by underwhelming force. Sinai and Beirut punctured such pretensions.

The picture of European policy that emerges from these two instances is paradoxical. The successful European force, that of Sinai, represented a sharp break with the "common," "independent," "unified" policy as it had developed over a decade. The unsuccessful Beirut exercise was also a break, representing as it did an action that followed Washington's lead. The attempt to use it as a lever to influence the United States or to create an independent stance collided with the reality that no one who counted really believed the Europeans could act decisively without Washington. Even in Lebanon where one major European state — France — had historic interests and influence, the Europeans were manifestly dependent on Washington both in the beginning and at the end.

In retrospect, it seems clear that changing conditions — in the region, in the oil markets, and in Europe itself — had also undermined the basis of a common policy. The Egyptian-Israeli peace of 1979 had been resisted after the fall of the Shah upset the oil markets. Within two years, however, the oil producers' own leverage had fallen victim to a decade of conservation, economic distress that lowered demand, and the successful development of alternative sources of supply. Meanwhile, European leaders were beset by critical issues that monopolized the agenda: economic problems, the Euromissile deployment, reform of the Common Market itself. Finally, the Mitterrand government in France determined to play its own hand in the Middle East.

The oft-frustrated search for an independent, united European role in the Middle East, however, should not be allowed to overshadow otherwise flourishing bilateral and multilateral relationships. The Europeans remain traders, purveyors of arms and suppliers of diplomatic advice. As members of NATO, they help to anchor the southern flank, including Turkey, vital to the enduring security of Western interests in the area. Acting with the United States, they can provide a crucial capability. Acting without the United States, they can make much less of a constructive difference, though, as events have shown, they can make a good deal of trouble for themselves and for others. And it must be said that sometimes, even the Atlantic partners working together cannot succeed.

That raises a more significant issue: the ability of the United States and select European partners to deal with crises that affect their security in regions beyond Nato's formal boundaries. While this issue has been debated at length, almost unseen by the debaters, American and European statesmen have managed by trial and error to work together. Notwithstanding the ghost of the Suez debacle of 1956 and the more recent querulous exchanges over Middle East policy, both the Sinai MFO

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the Beirut MNF testified to the existence of the *will* to cooperate. But will alone is not enough.

In this sense, the Beirut experience remains profoundly disheartening not because the United States and its European allies failed to cooperate, but because they failed to succeed. The Sinai force was crucial to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in which the essential local compromises had been reached with American help; the United States appealed to its allies with a clear conception of what had to be done and the consequences for failing to do it. In Beirut the local compromises were absent; American policy emerged as confused; and very powerful allied navies and highly trained though not numerous ground forces failed to produce local compromises. As these words are written, the Atlantic allies face another regional crisis — in the Persian Gulf — where the stakes are high, the local compromises are lacking, and where the chronicle of successful Western peacekeeping ceases abruptly with the British withdrawal over a decade ago.

For the eighties, then, the issue is no longer whether the United States and its allies can work together to meet challenges beyond NATO's formal structure. They can. But can they succeed? Cooperation is a precondition of success but is not sufficient unto itself. The ambiguities of Beirut are far more likely to be the case than the certainties of Sinai.[46] It is for Western statesmen to make sure that the illusions of the past do not cloud their vision of how to deal with the realities of the future.

[46] In August of 1984, when British, French, and Italian warships joined the U.S. navy in searching for mines in the Red Sea, believed to been laid by pro-Iranian forces (perhaps Libya), the French and Italians stressed the bilateral nature of the exercise. A French diplomat was quoted as saying, "We still have quite a bad memory of what happened in the multinational force in Lebanon." (See the *Washington Post,* August 29, 1984.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATO'S OUT-OF-REGION CHALLENGES AND EXTENDED CONTAINMENT

by William T. Tow

The question of NATO's out-of-region policy problems has become especially salient following the fall of Iran's pro-Western monarchy and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which, in turn, led President Carter to extend America's own defense perimeters to the Persian Gulf. As the Reagan administration took office, the U.S. historic tendency to extend NATO security interests beyond Europe into American global security commitments gave way to a new determination to incorporate the Europeans, the Japanese, and other U.S. allies into greater defense burden-sharing efforts. Left open, however, were questions related to what specific threats NATO members and other industrial democracies should confront, what means should be employed, and how responsibilities for meeting extraperipheral security challenges should be precisely defined.

Current policy ambiguities inherent to Atlantic Alliance members undertaking Third World security responsibilities on a collective basis are related to rising tendencies by Europeans to favor a strict constructionist view of NATO's geographic coverage. This trend has partially resulted from postwar U.S. tendencies to redirect the Europeans' defense orientations toward their own continent. Strategic atrophy within the Alliance has also proceeded from long-standing differences between Washington and Europeans what comprised proper levels and types of defense burden-sharing within a European or extra-European context. Most important, there has never been — nor is there now — any systematic or formal mechanism within alliance channels for implementing viable "extended containment" strategies in response to global threats that directly affect the North Atlantic region.[1] As a result, common policy resolution has, usually, been superseded by asymmetrical national interests. Individual NATO members' disparate interpretations of Soviet behavior in the Third World have obstructed the forging of any alliance-wide efforts

[1] The concept of extended containment as applied to American foreign policy interests and to checking Soviet power projection throughout the Third World is addressed by Charles Wolfe, Jr., "Extended Containment," in Aaron Wildavsky, ed., *Beyond Containment*, (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1983), pp. 147-68.

William T. Tow is Assistant-Professor in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. A NATO Fellow in 1981, he is currently collaborating with Douglas T. Stuart on "The Limits of Alliance," a study of NATO's out-of-region problems.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to derive a unified strategy for neutralizing those aspects of Soviet behavior outside Europe that do constitute legitimate threats to Western security interests.

The following discussion reviews some key components that historically have played a role in obviating NATO's assumption of a global security identity. More recent diverse perspectives about how best to address current NATO strategic problems that originate from outside the treaty area will also be briefly assessed. Subsequent analysis considers how increasingly amorphous NATO pro forma defense parameters have become, penetrated by the sheer diversity of Soviet or other anti-Western military challenges now materializing along littorals and staging posts previously judged peripheral or secondary to immediate alliance geographic concerns. Such factors have unquestionably strained NATO's diplomatic and military resources, creating disarray within alliance decision-making circles over who should deal with new extra-regional threats now emerging and how overall NATO strategic approaches should be redefined. A final concern of this article is how effectively the United States and its European allies have responded to emerging Soviet or indigenous Third World capabilities that are clearly anti-Western in orientation. This issue relates to NATO's need to identify updated alliance burden-sharing requirements that are more responsive to extra-regional crisis, and to derive consultative mechanisms specifically geared toward truly global strategy coordination.

Historical Perspectives of NATO Coverage: The Legacy of Geographic Restraints

Many initial U.S. postwar security policies were rationalized as necessary stratagems to fill power vacuums caused by West European nations scaling down their own global security commitments. The Truman Doctrine, Washington's affiliation with ANZUS, the Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan, and other Pacific defense pacts during the early days of the Cold War resulted from the consensus reached within most American policy-making circles: Britain and France could no longer be considered world powers.[2] Buttressed with this perception, Washington moved during

[2] As early as 1942-43, President Roosevelt was openly skeptical of Britain's postwar ability to sustain its great power status. On several occasions he advocated Indian independence and the overall dissolution of the British Empire, much to the chagrin of Prime Minister Churchill. See the recently declassified correspondence between the President and the Prime Minister in Warren Kimball, ed., *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), especially Volume I, p. 373 and pp. 447-48. For statements by Roosevelt concerning his preferences for decolonization by postwar France, consult Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 168-69. For background on similar geostrategic calculations reached by Britain's Post-Hostilities Planning Subcommittee, comprised of representatives from all three services of the British military, see Habibur Rahman, "British Post-Second World War

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the 1950s and early 1960s with deliberateness to encourage West European governments to retract their lingering extra-regional strategic commitments and to accept a tightly managed Soviet-American bipolar global security framework. Following the acceleration of the U.S. own military involvement in Vietnam, however, official Washington had second thoughts about the pace of divestment which they had earlier imposed upon the European colonial powers. In an application of hindsight, the initial American approach seemed excessively idealistic and historically short-sighted.

Indeed, current West European perceptions of a Washington overly zealous in applying military power to Third World conflicts that might escalate to superpower confrontations involving Europeans may well be related to Europe's earlier traumas arising from decolonization and the retreat of the colonial powers from great power status.[3] Contemporary policy disputes within the Alliance over how to cope with extra-regional security threats have perpetuated the differences between the Americans and the Europeans on how best to influence Third World nations in an era of post-decolonization. The European argument downplays the value of importing tensions into Europe, and contends that economic assistance to potential Third World belligerents is the most effective way to retain Western access to critical natural resources needed for the industrial democracies' economic well-being. The United States countered that diplomatic or economic initiatives have not always prevented eruption of conflicts that directly affect the West's survival. To argue against military action in such cases sounds ". . . like a cop-out, an excuse for not helping or a desire to protect cozy arrangements in Europe from the intrusion of nasty realities elsewhere." [4]

But U.S. postwar foreign policy has also undergone intermittent cycles of alliance maintenance and disengagement. The most recent decline of American power occurred between 1968 and 1980, as the Vietnam War undercut U.S. public support for sustaining a military commitment to Third World security associates where U.S. territorial security was not directly involved. The Nixon Doctrine acknowledged

Military Planning in the Middle East," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 5, No. 4 (December 1982), p.514. Also relevant are Phillip Darby, *British Defense Policy East of Suez 1947-1968* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), especially pp. 1-55; and Walter Goldstein, *The Dilemma of British Defense: The Imbalance between Commitments and Resources*, Mershon Center National Security Pamphlet Series #3 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, April 1966); and Basil Collier, *The Lion and The Eagle: British and Anglo-American Strategy, 1900-1950* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1972), pp. 422-24.

[3] See the views of A.W. Deporte, "NATO of the Future: Less is More," *The Fletcher Forum* 7, No. 1 (Winter 1983), pp. 5-6; and Douglas T. Stuart, "NATO Out of Area Disputes: From the Washington Talks to the RDF," *Atlantic Quarterly* 2, No. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 50-66.

[4] Quoted from Gregory Treverton, "Defense Beyond Europe," *Survival* 25, No. 5 (September/October, 1983), p. 219.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this disillusionment in policy terms.[5] Subsequently, an American commitment reduction evolved, similar to Britain's 1967 decision to pull out its forces East of Suez. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was dissolved by mutual consent of its Western and Asian affiliates in 1977, while the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), designed to safeguard Western interests in Southwest Asia, quietly died two years later in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution.

In retrospect, it seems clear that Washington's postwar collective defense network, fashioned in the early to mid-1950s after the NATO precedent, was no more effective than President Franklin D. Roosevelt's faith in the United Nations Security Council to forge a stable international order through implementing principles of collective security. Moreover, U.S. postwar strategic planning has been complicated by the dilemma of matching limited national strategic resources with ever-broadening security commitments.

The prospect that an American extended containment strategy could involve the U.S. in multi-theater warfare was never precisely reconciled by successive postwar American strategic doctrines. U.S. contingency planning focused instead on uncertainties about "half wars" breaking out in Third World regions, possibly escalating into direct superpower nuclear confrontations; and over military force sizing and allocation problems undercutting NATO's ability to conduct mobile warfare or any other type of combat beyond a standing defense of Western Europe itself. Failing to resolve such ambiguities, American strategy fluctuated intemperately, ranging from the selective response formulas of the Eisenhower and Carter administrations to more geographically comprehensive designs (by implication) postulated by President Truman with NSC/68, by President Kennedy's "flexible response" doctrine, and by President Reagan's "horizontal escalation" prescriptions which assume potential inter-theater relationships inherent within any future Western military involvement.[6] The Nixon-Kissinger pursuit of détente with the Soviets and of normalized relations with the Chinese stands as the one clear alternative American postwar effort to adjust traditional American extended containment strategy against perceived limits of U.S. national power. None of these planning approaches, however, has proven sufficient in meeting the needs of Washington's extended alliance commitments.

---

[5] John Lewis Gaddis has asserted, for example, that the 1968 North Vietnamese Tet offensive demonstrated "the irrelevance of the kind of power the U.S. could bring to bear in such situations . . . . [and that] . . . . Washington's commitment [to Vietnam] had grown to the point that the United States would have been hard pressed to respond anywhere else in the world if a comparable crisis had developed." Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 267.

[6] For sophisticated analysis on adjusting strategic doctrine and force planning to resources earmarked to fight major and minor wars on a global basis, see Robert P. Haffa, Jr., *The Half War: Planning U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1960-1983* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984); and Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "Thresholds and Theologies: The Need for Critical Reassessment," *Survival* 26, No. 4 (July/August 1984), pp. 159-61.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Much present disagreement over the suitability of extra-regional defense missions for NATO is, therefore, related to the unresolved ambiguities within the U.S. extended containment legacy. Especially pertinent are questions now emerging in the United States on how much defense responsibility the United States should, or can, assume vis-à-vis the other industrial democracies. This re-evaluation is far from unique to U.S. postwar history; the Mansfield Amendment and the Nixon Doctrine, emanating from the U.S. legislative and executive branches of government respectively during the late 1960s and early 1970s, were merely symptomatic of traditional isolationist strains long ingrained into U.S. foreign policy. NATO has represented a sharp departure from such tradition, compelling the United States to maintain world power status in the truest sense — its navy and air power safeguarding distant allies and bases, and Washington continuing to extend its military pressure to points far beyond U.S. frontiers.

As the mid-1980s draw near, new appeals call upon the nation's leaders to acknowledge the limits of American power by declaring U.S. strategic independence from a series of "entangling alliances" and "untenable global security commitments." Those who disparage America's continued presence in NATO argue, for example, that it would be impossible for U.S. armed forces to fight simultaneous wars in Central Europe and the Persian Gulf. They further note that rising domestic economic constraints will require Washington to force the Europeans and Japanese to look after their own defenses before the end of this century. There is little agreement among such commentators, however, about the priority of future security efforts beyond the U.S. homeland.[7]

There is evidence of some movement by the West Europeans to reconsider the value of greater autonomy in their defense policies exercised both within and outside their own continent. The Western European Union (WEU), for example, is now being examined with a revived interest by European NATO members as a possible instrument for more indigenous coordination on security matters.[8] Realistically, however, prospects for an autonomous, credible European defense effort, directed toward a Third World contingency, are no more favorable now

[7] Among the more sophisticated criticisms of NATO's continuation in its present form are Christopher Layne, "Ending the Alliance," *Journal of Contemporary Studies* 6, No.3 (Summer 1983), pp. 5-32; Earl C. Ravenal, *NATO's Unremarked Demise,* University of California, Berkeley Policy Papers in International Affairs #10 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1979); as well as Jeffrey Record and Robert J. Hanks, *U.S. Strategy At The Crossroads: Two Views* (Cambridge, Mass. and Washington D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., June 1982).

[8] Ian Davidson, "1954 Comes Round Again," *Financial Times* April 16, 1984, p. 19; Diana Geddes, "Europe Defense Group Revived," *The Times* (London), June 13, 1984, p.6; Kurt Becker, "Western European Union: The Sleeping Mummy Comes to Life Again," translation of a *Die Zeit* article of June 8, 1984, reprinted in *The German Tribune* 1137, June 17, 1984, p.2; and John Vinocur, "U.S. Allies Consider 'Europeanization' of Defense Policies," *International Herald Tribune,* February 27, 1984, p.1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than when the French Assembly voted down the European Defense Community (EDC) thirty years ago. The same political and strategic factors which undercut that experiment still exist. France is concerned about German neutralism as Bonn tacitly pursues *Ostpolitik* with East Berlin, despite Soviet attempts to block closer intra-German political ties. And as Lord Carrington, NATO's new secretary-general recently noted, the British remain sensitive that any European independent initiative in the defense sphere apart from the protection of the U.S. strategic umbrella would be predestined to failure.[9]

By necessity, therefore, any joint U.S.-West European efforts to redefine global defense burden-sharing will have to take place within a NATO context. In recent NATO communiqués, the Alliance's foreign and defense ministers have acknowledged this hard reality. Some members, such as Denmark, have openly sought to distance themselves from the larger NATO states' rapid deployment force efforts. Social Democratic Party Defense Policy Committee Chairman Lasse Budtz, for example, recently noted that while "great sympathy" has been expressed for American RDF efforts within NATO meetings, the smaller states of the Alliance could not be expected to acquiesce automatically to NATO out-of-area initiatives, especially against a prospective opponent with which Denmark does not necessarily wish to enter into disagreement. Accordingly, Budtz concluded, ". . . the NATO system should not be used as a backup system for the United States outside of Europe. . . ." [10] In 1981, moreover, NATO's other Scandinavian member, Norway, refused to participate in "Ocean Venture '81" — an alliance naval exercise which spanned the entire Atlantic and involved the fleets of five Latin American nations. Oslo interpreted the scope of these maneuvers as going well beyond the purview of sustaining a "Nordic Balance" against Soviet military power, and regarded its own participation as unnecessarily provocative to the Soviet Union.

Notwithstanding obvious differences among NATO states on extra-regional matters, there is evidence that some alliance resources are being shifted gradually to improve NATO's ability to act decisively in future extra-regional contingencies. Britain has established the Fifth Infantry Brigade for possible duties in Southeast Asia and its intermittent dispatch of helicopter/vehicle take-off aircraft carriers supplement its small Indian Ocean naval presence. The French Forces d'Action Rapide

[9] Interview with Carrington by Jean François Poncet and Henri de Kergorlay in *Le Figaro* [Paris], July 24, 1984, pp.1, 5 as translated and reprinted in FBIS, *Western Europe (Daily Report)*, July 26, 1984, pp.C-4, C-5.

[10] See Budtz's remarks in "The Missiles and NATO: The Small Nations Have Different Interests From Those of Large Nations," in *Aktuelt* [Copenhagen] as translated and reprinted in FBIS, *Western Europe (Daily Report)*, December 16, 1982, pp. P-1 through P-3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(FAR) is also earmarked for extra-European as well as intra-European contingencies, although it would need French commercial airliners or U.S. aircraft to deploy great numbers of troops or heavy equipment to bases in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and elsewhere throughout the Persian Gulf area.[11] Studies at NATO's Brussels headquarters also focus on how future military operations in the Persian Gulf or in other Third World resource centers could best be developed and coordinated.[12]

Yet the scope of extra-European threats to NATO is far broader than a mere future Persian Gulf oil supply disruption postulated by the Carter Doctrine, and far more complex than the tight bipolar scenarios of Soviet or Soviet-backed intervention forces confronting a larger American navy often portrayed by the horizontal escalation theory or its offshoots most recently offered by the U.S. Defense Department. More comprehensive assessments of out-of-region security challenges as they affect the North Atlantic region are needed. NATO planners must actually determine how current and projected Western force capabilities can be applied to Third World contingencies with a direct impact on NATO's security interests. Hard consensus on such defense burden-sharing will be difficult to attain within alliance circles. So too will agreement on how more traditional collective defense tasks shared by the allies *within* Europe will be concurrently adjusted.

Coming to Geographic Terms With NATO's Extra-Regional Threats

A NATO strategist most concerned with out-of-region threat identification would focus on how the formal treaty area itself could be militarily outflanked and compromised either by the Warsaw Pact along NATO's perimeters or by Soviet-backed Third World contingents in the more peripheral regions. In either case, anti-Western forces would identify those geographic axes of advance for such operations, which could become instrumental in severing Washington's extended containment from central Europe, without allowing the United States to deal with European

[11] Specific estimates of force composition are offered by Raphael Iungerich, "USCENTCOM Is Not Alone," *Armed Forces Journal International* 122, No. 3 (October 1984), pp. 106-107, 134; Major-General T.A. Boam, CBE, "Defending Western Interests Outside NATO: The United Kingdom's Contribution," ibid., pp. 116-20; and Giovanni de Briganti, "Forces d' Action Rapide: France's Rapid Deployment Forces," ibid., pp. 122-23.

[12] See "North Atlantic Council Communiqué," *NATO Review* 29, No.3 (June 1981) where it was asserted that a number of allied states possess or are determined to acquire military capabilities applicable to Third World defense operations. Also consult Leon K. Pfeiffer, Director, NATO Defense Policy Office for International Security Policy, "NATO Takes a Broader View," *Defense 81* (November 1981), pp.9-10. Subsequent communiqués have reiterated this general policy line. For open analysis of ongoing NATO contingency studies of future Alliance defense efforts in the Persian Gulf, see the North Atlantic Assembly, Political Committee, *Interim Report of the Subcommittee on Out-of Area Security Challenges to the Alliance* (AA 200 PC/OA 83-7), Brussels: International Secretariat, November 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and extra-European threats on a sequential basis as was the case in World War II.

In this light, at least five key geographic zones should be weighed for their impact upon future NATO extraperipheral defense requirements, and on extended containment in general. These are the Arctic layers of the Northern Cap; the North American approaches into Greenland/Iceland/United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, which often are regarded as "grey areas" in terms of applying them to the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) or other formal NATO command coverage; Southwest Asia; the Aegean/Mediterranean Crescent, extending beyond the territories of NATO's relevant southern flank members (Greece and Turkey); and the South Atlantic/Cape Route. Over the past decade, the Soviet Union has moved to establish its force projection capability in all five areas while indigenous, anti-Western (but not necessarily pro-Soviet) ethnic and political factions are interspersed across the latter three.

Arctic/Northern Cap Zone

The Northern Cap extends from the Norwegian Sea on the west to the White Sea on the east, and encompasses the northern coasts of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the USSR. The Arctic peripheries of the Cap have assumed vital importance in NATO planning circles in ways hardly anticipated only a few years ago. U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman declared in Oslo during August 1983, for example, that an attack on Finnmark in northern Norway would be construed as an attack on Washington, D.C.[13] In less hyperbolic terms, Arctic positions along the Northern Cap have become more important as the role of Soviet naval bases along the Kola Peninsula has greatly expanded. By the late 1970s, upward of 70 percent of total Soviet nuclear ballistic submarines (SSBNs) were deployed in Arctic/Northern Cap positions.[14] While recent reports allege that the Soviets are moving Delta II class submarines closer to U.S. east and west coasts in retaliation for NATO's deployment of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, Arctic/Northern Cap firing positions are better suited to the USSR's present strategic force composition in light of Soviet geography and improving Western anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capa-

[13] As quoted in Clive Archer, "Recent Developments in Nordic Security, "*Contemporary Review* 244, No.1420, p.243.

[14] Soviet Northern Cap strategies are covered by Willy Østrong, "The Strategic Balance and the Arctic Ocean: Soviet Options," *Cooperation and Conflict* 12, No.1 (1977), pp.41-62; reports of Østrong's comments on his book *The Soviet Union in Northern Waters* by Borre Hangstad, "Norwegian Arctic Expert Views Soviet Design in Polar Area," *Klassekampen* [Oslo], June 14, 1983, pp.8-9 as translated and reprinted in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) 84060, *West Europe Report*, August 8, 1983, pp.42-46; and John Jordan, *Soviet Fleet 1960 to the Present* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983), p.96.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bilities. The Barents Sea, along with the Sea of Okhotsk off the USSR's Pacific coast, will continue to serve as a primary Soviet SSBN deployment site because it is largely protected by surrounding Soviet territory and because Western ASW capabilities can better be countered in locales closer to the Soviet homeland.

The Arctic region has also become a logical place for Soviet forces to contest NATO naval missions and reinforcement efforts, counterbalancing GIUK to the south. Two extensive Soviet naval maneuvers in the Northern Cap occurred in September 1983 and April 1984. These involved approximately thirty surface fighting ships and twenty submarines; both maneuvers simulated the blockage of NATO amphibious forces approaching northern Norway.[15] In response, a British patrol, led by the missile destroyer *Liverpool,* ventured into Barents Sea waters in early January 1984. "Exercise Teamwork 84," NATO's well-publicized follow-up in March, involved 150 allied ships and submarines deployed near the Arctic Circle, closely hounded by a pack of Soviet nuclear attack submarines and reconnaissance aircraft.[16] A British observer noted that the NATO exercises demonstrated Brussels's growing recognition of the need for an effective Western response to the Soviet extra-regional challenge from the north: "Like the long-standing patrol by two British frigates off the entrance to the Persian Gulf, the 'Liverpool's' patrol which took her east [into the Northern Cap] was outside NATO's geographic limits. The value of both patrols to the Alliance is considerable. . . ."[17]

GIUK's Extra-Regional Dimensions

GIUK's relationship to NATO's extra-regional concerns centers on the transport of most American and Canadian troops in North America as well as U.S. forces in the Western Pacific once incorporated into a "swing strategy" for European defense. These troops would have to travel along GIUK to reach the eastern Baltic approaches and vital Northern European Command (NEC) defense lines. GIUK also represents a zone critical to either Soviet army and naval power breakout efforts originating from the Kola Peninsula or the forward defense of the Soviet homeland. Were the Soviets able to penetrate or control significant portions of GIUK,

[15] Desmond Wettern, "Russians Stage Big Naval Exercise," *The Daily Telegraph,* December 16, 1983, p.4; Rodney Cowton, "Soviet Fleet Close to 'Nuclear War' Phase," *The Times* (London), April 5, 1984, p.6; and "U.S. Seeks Soviet Warning of Sea Exercises," *International Herald Tribune,* April 7-8, 1984, p.5.

[16] Cowton, "NATO Forces Group for Icy Exercise," *The Times* (London), March 8, 1984, p.2; "Russian Sub Pack in Arctic," *Daily Telegraph,* March 15, 1984, p.3; Wettern, "Brittania's Dilemma: A Naval Strategy But Few Ships," ibid., January 20, 1984, p.10; and David Wallen, "Cat-and-Mouse on the High Seas," *The Times* (London), March 15, 1984, p.5.

[17] Wettern, "Britannia's Dilemma."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they would not only preclude adequate reinforcement of NATO continental defenses, but would set the stage for subsequent compromise of the North American Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS), and related command, communications, and control systems spanning the earth from Thule, Greenland to Alaska.[18] In recognition of these geostrategic realities, SACLANT has turned the GIUK region into a veritable lake for the Western placement of advanced Sound Surveillance Systems (SOSUS) and other components of ASW warfare. While the main geographic thrust of the Baltic–GIUK threat falls within NATO's treaty coverage pertaining to Atlantic defenses, future Soviet efforts to link the USSR's Baltic military power with both developing Northern Cap interdiction capabilities and with efforts to increase Soviet politico-strategic influence over Iceland, Greenland, and other key GIUK staging posts seem inevitable.[19]

Southwest Asia

Southwest Asia, constituting a third NATO out-of-region area of concern, encompasses the Dardanelles and Turkey to the northwest and spans Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. A modern geographic counterpart to the British Northern Tier strategic purview discussed earlier, Southwest Asia is geographically contiguous to NATO's southern flank and eastern Mediterranean operations as well as to the increased presence of U.S. and allied navies in the Indian Ocean. It is therefore a critical element in overall East-West competition for access to natural resources and for building global strategic positions. NATO's Chief of Staff for Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) recently noted that the only constants in areas immediately east or south of his command are "instability and unpredictability," with any number of variables capable of jettisoning Western influence and setting off confrontations:

> . . . the vital natural resources that lie just beyond NATO's border to the south and east, taken in conjunction with the diversity and number of non-traditional threats to the Alliance, leads me to the judgment that the center of NATO's strategic concern has shifted towards the Southern Region. Although we lack the capability to do much about them by ourselves, we in the Southern Region are in the forefront of these new challenges. . . .[20]

---

[18] Erling Bjøl, *Nordic Security* Adelphi Paper 181 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1983), p. 33.

[19] For discerning analysis, see Luis Rey, "Shadows Over the Promising Arctic," *Geopolitique*, No. 5 (Winter 1984), pp. 96-97; and Bjorn Bjarnason, "Iceland's Role in Soviet Security Policy Reviewed," *Morgunbladid* [Reykjavic], July 30, 1983, pp. 18-19, translated and reprinted in JPRS 84252, *West Europe Report*, No. 2198, September 12, 1983, pp. 34-42.

[20] Lieutenant General James M. Thompson, Chief of Staff, Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe, "The Southern Flank and Out-of-Area Operations," *RUSI* 128, No. 4 (December 1983), p. 15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Turkey, in particular, remains a critical Western security concern, just as when the Truman Doctrine was implemented in 1947. This country abuts the USSR's southern border and also lies adjacent to Syria, Iraq, and Iran — all key states along the South Asia/Middle Eastern "arc of crisis." Accordingly, Ankara, controlling an important geopolitical bridge between Europe and the Middle East, is a key component of a still largely intact air/ground barrier of pro-Western states stretching from Norway's northern reaches to non-communist Southeast Asia and Oceania. Since the highpoint of the 1950s, however, when CENTO and SEATO supplemented NATO's ability to block the USSR's access to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, several factors have weakened the Western belt of containment: (1) loss of Western base access (even Turkey's bases are restricted as to how NATO can use them); (2) the aforementioned dissolution of both CENTO and SEATO components of the American extended deterrent in the late 1970s; (3) the rising political instabilities of South Asia and parts of Africa; and (4) the Soviet Union's extension of its own defense perimeter into the Mediterranean on a full-scale basis. Extensive Soviet economic assistance, coupled with increased Arab pressure on Ankara to assert a more characteristic Islamic foreign policy have raised concerns in many NATO capitals that the seemingly intractable Greek–Turkish disputes over the Aegean and over Cyprus may not be the only source of possible future Turkish neutralism or hostility toward the West.[21] If Turkey and the Dardanelles were to be denied to NATO, one of the worst extraperipheral threat scenarios yet concocted by alliance analysts could then materialize: the Soviet Union could build a continuous military presence facing Western Europe between the Kola Peninsula on the north and the Mediterranean-Aegean axis on the south, choking off both Atlantic and Mediterranean/Persian Gulf sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) to West European and Japanese access in the process — even before significant elements of American air and naval power could be introduced to counterbalance Soviet military initiatives in these areas; or, against an isolated central Europe out-right. Disturbing evidence of Turkish distancing from West European and American security objectives has already surfaced. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal has become increasingly vocal in his criticism of the U.S.–Israeli strategic relationship, and Ankara was lukewarm in supporting American and West European peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon. Turkey has also refused to provide facilities for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) intervention against Middle Eastern

[21] Bruce R. Kuniholm provides a general background on Turkey's current strategic position in "Turkey and NATO: Past, Present, and Future," ORBIS 27, No. 2 (Summer 1983), pp. 421-45. On Soviet-Turkish relations, see Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan* (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 1-55. On the developing status of Arab-Turkish relations, consult Patrick Seale, "Turkey Urged To Back Iraq," *The Observer,* February 5, 1984, p. 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

targets, contending that the RDF would be used to intervene in the internal affairs of Arab states instead of blocking Soviet moves into Iran or into the Persian Gulf.[22]

The Aegean/Mediterranean Crescent

This zone provides a natural geographic barrier between the USSR's Black Sea fleet and the Mediterranean gateways to the greater expanses of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. Throughout much of the postwar era, U.S. and British naval commanders have argued over the extent of formal NATO coverage in the eastern Mediterranean.[23] Rising sensitivities in Greece over NATO's possible conflict of interest with Athens's Third World neighbors in Africa and the Middle East also may preclude NATO's European Command (EUCOM) from exercising a desired geographic preogative over future Western military action in those areas. The political attitudes of the Papandreou government illustrate that extra-regional considerations in Western capitals must also weigh the impact of political change occurring within regions of vital interest to NATO strategists.

Since their 1981 electoral victory, the Greek Pan-Hellenic Socialists (PASOK) have intimated that Greece might eventually pull out of NATO and become a member of a nonaligned, pan-Balkan organization with Yugoslavia and other interested parties. The latest U.S.-Greece Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) (July 1983), extends U.S. basing operations in Greece for another five years, but all U.S. operations in Greece are to be discontinued by the summer of 1989. Over twenty basing operations will be dismantled, including the important complexes at Souda Bay in northwest Crete and the adjacent Iraklion Air Station, as well as the Hellenikon Air Base and Nea Makri Defense Communications System (DCS) near Athens. Moreover, under the terms of the new agreement, the bases assume a strictly defensive character. No operations are to be directed against Arab countries with which Greece has cordial ties, or against any other party without the Greek government's consent.[24]

---

[22] Sam Cohen, "Turkey Joins Islamic Fold," *The Christian Science Monitor,* January 20, 1984, p. 9; and Paul Taylor, "Turks Turn Down Facility for Intervention Force," *International Herald Tribune,* April 17, 1984, p. 1.

[23] For background on early Mediterranean/Middle Eastern Command disputes within Western defense planning circles, see Walter S. Poole, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vol. II, 1950-1952* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1980), especially pp. 230-41; and JCS 1868/243, "Command in the Mediterranean and the Middle East," in *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Part II, 1946-1953* (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1980), Reel IV at 0510.

[24] North Atlantic Assembly, Political Committee, *Interim Report of the Subcommittee on the Southern Region* (AA 193 PC/SR 83-7), Brussels: International Secretariat, November 1983, pp. 4-5; "Greece and U.S. Sign Defense Agreement," *Financial Times,* September 9, 1983, p. 3; and "Greece Says Pact Spells End to American Bases," The *New York Times,* September 11, 1983, p. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As they stand, the installations retain important capabilities for the United States and NATO to carry out selected out-of-area security functions. Souda Bay resupplies and replenishes the Sixth Fleet in transit to or from staging posts in the Middle East. Iraklion's communication network — "Candia" — is a key nerve center for NATO's intelligence and communications net covering the Eastern Mediterranean approaches, the Middle East, and North Africa. Electronic surveillance of Soviet and Warsaw Pact naval movements near NATO-controlled waters is also carried out at Nea Makri. All of these installations provide critical overlapping coverage between NATO defense zones and Soviet deployments beyond NATO's formal patrol areas. Turkish and Greek air defense networks operating under NATO auspices provide the basic means for the West to collect intelligence and organize a conventional deterrent along the Aegean gateways to critical Mediterranean and Middle Eastern SLOCs, a capability that perhaps would be irreparably impaired were Turkey or Greece to withdraw from NATO.[25]

The South Atlantic Cape Route

A fifth sector of NATO extraperipheral attention is the massive circumference comprising the South Atlantic Cape Route, which links Western Europe with the Caribbean/Central-South American regions on one side and with the resource-rich South African veldts on the other. The 1982 Falkland Islands episode and the U.S. intervention in Grenada the following year have graphically illustrated the inter-relationship of NATO's defense concerns with South Atlantic and Caribbean security questions. Increased Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean and along the Cape route threatens Western resource and trading lifelines, and has reduced the West's offshore naval edge over the Soviets to a "slim margin of superiority."[26]

[25] For additional background on the integration of Turkish and Greek base network functions, see Thomas Veremis, *Greek Security: Issues and Politics* Adelphi Paper 179 (London: IISS, Winter 1982), pp. 4-5; United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations* 96th Cong., 1st Sess., April 1979, pp. 59-61; and Andriana Ierodiaconou, "U.S. Tries to Keep Fractious Allies Apart, But Together," *Financial Times*, September 14, 1983, p. 2.

[26] This type of assessment was offered as early as 1980 by Admiral Harry O. Train, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Forces, in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, *Department of Defense Authorization For Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981* 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 19, 1980, p. 345. Also see James Cable, *Britain's Naval Future* (London and Basingstroke: The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1983), pp. 105-24. Cable cites Train's arguments that a shortage of American carrier battle groups during a Warsaw Pact/NATO confrontation including the southern flank would reduce NATO's reinforcement operations to a matter of "luck," so that the Mediterranean and other peripheral waters under NATO's defense purview wouldn't be free" from the ambiguity of their response for extra-European hostilities. . . ." (pp. 118, 123).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The NATO European members retain low-level defense capabilities in these regions, which have become increasingly susceptible to extra-regional crisis. Britain supports a contingent of 4,000 army personnel, along with modest naval and air deployments, in the Falklands, and around 1,800 additional military personnel with supporting Harrier aircraft in Belize, opposite Guatemala. The U.K. presence at the latter site, however, will most likely wane or be relinquished soon to U.S. forces. The British could still play a limited military role in the Caribbean or supplement American offshore power in the South Atlantic if U.S. forces are asked to intervene in some future Central or South American crisis. London also sustains an intermittent Indian Ocean presence of one or two destroyers or frigates with supporting ships, although recent task forces have found difficulty in making unqualified port calls because of the Royal Navy's refusal to disclose such a contingent's nuclear capability. Britain also stations a small naval detachment at Diego Garcia in support of U.S. operations in the Indian Ocean. France deploys more significant Indian Ocean force levels from Djibouti, at the juncture of the Horn of Africa, and near the increasingly formidable Soviet presence along the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el Mandeb Straits.[27]

France has also been active in North Africa, providing significant military assistance to Chad, to ward off Libya's military pressures against that backward African state. The French have also retained the "Commandement Supérieur Interarmies du Groupe Antilles-Guyane" (The French Antilles and Guiana Defense Zone) headquartered in Fort-de-France, Martinique, and covering the directorates of Martinique, Guadaloupe, and French Guiana. Altogether, this inter-service overseas command has 7,300 personnel, including the thirty-third Marine "Regiment d'Infanterier" in Martinique, a Marine battalion in Guadaloupe, and an attached patrol escort ship with two minesweepers. The French military presence in the West Indies, along the West Atlantic approaches to the Panama Canal, allows this Caribbean region to serve as a protective screen to the Americas. Were it under hostile control, the strategic equation for the overall Western hemisphere would change markedly. Presently, the

[27] Analysis of Britain's presence in Belize includes Henry Stanhope, "U.S. Fears Over Defense of Belize," *The Times* (London), October 3, 1983; George Philip, "Belize: The Troubled Regional Context," *The World Today*, 40, No. 8-9 (August-September, 1984), pp. 370-76; John Carlin, "Welcome Anachronism Keeps Guatemala at Bay," *The Times* (London), October 20, 1983, p. 8; and Paul Elman, "Guatemalans Want British Soldiers To Stay in Belize," *The Guardian*, September 3, 1983, p. 7. The status of British deployments in the Falklands and French force levels in Djibouti are covered by The International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1983-1984* (London: IISS, 1983), pp. 29, 33. For background on Soviet activities in the Red Sea and East Africa, see Dieter Braun, *The Indian Ocean: Region of Conflict or "Zone of Peace"* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1983), especially pp. 156-58.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

West Indies serve as a viable geographic rampart in support of NATO's forward defense strategy.[28]

Threat perception issues pertaining to the South Atlantic and Caribbean are among the most divisive in the Alliance. France, attempting to cultivate a progressive image throughout the nonaligned world, and, to a lesser extent, West Germany have been openly critical of U.S. military assistance to El Salvador and Honduras. In more basic terms, however, the general NATO European concern is that, if Washington continues to be preoccupied with Central American insurgency movements, it could gradually shift its primary focus of strategic commitment away from NATO Europe toward the Western hemisphere. French President François Mitterand recently warned the Reagan administration that if it continues to back the ruling oligarchies and dictatorships in Central America, which foster social and economic revolution, that region's masses may well turn toward the Soviet Union and Cuba for the means and weapons. Such policy, therefore, would convert American fears about communist expansion throughout Latin America into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, America's extended containment toward other regions would be undercut in the process.[29] West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, by contrast, candidly speculated that while the United States would compromise its strategic interests were it to turn away from Europe, any such move would in large part, be due to Europe's own "weakness and lack of decision-making ability" on security matters.[30]

Britain has also been disconcerted over the Reagan administration's tough line concerning the U.S. backyard. The conservative Thatcher government, still seriously adhering to the concept of a British Commonwealth, was visibly upset over the U.S. "disregard" of British sensitivities in Washington's Grenada invasion, even though that newly independent Commonwealth affiliate was clearly developing into a Soviet/Cuban enclave. Prime Minister Thatcher, in a BBC interview, noted that while she was "utterly against communism and terrorism" in the Caribbean or anywhere else, she could not concur with any "new law that wherever communism reigns against the will of the people . . . . the United

[28] The French Caribbean presence is reviewed by Trevor M. Dupuy, *The Almanac of World Military Power,* Second Edition (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980), p. 151; and IISS, *The Military Balance 1984-1985* (London: IISS, Fall 1984), p. 39.

[29] FBIS, *Western Europe (Daily Report),* February 26, 1982, pp. K-4, K-5. For recent analysis of the Mitterand government's own resistance to left-wing independence movements spawning in both Guadeloupe and Martinique, see Scott B. McDonald and Albert L. Gustman, "Mitterand's Headache: The French Antilles in the 1980s," *Caribbean Review* 13, No. 1 (1984), pp. 19-21.

[30] FBIS, *Western Europe (Daily Report),* April 11, 1984, p. J-1, citing translated excerpts of a policy address before the Carl Shurz Society on April 10, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States shall enter."[31] London was already upset with Washington over its November 1982 U.N. vote supporting negotiations in the issue of Falkland sovereignty, prompting Whitehall to conclude, however reluctantly, that the United States considered Britain just another European country rather than Washington's oldest and closest ally.[32]

Yet, in retrospect, the British remain pragmatic about the inevitable correlation between one's influence and the commitment of one's own national resources. As British journalist David Watt observed in Grenada's aftermath: ". . . we cannot be certain of influencing American policy unless we can make ourselves indispensable . . . we cannot make ourselves indispensable unless we are prepared to shoulder serious responsibility."[33] The primary conceptual dilemma for NATO Europe, generated by increased U.S. involvement in the security of its own hemisphere, is how to define the Alliance's traditional rationale of extended containment in the light of revised U.S. defense priorities. *The Times* (London) has succinctly outlined the problem:

> . . . Stability in the Caribbean Basin and the Gulf of Mexico is important to NATO for two reasons. The first, and most obvious, is that if the United States is distracted by what it feels to be a threat in a more vulnerable area closer to home than Europe, it will have less time and effort to spend contributing to the security of Western Europe or the Middle East. Secondly, in strictly logistical terms, the Caribbean Basin and the Gulf of Mexico are important because in a European emergency at least 40 per cent of all American supplies and reinforcements for Europe are destined to pass that way. Thus the more the Soviet Union and Cuba penetrate that area, the less secure a source of strategic supplies it would become.[34]

Despite her government's opposition to U.S. military action in Grenada, Prime Minister Thatcher related to her country's parliament a willingness to dispatch British forces to the island in a peacekeeping role and publicly maintained that "there are much larger issues at stake between the United States and the United Kingdom, and indeed . . . the whole future of NATO. We stand by the United States and continue to do so in the larger alliance."[35]

The problem of NATO's out-of-region commitments outrunning alliance resources to meet them still dominates NATO's extraperi-

---

[31] Joseph C. Harsch, "Invasion of Grenada Reinforces Distrust of U.S. by Its NATO Allies," *The Christian Science Monitor,* November 4, 1983, pp. 7-8. Also see Malcolm Rutherford, "End of the Special Relationship," *Financial Times,* October 28, 1983, p. 15.

[32] See Nicholas Ashford, "U.S. and Britain Take the 'Special' Out of the Relationship," *The Times* (London), November 10, 1982, p. 6.

[33] Watt, "A Vacuum Europe Should Fill," *The Times* (London), October 28, 1983, p. 10.

[34] "NATO and the Caribbean [Editorial]," *The Times* (London), October 3, 1983, p. 11. Also see Michael M. Harrison, "Allies Fear U.S. Attention Given to Central America," *Los Angeles Times,* June 18, 1984, p. 5; and A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, *NATO Today:* The *Alliance In Evolution* 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., April 1982, pp. 40-42.

[35] "Call to UK for Forces Would be Considered," *The Times* (London) [coverage of Parliamentary debate on October 27, 1983], October 28, 1983, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pheral threat calculations, even as the USSR's global military capabilities continue to grow. Paradoxically, the postwar history of European military interventions in Third World areas, as noted by the eminent British naval historian James Cable, has not really been anti-Soviet in nature and has usually been ill-received in Washington.[36] This trend was established during the 1956 Suez crisis and perpetuated by U.S. resistance to the continuing Belgian and Portuguese efforts to retain a military capability in Africa in the 1960s. More recent British, French, and Italian efforts to sustain military support for U.S. peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon, and reciprocal U.S. support of French military actions in Chad, have both ended on disparate notes. In Lebanon, the Reagan administration and the deployed West European states pulled out their forces following concerted terrorist attacks against their positions. More recently, relations between Washington and Paris have been strained by the French military's departure from Chad, and by subsequent disclosures that France withheld intelligence on Libya's long-range intentions to stay in Chad — even after the negotiations of a November 1984 withdrawal agreement were completed.[37]

Yet, lack of European involvement in future out-of-region confrontations where Soviet or Soviet-backed forces may be directly involved would promote the U.S. view of its allies as totally dependent on the American extended containment for safeguarding their own interests. Maximizing response capabilities for extraperipheral NATO contingencies across-the-board, while retaining the Alliance's flexibility on method, clearly stands as the optimum policy approach. The specific mechanisms for deriving more effective burden-sharing measures within such a framework are still in the formulative stages.

Achieving NATO Cooperation on Out-of-Region Contingencies

The question of developing adequate responses to extraperipheral threats relates to overall alliance burden-sharing issues and to NATO members' eventual success in underwriting supplementary agreements with extra-regional pro-Western states to safeguard mutual security interests. The first aspect of this problem hinges upon the ability of the United States, Britain, France, and in a few instances, the "second echelon NATO powers" (e.g., Italy, the Netherlands, and Canada) to coordinate their respective force contingents during a Third World crisis without significantly depreciating European defenses. West Germany's role here

[36] Cable, *Britain's Naval Future*, p. 148.

[37] "Mitterrand Says Libya Troops Are Still in Chad," *International Herald Tribune*, November 17-18, 1984, pp. 1, 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is critical because despite successive denials by its defense ministers that Bonn would ever participate in extra-regional NATO operations due to constitutional restraints, strong counter-arguments have been advanced that Bonn's decision to assume expanded naval defense missions to Norway in the north and Calais to the west opens the way for symbolic German naval deployments along the Persian Gulf's oil lifelines during a future crisis. Moreover, a West German frigate, was involved in the November 1984 Composite Training Unit Exercise 1-85 off the coast of Puerto Rico, in conjunction with twenty-five U.S. warships, two Dutch combatants, and one ship each from Canada and Britain.[38]

Overall, prospects for better NATO extra-regional crisis coordination rest upon the assumption that a sense of common purpose can be reached by interested Western powers at the outset of any such crisis. Additional elements of NATO's extraperipheral challenge relate to burden-sharing considerations: e.g., the success of the United States and its allies in securing base access close to crisis areas; the attainment of effective intelligence-sharing with relevant Third World nations; and the upgrading of involvement by Israel, Japan, Australia, and possibly ASEAN with selected NATO contingency planning.

Alliance burden-sharing primarily centers on how security resources allocation and distribution can be achieved most equitably among participants. In 1978, NATO enacted the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) that committed members to increase their annual defense budgets by 3 percent in real terms over the following six years, thereby correcting a perceived imbalance of conventional military power in central Europe. Specific tasks to be fulfilled included greater procurement of new weapons systems and related logistical support materiel, as well as increased stockpiling or "pre-positioning" of such weapons and materiel in the central European theater. Nuclear force modernization and equipment standardization were also integral to the LTDP; and, in a sense, the magnitude of the tasks implied by this burden-sharing initiative could lead one to conclude with British defense analyst Peter Foot that "NATO already has an over-full agenda" without ". . . becoming obsessed with the specifically military dimensions of its security in the Third World." [39]

---

[38] John Vinocur, "Bonn Moves To Lift Curbs on Fleet, Opening Way To Wider War Roles," The *New York Times*, July 18, 1980, p. 4; Vinocur, "Bonn Expects Pressure From Allies To Send Warships to Persian Gulf," ibid., October 13, 1980, p. 16; and "25 U.S. Warships in Caribbean, in Easy Reach of Nicaragua," ibid., November 9, 1984, p. 6.

[39] Foot, "Western Security and the Third World," in Lawrence Freedman, ed., *The Troubled Alliance: Atlantic Relations in the 1980's* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 148. Also see Foot, *Beyond The North Atlantic: The European Contribution,* Aberdeen Studies in Defense Economics #21 (Aberdeen, Scotland: Center for Defense Studies, Spring 1982). For background on the LTDP and the 3 percent defense spending commitments, see Foreign Policy Research Institute Staff, *The Three Per Cent Solution and the Future of NATO* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1981); Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments, Assembly of Western European Union, *Burden-Sharing in the Alliance* Document 947, Paris: WEU, May 18, 1983; Simon Lunn, *Burden-Sharing* Chatham House Paper #18

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet by the late 1970s, the U.S. leadership had come under increased pressure to assuage growing perceptions among the electorate that Europe and Japan were enjoying a free ride in security matters at U.S. expense. By June 1982, a NATO Summit in Bonn resulted in a communiqué explicitly noting that a more integrated defense structure and a fairer burden-sharing standard within the alliance would have to take into account, "developments outside of the NATO area which may threaten our vital interests," and which primarily involve a risk of conflict with the Soviet Union or its allies. Specifically, European members of the Alliance were advanced the following guidelines by U.S. officials in Bonn:

> . . . First, they have to be prepared to compensate from their own resources not only for any United States deployments from the NATO theater to Southwest Asia but also to make contingency plans for a situation where, in the event of a simultaneous military threat in Europe, United States reinforcements currently scheduled for rapid deployment to Europe were diverted instead to Southwest Asia. Notwithstanding American assurances that the defense of Europe will remain the highest priority of the United States, the danger of a confrontation on two fronts, and of a Soviet feint or diversionary move to tie down United States forces in the Middle East or Southwest Asia must be recognized. . . . Secondly . . . the European allies must be prepared to facilitate by action within the NATO area movements of United States forces, or indeed the forces of any other NATO country, passing through the NATO area. Overflying, staging and refueling and port facilities of all sorts may be involved. . . . There is a third response which only certain European allies are in a position to offer. Often the early dispatch of a very highly trained experienced force early in a crisis can prevent its development into a full-scale emergency. For this certain European airmobile or amphibious units such as the British marines, and French paratroops, would be particularly appropriate. Certainly an exercised and preplanned determination by some European countries to bear if only a small part of American out-of-area burdens would greatly enhance mutual understanding in the alliance.[40]

Since the LTDP enactment, however, little success has been experienced in establishing *quantitative* expenditure criteria mutually acceptable to both the United States and the West Europeans. The Reagan administration has, in fact, been more prone to emphasize an enhanced European/Japanese defense capability to undertake expanded security missions — the second and third responses cited above — in lieu of increasing defense budgets or overall resource allocations (called for by the first guideline). By 1983, U.S defense officials were expressing cautious optimism about the levels of out-of-region defense cooperation elicited by Washington from NATO Europe, Japan, and the ANZUS powers (Aus-

(London, Boston, and Henley: The Royal Institute of International Affairs and Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1983); James, R. Gordon, *NATO Burden-Sharing* The Washington Papers #96 (New York: Praeger, 1983), especially, pp. 47-54; as well as Jacquelyn K. Davis and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *The Atlantic Alliance and U.S. Global Strategy* (Cambridge, Mass. and Washington D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Research Analysis, Inc., 1983), pp. 39-40.

[40] Western European Union, *Burden-Sharing in the Alliance*, p. 11. Also see John Vinocur, "NATO Backs U.S. Operations in Mideast," The *New York Times*, December 3, 1982, p. 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tralia and New Zealand). In testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, the State Department's Director of Politico-Military Affairs cited the following extraperipheral burden-sharing measures undertaken by Washington's allies:

(1) British and French development of intervention forces for "contingency use" should Western interests be threatened outside of Europe; in November 1983, the Thatcher government announced plans for upgrading the Fifth Infantry Brigade to carry out "significant interventions of its own" by 1985 with the purchase of six Tri-Star strategic tankers and an increase in manpower from 1,900 paratrooper/infantry battalion personnel to over 5,000; likewise, France upgraded and consolidated its "force d'interventions extérieures" during 1983 by creating the "Force d'Action Rapide" bringing five divisions plus a logistics support group (about 47,000 personnel) under one command to deal with either territorial defense missions within France and central Europe or to intervene in selected Third World missions.

(2) Agreeing "in principle" to provide en route support to U.S. and other allied force deployments to Southwest Asia in the event of an emergency. In June 1983 (subsequent to the Politico-Military Affairs testimony) the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) reported that eight NATO nations provided overflight rights and en route access and support to U.S. forces deploying to annual CENTCOM exercises in Southwest Asia during 1980-82.

(3) Identification of actions necessary to ensure the defense of Europe should U.S. forces be diverted to defend Western interests in Southwest Asia or elsewhere. The U.S. DOD later reported that ten NATO nations have committed themselves to meeting the 600 commercial ship minimum requirement needed to reinforce NATO Europe during wartime, even if their quotas should increase due to greater U.S. efforts. In addition, nine NATO members have committed themselves to increasing their contributions of civil long-range cargo aircraft and civil wide-body passenger aircraft under the same circumstances.

(4) European participation in the multinational forces (MFOs) for Lebanon and for the Sinai.

(5) British and French maintenance of aforementioned military forces in the Indian Ocean and British deployment of a small naval detachment (about thirty personnel) on Diego Garcia in support of developing U.S. RDF operations there.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(6) Japan undertaking a 1,000-mile defense of its own sea lanes and significantly increasing its Third World economic assistance programs. Japan had already made it clear that it would allow U.S. RDF forces to use American military bases in Japan for backup to emergency deployments to the Middle East, Africa, and the Indian Ocean.

(7) Continued Australia/New Zealand participation in ANZUS with the United States, and affiliation with Britain, Malaysia, and Singapore in the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA).[41]

Notwithstanding such incremental growth of extra-regional cooperation among the industrial democracies, there is no public evidence that NATO has yet developed a unified and comprehensive program specifically to facilitate extraperipheral policy coordination from a geographic or mission-oriented point of view. In a protracted conventional war involving NATO forces in a worldwide SLOC coverage role, Atlantic-Mediterranean, Indian, and Pacific Ocean operations would all compel the West to pursue sea control missions with adequate maritime power and resources necessary to fulfill them. Yet most current West European naval capabilities reflect an operational bias toward sea denial missions, anti-mining countermeasures, or offshore patrol.[42] While some British and French anti-mining ships were involved in the Persian Gulf mine-sweeping operation of mid-1984, most multilateral European naval coordination — the Tripartite minehunter arrangements between France, the Netherlands, and Belgium directed toward the English Channel and North Sea, for example — lacks the flexibility to be applied in an extra-European context.

Over time, however, as U.S. responsibilities for countering Soviet power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans increase, Europeans will have to develop greater sea control capabilities for missions in eastern Mediterranean, South Atlantic, and Middle Eastern settings — if Western

[41] Prepared Statements by Rear Adm. Jonathan T. Howe, Director of Politico-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State in Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, *International Security Issues* 98th Cong., 1st Sess., April 25, 1983, p. 23. Further details on the Fifth Infantry Brigade are found in an address outlining the imminent decision by Michael Heseltine, UK Secretary of State for Defense, "The United Kingdom's Strategic Interests and Priorities," RUSI 128, No. 4, (December 1983), p. 4; and by Drew Middleton, "Britain's Planning Intervention Force For Worldwide Deployment in Crisis," *International Herald Tribune,* November 14, 1983, p. 5. The revised French program is covered by General René Imbot, Chief of Staff of the French army, "The French Rapid Action Force," *NATO's Sixteen Nations* Vol. 28, Special Issue 1, 1983) pp. 34-35; in an address delivered by French Premier Pierre Mauroy on French strategic doctrine as it appeared in *Defense Nationale* [Paris] and translated and reprinted in JPRS 84909 *West Europe Report,* No. 2243, December 8, 1983, pp. 53-60; and "The French Army: Shield and Sword for Europe?" *The Economist* 291, No. 7347 (June 23, 1984), pp. 37-40. U.S. Department of Defense out-of-region burden-sharing assessments are contained in U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* (Washington D.C.: USGPO, March 1983), pp. 60-61. For Japanese Diet statements clarifying conditions of American use and transit of RDF elements, see FBIS, *Asia and Pacific (Daily Report),* February 1, 1980, p. C-1.

[42] For comments on these capabilities, consult Norman Friedman, "Western European and NATO Navies," *Proceedings* (U.S. Naval Institute) 110/3/973 (March 1984), pp. 35-43.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

global resources and SLOC access are to be maintained. Some encouraging signs in this regard are materializing, but only on a national level of coordination. Developing French, Italian, and Spanish aircraft carrier programs, could be used to complement the Sixth Fleet's offshore patrols in the eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, and in selected western Mediterranean approaches to the Atlantic opposite North African shores if the Greek basing arrangements indeed terminate during the late 1980s and early 1990s.[43] But if the southern flank carrier force assets are to be coordinated intelligently, the Supreme Allied Command, Europe (SACEUR) — either in the formal NATO environment or in independently negotiated arrangements with Paris and Madrid (if France and Spain remain outside the NATO SACEUR framework) — will have to embark on a more comprehensive force use assessment in non-strategic war scenarios, mindful of a wide array of extra-European variables. The projected French nuclear carrier *Charles de Gaulle* (replacing the aged *Clemenceau*), for example, is scheduled for deployment in the late 1980s, and arrangements between the French navy and its American or British counterparts for predesignated geographic coverage of the Gulf area or of the Indian Ocean could be negotiated prior to crisis outbreaks.

Such understandings would be similar to American-French cooperation during Washington's backing of French military efforts in Indochina during the early 1950s, or comparable to American support of British operations in Kuwait (1961), French and Belgian operations in Shaba (1977–78), and most recently, logistical assistance extended to France in the Chad operations (1983). The United States might also play a stronger role in preventing recurrences of Pacific allied intransigence concerning British task force port privileges attributable to the royal navy's (as well as the U.S. navy's) policy not to disclose task force nuclear capabilities. The British V/STOL carrier *Invincible* was denied entry into Japanese and Australian ports during a winter 1983 cruise, thereby impeding coordination of strategic naval policies with pro-Western Pacific states to levels attained successfully during past such visits.[44]

The problem of NATO force coordination regarding a Northern Cap defense graphically illustrates the absence of consensus over geographic and functional priorities in alliance extraperipheral planning. In

[43] Ibid.; Stephen Cioglia, "Stand By: Italy's Carrier Arriving," ibid., pp. 155-56; and Commander Richard H. Purnell, "New Carrier for Tomorrow's Spanish Armada," ibid., pp. 177-79.

[44] "Japanese Rebuff the Invincible," *The Guardian*, December 12, 1983, p. 30; and Rodney Crowton, "Far East Naval Visit Beset With Problems," *The Times* (London), January 7, 1984, p. 4. For an inventory of past British naval interaction with Pacific states, see William T. Tow, "U.S. Alliance Policies and Asian-Pacific Security: A Transregional Approach," in Tow and William R. Feeney, eds., *U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 39, 43, 45-47; and Tow, "Asian-Pacific Security Alliances: Re-Evaluating Britain's Transregional Role," *Royal United Services Institute and Brassey's Defense Yearbook 1983* (Oxford: Brassey's Publishers Ltd., 1983), pp. 118-37.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Northern Cap, both Canada's Air-Sea Transportable Brigade (CAST) and the British-Dutch Marine Commando Force (UK/NL MCF) are earmarked for emergency deployment to northern Norway in the event of a Soviet invasion. U.S. Marine elements of ACE Mobile Forces are the designated support. Yet CAST would be hard pressed to reach northern Norwegian positions in time to wage any credible forward defense. Recent reports by the Canadian Senate's Subcommittee for Defense and by the Canadian defense minister have both sharply criticized Canada's inability to protect North American reinforcement convoys beyond its own shores.[45] Moreover, Denmark has also criticized Canada's "Norwegian priority," maintaining that time and geography negate an immediate defense of the Northern Cap; and that Canadian forces could better be used to supplement Copenhagen's own questionable ability to defend the Jutland Straits along the Baltic, opening up into the GIUK area.[46] If Soviet forces were to attack Northern Cap positions as part of an overall European offensive, nothing in NATO's current doctrine specifies whether CAST would be dispatched directly to the Cap or instead to the south where accessibility to NATO defense positions is more certain. Nor is the participation of the UK/NL MCF or US-ACE component guaranteed; insofar as these units might be redirected to more proximate defense of central European positions, leaving the Cap relatively underdefended.[47]

A consensus among NATO members regarding mission orientation and resource allocation for out-of-region contingencies is, by itself, insufficient. Coordination of out-of-region objectives would have to be complemented by NATO's attaining greater base access or by embarking upon the construction of bases in Third World locations near anticipated extra-regional crisis areas. NATO would have to consult with pro-Western Third World nations to determine how their security interests might become entwined with NATO's during a specific crisis within or beyond Europe.

At present, NATO's substantial airlift capabilities are inadequate to support the levels of personnel and logistical activity necessary

[45] Sharon Hobson, "Canadian Senate Salvo," *Proceedings* (U.S. Naval Institute), 110/3/973 (March 1984), pp. 147-48; and "Canadian Military Faulted," *Los Angeles Times,* May 24, 1984, p. 2.

[46] Olav Trygge Storvik, "Denmark Reportedly Wants Canadian Brigade Earmarked for Norway," *Aftenposten* [Oslo], September 29, 1983, p. 4 as translated and reprinted in JPRS 84735, *West Europe Report* No. 2322, November 14, 1983, pp. 39-40. Also see Storvik, "Canada and Norway Increase Cooperation in North," *Aftenposten,* October 13, 1983, p. 15 as translated and reprinted in ibid., pp. 37-38. For an account of NATO's BALTAP Command defense functions, see Anders C. Sjaastad, "Geopolitical Realities and Alliance Military Contingencies: The Northern Flank," in Kenneth A. Myers, ed., *NATO: The Next Thirty Years* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), especially pp. 172-73: Toivo Miljan, "East vs. West: Political and Military Strategy in the Baltic Littoral," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 12, No. 3 (Fall, 1981), especially pp. 213-20; and Dora Alves, "Defending the Baltic," *Pacific Defense Reporter* 10, No. 1 (July 1983), pp. 50-52.

[47] For a basically corroborating analysis, see Tomas Ries, "Defending the Far North," *International Defense Review* 17, No. 7 (1984), p. 879.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to sustain minimum combat effort in many Third World locales. Little bare-base equipment designed to convert quickly underdeveloped or abandoned airstrips, billeting, or storage space into functional and modern NATO basing operations is now on hand in many potential "host countries." This situation applies to Ras Banas in Egypt, at Masirah Island in Oman, at Mombasa and at the Nanyuki airfield in Kenya, and at various other sites along the Arabian Peninsula, which one day might be the focal point of a Western military intervention as part of an overall defense effort to save its energy supplies. All of these bases have been subject to a series of complex negotiations over military assistance packages, targeted as symbols of confrontation between opposing political and ideological factions within the Western polities, and downgraded in value by the inability of the CENTCOM and by smaller European rapid deployment force components to avoid ". . . the tasking of the same units to do double or triple duty . . . (i.e.) the issue of *force* versatility and concurrent availability has not been resolved [within NATO command channels]." [48]

While the U.S. CENTOM is specifically earmarked for response to Southwest Asian contingencies, for example, this focused planning concept breaks down in real world planning situations if and when an anti-Western threat materializes in South Africa or in Northeast Asia. In most limited wars where the United States has been involved since the Korean conflict, little residual conventional military power remains for tending to other extra-regional crises simultaneously. This has been even more true in the case of European NATO countries, where the dispatch of precious naval task forces to the South Atlantic or to the Indian Ocean has led to high levels of uncertainty regarding the continued efficiency of in-theater sea and air corridor defense. Ultimately, NATO states must become more proficient in applying durable burden-sharing formulas to managing limited force levels within an inter-theater context.

Under such circumstances, Japanese, ANZUS and ASEAN security officials should meet regularly, even if informally, with their NATO European counterparts to identify and act upon common increasingly relevant interests. Continued U.S. extended containment toward Western Europe, will strain U.S. Pacific forces in the event of an intervention on behalf of European oil and commercial interests. Such strain will have immense impact on ASEAN or other pro-Western Asian countries' geopolitical calculations and defense investment prerogatives. A mutual West European-Asian/Pacific consciousness-raising under U.S. leadership

[48] Quoted from Robert P. Haffa, Jr., *The Half War: Planning U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency 1960-1980* (Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1984), p. 240. Emphasis in original. Also see Maxwell Orme Johnson, The Military as an Instrument of U.S. Policy in Southwest Asia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 15-33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would therefore seem appropriate.[49] Such a forum might address the future status of U.S. and NATO fleet access to Asian-Pacific ports where nuclear ships are involved; NATO collaboration in arms sales and military assistance programs to the growing ASEAN defense infrastructures; the implementation of Japanese military-related technology transfers to West European countries as a follow-up to the burgeoning U.S.-Japanese military technology relationship (Japanese interpretations of constitutional law in this case have been inestimably flexible); and the need to organize some low-key joint Pacific/European nation military maneuvers with U.S. cooperation to cover Atlantic to Pacific SLOCs via the South Cape Route and Indian Ocean, should U.S. forces be diverted to a Persian Gulf defense effort or be tied down in the western hemisphere.

The Agenda for the Alliance

Critics of NATO's involvement in extra-European defense coordination question the premise that any formalization of security mechanisms can occur in an atmosphere of intra-alliance debate over the nature of the Soviet threat and the best way to meet it. Even advocates of a more globally-oriented Atlantic Alliance still seem to entertain reservations about how effective the transatlantic bargain will continue to be if NATO is forced to dilute its energies and resources over an ever-widening area. Former U.S. Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has recently recalled, with some bitterness, how the West Europeans too readily condemned U.S. intervention in Grenada, notwithstanding a strong appeal by other Caribbean states for U.S. military power to be applied in a just cause in its own region. Now NATO Europe, in general, only reluctantly acknowledges "the difficult requirements for a nation with global responsibilities [as opposed to those] with more regional concerns . . . the sheer scope of American interests engages the United States in a different set of perspectives and imperatives. . . ." [50]

As previously noted, however, the Europeans have experienced a painful decline in their global status over the postwar era, and

[49] As suggested by Terry C. Diebal and Gen. Russell E. Dougherty, "The Atlantic and Pacific Alliances," in Report of the Atlantic Council's Committee on China Policy, *China — Policy for the Next Decade* (Boston, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1984), p. 336. The Rand Corporation's James Digby has asserted that ". . . NATO and other current alliances could be supplemented with a more widespread (but looser) set of two-nation and multi-nation specialized agreements to guard mutual interests outside of Europe. The forces that guard these interests could head off conflicts that might spread to Europe and be a reserve for Europe too. . . ." (Digby, "There's Work Elsewhere for NATO," *Los Angeles Times*, June 10, 1984, Part IV, p. 5.)

[50] Eagleburger, "The Transatlantic Relationship — A Long Term Perspective," *NATO Review* 32 No. 2 (April 1984), pp. 8-14. An illuminating comment on the Europeans' insistence that NATO, by its character, has no mandate outside Europe is offered by John Barry, "Violent Visions of Gun Rule," *The Sunday Times* (London), April 29, 1984, p. 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thus feel that they have acquired some hard-learned lessons about the limits of power, from which their superpower associate may now benefit. Intra-alliance unity can prevail over tendencies of polarization if both the Americans and the Europeans recognize the basic principle that military actions by one or more of the allies will have ramifications for the Alliance as a whole. As such, consultation with its alliance partners should be top priority for a NATO member intending to use force in an extra-European contingency.[51] Some promising suggestions proposed by concerned Western security analysts on how to institutionalize such consultations include the forming of a NATO Principal Nations Group consisting of the United States, Britain, France, and possibly West Germany, within its limited constitutional prerogatives, as well as Japan collaborating with NATO from outside Europe. A more comprehensive NATO Out-of-Area Consultative Group, involving a greater number of alliance member states, has also been suggested because it would avoid the notion of a two-tiered alliance, and would encourage smaller NATO members to take a greater interest in Europe's geostrategic relationship with the world's other regions.

The essence of these proposals is far from novel; Charles de Gaulle proposed a NATO global triumvirate of British, French, and U.S. military planners in 1958, only to be refused by U.S. officials concerned about preserving the facade of NATO institutional and bureaucratic unanimity. Washington's attempts to involve NATO in Southeast Asian defense planning during the following decade were equally unpopular with the French and with other Europeans. In the contemporary strategic setting, however, there is a clear need for the Alliance to entertain systematic discussions about questions of resource access, ethnic change, and Soviet power projection which have enlarged in ways unanticipated at the time of NATO's founding. Moreover, if NATO's scope must be global to serve all the participants' interests effectively, cohesive networks for extra-regional coordination and burden-sharing must be forged between NATO's large and small states, as well as between various NATO members and potential pro-Western security partners throughout the Third World.[52]

NATO will ultimately survive the extra-regional challenge because Western Europe long ago concluded that it has nowhere else to turn but to the United States for the preservation of its culture and values. The overall viability of the Alliance, however, is related to the need to

[51] This point is especially well stated by Geoffrey E. Pattie, "Western Security Beyond the NATO Area," *Strategic Review* 12, No. 2 (Spring 1984), p. 43.

[52] These broad consultative objectives are comprehensively covered by Karl Kaiser, Winston Lord, Thierry de Montbrial, and David Watt, *Western Security* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1981) concerning their proposal for the origination of a Peripheral Nations Group; and by Phil Williams, "Revitalizing the Western Alliance: Proposals for Change," *Atlantic Quarterly* 2, No. 2 (Summer 1984), pp. 120-25, in terms of creating an Out-of-Area Consultative Group.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

find a positive basis for dealing with the rising extra-European dimension of contemporary security challenges. West German Foreign Minister Genscher correctly urged Europeans to be less skeptical of American enthusiasm for reaching out to other regions and to take a position with the United States as a "strong and self-confident partner" as a new century unfolds.[53] NATO's ultimate survival may well rest upon the Europeans' future inclinations for moving beyond parochial reliance on strict constructionist rationales and stale policy ambiguities to search for more enlightened, if riskier, incentives for security cooperation with the United States. Washington could reciprocate by encouraging greater European participation in the defense of the geographic peripheries that increasingly affect the North Atlantic region's overall defense outlook. The United States might accept the reality that West Europeans have legitimate political and security interests of their own, extending beyond their own continent but generally tending to enhance rather than to impede overall Western influence within the Third World. Under such circumstances, concerned alliance efforts to achieve relevant consultative mechanisms as well as doctrinal unity for preserving and strengthening extended containment can be pursued legitimately and optimistically.

[53] Genscher, FBIS, *Western Europe (Daily Report)*, April 11, 1984 p. J-1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"a truly commendable piece of work"
Charles Burton Marshall
statesman, educator, writer

The Politics of the Nuclear Freeze

by Adam M. Garfinkle

A balanced, but piercing, analysis of the nuclear freeze movement. The book traces the origins and institutional development of the freeze movement as well as the sources of opposition to it, shedding new light on its intellectual and historical roots in contemporary American politics. From its inception in 1979, through the passage of a freeze resolution by the U.S. House of Representatives in 1983, to its role in 1984 presidential election politics, the story of the freeze is woven into a larger chronicle of U.S. foreign and defense policy. The highly emotional character of the freeze movement, the religious and ethical dimensions of the current debate, and the mobilization of professional groups for and against the freeze are treated in depth. Readers across the political spectrum will find this volume an essential guide to one of the most controversial issues of our time.

L.C. 84-6030 258 pages ISBN 0-910191-08-5 **$7.95 paper**

RELATED TITLES:

NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC PLANNING, by Colin S. Gray
L.C. 83-20800 130 pages ISBN 0-910191-07-7 **$5.95 paper**

THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, by Robert F. Turner
L.C. 82-24192 147 pages ISBN 0-910191-06-9 **$4.95 paper**

Foreign Policy Research Institute
Philadelphia Policy Papers
3508 Market Street, Suite 350
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

correspondence

A Comment on the Meaning of Moderation

To the Editor:

Jack Snyder is normally an astute observer, and his peculiar misreading of my essay in *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* is not quite egregious. Leaving it unremarked would be unfair to Joe Nye and the book as a whole, however, because Snyder rests a large part of his review on the critique of my one chapter. That critique confuses my empirical arguments with normative ones, infers things I did not say or mean to suggest, and attributes to me more general arguments that are caricatures extrapolated from these misunderstandings. (This is ironic, since Snyder has written eloquently elsewhere about problems of misperception.)

For example, Snyder denies my statement that Soviets do not appear "to differentiate deterrence from 'compellence' as clearly as American theorists do." He then suggests that I meant the opposite of what I wrote, and finally uses this to charge that I believe that " 'equal counterforce capabilities' are needed to make Soviet strategists suitably pessimistic"; the balance of terror is "delicate" and "must be managed to close tolerances"; and crisis stability is an illusory concept (pp. 624-25).

If the Trofimenko essay I cited as the basis of my statement is not a valid example of Soviet views, I bow to Snyder's expertise. But the Trofimenko piece was undoubtedly cleared by Soviet authorities, and it says what I attributed to it: "*coercion is the ultimate form of deterrence*. . . . The actual demonstration of indisputable superiority . . . can increase the deterrent effect. . . . In the absence of a Soviet military threat to the United States *American deterrence of the Soviet Union thus acquired an offensive rather than a defensive character*" (emphasis added). Whether or not this represents Soviet views, Snyder presents my statement (about Soviet views of NATO's deterrent as a compellent) as an argument that the *Soviets* are offensive, adventurous, and hard to deter! Whether or not that is true, it was not my point.

I do not know why Snyder mistook my dismissal of static equilibrium for a rejection of crisis stability. My point was that it is unrealistic to hope that all innovation and adaptation in force structures

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

can be stopped, so if stability is to be maintained we have to try to control the process of change. Where Snyder criticizes me for *endorsing* equal counterforce capability (a subject I mentioned parenthetically but he implies is a leitmotif of the chapter), I was *observing* what is a fact (that American political leaders have been unwilling to concede a counterforce advantage to the Soviets) and suggesting how to pursue the goal without obscuring the robustness of both sides' basic deterrents. Even if my descriptive argument should be judged as a normative one, it would stand. Snyder's view that a goal of equality in counterforce capability undermines mutual assured destruction is nonsense. Why would inequality be more stable? Snyder must assume that a Soviet counterforce advantage would be unalarming because the U.S. would retain enough survivable forces to devastate the USSR. If so, why would a world in which, say, the Soviets could destroy half of the American force while the U.S. could destroy a third of the Soviet force be more stable than one in which each could destroy half? If what Snyder really means is just that counterforce is a bad thing, or that we really have equality anyway, fine, but those are different points and don't tell us why we should prefer the Soviets to have more counterforce than we do.

I am criticized for taking " 'the gap in the conventional balance' as axiomatic" and worrying too much about the viability of extended deterrence. My references were descriptions of the dominant assumptions that have framed debate in U.S. policy making. My own views are more equivocal (see my article in this very issue of ORBIS and in the January 1985 issue of *World Politics*), though not as sanguine as Snyder's, which are a minority school of thought. But whoever is "correct" is a separate issue. Snyder argues mostly about what makes strategic sense; I was writing about how certain beliefs, dilemmas, and conflicts have driven policy making. Snyder suggests these controversies and anxieties need not have happened if national security elites had not misunderstood the issues, and he accuses the book as a whole of blaming democratic pluralism for the problem and of making a fetish of management and moderation. But the book happens to be *about* management of policy, and he does not make any convincing case for why less management or moderation would result in policy closer to what he personally considers wise. Snyder's critique confuses distinctions between process and substance and his position seems more elitist than ours. His criticism implies that to get better policy we should not focus on how to discipline a political process involving multiple constituencies and concerns, but on how to convince the elite of the validity of Jack Snyder's analytical vision of the world.

RICHARD K. BETTS
The Brookings Institution

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Author Replies

To the Editor:

In my comments on Dr. Betts's chapter, it is true that I focused on several remarks that he made in passing in the course of a wide-ranging argument. I did so because I thought they were revealing of some unspoken assumptions that shaped both his approach and that of the volume as a whole. Betts's reply leads me to believe that I was not altogether wrong in these interpretations.

"Even if my descriptive argument should be judged as a normative one, it would stand," he says. He cannot see, for example, why a world of equal counterforce would be less stable than one in which the Soviets enjoyed a counterforce advantage. For the sake of argument, let's assume that Soviet doctrine places a heavy emphasis on counterforce warfighting, tends to evaluate the strategic balance and the requirements of deterrence in those terms, and sees a not inconsequential advantage in getting in the first blow in a counterforce duel. This would place the West on the horns of a dilemma. On one hand, there would be an incentive to strive for counterforce parity to deter the Soviet-style strategic thinker. Indeed, one would need counterforce parity even after absorbing a Soviet first strike, by this logic. On the other hand, Western counterforce capabilities will look quite provocative to such a Soviet strategist, who believes that counterforce asymmetries matter, and may worry that a U.S. first strike would pay off handsomely in that regard. The quotations from Trofimenko that Betts cites underscore this dilemma.

I certainly agree with Betts about the "robustness of both sides' basic deterrents," but it is by no means clear that equal counterforce is the best way to remind the Soviets of that fact. Any increment of counterforce capability is likely to have both good and bad effects on deterrence. One could argue that these increments are most beneficial at the extremes. When you have no counterforce at all, a little may be helpful in generating risks and enhancing credibility. When you have a lot, buying still more counterforce to achieve a splendid war-winning capability might make some sense, too. But in the middle ranges, where we are now, increments of counterforce may serve only to obscure the basic robustness of MAD, especially in the eyes of a Soviet strategist whose conceptual framework coexists uneasily with the reality of MAD. Objectively speaking, the deterrent balance in 1914 should have been "robust" and "stable," but when France and Russia followed Germany in adopting misguided offensive strategies, that objective stability was obscured and war resulted.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The main point of my review was that the "managed balance of power" approach tends to equate stability and moderation with the ad hoc micromanagement of unresolvable tradeoffs. In doing so, it underrates the importance of stabilizing structural conditions, like MAD, as a prerequisite of and lodestar for any policy that is to be truly moderate. I used the example of a "dynamic," "managed" counterforce balance to suggest the dangers of trying to navigate carefully down the middle of the road. I regret any mischaracterization of Betts's views that may have occurred in my attempt to make that point.

Finally, as regards the confusion between "process and substance," Nye himself stresses the connections between the two. He advocates his "managed balance of power" strategy (i.e., substance) on the grounds that it has the best hope of maintaining the continuity of a moderate policy, given the nature of American pluralism and alliance politics (i.e., process). But in reading the book, I found it unclear whether strategy was being tailored to fit inexorable domestic realities, or whether the authors' pre-existing views on the strategic requirements of a "managed balance of power" were determining their view of political constraints. For example, if the national security managers believe that deterrence requires the deployment of NATO theater nuclear forces to balance the SS-20, then the resulting political fallout is a consequence of strategy, not just a constraint on it. In Betts's chapter, there are several instances where the empirical and the normative (process and substance) are subtly intertwined. He says, for example, that "Doves and hawks must confront two political facts: that treaties are not salable unless they appear to preserve military equality, and that unilateral efforts sufficient to substitute for treaty restraints on Soviet forces are not long sustainable" (p. 124). Surely the latter statement mingles a strategic judgment with a political assessment. If Betts's preferred strategy were different, his view of political constraints would be different. It is possible that the "confusion" between process and substance lies neither with me nor with Betts, but rather is inherent in the subject matter. If so, it is better to be explicit about the connections between the two.

JACK SNYDER
Columbia University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SELECTED

publications received

WORLD POLITICS

The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War. By George F. Kennan. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984. 300 pp. $19.95. The focus of George Kennan's latest study is quite narrow: 1890 to 1894, the period leading up to and including the establishment of the Franco-Russian alliance. Apart from a few concluding comments, there is little on the dynamics of the relationship in the years that followed and that culminated in the Russian Revolution of 1917. Steeped in the insights gleaned from Russian and French archives, analyzed with sensitivity and insight, and written with admirable lucidity, the story as told by Mr. Kennan holds our attention throughout. His attempt, however, to link the "aberrations, misunderstandings, and bewilderments" leading the alliance to the subsequent sequence of tragic developments that brought tragedy to Western civilization seems somewhat overdrawn. The conclusions do not flow inexorably from the history he explores.

Bread for the World. By Arthur Simon. Ramsey, N.J.: Pamlist Press; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1984. 219 pp. $4.95. This book, a revised edition of Simon's 1975 publication, is intended to provide a general introduction to world hunger. Simon basically laments the neglected role of public policy towards the issue of hunger. The author contends that the United States has never made the elimination of hunger a priority; and no president has put forth a comprehensive set of policies that offer some hope of moving us toward a hunger-free world. A second purpose of the study is to convince readers that they can effect change by insisting on better policies, and by using their leverage as citizens. As the author intended, the utility of the book lies in its call to commitment on the part of those whose issue is alleviating world hunger.

Visions of World Order: Between State Power and Human Justice. By Julius Stone. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 246 pp. $26.50. An unusual and interesting book by one of the world's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

best-known authorities on international law and jurisprudence. The primary objective of this fascinating study is to explore how international laws can best serve the aspirations and expectations of human beings who populate the states of the world. Even though much has been written on the subject of individuals and international law, most writings have been devoted to areas of international law within which and under conditions where individuals have been recognized as bearers of rights and obligations under it. Stone has gone a step further in that his inquiry is not concerned with the technical precepts of existing international law, but with two major issues. The first deals with the factual substratum out of which that law can be thought to arise (such as conditions of life, expectations, and the aspirations of populations that constitute the states); the second matter is concerned with the degree of relevance of this factual substratum to discussions of international law and justice (for instance, is it sensible to argue about justice between states without evaluating the aspirations of human beings who represent such entities as the states). On the whole, this is an outstanding and provocative work. Must reading for those who take a serious interest in the field of international law and jurisprudence.

The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy. By Walker Connor. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. 614 pp. $47.50 ($14.50, paper). Traces the evolving relationship between communism and nationalism from the manipulation by Marx and Lenin of national sentiments in the interest of promoting revolution to actions by various Marxist-Leninist regimes to implement, faithfully or otherwise, the "Leninist national policy" of crushing the forces of nationalism after the revolution. With respect to Marx and Engels, the author concludes that their strategy "called for ostensible commitment to the principle of self-determination in the abstract, while concomitantly reserving to themselves in each and every case the decision as to whether a particular movement was to be supported or opposed. At a less abstract level, Marx and Engels were in fact most niggardly in proffering support for national movements . . ." (p. 13). Departing from a principled internationalist position, Engels often lapsed into ethnic stereotypes, referring to "lazy Mexicans," "bullheaded Slavs," and "potato-eating children of nature" (the Irish). With respect to the period since the First International, the author concludes that nationalism has proven to be far more powerful than Marxism. Communist movements have been accepted in countries where the two "have been wedded in the popular mind" but rejected where the two social forces have been seen as at odds. A major work of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scholarship in comparative politics, the volume examines the interaction of nationalism and Marxism-Leninism in the USSR, China, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Vietnam.

Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of U.S.-Soviet Relations. By Ralph K. White. New York: The Free Press, 1984. 374 pp. $20.00. The author's central thesis is that the United States and the Soviet Union each "imagines that it faces an inherently, implacably aggressive enemy when it actually faces an enemy as fearful as itself — an enemy driven mainly by fear to do the things that lead to war." If this proposition is accurate, then the assessment and suggestions that follow are sound and attractive. If, however, the diagnosis — the reconstruction of the origins and dynamics of the old and the new cold war — is flawed, then the recommendations are inherently misplaced. Dr. White is a thoughtful and concerned social scientist. He seeks throughout to be fair and dispassionate; but his concluding section, "Grounds for Hope," seems too general to serve any discernible policy-relevant utility. His recounting of past history suggests misperceptions derived from a failure to understand what it is that really drives — and constrains — superpower policies, especially in the Third World.

The Coercive Utopians: Social Deception by America's Power Players. By Rael Jean Isaac and Erich Isaac. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, Inc., 1984. 325 pp. $18.95. The "coercive utopians" come from diverse backgrounds and traditions, but share a commitment to social engineering and political manipulation of the existing political system in the United States with a view toward undermining institutions and ideas that contravene their own particularistic, partisan vision of the future. Ideologically, they are uncomfortable with American pluralism, but are adept at exploiting it to their advantage. Sociologically, they are drawn from the highly educated and well endowed. Politically, their animus is invariably directed at U.S. policy. What is fascinating in this highly readable, well-researched exposé is the naming of names — individuals, institutes, and organizations. The style is lively, the data are persuasive, the effect is disturbing. The study contributes to an understanding of the ways in which the secular millenarianism of the utopians adversely affects America's internal cohesion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MILITARY, NATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Talks. By Strobe Talbott. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984. 384 pp. $17.95. Strobe Talbott, diplomatic correspondent for *Time* and author of *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II,* has written a sequel to his earlier book on the nuclear arms negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. In Talbott's view, the current impasse in the arms talks can largely be explained by bureaucratic disputes and personality clashes within the Reagan administration. These disputes prevented the United States from showing the requisite flexibility in the negotiations with the Soviet Union and seizing opportunities for a breakthrough in the limitation of nuclear arms. In particular, Talbott sees the bureaucratic machinations of Richard Perle and Edward Rowney behind the administration's hard line toward the Soviet Union. The main problem with Talbott's account is that it gives the Soviet Union far too passive a role in determining the outcome of arms talks between the two superpowers. In effect, the negotiations that Talbott has written about are those between the Department of State and the Pentagon. The so-called stalemate in the arms talks between the two superpowers cannot be completely understood, however, by examining only the American decision-making process. Of course, Talbott cannot hope to obtain the abundance of evidence on Soviet internal decision making on arms control as he does of American policy making. As a consequence, it is impossible to state with any certainty that there actually were opportunities for an agreement in either the strategic arms reduction or the intermediate nuclear forces talks. Even Talbott concedes that the sketch agreement drawn up by Paul Nitze and Yuri Kvitsinsky during their famous "walk in the woods" stood little chance of being approved by the Kremlin, regardless of whether Washington had made a more favorable response. The Soviet walkout, in late 1983, on both sets of negotiations epitomizes the Kremlin's inflexibility on arms control. While Talbott has given us a detailed account of American policy making on arms control, it can be considered at best only half the story.

Nuclear Forces in Europe: Enduring Dilemmas, Present Prospects. By Leon V. Sigal. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1984. 181 pp. $22.95 ($8.95, paper). This study examines the paradoxes and inconsistencies associated with NATO nuclear doctrine, and what Sigal believes to be the consequent flawed military rational underlying the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe. Also included is a good discussion

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the inter-alliance politics surrounding the decision to modernize and expand NATO's theater nuclear forces, and a hard look at recent negotiations aimed at controlling and limiting these forces. The final chapter addresses the problem of battlefield nuclear weapons. A useful commentary.

The Defense of the West: Strategic and European Security Issues Reappraised. Edited by Robert Kennedy and John M. Weinstein. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. 451 pp. $30.00 ($13.95, paper). This is an excellent guide to some of the most immediate and pressing security questions facing the United States at the present time. Every one of the essays in this collection is both innovative and readable, an unusual feature of any collected work. It is evident that the editors spent a great deal of time and effort to ensure uniform quality throughout the book. The study deals with a number of critical issue areas, including strategic and theater nuclear arms control, strategic defense, chemical warfare, alliance burden sharing, and European perceptions of alliance military requirements and prospects. Of particular note is Robert Kennedy's opening essay on the current state of the strategic balance.

Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe. By Joshua M. Epstein. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. 288 pp. $22.50. This is an extremely innovative study which, while looking in detail at the development and current capabilities of Soviet Frontal Aviation, also provides a larger and sorely needed critique of the assumptions underlying traditional approaches to military forcasting and threat assessment. Epstein develops an improved methodology for analyzing enemy force capabilities, and applies this methodology to the evolving Soviet air threat to Europe. The result is a fascinating look at the politics and uncertainties surrounding Soviet force planning, issues seldom discussed by Western defense analysts. Despite the complex and multifaceted nature of this topic, the book is well written and organized.

National Interests and the Military Use of Space. Edited by William J. Durch. Cambridge: Ballinger Press, 1984. 286 pp. $28.00. A useful collection of essays on the strategic, arms control, and legal implications of the growing U.S. and Soviet competition in space. The collection is well balanced, both in tone and in terms of its treatment of the technical and policy dimensions of the issues it addresses. Topics include the role of space in U.S. and Soviet military planning, the vulnerability of space-based assets, satellites in naval warfare, legal aspects of military space

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

activities, and the problems and prospects for arms control initiatives in this area.

DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY HISTORY

The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938. By Jiri Hochman. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. 253 pp. $29.95. This is an excellent study of Soviet foreign policy during the critical era between the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations in 1934 and the Munich Crisis of 1938. Using a wide range of primary and secondary sources, Jiri Hochman provides a detailed examination of the ideological and strategic axioms underlying Soviet foreign policy. His thesis, persuasively argued and documented, is that the Soviet Union was not seriously committed to its alliance with France and, instead, actually wanted to resume the "special relationship" with Germany that had foundered after Hitler came to power. According to this view, the roots of the Hitler-Stalin Pact can be clearly seen before the hectic summer of 1939. The objective of Soviet foreign policy, then, was to revive ties to Germany, and, failing that, to lay the diplomatic foundations for a strategic alignment against Germany in case Hitler decided to attack eastward. In this way the Soviet Union could call for Western support in a war against Germany, while at the same time preserving its flexibility to act if Hitler struck to the west. When compared to the negotiations that preceded the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1893-94, described by George Kennan in his book *The Fateful Alliance,* the Soviet Union certainly avoided any firm military commitment to France in the pact signed by the two countries in 1935, and thereby preserved its diplomatic freedom of action in a crisis.

The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914. By Ivo Nikolai Lambi. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984. 462 pp. $37.50. This superb study, based on extensive research in German archives, details and analyzes the rise of Germany as a great naval power during the opening years of this century, and the challenge this development posed to Britain. Building on the pioneering research of Paul Kennedy and Volker Berghahn, Professor Lambi richly documents the expansive nature of Admiral Tirpitz's fleet-building programs, which were designed to provide Germany with a force of capital ships equal to that possessed by Britain in northern

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European waters. Lambi firmly places Tirpitz's naval program within the context of Wilhelmine Germany's domestic politics, internal governmental feuding, and diplomacy. Throughout this study, the figure of Tirpitz looms as a formidable politician and bureaucratic fighter, despite the flaws in his strategic conceptions of building a battle fleet to rival that of Britain. This efficiency in building up German naval power coupled with little understanding of the larger international political and strategic conditions proved a disaster for Germany because Tirpitz's schemes antagonized both Britain and the United States. It is indeed surprising that Tirpitz has not found a scholar to write a modern, full-length biography, despite the availability of his personal papers and the German naval archives for this period. Professor Lambi's fine study is highly recommended to those interested in understanding the complex interaction of personal, organizational, internal political, and international factors that shaped the famous *naval armaments race between Britain and Germany before World* War I.

The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914. By Jack Snyder. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. 267 pp. $35.00. This is a penetrating account, filled with valuable theoretical insights, of the military planning in France, Germany, and Russia on the eve of the First World War. Using the analytical approach of controlled comparison, Jack Snyder examines the role of doctrinal and organizational biases in military decision making and operational planning. Snyder's insight that the simplification of strategic doctrine into a cherished dogma "will be greatest when [military] institutions are strong and centralized" is of great relevance for the current debate over reforming the command and planning functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also has immense value for understanding and predicting likely Soviet military behavior in a crisis or wartime. This book would have been more complete had it also examined military decision making in Austria-Hungary before World War I. In Austria-Hungary, Conrad von Hötzendorff, chief of the general staff, was an ardent apostle of offensive warfare, and, as a consequence, Hapsburg forces attacked, though heavily outnumbered, on both the Russian and Serbian fronts. In what should have been viewed as the predictable outcome by the general staff in Austria-Hungary, Hapsburg arms suffered major defeats and heavy losses on both fronts. Nowhere, then, was the flight from reality to offensive warfare more pronounced than in Conrad's actions during the opening campaign of World War I. This example would have strengthened Snyder's arguments on the influence of doctrinal and organizational biases in promoting offensive war plans. Finally, Snyder is superb in detailing Russian war plan-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ning in this era, providing perhaps the best account in English on this topic.

WESTERN EUROPE

The Dynamics of Change in NATO: A Burden Sharing Perspective. By James R. Golden. New York: Praeger, 1983. 229 pp. $24.95. An interesting look into the problems of coordinating NATO policies toward the overall goal of strengthening what Golden considers to be an increasingly strained alliance. His "burden-sharing" approach emphasizes the difficulties of evaluating the precise contributions to the alliance by each member nation, as well as the difficulty of assessing the exact benefits that each nation extracts from the alliance. As a means of bypassing this public-goods problem, Golden asserts the importance of emphasizing "the private-goods aspects of the alliance through bilateral arrangements that can link economic, political, and military interests." In this connection, the third part of the book is a case study of bilateral U.S.-West German relations which begins by developing the context of the security relationships between the two countries, and concludes with an analysis of bilateral cost-sharing arrangements such as "offset payments" and "host-nation support." Part IV is devoted to the problems of formulating a coherent and coordinated policy with respect to economic policies in general — the economic health of NATO being supremely important to its basic capabilities; and the use of specific economic policies as a means of influencing the East. Unfortunately the book is already dated in several key areas in light of such recent developments as: the NATO deployment of a new generation of IRBMs, the failure of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, and the continuing economic recovery. In all, Colonel Golden's vision of the alliance is shadowed by a decidedly American point of view.

Western Europe and the United States. By Michael Smith. Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, Inc. 1984. 152 pp. $19.50 ($8.95, paper). In an interesting and well-written book, Smith has tried to stimulate and to provide a framework for more detailed inquiry into European-American relations. The book stresses the paradoxes inherent in the coexistence of continuity, change, and uncertainty within European-American relations. Smith analyzes the latter in three connected ways: by providing a framework of events, by evaluating the reactions of policy makers, and by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assessing the merits of academic interpretations. Such themes are then developed to focus on the settings within which European-American ties have found expression, on the issues that have arisen among the countries, and on the processes by which these issues have been managed and pursued. The study also provides the reader with relevant references and sources that are linked to an extensive annotated bibliography. On balance, a useful introduction to the major issues in European-American relations that should appeal to the specialist and non-specialist alike.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

India and the West — Documents 1980. Edited by J. A. Naik. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1983. 320 pp. $50.50. Texts of documents, speeches, joint communiqués, and agreements highlight India's relations with the West. The volume also provides statistical data on India's trade relations with the West, its nuclear policy, and international events involving India. While the book offers some pertinent information for those interested in Indo-Western ties, trivial annoyances such as misspellings and an absence of commentary by the editor hardly make it recommended reading for those who appreciate fine scholarship.

Jinnah of Pakistan. By Stanley Wolpert. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984. 421 pp. $24.95. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the father of Pakistan, was a remarkable political figure about whom little has been written. Though he remains very much an enigma, this outstanding biography provides us with as sensitive and searching an understanding of the man, his politics, and his times as we are likely to have. Professor Stanley Wolpert, a distinguished historian, has written a compelling book. He traces Jinnah's early life as a provincial, indifferent young man in Karachi and follows him to London where he studied law and became a British barrister. On returning to India in 1896, Jinnah plunged into politics, became a leading figure in the Indian nationalist movement, clashed with Gandhi and Nehru, and decided that India's Muslims must have their own nation-state. His role in single-handedly maneuvering, intriguing, and fighting for his vision is developed in all its complexity and drama. Wolpert's writing is vivid and exciting.

India Under Pressure. Prospects for Political Stability. By Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, Inc., 1984. 214 pp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

$18.50. This well-rounded and interesting study explores the prospects for political stability by examining its forces, domestic and international, that are likely to be instrumental in shaping India's future. The author contends that the Indian government is under ever-increasing pressure due to internal social and political unrest; and provides the reader with broad arenas of conflict and social unrest: regionalism, communalism, untouchability and caste violence, agrarian unrest, urban unrest, and election violence. Hardgrave then investigates the capacity of India's political parties, the bureaucracy, and the military to cope with change and manage the potential for political conflict. As such, the Congress party, the leadership of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the problems of succession, prospects for unity among opposition parties, and the potential impact of a coalition government on political instability are closely examined. In concluding, Hardgrave discusses the role of foreign relations, and its impact on India's political stability. Within the latter context, India's ties with South Asia, the Middle East, the USSR, China, and the United States are studied in detail. Students and scholars interested in the affairs of the Indian subcontinent will undoubtedly find this book of value.

Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy. By Louis D. Hayes. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1984. 203 pp. $19.00. A stimulating discussion that focuses on the political experience of Pakistan since independence. The author provides in-depth analyses of the problems, opportunities, and frustrations of modernization. Hayes asserts that Pakistan's political system has failed because the foundations of the state and the requirements of modernization have not been bridgeable by any institutional arrangement yet employed. Hayes contends that Pakistan's political development has been shaped by five factors: the philosophical or theoretical foundation of the political system; the effectiveness of public policy which involves the failure to fulfill the demands of the modern state; persistence of regional and social imbalances within the political process; failure of political actors to support the integrity of political institutions; and international relations. The study concludes that the central question facing Pakistan today is the same that has faced the country since its inception almost forty years ago.

Sino-Russian Relations. A Short History. By Rosemary K. I. Quested. London and Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984. 194 pp. $20.00 ($7.95, paper). Possessed of vastly different histories and civilizations, Russia and China today confront one another across the longest national frontier in the world. Dr. Quested, who teaches the history of Sino-Russian relations at the University of Hong Kong, has written a much-needed survey.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Beginning with earliest times, the survey becomes more detailed from the seventeenth century onwards, when the two nations became direct neighbors. There are no footnotes in the book, but each chapter has a very helpful bibliographical guide. Due to her much-compressed style, the author has often simplified complex issues of international relations; neither is her description of the early Bolshevik strategy vis-à-vis China free of error. In her last chapter, "Towards New Balances of Power Since 1978," Quested offers a pessimistic, as well as an optimistic scenario, for the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Nevertheless, she believes that "China will be able to consolidate and maintain its independent role and become an increasingly great world power."

Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia 1810–1895. By Gerald Morgan. London: Frank Cass, 1982. 264 pp. $30.00. Colonel Morgan's book offers some colorful ramifications to the essential findings published a year earlier in Malcolm Yapp's important *Strategies of British India. Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798-1850.* Yapp's thesis then was that Russia reactivated the Central Asian front against India as an effective diplomatic lever whenever she wanted to divert British attention from other critical spots of friction, such as Poland, the Balkans, Turkey, the Caucasus, Iran, or later, the Far East. While the British side has been well researched in Morgan's book, it still remains very much guesswork in the absence of any major Russian document that would support the author's somewhat paradoxical assertion that there is no real evidence "of any serious plans to invade India — which is not to say that no plans were ever considered." The review of the Great Game in Central Asia ends with the final settlement of the Afghan border question between the two rival powers in 1895, but Geoffrey Wheeler, a well-known contributor on Central Asia, summarizes in the epilogue the subsequent developments in the region up to the present time. He not only discusses the opposing models of colonial rule as exemplified by Russian/Soviet Turkestan and British India, but provides a useful guide through the changing interpretations in Soviet Marxist historiography in its assessment of the tsarist conquest of Central Asia (from "absolute evil" to "progressive incorporation"). Wheeler's final reflection considers the implications of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan for the whole region.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State. By Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup. London and Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St. Mar-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tin's Press, 1983. 170 pp. $27.50. To interpret the complex relationship between the Soviet Muslims and their state has recently become a challenging subject in view of the multiple pressures to which this community of between forty-five and fifty million has been subjected. Very few scholars can treat the subject of Islam in the Soviet Union with such authority as Alexandre Bennigsen. In cooperation with his daughter, Marie Broxup, he has condensed his more than thirty years of experience into a book that provides a solid historical overview of the relationship between Russia and Islam. Chapters dealing with the influence of Islam from across the Soviet borders and with the future of Soviet Muslims are shorter, but supplied with demographic tables and very useful appendixes, showing each Muslim ethnic group with regard to its strength, locality, and the literary languages used since the October Revolution. Not all readers will share Bennigsen's pronounced opinions on the future of Islam in the Soviet Union. This concerns not so much his rejection of the official myth about creating from all Soviet nationalities the ultimate racial symbiosis, the "homo sovieticus" *(sovietskiy chelovek),* which has meanwhile been discarded even by Soviet writers, as it does the really controversial passages in the book which predict an inevitable showdown between the Russians and the steadily growing Muslim population inside the great Soviet superpower.

The Russians and Reagan. By Strobe Talbott. New York: Vintage, 1984. 140 pp. $4.95 (paper). This Council on Foreign Relations book, with a foreword by Cyrus R. Vance, is a largely chronological analysis of U.S.-Soviet relations since Reagan took office. Lacking a coherent conceptual framework, it is a brief account that nevertheless develops a consistent theme, namely that the tone and substance of Reagan's policy toward the USSR has unnecessarily provoked and disillusioned Soviet leaders. While acknowledging Moscow's considerable responsibility for the deterioration of bilateral relations, the author's focus — Soviet reaction to Reagan's views and policies — tends to leave the impression that the administration's miscalculations and errors have been chiefly at fault for the downturn.

Russia and the Russians: Inside the Closed Society. By Kevin Klose. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984. 350 pp. $17.50. The *Washington Post's* Moscow bureau chief from 1977 to 1981 explores the Russia he came intimately to know. A fitting addition to the list of similarly evocative books by Feifer, Kaiser, Smith, Pond, and Shipler. It is difficult on reading these volumes not to regret that their portraits, searing but not unsympathetic, of Soviet reality cannot be published on the front pages of their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

newspapers. This volume includes a lengthy account of Alexei Nikitin, the Donetsk miner whose questioning of safety conditions in the mines ultimately led to his debilitating treatment with depressant drugs at KGB psycho-prisons. As Klose concludes, "there are many ways to crush the human spirit and, after sixty-six years in power, the Soviet regime knows all of them."

Sovremennaia vneshniaia politika SShA (Contemporary Foreign Policy of the USA). Two volumes. Edited by G. A. Arbatov et al. Moscow: "Nauka" Publishing House, 1984. Volume 1: 458 pp., 2 rubles, 40 kopecks. Volume 2: 477 pp., 2 rubles, 60 kopecks. Advertised as "the first comprehensive study of contemporary American foreign policy in Soviet historical science," these two volumes (approved for publication by censors T-15190 and T-22068, respectively) are divided into four parts: the U.S. foreign-policymaking process, U.S. global strategy, instruments of U.S. foreign policy, and regional problems. Contributors from the USA and Canada Institute include Zhurkin, Trofimenko, Davydov, Zamoshkin, Zanegin, and Kremenyuk. As authoritative and careful a work as one can expect of Soviet scholarship not "written for the drawer" or for the Central Committee. In a review in *Pravda* (July 5, 1984), Aleksandr Yakovlev, director of the rival Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), lauded the volumes' demonstration of the "concrete examples of the positive achievements of détente." In this context, Yakovlev, former Soviet ambassador to Canada after dismissal as one of the Central Committee's top ideologists, states that "it would be incorrect to view détente as a completely eclipsed stage in so far as the real possibilities for decisively normalizing the international situation have not been forfeited." This, too, appears to be the message of these volumes.

The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980. By Bruce D. Porter. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 248 pp. $29.95. The role of Soviet military power in promoting the USSR's foreign policy aims is the subject of this thoughtful, well-researched study. Five case studies are analyzed in detail — the Yemeni civil war of 1967, the Nigerian civil war, the October war, the Angolan civil war of 1975, and the Ethiopian-Somalian war of 1977. Each chapter analyzes the local dispute; the diplomatic relationship between the USSR and the Third World actor; the quantity and quality of military assistance; the role of Soviet and East European advisers; the Soviet-American interaction; the China factor; and the outcome. Each is rich in data and insights. What emerges is a valuable confirmation of the Kremlin's shrewedness, opportunism, sensitivity to the political as well as military

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dimensions of a conflict, and readiness to commit ever-increasing resources to a wide range of objectives.

Energy, Economics, and Foreign Policy in the Soviet Union. By Edward A. Hewett. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984. 228 pp. $28.95 ($10.95, paper). At a time when the main basis of Soviet energy production has been moving steadily eastward, it is important that Western analysts should pay attention to the far-reaching consequences of energy economics on both the domestic and foreign policies of the USSR. The author argues that, despite the 1977 CIA forecast that the Soviet Union would become a net importer of fuel after 1980, not only has the volume of her oil exports been maintained, but she will most likely remain a net energy exporter throughout the 1980s. Notwithstanding the stagnating Soviet oil output and the mounting cost of production in the new Siberian fields, the Soviets still seem to have a certain room for maneuver in maintaining their energy export levels by substituting oil for natural gas. The Soviet leaders, however, are facing some hard choices. They know that in order to earn additional hard currency through increased energy exports to Western Europe, which they need in order to purchase grain and Western technology, they will have to reduce oil shipments to their Warsaw Pact allies. Since every barrel of Soviet oil withdrawn from subsidized shipments to Eastern Europe must be purchased at the higher world price in dollars, economic stagnation might result. This could easily generate political unrest as has happened so often in the past. Hewett has provided some forty useful tables and figures and an adequate index.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia. By A. Reza S. Islami and Rostam Mehraban Kavoussi. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984. Near Eastern Studies, No. 1. 124 pp. $9.95. The authors, both assistant professors at the University of Washington, make clear their disapproval of the Saudi Arabian state from the outset, "The Saudi system is not ready to face the coming crisis" (p. xiv). Their brief examination of the historical, economic, and social background to modern Saudi Arabia is as superficial as it is negative, and does not convincingly support their contentions. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

better monograph on this subject remains the 1982 *Washington Paper* by John A. Shaw and David E. Long, *Saudi Arabian Modernization: The Impact of Change on Stability.*

Islam in Foreign Policy. Edited by Adeed Dawisha. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Published in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 191 pp. $24.95. The result of a Chatham House conference, this book is a companion volume to the earlier *Islam in the Political Process* (edited by James P. Piscatori). As Dawisha notes in his introduction, it is devilishly difficult to determine precisely whether the role of Islam in the foreign-policy decision-making process is that of "motivator, legitimator or simply a justifier for a particular foreign policy." Consequently, the various authors display a wide variety of approaches and conclusions. Each chapter examines a single country; these include Iran (R.K. Ramazani), Saudi Arabia (James P. Piscatori), Libya (B. Scarcia Amoretti), Pakistan (Shirin Tahir-Kheli), Egypt (Ali E. Hillal Dessouki), Morocco (I. William Zartman), Iraq (Adeed Dawisha), Nigeria (Sam C. Nolutshungu), Indonesia (Michael Leifer), and the Soviet Union (Karen Kawisha and Hélène Carrere d'Encausse).

A Middle East Studies Handbook. By Jere L. Bacharach. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984.172 pp. $20.00 ($9.95, paper). A major revision and updating of the volume originally published in 1974 as *A Near East Studies Handbook: 570-1974.* In this handbook, Bacharach collected in one volume research materials that had been previously scattered in a number of separate works. Encyclopedic in coverage, containing terms, maps, names, and dates, this fully indexed handbook furnishes information on a vast geographical area: Iran, Egypt, Turkey, the Fertile Crescent (modern Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel), and the Arabian Peninsula. In sum, this volume is informative, impressive, and of value to those concerned with the medieval as well as the modern Islamic Middle East.

OAPEC: An International Organization for Economic Cooperation and an Instrument for Regional Integration. By Abdelkader Maachou. Translated by Antony Melville. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 198 pp. No price given. **The Oil Companies and the Arab World.** By Giacomo Luciani. London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 197 pp. $25.00. Abdelkader Maachou, the Algerian chief adviser to OAPEC, has produced a rather dry and static account of OAPEC's background, structure, and goals. His emphasis is on official policy, statements, and organization, and he shies away from any rigorous or critical eval-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

uation of OAPEC's impact on development and integration in the Arab world. In addition, the unwieldy translation continually reminds the reader that original publication was in French. The most useful parts of this book are the fifty pages of appendixes on OAPEC documents and statistics. On the other hand, Giacomo Luciani, director of studies at the Istituto Affair Internazionali, provides a more thoughtful look at the structural transformation of the international oil industry. As he points out, most analysis of this subject since the early 1970s has concentrated on the role of the oil-producing countries. Luciani, however, looks at the impact on the major international oil companies. He argues that the way to return stability to the industry is through "vertical reintegration" or a new partnership between the producing countries and the international companies.

Britain's Withdrawal from the Middle East, 1947-1971: The Economic and Strategic Imperatives. By Jacob Abadi. Princeton, N.J.: The Kingston Press, 1982. 283 pp. $26.00. A perfunctory survey of the reasons behind Britain's gradual relinquishment of its imperial position in the Middle East. The author argues that economic reasons — and, to some extent, changes in strategic thought — were far more important in this process of retrenchment than emerging Arab and Jewish nationalism. The book serves more as a compendium of the words and ideas of policy makers and other scholars. It provides little independent analysis, and suffers from a particularly sloppy production process.

Local Politics and Development in the Middle East. Edited by Louis J. Cantori and Iliya Harik. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. 258 pp. $25.75. A collection of ten papers on local politics in the Middle East, originally presented at a conference co-sponsored by the University of Indiana and the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. The majority of these case studies concentrate on local politics in rural settings and three deal with Egypt. The others draw on research in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, Tunisia, and Turkey.

Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East. By P. J. Vatikiotis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 267 pp. $32.50. A collection of twelve essays (one is a book review) published over the past twenty-five years. Topics range from the general — the recent relationship between Egypt and Israel — to the detailed and dry — the modern history of Egypt as seen through the works of a prominent French author. Vatikiotis reminds us here that he is a competent scholar who is capable of solid analysis based on extensive research, but this collection verges on the tedious. Still, some of the essays are noteworthy. Vatikiotis's chapter on Islam is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

both a good description and analysis of the fundamentalist movement and, athough it was written in 1957, it is not outdated. In addition, the essay on the rise of a "clerisocracy" in Iran is as interesting as the term is synoptic. Suffering from unevenness and lack of a unifying theme, this book seems to belie an interest in publishing more than an interest in research. One hopes this is not a harbinger of the future, for Professor Vatikiotis has helped many a novice understand something of Arab politics.

The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. By Istvan S. Pogany. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 225 pp. $27.50. A comprehensive study of the role of the U.N. Security Council in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author, a lawyer, examines the role of the Security Council in the context of international law and against the backdrop of the original goals of the organization. The long and detailed legalistic approach bears witness to the view that few serious international agreements can be made in the context of the United Nations. In the five major conflicts analyzed (1948, 1951, 1967, 1973, and operation "Peace for Galilee"), Pogany shows that the Security Council was ineffective as member states acted in their own interests and used international law not as a guideline for conducting affairs, but as a method to rationalize their actions. Pogany's major contribution is a detailed account of the inner workings of the Security Council. Pogany examines the member states' gradual abandonment of idealism, as the U.N.'s membership exploded and political divisions became more apparent. The analysis of the international legal questions surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict is relevant only as philosophical discourse.

Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy, and Development. By Frank Tachau. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. 228 pages. $27.95. Neither an encyclopedic nor comprehensive study, but a reasonably competent sketch of Turkish political culture over the six decades since the establishment of the republic. Tachau stresses throughout the intrinsic conflict between traditional Turkish values (notably a strong respect for authority) and the relatively newer ideals of democracy and economic development. According to Tachau, it is the fractious interplay of these three "dynamics" in Turkey's modernization that lies at the heart of Turkish political tension. Beginning with an overview of Turkish political culture from a historical perspective, Tachau follows with a description of Turkish political institutions and major political actors. He then briefly traces Turkish economic development, describes the interaction between urban and rural cultures, and finally offers a rather sketchy overview of Turkey's participation in the international system. (The interested reader

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

can substitute instead Bruce R. Kuniholm's essay on this subject in the Summer 1983 ORBIS). Despite its limited ambitions, this volume provides both a useful introduction to those wholly unacquainted with Turkey, and a solid, though not particularly imaginative, interpretation of Turkish politics for the more expert.

LATIN AMERICA

Juan Peron and the Reshaping of Argentina. Edited by Frederick C. Turner and José Enrique Miguens. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983. 268 pp. $24.95. The legend of Juan Peron continues to haunt the Argentine political and cultural mind. Although recent events in that country may seem promising, one cannot underestimate the impact of Peronism on the Argentine political culture, the indelible mark left by decades of exaltation, nostalgic obsession and, more often than not, disappointment. The authors grouped here, including four native Argentines, attempt a dispassionate, objective analysis of Peron's charismatic personality. While often expressing critical opinions on concrete political actions and orientations of Peron and his partisans, the authors do not minimize the significance and the far-reaching implications of Peronism. Peron and Peronism are considered representative of twentieth-century Argentina, of its unfulfilled dreams and ambitious self-projection. Avoiding emotional accusations, the authors try to decipher the reality that inspired, fostered, and eventually ruined the myth of Juan Peron. A shrewd populist demagogue or a fanatical nationalist, Peron was undoubtedly the founder of a movement and an ideology that continues to galvanize political energies and to generate acerbic polemics. The resurrection of Peronism is, therefore, more than an abstract possibility; and analyses of its mythological-ideological underpinnings are always helpful for the understanding of the new cycles of enthusiasm, violence, quixotic illusions and tragic disillusions.

The Venzuela-Guyana Border Dispute. Britain's Colonial Legacy in Latin America. By Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner. Boulder, Colo. and London: Westview Press, 1984. A Westview Replica Edition. 349 pp. $27.50. This study of the territorial dispute between Venezuela and Guyana provides a helpful analysis of the claims and issues involved in a potentially dangerous regional conflict. The author thoroughly explores

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the historical and legal dimensions of a dispute whose stake is the Essequibo Territory, actually two-thirds of Guyana. Particularly interesting are the connections of both implicated actors with other Third World states, and the author's appraisal of the possibilities for a solution by force. Venezuelan president, Jaime Lusinchi, is considered a hard-liner with regard to this topic and, according to the author, he seems determined to settle his country's claim once and for all. A peaceful solution, desirable as it is, depends on the ability of the United Nations secretary general, "who is likely to choose mediation first, and, failing all, arbitration."

Revolutionary Cuba: The Challenge of Economic Growth with Equity. By Claes Brundenius. Boulder, Colo. and London: Westview Press; London, Kingston, and Port of Spain: Heinemann, 1984. 224 pp. $22.00. Cuba is a matter of utmost interest not only for those studying the revolutionary phenomenon in this century, but also for people eager to know more about post-revolutionary economic policy. This book tries to offer a comparative approach — vis-à-vis other Latin American nations — to what the author estimates as the meaningful model of Cuban economic development. Brundenius, sympathetic to the object of his study, is persuaded that due to its socialist option, Cuba was able to reach a significant degree of economic growth. The basic assumption here is that Cuba under Fidel Castro initiated an alternative development model, and this despite the notorious oscillations and erratic strategies of the regime. The ostentatious scholarly analysis, the abuse of data cannot obscure the ineptitude of Cuban planners, their lack of interest in the real dynamics of the country's economy. No theoretical acrobatics can disassociate the "heavy dependence of Cuba on the Soviet Union for economic and financial support of development projects" from the nation's subordination to the dogmas of central planning and the expansionist aims of the USSR. One is astounded by the absence of a thorough interpretation in this study of such a complex political and social process as the militarization of the Cuban economy. The single-crop socialist experiment in Cuba, the bankruptcy of various programs of industrialization, the dismal stagnation are serious warnings for anyone aiming to assess the perspectives of Castro's regime. The author seems to indulge in statistical enthusiasm rather than ponder the social (human, political, cultural, economic) costs of Castro's espousal of obsolete Marxist dogma.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

A quarterly journal addressing the complex issues of population and socioeconomic change

Volume 10 Number 4
December 1984

Alejandro Portes/Lauren Benton *Industrial development and labor absorption: A reinterpretation*

Basil Ashton et al. *Famine in China, 1958-61*

Melba Gomes *Family size and educational attainment in Kenya*

Moni Nag/Neeraj Kak *Demographic transition in a Punjab village*

Notes and Commentary *Oded Stark on bargaining, altruism, and demographic phenomena/Daniel R. Vining, Jr. on family salaries and the East German birth rate*

Data and Perspectives *R. T. Ravenholt on addiction mortality in the United States, 1980*

Archives *Cantillon on tastes and population growth*

Book Reviews *by B. Gilland, P. Taubman, H. Daly and others*

Documents *International Conference on Population*

Subscription Rates: $3.50/issue, $14.00/year. Order from Population and Development Review, The Population Council One Dag Hammarskjold Plaza New York, N.Y. 10017

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

國際關係研究

THE KOREAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

The Korean Institute of International Studies is a non-profit independent academic body, founded in 1965, aimed at promoting multinational and interdisciplinary research in the fields of peace and development. KIIS endeavors, through publications, meetings, seminars, conferences, joint research projects and exchange programs with institutes abroad, to encourage discussion and cooperation among researchers both within and outside of the country, and to effectively contribute to the study of peace and development.

The Korean Journal of International Studies

Publisher & Editor: Chong-Ki Choi

An English-language quarterly founded in 1970, the *Journal* includes articles by both Korean and overseas specialists, review articles and source materials.

- **Submission of Manuscripts**: The *Journal* welcomes the submission of manuscripts on all aspects of contemporary international affairs. Manuscripts typed in double space should be submitted to the Editorial Board.
- **Exchange Program**: The *Journal* welcomes regular exchange with academic periodicals on international relations and related fields.
- **Subscription**: Institutes and libraries U.S. $35 a year; individuals U.S. $32 a year. Foreign currency at the official rate will be accepted.
- **Back Issues**: Back issues are available at U.S. $9.00 a copy.

Contributors to the *Journal* include

C.F. Alger, W.J. Barnds, A.D. Barnett, Z. Brzezinski, J.W. Burton, J. Galtung, M. Haas, D. Hellmann, K.J. Holsti, G.K. Kindermann, L.W. Pye, E.O. Reischauer, R.A. Scalapino, D. Senghaas, J.D. Singer, G.C. Smith, N. White, A.S. Whiting, J.A. Yager, D.S. Zagoria.

The Korean Institute of International Studies
K.P.O. Box 426, Seoul, Korea

Cable Address: 1234 Seoul, Korea; Tel. 752-7727, 7728, 28-7726

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Conflict Quarterly

The international journal of
Low-Intensity Conflict
Revolution, terrorism, political warfare,
propaganda, intelligence and the
government, media and public responses

Four issues $15.

Centre for Conflict Studies
University of New Brunswick
Fredericton, N.B., Canada E3B 5A3
Telephone: (506) 453-4587

Shouldn't You Be Reading Us?

THE WORLD TODAY

STUDENTS OF CURRENT AFFAIRS, to be well informed, need the facts. In THE WORLD TODAY, the monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, experts bring to the general reader up-to-date and reliable information on world affairs.

Authoritative and objective, THE WORLD TODAY deals primarily with international problems but also includes articles on internal political and economic conditions in individual countries or regions, written by authors with first-hand knowledge. Short comment in 'Notes of the Month' puts current developments into perspective and provides a background to events of international significance.

Annual subscription (12 issues a year including postage inland and overseas)

Vol. 40	1984
USA	$40
UK	£15
Elsewhere	£20

Published under the auspices of the
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
LONDON
by the Oxford University Press
Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE Atlantic Community QUARTERLY

Editors: **Francis O. Wilcox and John D. Hickerson**

A Publication of the Atlantic Council of the United States

As the publication of the Atlantic Council, the journal aims to promote closer mutually advantageous ties between Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Its objective is greater security and more effective harmonization of economic and monetary policies. Its articles include policy recommendations on important foreign policy questions, drawing upon the knowledge and experience of individuals with extensive backgrounds in government, academia, and international relations. It explores problems governments must deal with, and makes recommendations about them.

Recent Issues Featured

Look Again: It's the West That's Strong, Moscow That's Weak	*Lord Carrington*
The Western Alliance: Strength Through Crisis	*Oliver Wright*
Can Europe Be Defended?	*Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr.*
The Alliance and Nuclear Weapons	*Roy Dean*
Review of U.S. Relations With The Soviet Union	*Lawrence S. Eagleburger*
Soviet Perspectives On the Reagan Administration	*Dimitri K. Simes*
Westpolitik: Germany and the Atlantic Alliance	*Gregory F. T. Winn*
Economics of the Atlantic Alliance	*Ralph P. Davidson*
The World Economy Today: Signs of Recovery	*Martin Feldstein*
The Teaching of Values and The Successor Generation	*Atlantic Council Policy Paper*
Strengthening Interparliamentary Consultation	*Atlantic Council Policy Paper*

Published four times a year. Founded 1962.

Subscription rates: Individuals $15/yr., $25/2 yr., $34/3 yr.: Institutions $25/yr., $45/2 yr., $62/3 yr.; Domestic first class $6/yr.; Outside U.S.A. add $2/yr. surface mail, $14/yr. airmail. Single copies (min. order $10) $4/individuals, $5/institutions (current issues); $7.50 (back issues). ISSN: 0004-6760

Please address inquiries and orders to:

Transaction Periodicals Consortium
Department 2000
Rutgers—The State University
New Brunswick, NJ 08903

Exclusive distributors for Europe and the British Isles:
Karger Libri AG, Petersgraben 31, P.O. CH-4009, Basel, Switzerland

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Institute for Palestine Studies

New Publications

The Reagan Administration and the Palestinian Question: *The First Thousand Days*
Juliana S. Peck

An analysis of the Reagan Administration's public record on the Palestinian Question and related developments in Lebanon and the occupied territories.

1984 138 pp. $7.00 paper

Palestine and the Gulf
edited by Rashid Khalidi and Camille Mansour

Proceedings of an international seminar held at the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut. Among the contributors are Frank Barnaby, Robert Pranger and Michel Tatu.

1982 344 pp. $12.00 paper

Arabs Under Israeli Occupation, 1981
published in 1984

An analysis of Israeli settlement activities and human rights issues in the occupied territories, based upon Arab, Israeli and international sources. The tenth volume in an annual series.

1984 115 pp. $7.00 paper

The Karp Report: *An Israeli Government Investigation into Settler Violence in the Occupied Territories.*

1984 90 pp. $3.95 paper

Forthcoming

Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians, 1876-1948.
With an Introduction and Commentary
by Walid Khalidi

Order from:

INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES
Dept. C, P.O. Box 19449, Washington, DC 20036
Phone (202) 745-0868

Please add $1.00 for postage and handling, plus 50¢ for each additional book.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES



The major objective of this journal is to provide a forum for scholars engaged in study of the modern Islamic societies in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. It hopes to create a dialogue among specialists and leaders in public affairs in a wide range of areas and disciplines, including military strategy and foreign policy. The physical sciences, the social sciences, business administration, public administration and the arts and humanities will also be included. Special issues might concentrate on such topics as regional cooperation, religious and intellectual developments, public works, engineering advances, and the impact of transnational cooperation on national communities. Articles are invited from all parts of the world.

The journal is published under the auspices of the Pakistan American Foundation. 138 Tolentine Hall, Villanova University, Villanova, Pa. 19085. All correspondence should be addressed to the Editor. (215) 645-4738/4791. Annual subscription: $15.00. Foreign subscription: $18.00.

Editorial Board

Editor, Hafeez Malik, Villanova University

Associate Editors

Richard N. Frye, Harvard University
Hermann F. Eilts, Boston University
Rouhollah K. Ramazani, University of Virginia
Fred J. Khouri, Villanova University

Assistant Editors

Kail Ellis, Villanova University
John J. Schrems, Villanova University
Nadia H. Barsoum, Villanova University

Administrative Assistant

Susan Hausman, Villanova University

Advisory Editorial Board

Lee L. Bean, Ralph Braibanti, Joseph Elder,
Ismail al-Faruqi, Wadie Jwaideh,
Michelle McAlpin, Ylana N. Miller,
Robert G. Neumann, Naseem Sahibzada,
Annemarie Schimmel, Stanley Wolpert.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Liveliest Debate In America Is Between Conservatives.

Read it in Policy Review.

The freshest thinking in America is coming from conservatives, many of whom disagree with each other. No magazine better captures this debate's richness and diversity than Policy Review, published quarterly by The Heritage Foundation.

Every issue of Policy Review asks eminent conservatives—from Irving Kristol to Jerry Falwell, from Newt Gingrich to Milton Friedman—to wrestle with the most controversial questions of our day: abortion, racism, sex, dealing with the Soviets, whether government should regulate morality. Their answers defy all stereotypes. And they make fascinating reading—and not only for conservatives. That's why more and more subscribers depend on Policy Review for understanding the most important political and intellectual movement in America. Shouldn't *you* subscribe?

policy REVIEW

Published by The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 546-4400

ORM

YES. Please start my subscription to *Policy Review*: ☐ $15.00 for 1 year (4 issues)
☐ $28.00 for 2 years
(foreign subscribers please add $5.00)

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

☐ Check enclosed. (Please make payable to *Policy Review*.)
☐ Please bill me. Charge my: ☐ VISA ☐ MASTERCARD ☐ AMEX

CARD NO. _____ EXP. DATE _____

SIGNATURE _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Journal of PALESTINE STUDIES

Fall Issue 1984 **Vol. XIV, No. 1**

A Quarterly on Palestinian Affairs and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Published Jointly by the Institute for Palestine Studies and Kuwait University

Contents Include:

Interview:

☐ **Peace at an Impasse..... ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI**

☐ "News Speak" about the Lebanon War .....PAUL JALBERT

Interviews:

☐ **The Making of a Political Movement.....MUHAMMED MIARI**

☐ **Israel Divided: A Post-Election Assessment.....SIMHA FLAPAN**

☐ Sabra and Shatila 1982: Resisting the Massacre .....ZAKARIA AL-SHAIKH

☐ Benvenisti's Palestine Project .....ELIA ZUREIK

☐ U.S. Zionist Organizations: Their Tax-Exempt Status Challenged .....REX WINGERTER

☐ An American Testimony from an Israeli Prison: The Case of Mike Monsour .....JOHN P. EGAN

Institute for Palestine Studies
P.O. Box 19449
Washington D.C. 20036
Phone: (202) 745-0878

Subscriptions:
Individual: $18/yr.
Student: $16/yr.
Institution: $28/yr.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

ORBIS welcomes articles that examine problems in international relations. All correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, ORBIS, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

Manuscripts

- ☐ Authors should submit an original and two clear copies, accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope if return of the manuscript is desired.
- ☐ The entire manuscript (*including footnotes and tables*) should be typed double-spaced. Footnotes should be placed at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page. Tables should be typed on separate sheets, and all internal rules should be omitted. Articles that do not follow this format will be returned for retyping.
- ☐ Care should be taken that footnotes contain complete bibliographic information. For the proper footnote form — and all matters of style — please consult the latest edition of *A Manual of Style* (University of Chicago Press).
- ☐ The title page should include only the article title, author's name, and a fifty-word biographical statement (positions held, area of specialization, publications, and research-in-progress).

Figures

- ☐ Illustrations should be submitted as glossy photographs. The ideal sizes are 4-⅜"×7" (full-page) or 4-⅜"×3-⅜" (half-page), but in no case should photos be larger than 8"×10". Prints should not be stapled or clipped, and author's name, figure number, and top of figure should be marked *lightly* on the back.
- ☐ Legends should be typed double-spaced on a separate sheet.
- ☐ If an illustration has been published previously, the author must get permission to reproduce it.
- ☐ ORBIS will prepare maps and graphs for authors if they cannot provide camera-ready artwork, but some production costs will be passed on to the author.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. Postal Service

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION

Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685)

1A. TITLE OF PUBLICATION	1B. PUBLICATION NO.	2. DATE OF FILING
ORBIS	0 0 4 1 0 4 0 0	September 1984
3. FREQUENCY OF ISSUE	3A. NO. OF ISSUES PUBLISHED ANNUALLY	3B. ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION PRICE
Quarterly	4	$18.00-$45.00

4. COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS OF KNOWN OFFICE OF PUBLICATION *(Street, City, County, State and ZIP Code) (Not printers)*

3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104

5. COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL BUSINESS OFFICES OF THE PUBLISHER *(Not printer)*

3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104

6. FULL NAMES AND COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS OF PUBLISHER, EDITOR, AND MANAGING EDITOR *(This item MUST NOT be blank)*

PUBLISHER *(Name and Complete Mailing Address)*

Foreign Policy Research Institute
3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104

EDITOR *(Name and Complete Mailing Address)*

Nils H. Wessell, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104

MANAGING EDITOR *(Name and Complete Mailing Address)*

Gordon H. McCormick, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104

7. OWNER *(If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual must be given. If the publication is published by a nonprofit organization, its name and address must be stated.) (Item must be completed.)*

FULL NAME	COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS
ORBIS is owned and copyrighted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute,	3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104

8. KNOWN BONDHOLDERS, MORTGAGEES, AND OTHER SECURITY HOLDERS OWNING OR HOLDING 1 PERCENT OR MORE OF TOTAL AMOUNT OF BONDS, MORTGAGES OR OTHER SECURITIES *(If there are none, so state)*

FULL NAME	COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS
NONE	

9. FOR COMPLETION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AUTHORIZED TO MAIL AT SPECIAL RATES *(Section 423.12 DMM only)*
The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes *(Check one)*

(1) [X] HAS NOT CHANGED DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS

(2) [ ] HAS CHANGED DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS

(If changed, publisher must submit explanation of change with this statement.)

10. EXTENT AND NATURE OF CIRCULATION	AVERAGE NO. COPIES EACH ISSUE DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS	ACTUAL NO. COPIES OF SINGLE ISSUE PUBLISHED NEAREST TO FILING DATE
A. TOTAL NO. COPIES *(Net Press Run)*	4000	4000
B. PAID CIRCULATION 1. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors and counter sales	17	20
2. Mail Subscription	3333	3239
C. TOTAL PAID CIRCULATION *(Sum of 10B1 and 10B2)*	3350	3259
D. FREE DISTRIBUTION BY MAIL, CARRIER OR OTHER MEANS SAMPLES, COMPLIMENTARY, AND OTHER FREE COPIES	170	170
E. TOTAL DISTRIBUTION *(Sum of C and D)*	3520	3429
F. COPIES NOT DISTRIBUTED 1. Office use, left over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing	480	571
2. Return from News Agents	--	--
G. TOTAL *(Sum of E, F1 and 2-should equal net press run shown in A)*	4000	4000

11. **I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete**

SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF EDITOR, PUBLISHER, BUSINESS MANAGER, OR OWNER

Karen Moses, Circulation Manager

PS Form 3526 July 1982

(See instruction on reverse)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indexes. ORBIS is indexed by *PAIS BULLETIN, Social Sciences Index, Current Contents, Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences, ABC Pol Sci,* and *Combined Retrospective Index to Book Reviews in Scholarly Journals.* Abstracts of ORBIS articles appear regularly in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life,* both of which are publications of the American Bibliographical Center, as well as in *International Political Science Abstracts,* published in Paris by the International Political Science Association. ORBIS is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents,* University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, and in *Political Science Abstracts,* Plenum Publishing Corporation.

Microfilm and Microfiche. ORBIS is available to subscribers on space-saving microfilm and microfiche. As begun with Volume 7 (the Spring 1963–Winter 1964 issues) for microfilm, and Volume 1 (1957–1958) for microfiche, each volume of ORBIS is recorded separately and is obtainable at the end of the volume year. A complete backfile of microfilm, Volumes 1-6, is on one reel, priced at $24.00. Please address inquiries direct to distributors. *For microfilm:* University Microfilms International, P.O. Box 1346, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. *For microfiche:* KTO Microform, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546.

Reprints and Back Issues. Back issues of ORBIS, Vols. 1-20, are available from Kraus Reprint Company, Route 100, Millwood, N.Y. 10546. Beginning with Vol. 21, back issues are available from the ORBIS Circulation Manager at $8.75 per copy. (Outside U.S.A., add $1.00 per copy.) Reprints of articles published in ORBIS, as long as they are available, are $3.00 each. (Bulk-order prices provided on request).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED